The Roads and Networks That Lead To… Reconstruction?

Author’s Note to the Reader: The strategic significance of border regions in sustaining Ukraine’s war and reconstruction efforts – a dual process unfolding simultaneously – cannot be overstated. In producing this analysis, I revisited some unpublished reflections on the value and credibility of deterrence sketched in 2016 during my tenure as Resident Fellow with the British Army’s Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, based at Sandhurst. Overall, the paper builds on detailed on-the-ground assessments and semi-structured interviews with diverse stakeholders in Ukraine and the wider region since February 2022, further complemented by data analysis, journalistic investigations, and reports. The overarching argument is that developing cross-border infrastructures ought to become a strategic imperative and a cornerstone of our regional deterrence approach, which I believe so far lacks unity of scope and, to some extent, credibility. While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine sparked a collective realization of the threats facing the continent, acting on this awareness remains fractured and inconsistent.
Introduction
Anchored in the region’s geography, the analysis primarily focuses on the border areas shared by Romania, Ukraine, and the Republic of Moldova. It shows how the crossing points, roads, rail networks, and maritime and riverine ports function both as vital gateways and sources of regional vulnerability. In their current state, these critical systems are woefully inadequate, particularly when evaluated against the demands of rapid Allied responses, military and civilian mobility, and effective logistical coordination.
Cross-border Integration – Before and After the War
Crossing borders between neighboring countries remains a challenging endeavor. In February 2022, following Russia’s (re)invasion of Ukraine, roads became the most viable option for transportation to and from Ukraine. However, road networks were soon to be overwhelmed by the exponential increase in freight traffic. Hundreds of trucks queued for miles on each side, often waiting for weeks on end to distribute everything from humanitarian aid, grain, and fuel to military materiel. Adjacent countries each had different border-crossing protocols, which contributed to the delays. I experienced this first-hand while crossing into Orlivka, Ukraine, from Isaccea, Romania, on an obsolete river ferry that connected the two shores. The ferry could barely accommodate the congestion (see Photo Collage 1).
Photo Collage 1
It seemed that no degree of logistical urgency could deter the red tape and that making do became the norm. This was even more of a concern for Ukraine’s southern and eastern neighbors, to include Romania and Moldova. ‘Making do’ in this case was the result of the severely underdeveloped infrastructures, transregional railway systems, and Danubian riverine ports along the shared border areas. Amid the chaos of war, the ultimate test of resilience was underway for a region that had so far proven deficient in developing and connecting its international and domestic transit corridors.
The Limits of Implementation (2007 onwards)
Connective road infrastructure and cross-border integration have been key components of European Union (EU) accession and association processes. As the flow of cash indicates (see Graph 1), the European Neighborhood Initiative (ENPI/ENI), and other cooperation formats, have focused precisely on supporting cross-border connections and easing cross-border travel between EU and non-EU countries.
Graph 1: ENI CBC 2014-2020 Combined Analysis
(The graphs listed at the end of this article illustrate the infusion of European funds under various programs and policy mandates, revealing not just the scale but also the strategic focus of investments (see Graphs 2, 5). Specifically, the graphs 3 and 4 also illustrate the extent to which countries have prioritized and achieved state-to-state interconnectivity. In most cases, this was achieved by enabling mobility through the process of building and upgrading roads and rail networks, improving access at border crossing points, and harmonizing customs and border procedures.)
It is not within the scope of this article to cover all the sources of funding for infrastructure development. The EU is certainly a major contributor, but it is not the only one. The US, for its part, also supports infrastructure-related projects through various agencies, such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID, for instance, has been instrumental in advancing energy security by crucially integrating the power systems of Ukraine and Moldova with Europe’s continental power grid. Since 2020, through the Three Seas Initiative (3ESI), the US has committed close to $1 billion to enhance cross-border energy, transport, and digital infrastructures among twelve EU member states located between the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas. In a nutshell, there has been no shortage of multilateral efforts or capital.
Then why the discrepancies? Multiple EU assessments and program evaluations indicate several externalities. However, that is only part of the problem. Poor governance, widespread corruption, and short-sighted domestic politics also contribute to the infrastructure projects underdelivering.
While some cross-border cooperation has yielded results, large-scale projects in areas of safety, security, and infrastructure have faced severe setbacks and delays over the years. These were largely attributed to lengthy bureaucratic processes when major state institutions were the primary project partners, frequent administrative turnover in EU and non-EU beneficiary countries, or inadequate commitment to meeting project deadlines. Such obstacles partially explain the disconnect and uneven regional development – disparities that were ultimately stress-tested in circumstances of war. Another explanation relates to strategic perceptions at a macro level.
Strategic Hesitancy
Russia, somewhat unsurprisingly, continued to benefit from European funding under Cross-Border Cooperation or CBC programs even after annexing Crimea in 2014. As a partner country of the CBC program, Russia received a considerable portion of investment funds intended for large-scale border infrastructure projects. This approach, often justified as pragmatic, underscored the EU’s strategic hesitancy to punish Russia, despite the latter’s aggressive, destabilizing territorial revisionism. At the time, program authorities were concerned that tensions over Ukraine might jeopardize long-term cooperation with Russia. Furthermore, the evaluation also noted that “(…) programme authorities [CBC] lobbied the EU for the CBC programme involving Russia not to be affected by the EU sanctions, reflecting the importance participating countries attached to cooperation.”
Over the years, the lack of strategic coherence and misalignment between EU funding streams and geopolitical realities conspired to weaken the collective response and, in hindsight, the credibility of deterrence. By 2023, however, strategic perceptions had shifted, and cross-border cooperation with Eastern Neighborhood countries became a key component of the EU’s broader geopolitical strategy and long-term security interests, at least in official statements. Moreover, at a European level, there is growing recognition of the importance of dual-use strategic infrastructure to enhance military mobility, as reflected in initiatives supported by the EU’s Connecting Europe Facility (see Graph 5). While this marks progress, it also raises the question of whether it is sufficient moving forward.
Wartime Routes of Solidarity
The ongoing war, Ukraine’s evolving needs in terms of logistics, and numerous pledges by international donors have led to some visible improvements in cross-border infrastructures. This includes additional access points, solidarity lanes, and other features. However, after decades of institutional neglect and patchy political commitments, these solutions seemed more immediate than long-term oriented. While the EU’s Solidarity Lanes Initiative helped unblock over 50% of Ukraine’s grain and oilseed exports, its implementation also exposed deep limitations and vulnerabilities. Rail and road routes faced serious logistical bottlenecks due to generally poor infrastructure, limited storage/transportation facilities, and delayed clearance procedures at crossing points.
The situation worsened when the Polish farmers’ and truckers’ border blockades caused major disruptions – waiting times extending for weeks, even months. In a snowball effect, similar developments occurred in Romania, Slovakia, Germany, and Belgium, with farmers and truckers protesting what they perceived as ‘unfair competition’, soaring insurance and tax rates, and a litany of bureaucratic grievances. These upheavals reduced export volumes and inflated logistical costs for alternative routes, somewhat undermining the ethos of solidarity. To add fuel to the fire, far-right populist factions – many with Russian ties – opportunistically exploited this widespread, growing discontent with varying degrees of success.
Black Grain
While facilitating Ukraine’s exports was sound and equitable in principle, underdeveloped (cross-border) infrastructure hampered transit flows to EU ports and third markets. Consequently, much of Ukraine’s produce was sold at dumping prices, often illegally, in neighboring countries.
Tax evasion and money laundering compounded ‘the black grain trade’, depleting Ukraine’s wartime budget. Investigations uncovered networks of over 600 Ukrainian exporting companies, many newly established, trading in grain worth hundreds of millions of dollars, while evading taxes. Also subject to separate proceedings in Ukraine, customs services and enforcement agencies (border police), often complicit, systematically failed to inspect suspicious exporters, more than half not even filing customs declarations.
Down the trading chain, ‘black grain’ importers were found in Romania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and beyond, including offshore shell companies and prominent agri-businesses. For instance, COFCO International Romania, a subsidiary of the Chinese multinational giant COFCO International, imported Ukrainian grain more than $145 million, of which $37 million was supplied by Ukrainian companies under investigation. Based on the inquiry, to obscure ownership, trading companies listed proxies as shareholders or directors, some of whom were under treatment in psychiatric institutions.
Borderlands and Regional Vulnerabilities
War profiteering is not isolated but rather symptomatic of pre-existing issues. Organized crime, smuggling, and trafficking networks have thrived in these borderlands for years, and in many aspects, have been exacerbated by endemic corruption, and now by the war in Ukraine. Since Russia’s invasion, smuggling routes have shifted, illicit activities intensifying along the borders shared by Ukraine, Poland, the Republic of Moldova, and Romania. A comparative assessment reveals pervasive organized crime networks spanning human, arms, and drug trafficking as well as counterfeit goods, tobacco smuggling, and cybercrime. Displaced populations, especially women and children fleeing the warzone, have become extremely vulnerable to trafficking, though official data on missing persons or victims of trafficking remains scarce. Insights on instances and patterns of human trafficking were provided by a UK-based NGO, working with both victims and institutional bodies, and with whom I have closely coordinated on humanitarian situational awareness throughout 2023.
Human Trafficking
At the onset of the invasion, NGOs, charities, and an army of self-mobilized volunteers coordinated intensively and often unmandated to assist refugees at Romania’s border entry points (see Photo Collage 2). This included securing evacuations, the provision of food, clean water, shelter, transportation, medical and veterinary care, along with many other public services that sprouted by the roadside. This grassroots effort mirrored similar responses across Europe. In Suceava, a major entry point for refugees in northern Romania, semi-structured interviews with Eliberare, a non-profit association specialized in preventing and combatting human trafficking, revealed the extreme vulnerability of Ukrainian evacuees having crossed the border: ‘(…) in many instances, they [the children] were entrusted to acquaintances to cross the border. In one heartbreaking case, the mother died, the father was at war, and with no immediate family, the child crossed the border accompanied by neighbors, with no documents whatsoever.’ There is mounting evidence of orphans being targeted for ‘back-door’ adoptions, by trafficking outfits.
Photo Collage 2
Though the ad hoc voluntary mobilization had a limited lifespan, it demonstrated a remarkable level of civilian preparedness in response to a complex emergency crisis. As the war persists, devising safety plans and profiling the most vulnerable populations remain challenging due to limited resources in Romania, and even more so in Moldova, where unregulated black markets and labor shortages increase susceptibility to modern slavery. Reports corroborate that fake and exploitative jobs are widely advertised on social media platforms or through apparently trustworthy portals. Pervasive since before the war, sexual exploitation also raises immediate concerns. Evidence obtained by the UK-based NGO, indicates a pipeline of Ukrainian refugees, young women and unaccompanied minors travelling via Romania, Moldova, Bulgaria, and Turkey to Athens, forced or induced to work in brothels managed by traffickers from the Balkans – a situation likely to be replicated in other major cities.
Despite having an institutional framework to combat human trafficking, Romania’s legislation ‘makes it very difficult even for accredited non-profits to secure government funding for safe houses and victim assistance,’ as the NGO representatives relayed during the interviews (August 2023). In fact, this funding gap reflects a global trend: while significant resources are directed toward law enforcement and border security, other crucial areas of prevention, victim support and rehabilitation remain severely underfunded. Overall, despite intensified institutional efforts to combat organized crime, criminal actors continue to exploit border regions with adaptable ease and resolve, driven by unrelenting demand elsewhere.
Although Romania fares comparatively better in terms of institutional resilience scores, elements within law enforcement, particularly border police, are prone to corruption – often perceived as largely inefficient. Moreover, the complicit involvement of low-level officials in trafficking cases ‘continues to be an issue.’ Like Ukraine and Moldova, though to a lesser extent, decentralized criminal networks are widespread and well-embedded along the northern Balkan trafficking route, with an established presence at Romania’s entry-exit points. Further complicating the landscape is Transnistria, the breakaway territory on Moldova’s eastern border, controlled by Russian proxies and captive to state-embedded mafia-style groups functioning outside law enforcement capabilities.
Arms Trafficking
Transnistria has long served as a manufacturing hub for untraceable small arms and military equipment, hosting large stockpiles of Soviet-era munitions, primarily concentrated at the Cobasna arms depot in the Ribnita district bordering Ukraine and Moldova. The enclave has been a major source of illegal weapons, with the port of Odesa acting as a key export conduit for trafficked and smuggled commodities, including, in at least one instance, radioactive compounds. Since February 2022, heightened military presence in the proximity of the Transnistrian border has largely suppressed illicit logistics, but routes have shifted via the southwest along the Moldova-Romania border. While large-scale arms trafficking from Ukraine into Europe remains limited due to detection risks and severe penalties, the conditions for its resurgence persist.
Fueled by corruption and a thriving black market, arms diversions did occur inside Ukraine, but so far, the overarching defense effort has significantly disrupted cross-border outflows, with little evidence suggesting an outward movement of weapons from the battlefield into established criminal channels. On one hand, the operational complexity and sophistication of moving weapons across borders may be too high and, for now, undesirable (from a criminal perspective), especially with increased scrutiny in Moldova and separatist Transnistria. On the other, stockpiling behaviors in Ukraine pose long-term risks of overflow into neighboring regions should a climate of opportunity emerge. Notwithstanding, preparedness is key in any scenario.
Mitigation
Supported by the US and the EU through counter-proliferation, border security, and capacity-building initiatives, Ukraine has enforced stricter controls on foreign-supplied arsenals, including inventory and munitions monitoring as a pre-emptive safeguard. While there is no shortage of policy efforts and investment, coordination between the various programs, strategies, and donor geographies—namely, the US and the EU—remains limited and fragmented at best.
At the implementation level, specialized training programs may not be prioritized for all relevant personnel within border law enforcement structures. A limited sample of interviews (4) I conducted with senior and mid-level Ukrainian officials from the State Border Guards and Customs in different locations revealed a perceived disconnect between donor-driven policy ambitions and on-the-ground realities. When asked about the impact of capacity-building programs, the level of awareness was low; as to the benefits of such training, most interviewees expressed some form of skepticism and mistrust, typically directed at the political chain of command. Several explanations emerge. First, security institutions with entrenched legacies may resist adapting to change. Second, dismantling vested interests in one institution is largely viewed ‘as a Sisyphean effort’ since bribes trickle down a vast spectrum of patronage networks – high-ranking appointments are often politicized, ‘dependent on the payment of hefty sums,’ which are then recouped through systemic bribery. In a pervasive rentier system, ‘the flow of money’ is the main constant. Third, high personnel turnover and competing interests undermine the institutional continuity needed for long-term reforms.
This systemic inertia fosters a cycle whereby reforms appear superficial and anti-corruption measures struggle to gain traction. Unsurprisingly, respondents suggested that a ‘complete reboot of the customs systems in Ukraine and neighboring countries’, along with an overhaul of higher command echelons, are necessary—even if radical—solutions, but offered no further details. Recently, the Ukrainian parliament, with support from external partners and a broad coalition of reformers, passed legislation to reform the State Customs Service, ranked in polls as the country’s most corrupt and least trusted institution. This marks only the beginning of a long and fraught reform process, bound to meet resistance from a powerful ecosystem of complicit businesses, corrupt officials and rogue proxies. As Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova move closer to joining the European Union, Integrated Border Management (IBM) will become critical to the countries’ accession agenda and, most importantly, to the region’s overall security architecture. External support will be required for this process to be effective, providing not only resources but also a measure of accountability and oversight, which, in the long term, would help safeguard the integrity of reforms.
Smuggling
Building resilience, however, requires a continuous assessment of vulnerabilities at both country and regional levels – a process that, I believe, remains deficient, at least in the public domain. Borders across the region are notoriously porous to criminal activities, and the geography itself often facilitates such operations. Smuggling, both large- and small-scale, continues unabated along established routes, as well as new ones, having increased in frequency and profitability since the invasion despite the appearance of tighter border controls. A key area of concern is the rise in people smuggling, especially of conscript-age Ukrainian men, which presents fewer risks and lower penalties than arms trafficking. Chernivtsi and Transcarpathia – regions in western Ukraine bordering Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland – have emerged as hotspots for this illicit market, converging with other types of well-established criminal activities such as mass-scale tobacco, alcohol, and drug smuggling. Widespread corruption within border agencies and uneven surveillance capabilities in cross-border areas have led to inconsistent enforcement practices and reduced operational efficiency.
People smuggling has often ended with tragic consequences for those choosing this route out of despair. In Romania alone, over 30 deaths were recorded, the majority in failed attempts to swim across the Tisa, a riverine border separating Ukraine and Romania. The harsh mountainous terrain compounds even more incidents, especially during the cold season. Based on on-the-ground reports, smuggling ‘packages’ vary in price from tens of thousands (EUR) at the higher end to a few thousand, depending on the promise and level of organization: bribing border guards and timed passage to coincide with certain shifts or a drop off within border proximity. As the chain of vested interests, profiteering, and criminal protection expands, the scope of smuggling activities is likely to scale up, leveraging increasingly sophisticated networks and capabilities (i.e.: drones, submersibles).
Border Surveillance Capabilities
Meanwhile, Romania’s border surveillance remains technically inadequate despite an obligation to secure the EU’s eastern periphery – a pre-requisite for full Schengen accession. As of 2016, only one of sixteen cargo scanners (of Chinese provenance) is functional, though nearing the end of its life cycle, the rest decommissioned for lack of maintenance. A contextual glimpse (see Map 1) into the level of modernization required, Romania totals fifty-four customs offices at border crossing points and thirty-seven internally; the only operational scanner located in Constanta-South inspects less than 20% of the daily cargo entering the port. This shortfall has driven tax evasion to an estimated 10% of Romania’s GDP, double the country’s 2024 defense budget. In December 2023, under EU pressure and with earmarked funding, Romania’s Border Authority acquired twenty-six cargo scanners, with two deployed at Giurgiulesti and Albita (at the border with Moldova), key transit points for Ukrainian grain en route to Constanta Port on the Black Sea coast. The systems are not functional yet, pending a radiological assessment, while the delivery calendar for the rest is unclear but likely not expected before 2026.
Map 1 – “BCPs Combined Analysis”
While a significant milestone, Romania’s full accession to the Schengen Area, formalized on 1 January 2025, places increased responsibility on the country to safeguard the EU’s external frontiers and reinforce the collective border security framework.
Romania shares 694.4 km of land, riverine, and maritime border with Ukraine. Currently, only three border crossing points (BCPs) are equipped to process cargo. The total processing capacity is estimated at 600 trucks per day. The (belated) introduction of an E-Queue system has somewhat alleviated the miles-long queues and border congestion, but the system is not uniformly operational. Since Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative, Romania’s Port of Constanta emerged as the main logistical hub for Ukrainian trans-shipments, handling a record 92 million tons of cargo in 2023, with 25 million tons from Ukraine. Despite these achievements, sources from the port’s administration report that patronage networks, corruption, and improper cargo scanning technologies pose significant risks to border security and strategic infrastructure. A recent test conducted by the Europol syndicate revealed alarming vulnerabilities at the port, including susceptibility to criminal infiltration. During the exercise, officers spent over six hours moving freely around the facilities, conducting simulated illicit activities, without being subjected to inspections or triggering any alarms.
River to Sea – The Ports and Waterways
For Russia, a hostile state actor with institutionalized criminality, exploiting regional vulnerabilities through criminal networks and illicit operations has been a persistent modus operandi. At a broader level, the weaponization of corruption and economic instability renders neighboring countries pliant to external interests and targeted influence campaigns, a phenomenon that extends into the Western Balkans. Moldova, with its breakaway region of Transnistria, served as a major route for Russian oil and fuel smuggling, further entrenching the region’s reliance on Russian-controlled energy supplies. Since the war, authorities in Balkan countries have confiscated more than 3,000 tons of illicit fuel valued at €4.3 million – four times the amount seized in 2021. This is not coincidental. With Russia blockading the Port of Odesa, river traffic along the Danube has surged, heightening the risk of illegal trade, including the smuggling of Russian crude oil for considerable profits. The lower Danube is the most dynamic and vulnerable, but there are concerns about potential blind spots upstream in the Schengen zone, where controls are more relaxed and opportunity is rife.
Despite the EU-wide embargo on Russian oil, Bulgaria, also a riverine country, was granted a special exemption and continues to purchase Russian oil, emerging as the third largest importer globally. The Port of Burgas on the Black Sea, the main entry point for fossil fuels, hosts one of the largest oil refineries in the Balkans, Neftochim Burgas, controlled by Lukoil, Russia’s second-largest oil producer – a monopolistic actor on Bulgaria’s domestic market, with a significant presence in Romania as well. Between January and June 2023, Russian crude oil imports amounted to 2.6 million tons, 92% of all crude oil supplies, thereby generating a significant profit margin for the Russian company, its operations in Bulgaria alone accounting for 4% of Russia’s total oil revenues. Under the EU exemption, Bulgaria has shipped locally refined oil by-products to Ukraine via Constanta and Giurgiulesti ports, the total value in 2022 exceeding €825 million, almost a thousand-fold increase from the previous year. While the EU embargo is expected to include Bulgaria by 2025, the country’s crippling energy dependence on Russian supplies could further aggravate its political instability, otherwise a protracted issue since 2020. Overall, favorable conditions for smuggling operations across the Balkans persist, with the Ports of Constanta and Burgas already serving as key entry points and the Danube as a natural conduit for illicit flows.
The third journey from Bucharest to Odesa involved a 12-hour bus ride via Chisinau (Republic of Moldova), entering Ukraine through the Palanca-Maiaky-Udobnoe joint crossing, south of separatist Transnistria. Palanca was subject to a sensitive territorial dispute until its resolution in 1999 when Moldovan authorities agreed to transfer the control and sovereignty of this 7.7km sliver of land to Ukraine in exchange for access to the Danube – 450m on the riverbank. This strategic swap conferred Moldova, a landlocked country, a much-needed lifeline and commercial access to international waters through the Giurgiulești river-to-sea freeport positioned at the confluence of the Danube and Prut rivers.
Since the war, the Moldovan port has emerged as an alternative hub for Ukrainian grain transshipments and other vital commodities (i.e.: fuel, fertilizer), handling 2.17 million tons in 2023 – nearly double its previous volume. However, the port’s operator, Danube Logistics, is entangled in criminal allegations involving the EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the company’s majority shareholder since 2021) and former Azerbaijani owner Rafig Aliyev, who is accused of diverting Moldovan state subsidies earmarked for the port’s infrastructure development to expand his fuel business, Bemol – a Moldovan petrol station operator. To further complicate matters, the freeport status creates ambiguity around the chain of command and responsibility for ensuring critical infrastructure security. Despite the recent surge in investments (see timelapse below), such controversies could render this strategic port susceptible to rogue interests and geopolitical manipulation.
[Grouped: GIF – “Sentinel_Giurgiulesti Port_Timelapse.gif” + “MAP 2 Regional Map” + caption GO HERE] Caption: to the right is a year-by-year timelapse of Giurgiulesti Freeport from 2022 until November 2024 showing waterway and infrastructure improvements, including the expansion of facilities. Compiled by the author from ESA (European Space Agency) Sentinel and Copernicus satellite data.
Border Crossings – Exposure and Gaps
The strategic significance of the Danube for the trans-shipment of essential Ukrainian exports calls for a joint re-evaluation of security vulnerabilities, not only in the tri-border area, where the Delta converges with Black Sea maritime routes but along the entirety of the riverine system connecting major Western hubs and European transport corridors. At the same time, the escalation in attacks on key Ukrainian ports along the Danube, which intensified after Russia exited the Black Sea Grain Initiative, is of even more immediate concern. In September 2023, a barge of Shahed kamikaze drones hit the Reni Danube port and Orlivka customs point (both on the Ukrainian side), targeting lorries awaiting clearance, destroying the ferry pontoon, storage facilities and injuring several, including two drivers. This was one of over 30 attacks in six months, directed at critical infrastructure on the Danube and the Ukrainian ports of Reni and Izmail.
The closure of Orlivka-Isaccea BCP, a vital access route to Constanta Port, caused major disruptions and a spike in freight rates for cargo barges. In response, Romania expanded the no-fly zone next to the Ukrainian border and increased F-16 and F-18 air patrols along the Black Sea shore and Danube approaches. Presumably, to avoid escalation, NATO has so far rejected calls to eliminate these mounting aerial threats despite Russia consistently testing response capacities. I believe this decision-making stalemate exposes a critical gap for overall defense, albeit not the only one. Though bordering an active warzone, outdated legislation prevents Romanian forces from neutralizing Russian drones transiting Romanian airspace en route to Ukrainian targets. Even in the absence of a firm Alliance-wide decision, further delays in updating national legislation to reflect the current security environment will only compromise readiness and the long-term credibility of deterrence. The night attack on Orlivka was vividly recounted by one Ukrainian lorry driver present at the scene, whom I interviewed in Constanta Port in July 2024: ‘We stood there like sitting ducks, over 30 lorries were incinerated. It was a hellscape. A bus carrying children thankfully just managed to cross [into Romania, via ferry] before the bombs [sic] hit (…).’
Yet, for most drivers transporting goods, commodities, and military materiel, a vital auxiliary role that often goes unnoticed, the risk of exposure to targeted attacks appears less troubling than routine issues associated with endemic corruption and poor infrastructure. Although efforts to enhance professional capacities and cross-border security have intensified, border management and customs regimes remain slow or even resistant to adapt – in great part due to illicit interests. Based on ten interviews with truck drivers conducted in Constanta Port, Romania (July 2024), corruption practices often mirror complex bureaucratic procedures in the form of ‘facilitation payments’ to expedite customs clearance, a process that can otherwise be delayed (arbitrarily) by red tape. The series of interviews revealed that in many, if not most cases, customs in the tri-border area do not process documents unless some ‘administrative costs’ are covered to speed up clearance. If not, ‘waiting times can stretch from hours to weeks,’ an unaffordable delay for most companies. ‘There can always be “unforeseen” problems with the processing of documents, something missing in the paperwork, additional checks, which make transit dependent on that “brown envelope”.’ This knowledge is common among the drivers, sending companies, and customs brokers alike, but silent complicity seems to prevail – a mainstay in countries plagued by deep institutional mistrust.
For drivers who possess a deep understanding of Europe’s transportation networks, gaps in cross-border infrastructures represent only one aspect of the region’s broader connectivity problem, and indeed so, the farther East, the less integrated.
Issues of Mobility
Developing robust in-country road networks may be just as crucial as modernizing border crossing points (BCPs). Romania lacks a contiguous motorway system along its north-south and east-west axes, which palpably undermines economic development, logistical mobility, and the country’s overall defense posture. With NATO ramping up presence at Mihail Kogălniceanu, set to become Europe’s largest NATO base, and Cincu (located in Brasov county, eastern Transylvanian plateau) the credibility of Allied deterrence on the Eastern flank also depends on Romanian decision-makers delivering on their decades-long promises – to modernize rail links, build domestic highways and invest in intermodal connections with European corridors.
An Earlier Test
After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Operation Dragoon Ride – the brainchild of Lt Gen Ben Hodges, then commander of the US Army forces in Europe – showcased NATO’s resolve at a critical juncture. The scope was to reassure eastern allies in a mixture of public relations and training exercises but also to display mobility capacities using the region’s road networks. The Romanian route involved transporting light Stryker armored vehicles and troops (over 400 military personnel from the US 2nd Cavalry Regiment and Romanian Land Forces) from the Kogălniceanu base near Constanta by the Black Sea to the Cincu training grounds for the Sarmis-15 multinational exercise.
The operation also exposed profound vulnerabilities associated with Romania’s poorly developed infrastructure, a journey that involved two-lane roads, some segments narrowly stretched across mountainous areas. Not much has improved since 2015. In a war scenario, the war-fighting credibility of Allied forces stationed in-country and beyond would be significantly undermined in the absence of swift mobility routes. Mountain passes traversing the Carpathian barrier, which in some cases are single access points between the southern plains (i.e.: Bucharest) and central regions (the eastern Transylvanian plateau where Cincu is also located) would become bottlenecks if not death traps. During the Dragoon Ride, portions of the road were closed off for the passage of military convoys, phased to avoid jamming an already heavy traffic. A conflict scenario dispels such a possibility. Civilian evacuations would likely take priority along the westward and southern routes, further limiting capacities for military movement and supply/resupply chains. In July 2024, the defense ministers of Romania, Greece, and Bulgaria signed a joint letter of intent to facilitate a corridor for the rapid movement of military personnel and equipment, a positive step towards the simplification of bureaucratic procedures. However, political intention alone does little to address persistent infrastructure deficiencies that could ultimately hinder the effectiveness of mobility plans.
Unfinished Business – The Bridges
A major chokepoint along the southern corridor is limited bridge connectivity across the Danube, the 470 km riverine border separating Romania and Bulgaria. Currently, only two functional bridges exist, with a third, Giurgiu-Ruse II, recently launched in public tender but still years away from the execution phase. Although a welcomed initiative after decades of political stalemate, the positioning of this new bridge near Giurgiu-Ruse I may become problematic, risking the exposure of two critical infrastructure nodes. Albeit at a smaller scale, another vital bridge project, delayed by bureaucracy, took over two years to commence.
The Cincu training base in central Romania, established in 1919 and strategically nestled within the Carpathian arc, is a key outpost with access and projection into multiple regions. Since 2023, the base has hosted the NATO multinational battlegroup led by France, undergoing significant expansion, which, in due course, could potentially accommodate brigade-level detachments. France alone has invested over €80 million in its technical modernization. However, precarious road networks and lack of connectivity pose severe challenges and costly workarounds for the transportation of heavy equipment and personnel to and from the base. The only bridge providing access over the river was unsuitable for military logistics and required reconstruction – an issue the regional administration failed to address before expansion began. As a result, the journey to the nearest township takes almost three hours instead of forty minutes had the bridge been operational. Transporting military materiel from France by rail takes four to five days to reach the base, hindering the logic of rapid response unless capabilities are pre-deployed or airlifted at significant cost. Despite Romania’s push for Allied troop deployments, a persistent gap remains between political intent, strategic ambition, and administrative execution.
The Rail
In their current state, road and rail networks, both in-country and across the region, are not equipped to handle the seamless transportation of heavy military equipment and large troop detachments. Railway networks are not standardized, which further hampers interoperability. Moldova and Ukraine still use a Soviet/Russian track gauge, while Romania, as well as other neighboring countries, conform to European standards. Baltic states use a mixture of both, although steps are being taken to integrate rail transport under the aegis of Rail Baltica, an EU-funded project. Romania benefits from one of the longest rail track networks in Europe, totaling almost 19,000 km, but poor maintenance and underinvestment led to its crippling degradation. As a result, the freight sector is severely impacted by speed restrictions, with the average train speed lingering at 15km per hour. This underdevelopment is not for lack of funding, as the graphs in previous sections indicate (see graphs 3, 4, 5). Over a span of 35 years, data from Romania’s Railway Company reveals that a modest 630 km of rail infrastructure underwent modernization, including limited cross-border connections, concentrated in the western part of the country and significantly less in the eastern neighborhood.
A distance like London-Paris, the 450 km train journey from Bucharest to Chisinau in the Republic of Moldova takes roughly fourteen hours, including the time-consuming change of wheelsets (bogies) performed by lifting each wagon upon crossing the border. It is a sight that can hardly be conveyed to Western audiences unless experienced in person. For the two neighboring countries sharing the same language and once part of the same polity, geographical proximity remains an illusion, long frustrated by infrastructure gaps and poor planning. Much like the Soviet-era train linking the two capitals, political will often stall at the border.
Conclusion and Epilogue – The Reconnect
Historically, Western strategic thinking conflated much of Eastern Europe with a buffer zone, a grey protective layer at the crossroads of great power territorial ambitions. This mindset is not only outdated but dangerously limiting. Eastern European countries, with a few notable exceptions (i.e.: the Baltics, Poland), became themselves exposed to strategic inertia as passive receivers of security under the clout of military alliances, engaged in a historical balancing act that fails to recognize the immediacy and specificity of today’s encroaching threats.
A credible regional deterrence posture would not supersede NATO’s collective defense. On the contrary, it is about creating layers of resilience. These layers must work in tandem with the alliance’s- strategic objectives of stabilizing and reinforcing its eastern flank while reducing the operational strain on NATO forces. This conversation ought to continue (or even commence) by acknowledging the sources of insecurity from within, which include a fragmented implementation of vital infrastructure projects, widespread corruption, delayed administrative reforms, crippling dependencies, lack of institutional continuity and memory, and strategic foresight. The territorial embeddedness of organized crime compounds vulnerabilities on a transnational scale and could magnify exponentially unless it is treated and acted upon as a security threat.
Furthermore, incorporating Ukraine’s reconstruction into a regional deterrence agenda would entail deeper partnerships in energy infrastructure, transport, and cybersecurity while providing support and oversight for domestic governance and judicial reforms. Over the years, conversations with civil societies in Ukraine, Romania, and Moldova have pointed to very similar aspirations and mutual grievances despite our governments’ decades-long failure in pursuing a more resolute and long-term oriented, strategic engagement with the neighborhood.
A Ukrainian friend who found refuge in Bucharest once candidly imparted that ‘We [in Ukraine] didn’t even have jokes about Romanians before the war.’ At societal levels in both countries, this statement reveals a psychological disconnect from realities unfolding just across the border. Yet, amid a tragic war, at least this gap is being bridged. To avoid losing important momentum, political will needs to catch up.
Additional graphs mentioned earlier in this article are listed below:
Graph 2: ENI Cross Border Sectoral Analysis
Graph 3: ESIF 2014-2020 Combined Graphs by Country & Achievement Indicators
Graph 4: ESIF 2022 (PL & RO) Combined Time Series Analysis
Graph 5: CEF Combined Graphs (RO-UA-MD projects & EU contribution