The State of The AUKUS Debate
Introduction
The contemporary debate on AUKUS reflects a broader analytical flaw in defense discourse where selective historical analogy and technical determinism are used to justify preexisting policy decisions.
This essay will examine the arguments made by authors in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) and the Australian Naval Institute (ANI) to show how technological determinism flattens historical context. They do this to argue for a return to off-the-shelf submarine platforms without addressing the initial strategic context of AUKUS, or that Australia had its own challenges with the construction of the Collins Class Submarines. Specifically, this essay will address the core of the debate before the exploration of the strategic realities in the research essay.
The arguments examined lie in stark contrast to the Congressional Research Service, which shows the United States has a long history of building submarines and is best placed to deal with the industrial challenges which are facing the AUKUS manufacturing program. These lesson highlights are being used by both sides of the debate.
AUKUS and Defense Policy Context
AUKUS was created to deliver three pillars. Pillar 1 would deliver Australia with Nuclear Powered Submarines to replace the aging Collins Class Submarines with Virginia‑class nuclear powered Submarines, along with a deeper cooperation in critical technologies (Pillars 2 & 3). This includes Electronic Warfare, Cyber Capabilities, and Artificial Intelligence.
This essay argues that most debates that are critical of AUKUS rely on technological and historical determinism. The reason for this is that they selectively call out that the United States is at risk of not delivering the Virginia-class Submarines because of supply chain issues.
To clarify, a few definitions will be used as an analytical lens for the AUKUS debates:
- Historical determinism refers to when an analyst selects the best case based on its “Goal Relevance” in pursuit of political objectives.
- Technological determinism refers to the assumption that technological novelty alone determines strategic outcomes, often leading to the dismissal of existing historical contexts, doctrine, political objectives, and operational contexts.
AUKUS and Diesel-Class Submarines
Technological determinism in the case of AUKUS shows up in the core of the debate of whether it is the right platform for Australian Strategic Deterrence.
Deterrence in this case is the marked shift in the Australian National Defence Strategy (2024) which places an emphasis on capabilities which alters the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) structure from balanced to an “integrated, focused force.”
A balanced force in The ADFs structure had focused on responding to a range of contingencies in the region. Thus, defense procurement focused on acquiring individual military platforms such as ships, aircraft, and vehicles. These contingencies that the ADF was expected to respond to were threats in Australia’s territory, Exclusive Economic Zone, and the need to provide domestic counterterrorism, along with humanitarian missions and disaster-relief in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
The new integrated investment program in context of the ADF delivers capabilities across the Navy, Army, Air-Force, Cyber, and Space Domains ensuring that they have the ability to deny any potential adversary’s attempt to project power against Australia.
The shift between the two Defense strategies (2019 and 2024) shows that the capability acquisition in 2024 focused more on managing Australia’s strategic risks. These risks had been articulated as the buildup of conventional and non-conventional militaries in the region.
When the Virginia‑class Submarines were selected as a part of Pillar 1, it was expected that they would fulfil that role until such time a jointly designed and built Nuclear Submarine was built by Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom.
The announcement of Australia moving away from the French retrofitted Barracuda-Class meant that Australia would be moving away from its longstanding practice of using diesel-electric submarines, which resulted in critical analysis of the plan.
A series of articles published by a retired submarine specialist in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute focused much of their criticism of the AUKUS plan on the idea that Australia:
- Lacked the Workforce to crew the SSNs, and a
- long lead time for the SSNs to be delivered.
Peter Briggs, in the article “The Sad state of Royal Navy submarine Capability—and the Implications for Australia”, uses history in the context of the delays of the Swiftsure-class during the Cold War to illustrate these points further. He does this by citing that the submarine workforce during that period dropped from 13,000 to 3,000.
While workforce development is an important consideration for any submarine program, relying on it as a central critique overlooks the long-standing U.S. commitment to strengthening its defense industrial base—a commitment reaffirmed in the 2025 National Defense Strategy.
Briggs points to the Collins program as a model of sovereign industrial success. While he acknowledges both the asymmetric advantages of submarines and the value of nuclear propulsion, his argument ultimately centres on longer‑term AUKUS supply‑chain risks. He treats these risks as enduring structural constraints rather than as conditions shaped by policy choices, investment, and alliance integration, leading him to advocate a shift to the Suffren class.
A similar argument appears in the Australian Naval Institute, where it focuses on the key issue of concentrating Australia’s Submarine acquisition into a single, highly constrained supply chain. This makes it clear that it was not a critique of political commitment or alliances, but a structural risk in the event the production schedule slips behind what is expected.
While they argued that Australia could explore the acquisition of the nuclear-powered French Suffren-Class or the conventionally powered South Korean KSS-III Class (SSKs), they conclude that these platforms could alleviate the issues with the acquisition of the Virginia-class. That is, assuming that at their current production rates would be suitable for acquisition.
The selective use of historical examples, combined with recurring emphasis on technological supply‑chain constraints, reveals a preference for shifting to alternative platforms, despite the fact that similar constraints would apply to both the Suffren‑class and the KSS‑III.
When contrasted with the Centre for Strategic & International Studies publication on AUKUS, the selectiveness of the arguments from the authors in ASPI and ANI becomes clear. CSIS clarified AUKUS’ promise was to restore a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific to counter decades of Chinese anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability with the goal of deterrence.
CSIS did lend credence to the argument of supply-chain risks by acknowledging that it has been beset by several issues, including the shortfall of hull production; but the divergence is that they acknowledge that it is not a result of the supply-chain but decision-making decades ago to reduce U.S. shipyard production rates. Again, this continues to further complicate the idea that Australia’s path forward is to abandon AUKUS and choose to press forward with either the Suffren or the KSS-III SSK.
AUKUS and United States
The argument of Australia exiting AUKUS, as discussed in the prior section, has been based on the core argument that the United States’ own industrial capability to deliver the platform is lagging what is required to sustain its own fleet of Virginia-class submarines. Much of the conversations ignore the strategic realities of the acquisition with a preexisting policy focus of acquiring platforms that are not built or designed by the United States.
Meanwhile, The United States Congressional Research Service (CRS) incorporates a historical discussion of the acquisition and production of the Los-Angeles (SSN-688), Seawolf (SSN-21), and finally the Virginia‑class (SSN-774). Each section discusses their technical capabilities, force posture requirements, where they had been retired, and individual unit cost.
This was all to inform congress of the historical continuity in which the U.S. can meet the required number of hull constructions to deliver the AUKUS program. Additionally, the U.S. Nuclear Program withheld nuclear technology during the Cold War to Allies, such as: the UK, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan owing to the extreme sensitivity of the technology. This makes the point clear that AUKUS is a significant strategic investment for the National Security posture of the United States.
All of this serves directly as a counter to the arguments of acquisition risk and industrial risk to Australian defense capabilities. It highlights that AUKUS is a leading unique opportunity to bolster Australian strategic deterrence in the face of Chinese anti-access and area denial tactics in the Indo-Pacific.
Conclusion
The Australian Defense Strategy is focused on securing platforms that are integrated and focused, designed to deliver on the core policy goal of deterring an enemy’s ability to project power on Australian shores. This then necessitated a shift from the French-Made barracuda class to the Virginia‑class; however, in-doing so, it has opened the plan up to criticism.
Most of the criticism tends to be focused on the fact that Australia does not have the workforce to meet the crew requirements, or that there are supply chain issues. These are presented as key risks to the AUKUS program, and as an alternative they argue Australia should be sourcing the French made Suffren-Class or the South-Korean SSK.
The issue with these suggestions is the selective use of historical evidence or that platform shopping may introduce the same key risks of which they are critical.
The United States had been wary in sharing its Naval Nuclear propulsion technology with allies given its sensitivity. Arbitrarily choosing to walk away from a strategic program like AUKUS based on supply-chain risks could have the adverse effect of damaging Australia’s relationship with the United States and a “true” deterrent ASW/irregular capability.
In the next essay of the series, I will explore the longer history of the United States’ Submarine Warfare capability and how it contributes to a deterrent/offensive posture for Australia.
