This is a well-developed and thought provoking piece. My comments are mainly questions, and I’ll admit up front that I haven’t been to Afghanistan, or am I anywhere close to being an Afghanistan scholar.

My read of this, as a strategy or basis for campaign design, is that it really requires the whole issue of governance to be re-thought. Rather than integrating tribes into a government (regardless of how federal or centralized), its more about building that government on the basis of the tribes in the first place. That concept alone will require re-thinking our approach and our definition of “Afghanistan” as a sovereign nation with a functioning government. As described, the tribes fill a “whole of society” role, not just security. Shouldn’t our “whole of government” approach be aligned in this way—PRT-type organizations focused on tribes, and not provinces? What is the utility of competing local government structures (tribes vs. provinces)?

The pitfalls that occur to me, along these lines, are that we will really be basing our long term commitment to Afghanistan on multiple commitments to individual tribes, rather than a collective commitment to a single Afghan government. Maj. Gant well describes how to engage a single tribe. What I would be concerned about is how we grow this to multiple tribes. He references “picking tribes”, and in one instance reflects on “What is his role in inter-tribal warfare?” This seems to me to be a big question. At some point, we will get involved in tribe vs. tribe issues (unless someone can tell me that Afghan tribes don’t fight or struggle with one another). We will possibly be in the position to have two Tribal Engagement Teams (TETs) arrayed against one another. I understand references to inter-tribal councils. Will we have to be prepared for “peace enforcement” measures to prevent “allied” tribes from fighting one another? Or do we pick winners and losers?

In his description of the tribal environment, it really sounds like the Taliban and the current Government of Afghanistan both have the same goal: the recognition and authority as the sovereign rulers of a unified Afghanistan. In each case, this comes at some potential expense to the authority and autonomy of the tribes. The comment keeps cropping up that the Taliban don’t need to “win”, they just need to avoid losing. I would assert that while this may be the strategy while we are there, their ultimate strategy is to win—to become the effective local and national rulers of the country. I’m wondering if a tribal-based strategy isn’t really turning the tables on the Taliban. Rather than trying to “win” ourselves, we are just setting the stage to prevent them from achieving their national objectives through our web of tribal relationships. Rather than set up a central Afghan government, we merely establish, and manage, a web of security and economic relationships that must be constantly adjusted to keep the tribes strong enough to resist Taliban efforts towards either their destruction or assimilation. We also fight “not to lose.”

Phil Ridderhof

To Colonel Ridderhof: Compare the ineffective government in South Vietnam in our previous war to the government in Afghanistan. You are obviously a student of military history. Isn't Major Gant recommending the same project we began with the Montengnards in South Vietnam? Didn't they have the same beefs with authority? The government did not care about them and could not protect them from Viet Cong and NVA enemies in their areas. The Special Forces that trained with them, embedded with them and fought with them gained their trust and confidence. Aren't we just trying to dry up the swamp in Afghanistan to get rid of Al Qaeda, its sanctuaries and other anti-west terrorists with global reach? In the short term, it seems that the embed strategy must be done to deny the Taliban the tribes they need to support them. Long term, after Al Qaeda, what does Afghanistan really mean to us? Do we really care if it ever develops into a real nation? So we have several pacts with tribes in the area. We have done this before. Our strategic interests are best met by embed with the tribes and direct support of tribes that are pro US and anti-Taliban/Al Qaeda. Nation building is the height of folly in a nation where most people have no education and no understanding of the modern world. The tribe is the governmental unit that they understand and that will endure long after our war. We should be flexible and not try to reinvent the wheel. Use what works.

There can be a solution to the opium problem. It can be converted to biofuel (biodiesel, JP). Even better, convince them to convert to Marijuana since it requires less labor and is an even better source of biofuel plus textiles. NGO's could help in the construction of refineries.

MAJ Gant's paper will hopefully be read by those who can write his orders to return to Manguel. He is needed there much more than he is needed in Iraq.

Salaam eleikum Y'all!

Major Gant gets it right!Many of us have been calling for such an appoach.. Tribes and states have been in conflict since the invention of the state 5500 BCE... What is happening in Afghanistan is the interaction of a corrupt state with ideologically motivated tribal entities. The tribes have a thin overlay of Al Qaeda globalist Islam but the heart is still Pushtunwali first, Islam second and Pushtun nationalism third.Iran and Pakistan are experiencing a similar situation in Baluchistan. If the Pakistanis could be awakend from their India fixation, they would realize that crushing the Taliban is in their vital interest and necessary for the survival of the current Pakistani state. The only solution in Afghanistan is a tough anti-corruption compaign centered on the Police and a longterm commitment to the villages and tribes with embedded troops/contractors along the lines of the Marine CAP Program. Of course in some areas the tribes are hollow memories but the local villagers can function in a similar manner.
currahee y'all

Working with the tribes is our only option for success in Afghanistan. I am not sure that the US Army command structure is capable of managing these operations.

One great fallacy is that there is no national government in Afghanistan. That idea is a western illusion not shared by the tribes or the insurgents.

Another problem is the use of the word Taliban. This word had meaning 15 years ago, now it loosely describes any one opposed to the coalition forces. It dignifies criminals and leads us to think that any one who opposes the coalition is part of an organized movement.

The issue of narcotics must be dealt with. The instability in Afghanistan is fueled by billions of heroin dollars. We should buy it from the farmers at market prices and work long term to change the environment.

This was filmed in the Pesch Valley:
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/05/19/60II/main618513.shtml?source=search_story

Why nobody thought about early swiss history as a very long-term solution surprises me.
Tribes, difficult terrain and most of all strong will eventually forming a tribal confederation (even named after a tribe, the helvetii) becoming one of the richest nations on earth. Happy end.

Can't access the linked blog from .mil account. Can we please host the document here so the rest of us can read it?

CJ,

What link are you referencing? If it is copyright protected we can't host it.

Dave

'http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/2009/10/one-tribe-at-a-time-4-the-full-document-at-last/'

Can't repost it here it is copyright protected.

I am a fan of Major Gants approach but acknowledge that the evidence in the following paper suggest that it would be futile.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/19595786/My-Cousins-Enemy-is-My-Friend-A-Study-of-Pashtun-Tribes-

It may be that the Pashtun tribal system may be too fragmented and uncertain to form a foundation for nation or state building. However, would it still not be suitable for something more modest, say, a network of tribes/villages/communities organized for self-protection from Taliban coercion? Just because a tribal approach may not be a magic bullet doesn't mean that it wouldn't be useful.

Reference the Swiss comment: When I was there as on a BCT staff in '06 and '07, we regularly, if informally, discussed the futility of attempting to impose a Western European social democracy on Afghanistan. As it happens, during the course of those discussions the Swiss model was often brought up as an alternative approach, adjusted for the obvious cultural and historical differences.

The problem with MAJ Gant's excellent piece, as I see it, is three-fold. In the first place, for a variety of reasons, such a strategy strikes me as politically unpalatable. If nothing else, it would mean a sea change in our approach to the GOA. Secondly, pursuing it would demand qualities of the general purpose force that I am not sure we possess in sufficient quantity. Finally, imagine the level of risk acceptance required on the part of senior leadership . . .

All together I suspect these hurdles make this approach infeasable. Of course, if he's right (I think he is) and it's the only way to win, and if I'm right about the feasibility of the approach (I hope I'm not) . . . well, the implications are unpleasant to say the least.

Mr. Henderson,

Maj. Gant's approach does not necessarily mean an abandonment of the GOA. What we have with the Karzai government is like a clogged pipe; we simply do a 'workaround' for the time being by channeling aid and effort directly to the Locals and by-pass the central government in this aspect while continuing other efforts with the GOA.

TS,

I didn't say "abandon," I said a "sea change." Right now we are, as a matter of policy both de jeur and de facto, attempting to organize a government in Kabul which will serve as the source of legitimacy for any local arrangement. At least implicit in MAJ Gant's recommended COA is an approach wherein legitimacy flows from the periphery to the center -- a very different way of looking at governance. These two approaches are incompatible in the long run.

Incidentally, the current approach is based on the presupposition about the nature of political legitimacy that underlies European government. The alternate COA, at its root, is similar to the presupposition that drove our own system, at least for most of our history. I suspect this is one of the unacknowledged and misunderstood reasons why we have a hard time coordinating COIN with our European brothers.

Of course, the extent to which our own national security decision making elite do or even can share the "legitimacy is bestowed by the perphery on the center" perspective is itself debatable . . . All in all, a sticky wicket, as they say.

To Douglas J:

After reading the article you linked I can only say that, overall, it REINFORCES Maj. Gant's approach rather than refutes it.

The main point of the article is that the term "tribes" with regard to Afghanistan is misleading and would be better replaced by the term or concept of "Locals." I believe that this is Maj. Gant's approach as well, acknowledging that tribal engagement will be different and flexible depending upon the locality.

Why we were not "going tribal" in the past several years is bewildering. Jim Gant is spot on.

MAJ Jim Gant’s essay “One Tribe at a Time” lays down a powerful and compelling argument for greater emphasis on working through indigenous tribes and irregular forces in Afghanistan. In other words, complimenting our existing strategy with more Tribal Engagement and Remote Area Operations. Gant’s thesis essentially states that tribes are the key to social order and stability in Afghanistan and that any successful strategy must not only focus on gaining their allegiance, but enlisting them in the fight to wrestle control of their land from the Taliban. He drives the point home with a personal narrative that rings far more authentic and authoritative than any academic ponderings possibly could. His straightforward and plainspoken paper effectively captures the essence of an argument that has been difficult for many Special Forces officers to articulate, even to others within their own ranks.
Traditional social networks, like the tribes in Afghanistan, are absolutely the key to stabilizing a country that has no recent history of effective governance. Identity in Afghanistan is first and foremost tribal. This tribal identity greatly overshadows national and even religious allegiances. Yet, our own preconceptions and highly modernist ideas about state formation have largely blinded us to this reality. Even worse, some of our actions over recent years have attempted to rapidly reform that identity to make it fit within a liberal democratic state order. These actions ignore the fact that identities don’t change; they evolve. Moreover, the evolution of identity takes generations, not years. Therefore, the only feasible course of action is one that capitalizes and builds upon that identity, while working over time to assist it’s evolution.
MAJ Gant’s personal narrative echoes the views expressed in a 2007 Strategic Studies Institute paper “Making Riflemen from Mud: Restoring the Army’s Culture of Irregular Warfare” by LTC James Campbell. In it, Campbell details the historical experience of the US Army working by, with and through indigenous irregular forces throughout its history. He convincingly points out that irregular forces were assumed to be an essential enabler to almost any US military operation prior to WWII. His recount of history from the French and Indian War through the Philippine Insurrection shows that irregulars are particularly well suited for roles and missions such as: reconnaissance, scouting, constabulary force, interpreters, guerrillas, counter-guerillas, rear area or flank security, guides, agents, spies, village self-defense, and in limited cases even main force operations.
The significance of “One Tribe at a Time” is three fold. First, it insists that a successful and enduring Afghan government must be built upon the existing tribal social structure, especially at the provincial level and below. Second, it calls upon American strategists to incorporate the irregular capacity of the tribes to contribute to their own security as a critical enabling effort to the new campaign design. Third, it calls upon Special Operations community to critically evaluate the balance and emphasis of its current contribution to overall campaign.
The emerging campaign plan for Afghanistan appears designed to achieve greater security by massing more forces in populated areas as part of a clear, hold and build strategy. MAJ Gant’s proposal to employ irregular forces in remote areas provides a feasible, acceptable and suitable means of creating the economy of force required in the rural areas to achieve that mass in population centers. According to Colin Gray, economy of force, especially through unorthodox means, is one of two “master claims of SOF”. While MAJ Gant calls for the creation of a new force for Tribal Engagement and Remote Area Operations, his own successful actions as a Special Forces detachment commander doing just that suggest that there is an organization capable and ready for that mission.

MAJ John Litchfield, US Army
16 Dec 2009

Jim,
I read it again and I am still on board. We Green Berets are extremely good at working in environments that do not require command and control from the heavy brass; we are good at commo in the most remote places; we can survive the harshness of the Afghanistan environment when others would fail. I believe that Green Berets are a unique breed of man that accepts chaos, confusion, living without resources, and making it all work. There is definitely a strategic impact that Green Berets can have as soon as we get out of the business of conventional approaches and risk aversion. You have given us a great framework in which to use and I hope we are man enough at the highest levels to take a chance. To counter the national news, Afghanistan is more secure than one is led to believe; even in Helmand Province (my personal paradise) we can do more engagements with the tribes. It works, we did it within the area of our firebase and it proved to be advantageous for force protection. It was very slow in development and would have taken another few months in order to meet my goal but my rotation ended early; the point being is that it works, some places faster than others, but it works. I will admit that my kinetic actions outweighed my non-kinetics but that is what the atmosphere called for then. Our non-kinetics, although small in number, proved very successful in our #1 goal of building rapport with the local populace. Around our firebase it was crawling with "bad guys" but they were eventually pushed out away from the firebase because the locals provided us with support in return for our support to them. I understand this is a simple example and does include the details but it is one that proved to me and my men that killing is not the absolute and we must be able to communicate with our foes in order to gain an understanding. The small group of ANA that we fought with had a great SGM and 1SG. We stood back and let them work and only got involved when the wolves were howling. The local populace respected the SGM and would be open and honest; the SGM was very good at calling their bluff or detecting deceit. This was the #1 advantage of the indirect approach and placed the responsibility of security on the IGoA through the ANA. USSF was involved but in a supporting role indirect approach) to the ANA. Green Berets are in this one for the long fight no matter what surges in and out of Afghanistan. We will have to work with locals in order to protect our future in their country. Politicians are counting the months before we can begin moving troops back home; Green Berets are counting the years they will endure maintaining a foot in the door. The pre-Bush administration removed us from Afghanistan on 2000 and we didn't have our ears to the ground to prevent our latest attack on America; that mistake will not happen again and it will be up to Green Berets to ensure that it doesn't. It all begins at the village level, not the other way around; bottom up with a push from top down. Sorry for the lengthy chat, just enjoying the reading.

To everyone who has posted comments about "One Tribe at a Time"...I have truly learned a lot through reading posts and comments about the paper, both the positive and negative ones. It has broadened and deepened my knowledge on the subject and forced me to ask myself a lot of questions, continue my research, and to think through many of the tactical, operational, and strategic problems and challenges associated with tribal engagemnet (TE). Steven Pressfield and I regularly discuss and work through many of the issues that are brought up on these pages.

The issues, problems, and challenges that have been discussed have convinced me even more that a large scale tribal engagment strategy (TES) is the way forward in Afghanistan. Doing it will not ensure "success"...but not doing it does ensure "failure".

STRENGTH AND HONOR

Jim Gant

Jim,

Thanks for an excellent paper and your service on the pointy end of the spear. Your paper has reopened my internal debate on the value versus risk (strategic not personal) of employing UW. The positive results of UW historically have tended to be temporary in nature (perhaps true of other forms of war also), while in the long run they "tend" to be detrimental (Burma, Philippines, Italy, Afghanistan against the Soviets, Afghanistan 2001/2, Iraq with Shi'a post Desert Storm, Kurds, etc.) to our interests if we're attempting to create long term stability. We tend to hype (and perhaps rightfully so) our UW successes, but my internal debate focuses on what is the value of largely operational successes that rarely result, and sometimes hinder, overall strategic success?

I know this feels like a gut shot to many in SF, but I have 29 years in SF (a couple more in the Army) and believe in UW where applicable, so trust me this is a painful argument for me also. I agree UW has great merit when applied as a business merger to accomplish limited objectives, and it has a great merit when a society is "truely" seeking liberation from an opprssive regime and is willing to fight for their freedom (though this is actually a rare occurance in history other than counter occupation campaigns, and now we're the occupiers).

On the other hand I agree with your comment that there is no other way to achieve what we're trying to achieve in Afghanistan (and perhaps some other locations), so perhaps the real issue is that your approach simply doesn't align with our current strategic objectives, and what needs to be changed is our strategic objectives (align them with reality, not neo-conservative goals), and then we can apply the UW strategy to achieve them. Food for thought.

Bill

(I have 29 years in SF)

Pardon the typo at the bottom of my last post, I was starting with bonafides, then decided to not to, but didn't catch it on final edit.

Jim,

I'd like to offer some comments on how to possibly broaden your one tribe approach into an operational construct. I'm sure that you've gotten some pushback from both Regular Army and SF b/c you are suggesting that we promote paramilitary forces with undetermined allegiances to the central government. This criticism is valid given our past history of using paramilitary forces in both UW and IR. So, a counter-argument must answer several questions:

1. What control measures do we place on the tribes we train, equip, and employ?
2. How do we integrate the various tribes into a working coalition to counter the Taliban?
3. How does the General Purpose Force assists this fight?

For the first two questions, I'd suggest using the existing political structures of the Shura Council and Jirga (sp?) to develop areas of operation, information sharing, and a semblance of command and control. If possible, have the Karzai gov't facilitate the negotiations with a long-term goal of integrating the tribal structures into the broader gov't on the back end. Think of the political side as an Articles of Confederation with the final goal of a Constitution once hostitilites cease. Enforcement of the treaty should remain on US forces. For example, if one tribe abuses its power and funding by attacking across boundaries and raiding another tribe, then penalties are enforced.

As for the US forces, we pick-up three main tasks: 1. Train, Equip, and Assist the Army and Police. 2. Secure the Major Cities. 3. Respond as a QRF for SF teams. 4. Clear denied areas.

Additionally, while the military is working security issues, we must provide freedom of maneuver and assitance to the NGOs to build the schools and facilitate micro-loans (not grants) for small business.

Thoughts?

Maj. Mike Few

Much easier to transfer this to the discussion board, but I'm looking forward to the answers from the members.

IMO

You can't really control these groups, instead you look for levers of influence, which SF is good at doing. However, if and when they decide to profit from the narcotics trade (or other illicit activity) there isn't much you're going to do about it. We have been trying to crack down on these criminal organizations for years with limited success.

Tribes and other resistance organizations "might" unify to fight a greater common threat, but once that unifying threat is defeated (Japan, Germany, Soviets, etc.) then they'll divide and fight among each other again until whatever conditions are established that allow a temporary or longer lasting peace. Putting U.S. troops in the fray won't change that, it will just force them to get caught up in a fight that isn't in our national interests.

GPF and SOF are mutually supporting in most cases, and the roles of each depends on strategy choosen to achieve the strategic ends.

We need to be realistic about human nature. Ever since the Wall came down in Berlin our nation has developed some ideas that are only supportable by optimism about a greater global social order, not the historical record.

Bill

Bill,

You are correct. Absolute control is an illusion; however, we do have options a bit more powerful than spheres of influence. If we have to arbitrate or intervene with a specific tribe for breaking a treaty, then we can cut-off funding, take their weapons away, and boycott them.

As for your hypothesis that everything can fall apart in the end, I would submit that is a possiblity regardless of our approach. To this end, I think that Jim Gant is suggesting the least-bad choice to a situation that we have commited.

The key in any endeavor is ultimately two-fold. First, the political officer- the ability to negoitiate workable treaties of power, money, and land-rights. Second, proximity of the military officer to accurately describe the situation on the ground.

Mike

I believe a 'one tribe at a time' approach is too tangled a web to navigate with any sort of good effect on a large scale. It can be effectively applied in limited areas where circumstances support. However, broadly applied, this concept will turn into a zero sum game that would very likely recreate the power struggle experienced in the early 1990's.

One of the important factors why the Awakening worked in Anbar was that Marines did not get bogged down in inter-tribal politics (for the most part). This was accomplished by primarily negotiating at the 'paramount sheik' level and leveraging/forcing this sheik to run his tribe in order to accomplish the endstate of the 'deal'. By doing this, it was the 'paramount sheik' who made the tough decisions regarding 'resource' allocation (be it CERP, checkpoint locations, detainee releases, reparations, etc.) based on his calculus and it was on him to sell/enforce his decisions to his subtribes. Had Marines tried to dictate to each subtribe what made sense to us based on fairness, it surely would have fractured the tribe and created pockets sympathetic to the INS that would have nullified whatever momentum was created in the first place.

In Afghanistan, there are no 'paramount sheiks' or even subtribe shieks with which to deal. Instead, there are tribal shuras. At which level within each tribe (subtribe, khel, clan) said shura has sufficient 'influence' over its land and people in order for us to effectively 'deal' with it is variable due to the fractured and non-contiguous nature of Pashtun tribes. This siutation is further complicated by pashtunwali, which will prevent the shura from being decisive in most circumstances...because we all know that there will be local winners and losers in doling out whatever 'influence' we are providing...and these losers will be obliged to avenge this slight. Without careful management, the second and third order effects of these decisions will ripple across boundaries and quickly outweigh the original benefits gained.

Tribal engagement is part of the solution but lasting stability starts with restoring a workable balance of power at the district level. In my opinion, 'One tribe at a time' as described further distorts this balance power vs contributes to it.

Great piece- really good job, Jim! You wouldn't believe how many people have emailed me this and are talking about it- even outside of the military and on Capitol Hill.

When I first read it I couldn't help to think of the obstacles to this approach (some of them already mentioned):

1) having to get the buy-in and cooperation of GIRoA
2) re-structuring our forces to support and execute such a strategy
3) selling the American people on what our interests are that merit such risk and possible losses

The more I think about it, though, the more I think it is a great tactical-level approach to most of the problems in Afghanistan. Since COIN is so much low-level anyway- this, IMO, would get at probably 70-90% of the problems--?

A HUGE challenge that has already been mentioned is the tying together of all the TET efforts into a TES- as you mention. An operational campaign plan to support this would require a very savvy approach and constant wheeling, dealing, and adaptation at our BCT, BN, SOTF, and B team levels- possibly something those staffs are incapable of--?

What kills me is why SOF didn't have a campaign plan that had portions of your TES as well as a plan for the cities and something for Pakistan as well, and tying it all together- for the post-Taliban rule era. CENTCOM has been blamed for not having a campaign plan for Afghanistan after the overthrow of the Taliban- but if SOF had had something like the TES we might could have avoided a lot of the pain and could now be trying to connect the tribes with the central government- without tons of conventional troops on FOBs. Lesson learned for TSOCs IMO: don't rely on a COCOM for a post-MCO campaign plan- do it yourself.

Good commentary. A couple of thoughts.

First, we all need to be relentless in pushing first for an Afghan government that the populace of Afghanistan believes is Legitimate. Without this, everything else we do is really a waste of time. (I stand by my position that the West needs to demand a comprehensive Loya Jirga, and then shut up and live by and support what comes out of it.)

The tribal efforts described by Jim have a very important role, as legitimacy here comes from the bottom up, not the top down. I constantly run into well intended smart people who use the terms "Official" and "Legitimate" as one and the same; but while the GiROA is "official" it all too often lacks "legitimacy" because of both its source and its lack of connection to the local populace where the ANSF operate.

This is where the tribal efforts come in, as they create tremendous "anchor points" if you will, where not only is there a zone of local securtiy and enfluence with full popular legitimacy; but also the presence of the SF team to connect them to other coalition and ANSF security forces operating in the area. Bringing "official" security and "legitimate" security together and allowing each to borrow from the other what they lack themselves (officialness to the legitimate force, and legitimacy to the official force).

I see this happening, and while it is a small, grassroots effort it does work. The keys will be:

1. Our commitment to not abandon those tribes who dare to place their trust in us and join such programs;

2. Our commitment to continue to dedicate high-value, low-density resources to such efforts;

3. And our development of a variety of ways to expand such efforts into the broader community, thinning and weaning them of the SOF that are critical for standing them up; and handing off effectively to conventional and ultimately, fully Afghan GiROA security institutions.

Sir,

Thank you for reading the paper and taking the time to post. I have enjoyed and learned from many of your articles.

I concur 100% with having a loyal Jirga where we offer an incredible amount of security - but we let them decide their leaders in their own way...

I really like what you said about "official" and "legitimate" and I also believe the use of TETs could be the linchpin in getting this accomplished.

The issue to me isn't if tribal engagement can work...me and men proved it could and many men before us proved it could be done...the question is:

1. Would they be supported by our own military?
2. Can we do it large scale?
3. Do we have the right type of people, who will give up the time necessary to make this work?
4. What are the long-term effects if we do this; and what are the long term effects if we don't?
5. How will this effect the FATA and the NWFP inside Pakistan?

Thanks again for writing Sir.

STRENGTH AND HONOR

Jim Gant - I am happy to see that you are open to comments and constructive criticism.

Therefore, wherever you are, please read this detailed, informed and insightful response to your article. It's everything that I want to say:

http://easterncampaign.wordpress.com/2010/01/18/petraeus-and-mcchrystal-drink-major-gants-snake-oil/

C.C.,

I opened your linked article with great anticipation, as I am always looking for keen insights to help shape my thinking.

Instead all I found were clever words criticising everything and offering nothing in return.

Disappointing. Not particularly surprising, but disappointing all the same.

Surely if you feel so strongly you must have some alternatives or derivative concepts to offer...

Bob

Why do you even need to meddle with the tribes in this way. The thinking behind this new strategy is so simplistic, the flaws in Gant's strategy have been perfectly highlighted by the link I provided above. Stop trying to behave like Lawrence of Arabia. I've personally spoken to people in areas where Special Forces are trying to 'advise, assist and lead local tribal security forces' and believe me they want nothing to do with them. The mere presence of SF among local communities is unwelcome, let alone any attempts to be 'buddies' and help them fight out their turf wars. Afghan government institutions need to be built up to help them do this, no one else should get involved. What Gant is proposing will only make things worse in the long-term. How can you pick sides when you clearly have no understanding of how complicated relations are between people?

It's almost laughable. Gant says 'when we gain the respect and trust of one tribe, in one area, there will be a domino effect will spread throughout the region and beyond'.

The only thing spreading like a domino effect is deep-rooted resentment due to indiscriminate SF search operations and abuse.