Soft Power and the US Nuclear Umbrella
Soft Power and the US Nuclear Umbrella
As China increases its nuclear capacity and Russia continues to maintain ambiguity in relation to the possible employment of their nuclear arsenal, it becomes difficult to view nuclear weapons as tools of diplomacy rather than those of war. Nuclear weapons can rightly be viewed as the hardest element of hard power for any nation, but holding this view to the exclusion of all others is shortsighted. For sure, nuclear threats can hold populations, infrastructure, and even entire governments at risk – a fact long recognized by nuclear theorists. Those same nuclear theorists, from Brodie to Kahn, have tended to think in primarily realist terms. This view is not necessarily false, but it is incomplete. The world today is intertwined by worldwide information and economic networks. This makes nuclear weapons far from simply a bilateral issue. They are rather a complex network of relationships, competing goals, and sought outcomes.
But while the preceding makes a strong case for the superiority of hard power, this view completely ignores the important role of soft power and the various benefits it bestows on a nation seeking to convince others to emulate their example. This article seeks to make the argument that while nuclear weapons are a frightening specter and certainly an instrument of hard power, the way they are used by the United States currently forms the foundation of a strong source of soft power that works in concert with other American soft power sources. This soft power is a powerful tool that aids in the attainment of US strategic goals; most notably, deterring adversaries from aggression. This article further takes aim at the current theoretical paradigm for deterrence and culminates by proposing a more complete method for considering deterrence.
To fully understand this article’s argument the ideas of soft power and deterrence must be firmly understood. A more detailed unpacking of the ideas as they will be applied is warranted. At its most basic, soft power encompasses all the intangibles that make a foreign audience want to get closer to the US. Outside of the West, recent efforts by some nations have yielded strong results, despite a rather different interpretation of what constitutes and builds soft power. The strongest examples come from America’s current great power competitors. Chinese soft power tends to emphasize the cultural and commercial appeal of China. However, Chinese soft power efforts have not seen results that were expected in some venues, with China even seeing decreases in evident soft power in some partner countries. Russia, for its part, has focused its soft appeal on a conservative interpretation of the world. Advocacy for the legitimization of these values has found fertile ground in some countries. However, its dismissal of other modes of interpretation has proved ineffective in a large part of the world. Western soft power, on the other hand, involves the fact that democratic beliefs make the US an attractive partner for those seeking to chart a similar course.
Despite the disparities in interpretations of soft power, certain universal soft power constants exist. The original and enduring definition of soft power was laid down by the famous political scientist Joseph Nye in the eponymous book Soft Power:
“The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture… it’s political values… and its foreign policy.”
The civilian implications of Nye’s interpretation of soft power were and are perfectly valid and applicable in a wide range of societies. It follows that traditionally soft power is associated with those aspects of a country that are farthest from the military realm. For America, this includes things like Hollywood movies, American clothing brands, popular music, and American advocacy for Western ideals. It is, however, the third aspect of Nye’s soft power equation – foreign policy – that this article primarily seeks to explore in more depth and utilize with application to the nuclear umbrella.
Nye’s exposition of soft power in the government arena is primarily focused on traditional American support for good governance, rule of law, and democratization. But Nye mostly neglects the closely related topic of soft power generated by the wise exercise of military power as a tool of foreign policy. This article terms this concept as “military soft power.” There is a litany of sources on this aspect of soft power, with many of the most important efforts coming from the security cooperation field. The most visible of these methods include military exchange programs, foreign military financing, and multinational training exercises. Though Nye mostly neglects the idea, he does note that “the military can sometimes play an important role in the generation of soft power.” All these tools of military policy are specifically aimed at the major goal of pursuing, “mutually beneficial objectives and/or interoperability with the US.” Variations of this terminology are found strewn about other strategic documents and high-level military commanders’ statements and priorities, usually preaching that American strategic goals can most efficiently be pursued through mutually beneficial outcomes. The variety of sources notwithstanding, it is sufficient to say that military soft power is a powerful force; one that wise practitioners of international relations seek to wield.
One of the key strategic goals of US nuclear policy is to deter strategic attacks by adversaries. The US, in its unravelling of what deterrence is, focuses on the “prevention of action” by an adversary through the “credible threat of unacceptable counteraction” by the United States. The realist will consider this credible threat in the arena of hard power: an overwhelming response utilizing the ample American nuclear arsenal. And certainly, the existence of overwhelming nuclear capability by the US is a credible deterrent. The US possesses a nuclear deterrent that significantly outpaces all but the most powerful global powers. But the very same threat of counteraction that makes deterrence work can rest in the guise of other areas, such as economic sanctions or actions short of open warfare. This threat can include a loss of prestige and a loss of partners and allies. At its extreme, this threat includes disparate groups banding together to jointly confront an aggressor.
Nuclear weapons pose the most powerful threat from a hard-power perspective. The massive level of death and destruction wrought by such weapons is a truly powerful deterrent. However, since the beginning of the nuclear era, many theories have been proposed for the proper place for nuclear weapons as a tool of security. That fact notwithstanding, there have been certain aspects of US nuclear policy that have long been ingrained in policy. One of these constants is the rejection of “preventative war” as a viable policy for the United States. The loss of a policy of massive retaliation gave way, “completely and inevitably to the policy and strategy of deterrence.” This seemed the best option to avoid the new reality of certain and symmetric exchanged total destruction. Current US methods to achieve deterrence and avoid massive, exchanged destruction include imposing costs on the adversary, denying the adversary benefits, and encouraging the adversary to choose restraint or alternative methods for engagement.
However, this deterrence, in its current practice goes beyond American territory. It is this “extended deterrence,” meant to “assure allies and partners,” that is the real notable piece of US nuclear policy. Extended deterrence and allied assurance work together to ensure a robust defense of the US and its allies, but only if allies have confidence that “the United States is willing and able to deter the range of strategic threats they face.” Put another way, allies must have faith that the US will accept grave consequences in the name of protecting them. A major issue with this concept arises when considering the possible actions of the US if nuclear escalation occurs. US allies naturally have doubts that the US would sacrifice a major American city to a nuclear strike in order to protect an allied city. This is a perfectly natural challenge to extended deterrence and is a constant with regard to the nuclear umbrella. However, as noted by the foreign policy expert Lawrence Freedman, allied assurance and a nuclear umbrella, even with a considerable dose of doubt mixed in, remains an extremely powerful tool of deterrence, even outside of the nuclear realm.
With a long-established goal of deterrence and the knowledge that the use of the nuclear umbrella is the US method of achieving extended deterrence, it remains to demonstrate how this policy builds military soft power over time. There are three main reasons that soft power is built through extended deterrence. First, the nuclear umbrella promotes and supports mutually beneficial outcomes for allies and partners. Second, continued restraint and nonuse of nuclear weapons is a clear display of Western democratic values. And third, through years of being steadfast and predictable the US builds increased trust with its allies and partners. When the results of these three efforts are brought together, the US realizes the benefits of a significant source of soft power, which creates a desire to emulate the American example and gives adversaries pause to reconsider their actions. This soft power, in concert with traditional hard power, presents a formidable challenge indeed.
Mutually Beneficial Outcomes
Extended deterrence represents the world’s most wide-ranging example of mutually beneficial outcomes; a goal that the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is clear about. By providing protection under the nuclear umbrella the US supports internal policy documents, like the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, pursuing mutually beneficial cooperation to “strengthen the international order.” The nuclear umbrella precludes the need for allies to acquire their own nuclear weapons. This benefits the US in that the level of complexity and risk of accidental escalation is kept at a minimal level. Simply put, the fewer nations with nuclear weapons, the less likely that misunderstanding or violent desire will lead to nuclear use. The US also protects its nuclear advantage by preventing new nuclear powers from emerging. While this realist view may seem harsh, the intermingling of realist views with idealist beliefs has long been a key aspect of American strategic thinking. However, from an idealist view, the prevention of emerging nuclear powers is in line with American support of several international agreements, like the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Limited Test Ban Treaty. These actions are also in line with the general ideals of arms control agreements like the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Thus, the United States derives a positive outcome from both a realist and idealist viewpoint, by pursuing mutually beneficial outcomes in its exercise of extended deterrence.
Partner nations, under the nuclear umbrella, receive a significant level of security in return for declining to develop their own nuclear weapons. The United States, through clear declarations, maintains a level or responsibility for its allies. This is most familiar in the guise of NATO’s Article Five, which claims that an attack on one NATO partner will be considered an attack on all NATO partners. However, similar protections and actions are laid out in Article Three of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea as well as the nearly identical Article Five of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America.
US partners not only receive the ultimate security that goes along with nuclear deterrence but also benefit by avoiding the massive financial outlays that would be required to develop a nuclear weapons program domestically, a burden that few economies in the world could handle. It is important to note, however, that nuclear weapons are considered by some nations to be “international normative symbols, which can be a powerful attraction.” This is true even of the closest US allies, as displayed by comments voiced by South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Turkish President Recep Erdogan. It is even true of the one state to suffer from the use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear issue in Japan has become increasingly controversial in recent years, due to a perceived need to join the nuclear club in order to avoid attacks on its territory. However, due to America’s constant partnership and a painful past with regard to nuclear weapons, there is no consensus on the issue. The main reason for Japan’s continued avoidance of nuclear weapons lies mainly in the credibility of US extended deterrence. Thus, despite the occasionally voiced consternation by protected allies that they lack their own domestic capability, extended deterrence and non-proliferation efforts have thus far been mostly successful in preventing the emergence of new nuclear-armed powers. It is therefore vital for the US to retain adequate, flexible, and resilient nuclear deterrence, because if allies and friends suddenly feel less secure, they may “reconsider their own need for nuclear weapons.” Consternation aside, to date the sovereignty of NATO, Japan, and South Korea all remain intact. The nuclear umbrella is a clear tradeoff that forms the basis of a balanced, mutually beneficial outcome. The US supports international agreements, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, while retaining its nuclear advantage. In return, partners get security and the reduced economic strain that goes along with a nuclear weapons program. This win-win situation forms a strong core of American military soft power with regard to extended deterrence.
Values Display
In his writing on soft power, Joseph Nye spends considerable time discussing the power of the overtly displayed values of a country. However, for Nye’s purposes, these values tend to rest in areas like good governance, rule of law, and democratization. In the end, nuclear deterrence “…is not strictly about making threats – it is also about offering assurances.” When this is applied to the United States’ consistent nonuse of nuclear weapons and assurance of responsible stewardship of nuclear weapons, the US taps into a strong source of soft power. By its careful and ardent adherence to policy, the US displays its values and can be seen as a steadfast nuclear power in the middle of a world where consistency is severally lacking in many areas.
Vladimir Putin’s Russia is a clear example of the opposite. Putin has made a habit of playing fast and loose with threatening nuclear use, especially since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russia’s Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence makes clear that the use of nuclear weapons is only acceptable when “the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.” On its face, this is not particularly different than American nuclear policy, which retains a certain level of nuclear ambiguity by eschewing a no-first-use policy. Where this becomes problematic is in Putin’s frequent statements that the risk of nuclear use is increasing. Putin’s irresponsible attitude towards nuclear weapons poses a risk to any potential Russian enemy and leaves experts to puzzle over Russia’s intent. Nuclear deterrence is after all, only feasible if the United States and their allies understand the Russian strategy on a rather deep level.
One such puzzling policy is what some analysts call the Russian Federation’s policy of “escalate to de-escalate.” This policy espouses a belief that by a tailored, preemptive strike on an enemy, Russia can bring its adversary to the negotiating table and preclude further nuclear use. While the Western interpretation of this policy is debated, the basic idea is simple: the tailored use of violence can prevent more violence. The belief in deterring conflict by igniting conflict is one that is at once intentionally ambiguous and extremely dangerous. It does, however, indicate that Russia perceives the rightful place of soft and hard power to be nearly diametrically opposed to the West, and shows a fundamental disregard for Western values.
While Russia waffles in its adherence to policy and its own stated values, the United States continues to pursue values that are consistent with its actions. In 2009, then-President Obama made his famous Prague speech, where he advocated for a world without nuclear weapons. He tempered this idealism with a dose of realism in acknowledging that this goal was not likely in his lifetime. Obama was not the first to pursue this goal. President Raegan, in his meeting with Gorbachev at the 1986 Reykjavik Summit, nearly accomplished this very goal by dealing with a likeminded Russian personality and holding to the dream of making nuclear weapons obsolete. While many have dismissed Raegan’s goals in subsequent years, those actions – the direct application of American values – can be directly connected with the beginning of the end of the Cold War. The main point of the proceeding examples is a focus on the constant efforts to live up to and espouse American values.
The early nuclear theorist Bernard Brodie noted that total nuclear disarmament may not be a reasonable objective due to the enormous risk involved. Stopping violators of disarmament would be almost impossible, and the risks to non-violators would be immense. It is just those quizzical actions and words by Russia in recent days that make total disarmament appear as a foolish course of action. However, at its most basic, the nuclear umbrella is in itself a powerful display of constant American application of its values. It is this steadfast nonuse of the ultimate weapon that continues to add to the reservoir of American military soft power. This is brought into particularly clear focus when one considers the current state of affairs. Russia has recently ceased its participation in the final piece of nuclear arms control with the US – the New Strategic Arms Control Treaty (New START). China continues to build up its nuclear arsenal at an alarming rate. All the while, the US is making overtures to the Chinese on new arms control and attempting through diplomatic channels to coax Russia to return to existing arms control regimes.
Trust Building
The long-lasting nature of nuclear deterrence relationships and their relative stability over three quarters of a century is another powerful source of soft power. When the strategic goals of the United States – specifically, aggression deterrence – align with strategic goals of partners and allies, the source of soft power finds a foundation. But when these same goals align for decades, this source is strengthened and built upon. It becomes about more than just common defense. It then becomes about forging common identities and extending trust. The alignment under international norms, multilateral agreements, and formal treaties only further strengthens the bond of commitment. This builds even more soft power, not only between allies, but internationally. Mark Suchman notes that this repeated compliance with international expectations of behavior is a strong source of building trust. Unaligned nations and neutral parties see the strong relationship between allies like the NATO partners and naturally feel attracted to this stability. This trust is what separates the United States in its exercise of policy from competitors, partners, and unaligned nations. But often the validity of this aspect of international relations goes unrecognized.
It is impossible to prove a negative. So, the consistent nonuse of nuclear weapons by the United States cannot necessarily be claimed to be the driving factor in US competitors absconding. This is further complicated by the doubts raised by some on whether the United States is willing to sacrifice its own population to protect foreign capitals. Former British Defense Minister Denis Healey famously noted that it only takes “a 5 percent credibility of American retaliation to deter an attack, but it takes a 95 percent credibility to reassure the allies.” But, doubt or not, it makes sense that a weaker nation would want to join a “balancing alliance with a nuclear power… as a means of extended deterrence.” Alliances are, after all, generally preventative in nature, and prevention of conflict and mutual support inherently reside in the realm of soft power. With proving a negative quite impossible, anecdotal evidence must be used to show the power of extended deterrence in an effort to ensure allied assurance.
A powerful example rests in the Iraqi experience during the Gulf War. Many reasons for Saddam Hussein’s nonuse of chemical weapons have been cited. However, the fear of a nuclear response for chemical escalation is a particularly powerful possibility. It very well may be that the existence of the American nuclear deterrent changed Hussein’s mental calculus to a degree where he decided not to escalate the conflict. In other words, it can be claimed that nuclear deterrence operated as designed and prevented an escalation of aggression on the part of Iraq. Even if the nuclear deterrent was only a proximal cause of Husseins decision against chemical weapon use, the effect on US partners was a view that American nuclear capability and extended deterrence saved lives and prevented a potential escalation of conflict. Such examples of deterrence work continue to build trust and military soft power between the US and its allies.
Recent years have seen a return of great power competition, prioritizing hard power over soft power. Treating nuclear weapons exclusively in this way is shortsighted. Nuclear weapons are anything but a traditional weapon and need to be treated in a way that recognizes this fact. President Truman was on to something in this vein when he noted, “[y]ou have got to understand that this isn’t a military weapon. It is used to wipe out women and children and unarmed people, and not for military uses. So, we have got to treat this thing differently from rifles and cannons and ordinary things like that.” Treating nuclear weapons differently begins with an adjustment to how we consider their effects. Nuclear power can be a foundation for soft power, which works well in conjunction with traditional hard power. They all work towards deterrence.
With an increase in military soft power and substantial hard power to back it up, both the US and its allies effectively deter foreign aggression. This military soft power is primarily built through the exercise of mutually beneficial outcomes, overt and consistent display of American values, and long-term building of trust between allies. This cumulative soft power has the effect of reassuring allies of their security. This also has the second-order effect of dissuading third parties from aligning themselves with American adversaries. A strong soft power deterrent may well shift the mental calculus of potential adversaries, which can actively dissuade them from attempting aggression against those who are under the protection of US extended deterrence. The addition of a strong alliance of many nations further presents adversaries with an insurmountable risk of using aggression. All three of these fortunate outcomes are in line with American deterrence policy. In this age of renewed great power competition, new threats, and potential adversaries, US nuclear policy brings together the US and its allies in closer cooperation to jointly confront the threat. It is essential that the most complete picture of deterrence is gathered, so all possible resources of deterrence are leveraged. It would be a shame indeed to fall into the trap noted by Herman Kahn 60 years ago and simply be a Western government, engaging in “wishful thinking.” That is exactly why the recognition of military soft power’s place in nuclear policy is so valuable and important.
Postscript: A More Complete Rendering of Deterrence
It has been pointed out that the traditional American method of considering strategy as the sum of ends, ways, and means has shortcomings. The ends, ways, and means paradigm may be somewhat simplistic and miss important nuance. That truth notwithstanding, the paradigm’s inherent simplicity allows it to convey complicated ideas with relative ease. As such, this article utilizes this method to suggest a more complete rendering of American deterrence policy that takes military soft power into account. The US Department of Defense’s Joint Operating Concept for Deterrence contains several graphics that show how deterrence functions, including this article’s use of selected graphics (see figure 2). However, the joint operating concept model completely ignores the presence of military soft power, which this article has shown functions in conjunction with hard power. Thus, it is imperative for American doctrine to incorporate this concept. Figure 3 shows how hard and soft power inputs (i.e., the means) combine with deterrence methods (i.e., the ways), and the preferred outcomes of deterrence (i.e., the ends). The figure below clearly shows the place for military soft power and its indispensable nature in contributing to a complete method of deterrence.[1]
[1] Graphic created by the author. Clipart is used with permission of the Defense Security Cooperation University.
If the United States expects its deterrence to continue to be effective, and the nuclear umbrella to continue functioning as designed, the proposed paradigm should be effectively incorporated in doctrine. The alternative has operated effectively to deter past conflicts, but there is little guarantee that future conflicts will resemble the past. Vital efforts must be made to ensure that American deterrence policy is continually adapted to the situation at hand. The best way to achieve this is to ensure that deterrence policy is as complete as possible. By neglecting half of the soft/hard power dichotomy, the US accepts a level of risk that may become intolerable in future conflicts. Prevention of this outcome should be nonnegotiable to policymakers.
The proposed rendering of deterrence is, however, just one method to conceptualize the place of military soft power in exerting deterrence on potential aggressors. Due to the significant lack of research on military soft power, there is yet much to unpack on the concept. Further exploration of this idea is unfortunately inappropriate for this forum, but the author hopes that this article will stimulate conversation and further the study of this concept as US military doctrine continues to evolve.
