This is a well-developed and thought provoking piece. My comments are mainly questions, and I’ll admit up front that I haven’t been to Afghanistan, or am I anywhere close to being an Afghanistan scholar.

My read of this, as a strategy or basis for campaign design, is that it really requires the whole issue of governance to be re-thought. Rather than integrating tribes into a government (regardless of how federal or centralized), its more about building that government on the basis of the tribes in the first place. That concept alone will require re-thinking our approach and our definition of “Afghanistan” as a sovereign nation with a functioning government. As described, the tribes fill a “whole of society” role, not just security. Shouldn’t our “whole of government” approach be aligned in this way—PRT-type organizations focused on tribes, and not provinces? What is the utility of competing local government structures (tribes vs. provinces)?

The pitfalls that occur to me, along these lines, are that we will really be basing our long term commitment to Afghanistan on multiple commitments to individual tribes, rather than a collective commitment to a single Afghan government. Maj. Gant well describes how to engage a single tribe. What I would be concerned about is how we grow this to multiple tribes. He references “picking tribes”, and in one instance reflects on “What is his role in inter-tribal warfare?” This seems to me to be a big question. At some point, we will get involved in tribe vs. tribe issues (unless someone can tell me that Afghan tribes don’t fight or struggle with one another). We will possibly be in the position to have two Tribal Engagement Teams (TETs) arrayed against one another. I understand references to inter-tribal councils. Will we have to be prepared for “peace enforcement” measures to prevent “allied” tribes from fighting one another? Or do we pick winners and losers?

In his description of the tribal environment, it really sounds like the Taliban and the current Government of Afghanistan both have the same goal: the recognition and authority as the sovereign rulers of a unified Afghanistan. In each case, this comes at some potential expense to the authority and autonomy of the tribes. The comment keeps cropping up that the Taliban don’t need to “win”, they just need to avoid losing. I would assert that while this may be the strategy while we are there, their ultimate strategy is to win—to become the effective local and national rulers of the country. I’m wondering if a tribal-based strategy isn’t really turning the tables on the Taliban. Rather than trying to “win” ourselves, we are just setting the stage to prevent them from achieving their national objectives through our web of tribal relationships. Rather than set up a central Afghan government, we merely establish, and manage, a web of security and economic relationships that must be constantly adjusted to keep the tribes strong enough to resist Taliban efforts towards either their destruction or assimilation. We also fight “not to lose.”

Phil Ridderhof

To Colonel Ridderhof: Compare the ineffective government in South Vietnam in our previous war to the government in Afghanistan. You are obviously a student of military history. Isn't Major Gant recommending the same project we began with the Montengnards in South Vietnam? Didn't they have the same beefs with authority? The government did not care about them and could not protect them from Viet Cong and NVA enemies in their areas. The Special Forces that trained with them, embedded with them and fought with them gained their trust and confidence. Aren't we just trying to dry up the swamp in Afghanistan to get rid of Al Qaeda, its sanctuaries and other anti-west terrorists with global reach? In the short term, it seems that the embed strategy must be done to deny the Taliban the tribes they need to support them. Long term, after Al Qaeda, what does Afghanistan really mean to us? Do we really care if it ever develops into a real nation? So we have several pacts with tribes in the area. We have done this before. Our strategic interests are best met by embed with the tribes and direct support of tribes that are pro US and anti-Taliban/Al Qaeda. Nation building is the height of folly in a nation where most people have no education and no understanding of the modern world. The tribe is the governmental unit that they understand and that will endure long after our war. We should be flexible and not try to reinvent the wheel. Use what works.

There can be a solution to the opium problem. It can be converted to biofuel (biodiesel, JP). Even better, convince them to convert to Marijuana since it requires less labor and is an even better source of biofuel plus textiles. NGO's could help in the construction of refineries.

MAJ Gant's paper will hopefully be read by those who can write his orders to return to Manguel. He is needed there much more than he is needed in Iraq.

Salaam eleikum Y'all!

Major Gant gets it right!Many of us have been calling for such an appoach.. Tribes and states have been in conflict since the invention of the state 5500 BCE... What is happening in Afghanistan is the interaction of a corrupt state with ideologically motivated tribal entities. The tribes have a thin overlay of Al Qaeda globalist Islam but the heart is still Pushtunwali first, Islam second and Pushtun nationalism third.Iran and Pakistan are experiencing a similar situation in Baluchistan. If the Pakistanis could be awakend from their India fixation, they would realize that crushing the Taliban is in their vital interest and necessary for the survival of the current Pakistani state. The only solution in Afghanistan is a tough anti-corruption compaign centered on the Police and a longterm commitment to the villages and tribes with embedded troops/contractors along the lines of the Marine CAP Program. Of course in some areas the tribes are hollow memories but the local villagers can function in a similar manner.
currahee y'all

Working with the tribes is our only option for success in Afghanistan. I am not sure that the US Army command structure is capable of managing these operations.

One great fallacy is that there is no national government in Afghanistan. That idea is a western illusion not shared by the tribes or the insurgents.

Another problem is the use of the word Taliban. This word had meaning 15 years ago, now it loosely describes any one opposed to the coalition forces. It dignifies criminals and leads us to think that any one who opposes the coalition is part of an organized movement.

The issue of narcotics must be dealt with. The instability in Afghanistan is fueled by billions of heroin dollars. We should buy it from the farmers at market prices and work long term to change the environment.

This was filmed in the Pesch Valley:
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/05/19/60II/main618513.shtml?source=search_story

Why nobody thought about early swiss history as a very long-term solution surprises me.
Tribes, difficult terrain and most of all strong will eventually forming a tribal confederation (even named after a tribe, the helvetii) becoming one of the richest nations on earth. Happy end.

Can't access the linked blog from .mil account. Can we please host the document here so the rest of us can read it?

CJ,

What link are you referencing? If it is copyright protected we can't host it.

Dave

'http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/2009/10/one-tribe-at-a-time-4-the-full-document-at-last/'

Can't repost it here it is copyright protected.

I am a fan of Major Gants approach but acknowledge that the evidence in the following paper suggest that it would be futile.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/19595786/My-Cousins-Enemy-is-My-Friend-A-Study-of-Pashtun-Tribes-

It may be that the Pashtun tribal system may be too fragmented and uncertain to form a foundation for nation or state building. However, would it still not be suitable for something more modest, say, a network of tribes/villages/communities organized for self-protection from Taliban coercion? Just because a tribal approach may not be a magic bullet doesn't mean that it wouldn't be useful.

Reference the Swiss comment: When I was there as on a BCT staff in '06 and '07, we regularly, if informally, discussed the futility of attempting to impose a Western European social democracy on Afghanistan. As it happens, during the course of those discussions the Swiss model was often brought up as an alternative approach, adjusted for the obvious cultural and historical differences.

The problem with MAJ Gant's excellent piece, as I see it, is three-fold. In the first place, for a variety of reasons, such a strategy strikes me as politically unpalatable. If nothing else, it would mean a sea change in our approach to the GOA. Secondly, pursuing it would demand qualities of the general purpose force that I am not sure we possess in sufficient quantity. Finally, imagine the level of risk acceptance required on the part of senior leadership . . .

All together I suspect these hurdles make this approach infeasable. Of course, if he's right (I think he is) and it's the only way to win, and if I'm right about the feasibility of the approach (I hope I'm not) . . . well, the implications are unpleasant to say the least.

Mr. Henderson,

Maj. Gant's approach does not necessarily mean an abandonment of the GOA. What we have with the Karzai government is like a clogged pipe; we simply do a 'workaround' for the time being by channeling aid and effort directly to the Locals and by-pass the central government in this aspect while continuing other efforts with the GOA.

TS,

I didn't say "abandon," I said a "sea change." Right now we are, as a matter of policy both de jeur and de facto, attempting to organize a government in Kabul which will serve as the source of legitimacy for any local arrangement. At least implicit in MAJ Gant's recommended COA is an approach wherein legitimacy flows from the periphery to the center -- a very different way of looking at governance. These two approaches are incompatible in the long run.

Incidentally, the current approach is based on the presupposition about the nature of political legitimacy that underlies European government. The alternate COA, at its root, is similar to the presupposition that drove our own system, at least for most of our history. I suspect this is one of the unacknowledged and misunderstood reasons why we have a hard time coordinating COIN with our European brothers.

Of course, the extent to which our own national security decision making elite do or even can share the "legitimacy is bestowed by the perphery on the center" perspective is itself debatable . . . All in all, a sticky wicket, as they say.

To Douglas J:

After reading the article you linked I can only say that, overall, it REINFORCES Maj. Gant's approach rather than refutes it.

The main point of the article is that the term "tribes" with regard to Afghanistan is misleading and would be better replaced by the term or concept of "Locals." I believe that this is Maj. Gant's approach as well, acknowledging that tribal engagement will be different and flexible depending upon the locality.