Conceptualizing Land War in the Digital Age | Atlantic Council + SWJ

The algorithm
For much of the twentieth century, armies organised themselves around a list of things soldiers do: in civilian-speak, moving, shooting, spying, protecting, and supplying. Yavuz Türkgenci, a retired Turkish general, thinks that list is now one function short. His July 2nd Atlantic Council report “Fighting a land war in the digital age: How armies must reinvent themselves—or be destroyed by those that do” adds a seventh category: control of the electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace, and layers artificial intelligence and data across the other six. The argument is that speed of decision now matters more than mass of force.
The tanks
On the question of old-fashioned maneuver warfare, Türkgenci is a reformer rather than an abolitionist. Tanks remain useful, he argues, for the one job drones still cannot do. That is, physically sitting on a piece of ground and daring anyone to take it back. His prescription is dispersion, stealth, and folding drones into the maneuver plan as opposed to sticking them on as an afterthought.
Dr. Amos Fox doesn’t buy it. In his essay “Maneuvering to Obsolescence: The Death Ride of the Armor Branch” Fox writes that tank enthusiasts are clinging to the ghosts of 1991 and 2003. He wants armor demoted to a supporting role where it can exploit gaps, not lead charges. He would even see the word “cavalry” retired.. Where Türkgenci sees a function to be modernised, Fox sees an identity crisis.
The people
While we’re at it, let’s bring in Susan Siegrist Thomas, who brings in another ingredient: organization. Her account of Ukraine’s drone innovation in “Beyond Technology: Ukraine’s Innovation Advantage” highlights decentralized decision-making and a procurement system that behaves like a system of startups (as well as other key aspects of the Ukrainian effort) that remind us of the human foundation of everything techy therein. Any kind of technology is only an enabler. Somebody still has to be allowed to use it quickly, she argues.
Put the three together and a pattern emerges. The old way is done. We can agree on that. But exactly what the new way is– and how to conceptualize it– remains the theorist’s/strategist’s/technologist’s/general’s/student’s challenge.
That’s why we write for Small Wars Journal.