Ten More For Taiwan: Policy Recommendations to Deter Chinese Communist Party Aggression

“Chairman John Moolenaar of the Select Committee on China wrote an op-ed in the Washington Times last week about Taiwan as a vital national interest. The op-ed was part of the paper’s special section on Taiwan called, “Why Taiwan Matters, Now More than Ever.” The section also highlighted the committee’s bipartisan policy recommendations in its Ten More for Taiwan report released last December.”

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In its original bipartisan report on Taiwan policy, Ten for Taiwan, the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party noted that “central to [the Select Committee’s] mandate is deterring CCP military aggression against Taiwan.”

Since Ten for Taiwan was published, developments instigated by the CCP have increased the risk of conflict over Taiwan. CCP actions over the last two years highlight the importance of deepening U.S.- Taiwan economic, defense, and other cooperation to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The United States’ goal is to deter war, which will require urgently employing all elements of national power.

The Select Committee has identified ten additional key bipartisan findings and recommendations to strengthen deterrence against CCP aggression towards Taiwan. Like the Select Committee’s Ten for Taiwan findings, this list is non-exhaustive. Instead, it provides a near-term roadmap for how the United States can comprehensively strengthen ties with Taiwan, deepen economic engagement, and expand the U.S.-Taiwan defense partnership:

1. Clear political signaling from the United States is essential for communicating American resolve to deter CCP aggression.
2. Deepening U.S. economic ties with Taiwan strengthens deterrence, bolsters Taiwan’s resilience, diversifies critical supply chains, and benefits the U.S. economy.
3. The United States must expand all efforts and pathways to ensure Taiwan has the capabilities it needs to defend itself in a conflict and against daily gray-zone threats.
4. The United States must rebuild the American defense industrial base to deliver the capabilities needed by the United States and our partners to deter and defeat aggression.
5. The Pentagon must fill critical capabilities gaps for Indo-Pacific deterrence while enhancing its logistics enterprise to sustain a protracted conflict in a contested environment.
6. The U.S. must strengthen joint military and economic planning with allies and partners, while accelerating U.S. military access and posture initiatives in the Indo-Pacific.
7. It is essential to enhance Taiwan’s domestic resilience across a variety of scenarios, including a protracted conflict, a blockade, and cyber-enabled coercion.
8. The United States must support Taiwan in advancing its whole-of-society defense readiness from active and reserve forces to civilian preparedness.
9. Defending Taiwan’s international space and economic ties worldwide enhances Taiwan’s strategic resilience.
10. Leaders in the Indo-Pacific believe the PRC is closely monitoring the outcome of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, of which Beijing is the chief enabler through its “no-limits” partnership with Moscow, and factoring lessons from its outcome into its cost calculation relative to a Taiwan invasion.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) utilizes a refined way of occupation that integrates coercion, legal warfare, and structural surveillance, a model previously applied in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong to fragment resistance and transform regional identities. The PRC treats time as a strategic asset by initiating pacification long before a formal invasion occurs. To counter this, the House Select Committee emphasizes that the United States must sharpen its political messaging to signal clear resolve, while simultaneously deepening economic ties and expanding defense partnerships to bolster Taiwan’s resilience across a variety of scenarios, including blockades and cyber-enabled coercion. By leveraging Taiwan’s advanced economy and democratic legitimacy, and by investing in whole-of-society defense readiness now, the U.S. and its partners can complicate Beijing’s legalistic integration efforts and ensure that any potential PRC occupation triggers a protracted, costly contest over legitimacy that deters CCP aggression from the outset.