Understanding the Potential Value and Risks of Arming Indigenous Groups in Support of US National Objectives

Understanding the Potential Value and Risks of Arming Indigenous Groups in Support of US National Objectives | Mark Grdovic: Substack| May 14th, 2026

In the first article for his new Substack page, retired Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel and Small Wars Journal contributor Mark Grdovic evaluates the possibility of arming Iranian Kurdish groups as a new strategy for the United States’ current conflict with Iran. Here are excerpts from just some of the analysis from this brief but fascinating post.

The Right Tool in the Toolkit?

Grdovic lays out the criteria for arming indigenous groups:

1. Does the group have compatible ideology with that of the United States? (is their battlefield conduct acceptable?)

2. Do they have objectives that are compatible with those of the United States? (are they amenable to being part of a future national government or do they expect to be the government, or break away as a new state?)

3. Does the group have competent indigenous leadership?

The Diversity among Kurds

Grdovic explains why treating “the Kurds” as a monolith would be a mistake:

With regard to the Kurds, speaking of them like a single entity is like speaking of Northern Americans (Canadians, Americans and Mexicans). Syrian Kurds, Iraqi Kurds, Turkish Kurds and Iranian Kurds, while somewhat culturally similar, are very different groups, and in some cases with distinct languages.

Geographic Limitations

He then emphasizes how these ethnic subdivisions limit strategic benefit:

Their capabilities will be largely limited to their own ethnic enclaves. Following an influx of support and some operational success, there can be the misperception and temptation (by groups and their sponsors alike) to operate like “mobile infantry”, potentially beyond their traditional territory and areas of popular support. This is what happened in southern Afghanistan in 2001/2002 after the success with the Northern Alliance in the north of the country. A Southern Alliance was somewhat manufactured in a hope of mimicking the success of the Northern Alliance. The results were not good.

No Guarantees for the Future

Finally, Grdovic warns of the unpredictable outcomes of such a partnership:

Another challenge that this type of operation faces is what to do if somehow a favorable agreement is reached or a more favorable government materializes and the groups you have armed (for the short-term tactical disruption) do not wish to cooperate with that new regime? Said another way, when a government chooses to arm groups, such as insurrectionists or separatists, with the intent of coercing an adversary into compliance, if those conditions are met, but the goals of the insurgent group are still unrealized, it places the operation at odds with policy.

Past Mistakes and their Consequences

The author concludes with a historic cautionary tale about promising to work with—and then abandoning—the Kurds:

However, a short time later, when Iran signed an agreement with Iraq, the Unites States was essentially forced to cease all support and abandoned the Iraqi Kurds. When asked about the decision, Kissinger coldly noted that “covert action should not be confused with missionary work.” While different audiences will interrupt Kissinger’s remarks as either somewhat morally appalling or politically pragmatic, the more important acknowledgment is the unintended second and third order effects from that endeavor. The abandonment of the Iraqi Kurds (circa 1975) ultimately empowered Saddam Hussein’s rise to power and destabilized the region for roughly the next 40 years.

Interested in reading more of the author’s contribution to the discourse? Here are his previous articles for Small Wars Journal:

• Untangling the Gordian Knot that is Irregular Warfare
• Special Forces Identify Crisis; Déjà vu all Over Again

While you’re here… 

Check out how some Kurdish forces have innovated in their use of drone warfare: “Guerrillas With FPV Drones: Ukrainian Battlefield Lessons for Kurdish Warfare.”

For more coverage of the pitfalls of arming rebels, hastily and secretly, check out “Covert Action in Irregular Wars: Unraveling the Case of Timber Sycamore in Syria (2012-2017)“