Turning West, Across the Gulf of Aden: The Houthis and al-Shabaab
Houthis’ own goals:
In June 2024, US intelligence claimed that the Houthis were discussing a deal that would involve weapon transfers to the al-Shabaab group. The nature of these negotiations suggested the transfer of advanced systems such as drones and surface-to-air-missiles. These would present a significant development when compared to the typical weapons (firearms, IEDs, and mortars) usually found in the Yemen-Somalia smuggling network. Considering the difference in capabilities between the Houthis and al-Shabaab, these trades could significantly strengthen al-Shabaab – though strategic considerations remain.
Illicit smuggling networks between Yemen and the Horn have been steadily growing for the last seven years, with a continuous increase in the quality and quantity of weapons smuggled. Work done by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GITOC) in 2020 showed that some of al-Shabaab’s weaponry acquired through the Yemen-Somalia network came directly through Iranian shipments meant for the Houthis. As the Institute for the Study of War notes, however, this is unlikely to be sanctioned trade, and instead a function of profit-seeking. Considering al-Shabaab’s and the Houthi’s sectarian differences this alliance is unlikely to be an ideological one, but rather a marriage of convenience against a common enemy: the United States.
What differentiates these recent agreements from those of the past is the explicitly referenced customer. Historically, weapons have flowed from Yemen to Somalia and then proliferated more broadly across the African continent. Iran has in turn profited from the illegal trade of weaponry, and the IRGC’s Quds Force has even supported “extremist groups and criminal networks” in the Horn directly through the selling of cheap Iranian oil. However, a formalized agreement such as the one being sketched in June of 2024 between the Houthis and al-Shabaab would open a new chapter of cooperation.
How much Iran might approve of the Houthis’ more independent extended smuggling networks is unclear. Iran provided al-Shabaab’s parent organization, al-Qaeda, with “sanctuary, training, weapons, and funds” throughout the early 2000s. Though we have generally conceived of the Sunni and Shia divide as diametrically opposed, the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” principle may apply. Iran’s own influence in the Horn of Africa implies they are more willing to cross over this ideological divide than previously thought. However, Tehran may not be so sanguine regarding the Houthis’ use of its transferred resources to achieve similar ends in the Horn of Africa.
To cast the Houthis as mere proxies of Iran fails to see the larger picture. The Houthis have increasingly attempted to distance their actions from their sponsors in Tehran. During the drone attack on Tel Aviv on July 19th, the Houthis insisted that “Iran had no part in the decision to attack Tel Aviv. We informed them afterward.” Brookings Institute also notes that the Houthis have at times undermined Iran’s own regional interests, such as when they declared a unilateral ceasefire with Saudi Arabia in 2019. The Houthis’ relationship with al-Shabaab might simply be another facet of this same pattern. An exclusive agent-receptor understanding of the Houthis’ relationship with Iran would be limiting and increasingly inaccurate; it is nonetheless important to note real material constraints binding the Houthis to Tehran.
What can the Houthis deliver?
By and large, the Houthis rely on Iran for many of its most sophisticated weaponry. As a result, the Houthi’s ability to transfer its weapons to al-Shabaab will likely be intertwined with its own domestic manufacturing capability or Iranian material assurances. Following Israel’s most recent strikes in Iran, questions have been raised over Iran’s ability to continue producing its solid-fuel ballistic missiles. Whatever missiles it can still produce might not be transferred toward the Houthis given Iran’s growing concerns over waning regional deterrence and a newly perceived vulnerability. The decreasing rate of Houthi strikes within the Red Sea since October might be a symptom of Iran’s diminishing material support for the group.
Previous escalations between Iran and Israel, such as those witnessed in April, had been met by an intensification of attacks on ships by the Houthis. All systems including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones were used at an increased clip between April and June.
Despite more recent direct attacks between Iran and Israel in September and October, the fall saw an overall diminishing of attacks that continued to steadily decline between August and November. This suggests that Tehran’s foreign policy calculus has changed and may suggest weakening support for the Houthis. Alternatively, this decrease in strikes might also represent a further decoupling between the Houthis’ and Tehran’s agenda. Iran’s previous feelings of relative comfort might have allowed it more freedom in its distribution of resources to more independent groups, but renewed vulnerability to Israeli strikes might require a foreign policy that is more closely aligned with Tehran’s core goals. What systems the Houthis have been using since September might better indicate their own production capacity, as well as their strategic rationale.
Recent attacks have been characterized by the increasing use of missile systems compared to drones, with drones increasingly being used as single systems instead of swarms. Between May and August, the average number of drones in each attack fluctuated between 2.5 and 2.9; in September and October, this number dropped to 1.2 and 2.0 respectively. Any value of above 3 is in a month with very few drone-based attacks; therefore, we believe the difference between the summer and fall represents a meaningful drop.
This suggests that the Houthis’ supply of drones is considerably more constrained when compared to the summer. We propose that the number of drones used between May and July may have been supplemented by Iranian shipments. Once these ceased due to Iran’s increasing domestic concerns, the number of drones launched more closely resembled Yemen’s domestic manufacturing capabilities. According to the US Treasury Department, the Houthis cooperate with Chinese-based companies for critical components required in the manufacturing of its drone programs which are in turn smuggled through Oman. A report by Conflict Armament Research has also shown a longer trend of growing Houthi autonomy in the construction of its UAVs. The decrease in attacks might not just represent its production capability but the Houthis’ own strategic calculations of decoupling from Tehran’s agenda. Still, the complexity of the drone manufacturing process should not be understated; even very simple drones rely on a complex web of often cutting-edge Western components, and we believe that material concerns outweigh strategic ones in this case.
While the Houthis continue to report manufacturing their own weapons systems, doubts have been cast. These critiques are generally directed at its advanced technologies such as the Hatem and Palestine-2 missiles which would likely have to be produced and delivered by Iran. Most ballistic missiles in the Houthis’ arsenal use comparatively simpler systems. The Houthis have also proven an interest in more diversified supply chains, having recently pursued ties with Russia to acquire anti-ship missiles. It should also be noted that the Houthis are likely in possession of independent motor construction capacity. Given the success of groups such as Hamas in the construction of basic ballistic systems under extraneous conditions, it is likely that the Houthis are able to form some domestic production. How scalable it is, and which systems this domestic production is used for, however, are both unknown.
Al-Shabaab’s Shopping List:
Though the Houthis might be able to produce ballistic missiles, there exist several strategic hurdles that make their transfer to al-Shabaab unlikely. Associated lead time, training, and costs, would render such a transfer vulnerable to adversarial strikes. Furthermore, the Houthis will likely have reservations about how effectively these systems would be employed by al-Shabaab. Considering the extensive infrastructure required to effectively deploy these assets, and al-Shabaab’s shaky hold on the northern Somali territory where strikes against American assets would be most feasible, the missile systems might be rendered a liability above all else.
Less complex systems such as the domestically produced Waid and Qasef drones might present a more attractive option. However, the environment that the Houthis and al-Shabaab find themselves in today is fundamentally different from the environment in which they were negotiating in June. The continuing use of these drones indicates that they still possess at least some ability to procure systems that al-Shabaab wants, but whether they consider the transfer of these systems to be worthwhile will depend on what al-Shabaab is willing to offer in return. This price will likely be steeper today than it would have been in June.
Conclusion:
The systems al-Shabaab would most likely want are the systems that the Houthis have seemed least willing to deploy. We believe that a reduction of Iranian support, the constraining of supply chains for domestic drone manufacturing via sanctions, increased military pressure on manufacturing facilities, and a renewed distancing between the Houthi agenda and Iran’s, have lessened the ability of the Houthis to supply al-Shabaab with UAVs.
More broadly, the Houthis’ growing comfort in creating new alliances across regional and ideological divides mirrors some of Tehran’s previous policies of strategic support previously provided to the Houthis themselves. Whether this will in the long term foster a new network of militant groups centered around growing Houthi capabilities remains to be seen.
