Irregular Warfare: Back to Basics
The US successfully learned the lessons of using irregular warfare (IW) at the tactical level against terrorist groups following 9/11, however, it seems to have forgotten some of the lessons it learned during that period and during the Soviet era as it debates how to use IW against strategic adversaries. To successfully compete against our adversaries in the non–kinetic space, we must focus on irregular warfare supporting capabilities to include creativity, regional expertise, and IW intelligence specialists.
As the US competes for global influence against its adversaries and positions itself to avoid a kinetic fight, we are debating on how to employ irregular warfare (IW). For the purposes of this commentary, IW involves activities short of conventional and nuclear warfare that are designed to expand a country’s influence and legitimacy and weaken or deter its adversaries.
The U.S. focus on IW has been erratic. In 1962, President Kennedy challenged West Point graduates to understand: “another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin, that would require a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, forces which are too unconventional to be called conventional forces…“ In 1987, Congress passed the Nunn-Cohen Amendment that established Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Defense Department’s Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) office. Both concepts that remain in the growing phase despite major irregular warfare successes in counterterrorism activities. A GAO report published in March 2024 highlighted an ongoing issue that makes solidifying the SO/LIC role difficult. SO/LIC has a deficit of some 30 plus hires (a good third of its proposed workforce).
The goal to use the irregular warfare concept as a consistent, strategic tool is not a new one for the U.S. Then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said in 2008 that “DoD needed “ to display a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which we possess in conventional combat.” In 2010, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen said, “We must not look upon the use of military forces only as a last resort, but as potentially the best, first option.” However, in December 2022, a RAND commentary pointed out that the US military failed to master irregular warfare above the tactical level. Even after twenty years of best practices of irregular warfare in the counter terrorism area, the 2020 Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy emphasized the need to institutionalize irregular warfare “as a core competency with sufficient, enduring capabilities to advance national security objectives across the spectrum of competition and conflict.”
Adversaries Ahead of Us
U.S. adversaries are experts at IW and do not have many of the legal or oversight hurdles that US IW specialists have. Chinese military writings highlight the PRC’s use of what we would call irregular warfare in the three warfares. This involves using public opinion, legal warfare, and psychological operations to spread positive views of China and influence foreign governments in ways favorable to China. General Wang Haijiang, commander of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Western Theatre Command, wrote in an official People’s Republic of China (PRC) newspaper. The PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative and Digital Silk Road are prime examples of using economic coercion as irregular warfare. Their Confucius Center underscore how they are trying to influence foreign populations through language and cultural training.
Russia uses IW to attempt to ensure the battle is won before military operations begin and to enhance its conventional forces. Russia calls this hybrid war and we saw this with the use of “little green men” going into Crimea in 2014 and the use of the paramilitary Wagner forces around the world. Russia also has waged a disinformation campaign against the US on digital platforms and even conducted assassinations and sabotage on foreign soil as ways to mold the battle space toward their goals.
What Is Needed
A reason for the US’ slow road to getting irregular warfare against peer competitors right is not enough focus on the support structures for irregular warfare. The US architects of IW seem to primarily focus on oversight structures and budget, and less on how to develop the enduring capability. In the 2023 and 2024 National Defense Authorization Acts, Congress gave the Department of Defense direction on the organization of SO/LIC and on funding SOCOM, with little direction on the development of support capabilities. In February 2023, Seth Jones, senior Vice President at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Congress that the US is still too heavily weighted toward preparing for conventional war. He highlighted military education and wargames as focused on this direction and not for training or informing irregular warfare. He also underscored the focus of Special Operations Forces (SOF) on direct action capabilities but not on such activities as information operations and other unconventional warfare.
Over the past twenty or so years, through the counterterrorism fight, the US learned how to use on-the-ground specialists, develop relationships at tribal levels, understand cultures to influence the population, and when needed, buy its way into influence. The US has the tools and the lessons learned that would enable a more level playing field against its adversaries who routinely use irregular warfare but it is ignoring those lessons and focusing on conventional weapons and technology to counter adversaries. A key to the way forward is to develop SOF personnel and commensurate intelligence professionals to support the SOF community who understand the people, the geography, and the societies they are trying to influence and affect.
Success in irregular warfare requires approaches that are informed by knowledge of a people’s attitudes, beliefs, frustrations, and geopolitical culture. In 2013, Army Chief of Staff Raymond Odierno, Marine Corps Commandant James Amos, and U.S. Special Operations Commander William McRaven observed that the Pentagon’s concept of competition does not reflect the fundamental reality that “competition and conflict are about people.” They concluded that the “growing problem in linking military action to achieving national objectives” was in significant part because the Pentagon tends to “focus on the clash and lose sight of the will” of the population.” They forecasted that our ability to shape a peaceful and prosperous global environment would rest more and more on our ability to understand, influence, and exercise control within the human domain.
The Department of Defense and the intelligence community have flirted with the need for expertise in the human domain or social cultural sphere for years. The Army once had its Human Terrain Teams. The Department of Defense put millions of dollars into socio cultural work in the 2015-time frame. This focus went away as we started concentrating more and more on near peer competition. Instead, we focused on technology as a way to compete with these adversaries—better weapons and more complex collection platforms. We even looked to cut Human Intelligence (HUMINT) to move toward what some call a lower risk approach to collection—using technology instead of humans. Meanwhile, Shane Shorter, senior enlisted leader for SOCOM recently warned, “you can’t surge relationships, you can’t surge trust. It’s constantly deploying to that same area. It’s understanding the culture. It’s drinking the cups of tea, eating the dinners, singing the karaoke.“ Meanwhile, a recent GAO report claims that less than half of SOF personnel have completed any foreign language training.
SOF personnel are considered the military’s most creative members. They are chosen for their ability to adapt, blend in, and think outside the box. This ingenuity needs to be encouraged. Shorter recently underscored this. He said “…creative thinking humans with the ability to interact with our partners and allies will make the difference.” We need a mindful balancing of oversight without stifling that uniqueness that makes irregular warfare so successful. The 2023 NDAA authorized the establishment of a Center for Security Studies in Irregular Warfare for developing IW concepts and doctrine. While some of this creativity may come naturally, we need to ensure that we put in place training that speaks to inventiveness, that pulls out these members’ ability to think through the impossible. Focused military classes across the services as well as the Irregular Warfare Center must build on latest practices for underscoring creativity and out of the box thinking. This entrepreneurial approach is not typically rewarded in a military that is focused on planning, rehearsals, and more planning, so how do we ensure that creative operatives are rewarded?
Focusing on Intelligence and Irregular Warfare
The other important part of the equation for irregular warfare is intelligence. This foundation for irregular warfare work is often left out in the examination of what is needed for the US to move IW forward. Intelligence officers who support IW need to have the same creative mindset as the operators. They also need to be experts in their regional areas—just like the SOF personnel.
The intelligence community’s approach to personnel over the past twenty or so years works against support for irregular warfare. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the intelligence community has moved from an expertise-based system to one that is more focused on processes. Once we had deep experts on all aspects of the adversary—analysts or collectors who had spent years focused on knowing everything about one foreign leader or one aspect of a country’s industry and with a deep knowledge of the language and culture of that country. With many more adversaries and with collection platforms that are much more expensive than those developed in the early days of the intelligence community, we cannot afford the detailed expert of yore anymore. The current premise is that if you know the processes for writing a good analytical piece or for being a good case officer, the community can plug and play you in any context. This means, we have put a premium on process while neglecting expertise. As with all things—we need to balance these two important aspects of intelligence work. In an address to a West Point graduating class in 2011, then Secretary of Defense Gates warned of the intelligence community’s turn from expertise driven analyst to process driven. Having started his career as an analyst, he understood the need for expertise and even in 2011 call for more emphasis on language skills and culture studies.
Even the latest Army cuts, some 4,000 Army SOF forces, show the emphasis on technology and the lack of understanding that we need both technology specialists and regional experts.
No doubt, a process-based approach to intelligence disciplines allows for greater flexibility. With this approach, we do not have to focus on creating a group of China experts, a similar group of Russia experts, and another group of counter terrorism (CT) experts who spend their careers on one problem set. The theory is that we can surge these analytical or HUMINT whiz kids to any problem and within a short period of time, they will be able to perform at high capacity because they know the basics. This approach also fits with what we are being told our new, younger workforce wants—the ability to try different things. This approach, however, puts irregular warfare at a disadvantage. In irregular warfare, precise and actionable intelligence becomes the linchpin of effective operations. We need to understand how the enemy thinks to be able to provide that precision to the operator. This insight comes only after years of studying the adversary.
To truly understand and use irregular warfare, we need to develop expert regional analysts and human intelligence personnel. Those individuals who understand the human domain that they are studying. We need to reward those experts and celebrate them just as much as we do the adaptable plug and play analyst or human intelligence personnel. Individuals who speak and understand the nuances of the languages of our adversaries, who understand the cultures and patterns of life are the SOF member’s best tool for advancing competition in irregular warfare. Developing this workforce must be a first thought, not an afterthought in the development of our irregular warfare doctrine.
CIA Director William Casey testified before Congress in 1981: The wrong picture is not worth a thousand words. No photo, no electronic impulse can substitute for direct on the scene knowledge of the key factors in a given country or region. No matter how spectacular a photo may be it cannot reveal enough about plans, intentions, internal political dynamics, economics, etc. Technical collection is of little help in the most difficult problem of all—political intentions. This is where clandestine human intelligence can make a difference.
Not only are analytical experts important in support of irregular warfare but so are HUMINT experts. We have focused on technology to fill intelligence gaps to the detriment of human intelligence. The Defense Intelligence enterprise has looked for ways to cut its HUMINT capability when we should be increasing our use of HUMINT collection and HUMINT enabled intelligence activities. In 2020, Defense One reported on a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) plan to cut US defense attaches in several West African countries and downgrade the ranks of others in eight countries. Many advocate for taking humans out of the loop as much as possible. This, the theory is, lowers the risk for human capture or leaks. As any regional expert will tell you, while satellites and drones can provide an incredible amount of intelligence from pictures to bits of conversation, what they cannot provide is the context for those pictures or snippets of conversation. As Director Casey inferred, it is only the expert who has lived on the ground, among the people he/she is reporting on who can truly grasp nuances, understanding local contexts, allegiances, and sentiments.
Even the latest Army cuts, some 4,000 Army SOF forces, show the emphasis on technology and the lack of understanding that we need both technology specialists and regional experts. Army SOF units are slated to decrease but they will get engineers and software specialists. While it is important to continue to upgrade technology and have specialists who fly drones and perform other data functions, those functions must be fused with human understanding of the adversary and the terrain. While algorithms can sift through vast amounts of data, human operatives and analysts ensure the contextual relevance of this data. Technologies are not sophisticated enough to read and report on the nuances of feelings and emotions. The regional experts equip SOF operators with the nuanced understanding required to navigate the complexities that make up the “prior to bang” playing field.
Conclusion
While methodologies and tools evolve with time, the need for contextual, human-centric understanding for being able to develop plans and operations in the realm of irregular warfare remains a constant. Those who try to make warfare or intelligence into a science miss the truth, that to be proficient in either, art is a must. We need the expertise to be able to decipher the stories, motives, and aspirations that make irregular warfare unique. Regional intelligence experts discern the patterns, motives and vulnerabilities of adversaries; key needs for developing irregular warfare campaigns. We need seasoned human intelligence personnel, targeteers, and analyst’s expert on the adversary to be able to do this. We also need to develop and reward the creativity that is so needed in the IW world.
The cost of all of this is but a rounding error when compared to the development of new technical intelligence platforms and the platforms’ massive infrastructure. Yet, this rounding error is a key lynchpin for irregular warfare and irregular warfare is our most likely avenue for avoiding a kinetic war. Human operatives, out of the box thinking, and expert analysts and human intelligence personnel are the needed bridges that connect data into actionable insights to allow our SOF community to practice the type of irregular warfare we have proven historically that the US. can provide.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
