Within this context, what follows are observations from collective experience: the distilled essence of what those who went before learned. They are expressed as commandments, for clarity, but are really more like folklore. Apply them judiciously and skeptically.

David Kilcullen intended his Twenty-Eight Articles, Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency as a guide for the company commander facing a COIN operation. Since the article first circulated, hundreds of officers have served as company commanders and in other positions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this article some of those officers comment on how Kilcullen's thinking applied to their mission in theater. Other former or retired Soldiers measure Kilcullen's points against their own experiences in other countries, conflicts, and years. All -- including David Kilcullen -- are members of the community of interest at the Small Wars Journal and Council.

Part II (Articles 6 -- 12).

6. Find a political / cultural advisor. In a force optimized for counterinsurgency, you might receive a political/cultural adviser at company level: a diplomat or military foreign area officer, able to speak the language and navigate the intricacies of local politics.

CPT Kranc on troop command: Why did Special Forces (SF) traditionally conduct unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense missions? Because being culturally astute are SF imperatives in their doctrine. We, in the conventional force, were never trained that way. Good units pulled in people who knew what they were talking about. I remember learning a great deal from Dr. Hashim. Once in theater, I got hooked into a sheik's family who brought me up to speed on the specific cultural do's and don'ts in my area. It helped place my soldiers in my troop on a higher plain of understanding than other units in theater. Our performance and results spoke to that.

CPT Holzbach on platoon leadership: Your interpreter will be your local advisor. You can't trust them with too much info, just for basic OPSEC reasons, but they are priceless sources of local info on cultural norms.

MAJ Custis on battle captains: I found that the contract linguists are a remarkable source of ground-truth information, if you only listen to them. A lot of what they say has to be taken with a grain of salt, because they love rumors, but after you're done with the shaker, they still provide a lot of context. You'd be surprised what you can pick up over a cigarette and cup of tea.

MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: Tag, advisor you are it! Understand that you are your counterparts' advisor on the U.S. and especially U.S. and Coalition Forces. Moreover, you are the CF's advisor on the IA. As an advisor, you will also be called upon to represent your government and possibly to provide insights into your government's actions or possible actions -- have an understanding of your culture (what you like and dislike about it), avoid selling it as "the best"; and understand your politics.

MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: MAJ Thornton nails it on the head. You are it! Get politically/culturally smart as possible before arriving in theater. Develop a rapport plan during your train-up. Figure out as a team how you are going to gain a better understanding of your unit's culture (both regional and professional) and politics. Again, look to assign different areas to different personnel. You cannot do everything yourself. A rapport plan should break down different responsibilities based on the personalities of your team. If you have a more social NCO versus a Captain, have that NCO do more of your rapport building.

Former Captain Bill Meara on the role of military advisor in Central America: Cultural factors really do form the equivalent of a terrain feature that cannot be ignored. I started crashing up against cultural differences as a twenty year-old in Guatemala. How could those nice people be so cruel to their Indian Cinderella's? Later, my counterinsurgency classroom El Salvador, with my students who insisted on copying every slide and who refused to answer questions unless I'd previously given an answer provided more reminders that sometimes the foreigners really don't think like we do. In that contra rehabilitation center, I observed the inability of even sympathetic Americans to understand Nicaragua's wounded young. And then there was the contra witchcraft meeting, and all that that memorable incident said about the cultural divide that separates us from the world's peasant warriors.

Fluency in foreign languages is the indispensable key to understanding. Even with strong language skills, it is difficult for us to really understand people like the contras—without strong fluency, we have no chance of understanding them. We don't need people like that fellow from Washington who wandered uncomfortably through the contra camp until he found the English-speaking politico from Miami, or the colonel-crat from Ft. Bragg who seemed so proud of his inability to speak Vietnamese. In order to be effective, you need to be able to sit in those late-night clouds of cigarette smoke and coffee fumes and understand the anguished stories of peasant guerrillas. You need to know what they mean when you hear them referring to you as a "chele," and you definitely need to know the difference between hablando paja and haciendo paja! You need to be able to curse like a contra when necessary, and if you want to really understand them, you need to have a level of fluency that lets you feel the same goose bumps they feel when they sing that song about those who've been lost. If you can't do these things, you run the risk of never understanding them, of never seeing them as real, complicated human beings. You will be prone to seeing them as mono-dimensional caricatures, like the stereotyped characters of Doonesbury... From "Contra Cross --- Insurgency and Tyranny in Central America, 1979-1989" by William R. Meara Published by Naval Institute Press, 2006

SFC Reber on teams: I am inclined to cover articles 1 thru 6 under one category. Well informed, prepared and appropriately trained for Goma was the only way Colonel Odom and I made it through. One missing element would have spelled disaster for our two-man team. What he didn't cover, I did and vice versa. Neither of us had the time to check on the other but we knew each other quite well. When we got more help from visiting defense attachés, Colonel Odom placed them in the right spots. In some cases, he had to sort some out and one went home.

MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: To me this is one if not the key issue in Iraq today. Culturally sensitivity is often viewed as a weakness and when planning combat operations it must be used in the MDMP and mission analysis process. A school-trained cultural advisor per company may be a pipe dream, but does not mean the idea is dead. I believe that it is worth the cost, time, and commitment to train a guy per squad trained as a cultural advisor. This would pay off huge dividends in Iraq. If we cannot do it at the squad, then we need it at the platoon level, perhaps as another additional duty for someone. The person chosen would have to become an expert to the best of his ability. Language proficiency's importance cannot be overstated. Every soldier should know, study, and carry the Defense Language Institute language survival guide. A few words learned a week in train-up and a few words used in conversation on a mission can and will pay huge dividends in a COIN environment.

LTC Odom on country teams: This goes back to point one; never stop seeking knowledge. I sought others' opinions. But be a questioning seeker of such knowledge. I have met FAOs whose actual time on the ground was almost none. I have served with Foreign Service Officers who had years inside a single country but never learned a thing. And on interpreters, always filter what they say to you through the prism of agenda: why are they telling you what they are telling you?

MAJ McDermott on company command: See point one, and then find a local and develop the trusted network. You are going to have to rely on your interpreter and whatever else you might have learned in your education and career. Understand that sometimes your subordinates might know more than you, listen to them.

MAJ McDermott on MiTT: Find a couple of honest broke interpreters. They often can give you some very good insights into what is going on in a unit. Make sure you visit with the soldiers and the NCO's. You can learn a lot about the units morale and capabilities from these guys. Key is developing a relationship with an interpreter to the point that you trust one another with your respective lives because that is what your are really doing in the long run.

7. Train the squad leaders, then trust them. Counterinsurgency is a squad and platoon leader's war, and often a private soldier's war.

CPT Kranc on troop command: On the high intensity battlefield, I, as a troop commander, can maneuver individual sections much easier than the COIN environment. The abilities of my junior leaders are paramount to everything I do. They conduct independent operations. Most of my patrols in my troop were lead by an E5 or E6. I had 3 officers in my troop. They couldn't be everywhere. I, as did my PLs, had to trust my NCOs to do the right thing constant with the commander's intent I wrote.

CPT Holzbach on platoon leadership: Ensure that your NCOs are applying Article 1 before and during the deployment. Make it formal training if you must. It is the nature of NCOs to take pride in their job and their performance of that job. If you make Article 1 part of their job, you'll have squad leaders and patrol leaders who you will be able to trust. Always ask for their advice. Give them a sense of ownership of any particular mission, and then let them execute. This is basic leadership.

MAJ Custis on battle captains: Get your COC people to as much formal and informal training as possible, even if it means foregoing multiple COC exercises. The Battle NCOs may think that steady state operations are mind numbing, but when you have rockets impacting around the COC, troops in contact, and a developing CASEVAC situation, a properly trained NCO truly shines. My battalion had an ops idiot savant who amazed me daily with his ability to pull in COP feeds, re-wire the COC after displacement, and sense when things needed to happen. He was a graduate of an operations specialist course, and it paid off during both deployments.

MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: Advisors on a small team have to be allowed the type of decentralized independence to get things done. Running a MiTT like a rifle company is counterproductive.

MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: You are a small unit, not a company or platoon. Build trust in your subordinates early and gain a good understanding of both their strengths and weaknesses. Understand their strengths and harness those to gain results. Work on or avoid exposing their weaknesses to your FSFs to both save face on their part and prevent any doubt in your team's competence from bubbling to the surface.

MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: NCOs and even soldiers make strategic decisions on the battlefield in a matter of seconds. Trusting them to make the right decision is not even a question. That bond of trust and confidence is only developed if we train them, develop them, inform them, and trust them on a daily basis. There is no close-hold information about a sector; you cannot hold back information they may need to make a decision. There simple is no room for micro-management here. Every soldier is a decision maker in COIN.

LTC Odom on country teams: The smallest possible unit is two. There is neither time nor people to allow the luxury of micro-managing a two-person shop in a place like Goma, Zaire or Kigali, Rwanda. I had to first assess that my fellow team members knew their job and then let them do it.

MAJ McDermott on company command: COIN is about decentralized operations this means you are going to have to balance risk against security. If you as a company commander don't have the confidence in you platoons and squads to go out and do great things alone, then you need to take a good look at yourself in the mirror. You have the responsibility to get these guys ready to go out do these missions. If they can't successfully do theirs, you are not going to be successful in yours.

MAJ McDermott on MiTT: A MiTT is basically a squad, MiTT's need to find out one another's strengths are task organize accordingly so that there isn't a drop off in capability while on operations.

8. Rank is nothing: talent is everything. Not everyone is good at counterinsurgency. Many people don't understand the concept, and some who do can't execute it.

CPT Kranc on troop command: Goes back to the rule of thirds that Tom Ricks talks about in Fiasco. Some are really good at COIN, some suck. Some of our best COIN operators are E5s and E4s who are out there every day. They understand how 2nd and 3rd order effects work. They see them up close and personal.

CPT Holzbach: You'll have to work with the soldiers and NCOs Uncle Sam gives you. Many Joes will not "get" counterinsurgency, usually because of inadequate training. You must constantly work to improve this problem by explaining why you're doing whatever it is you're doing. This will be especially difficult if one of your soldiers gets killed. Your platoon will want to take the gloves off. After one of my soldiers was killed, an E-5 I had stated that it would be effective if we dropped HE mortar rounds on one of the neighborhoods until the locals gave up the bad guys. This was mostly just blowing off steam, but you have to cut it off immediately. Explain that such things have been tried before by less civilized nations, and they don't work.

Of equal importance is to seriously examine your own COIN abilities. Just because you're reading this article does not mean you're good at COIN, or will become good at it. If you have an E-3 who really seems talented at this stuff, ask for his opinion. Rank is nothing.

MAJ Custis on battle captains: See article 7. If the square peg won't fit into the round hole, keep searching until you find a fit.

MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: This goes with point 7. I would add that a guy who comes to do one thing might not be very good at that one thing. You must put your round pegs in round holes and your square ones in square holes. Trying to force the issue is a waste of time and talent. Some of my best team members took on responsibilities that fell outside their MOS. We had two fire support NCOs, but little need to call for fire. One proved to be a fantastic collection manager and detainee affairs specialist. The other was very adept at Adobe Photoshop; he became my IO specialist.

MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: This is an important statement for future advisors to understand. Substitute "advisory work" for "counterinsurgency." Serving as an effective advisor is not for everyone. Just because an officer or NCO has had a successful career up to this point is not an indicator of their ability to advise FSFs. Take a look at the type of person T.E. Lawrence was, a loner, truly in love with the language, culture and with little to no military training. Was his lack of military training a hindrance? On the contrary, it was a huge benefit. Lawrence did not have any of the preconceived notions of "proper" warfare during his time as an advisor to the Bedouin forces. Take a hard look at the character of your team members. If you have someone who just does not "get it", seriously look to replace that team member.

MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: Once again you have to tailor your teams to your mission profile and the personalities of the team, whatever size element that "team" may be. Some teams are better at some things than others. Waiting until you are in country in a COIN fight is not the place to develop a team. Exploit the apparent strengths of your teams and subtly work on weaknesses if possible. Just tell me what to do and not how to do it and you may be pleasantly surprised.

SFC Reber on teams: Colonel Odom mentioned me several areas on the Small Wars Council. I don't consider what I did extraordinary. Most good NCO and Officer teams can perform equally well, providing they know what they're getting into. Fixing Colonel Odom's phone so it would last for days, scrounging disposable weapons, and running logistics support for the Joint Task Force were all based on my knowledge of the country coupled with the situation at hand.

LTC Odom on country teams: Just as you assess who can do a job and leave them to it, you must weed out those who cannot. COIN and stability operations environments exhibit the strategic compression of action and events. A single talented individual can do wonders; a lesser-talented individual can be disastrous. Working three different languages, Sergeant First Class Reber negotiated and coordinated multi-national use of an over crowded airfield in Goma. A field grade officer I had working for me in contrast ended up going home early when he proved unable to work in that environment.

MAJ McDermott on company command: You have to —to take an honest look at your subordinate leaders. You also have to be —to move people around based on strengths. This means don't let the administrative burden prevent you from doing what needs to be done. That being said, rank does matter. You have to observe your guys and determine who should work with whom in order to offset any large gaps in capability between people (i.e. kick ass team leaders with a week squad leader, etc.).

MAJ McDermott on MiTT: With your partner unit, you have to enable the chain-of-command to develop into an effective tool. This means that you have to look at the long term systemic fix as being the better course of action than the short term immediate fix. A pratfall is utilizing an Iraqi platoon leader over the company commander based on capabilities of the two individuals. You have to empower the leaders, or else you going to create an undisciplined mob that will not fight well. Work with you partner unit in developing and appointing good subordinate leaders. Help your counterpart identify and place into leadership roles those junior officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers that should be in positions of responsibility based on merits, not other non-relevant reasons.

9. Have a game plan. The final preparation task is to develop a game plan: a mental picture of how you see the operation developing.

CPT Kranc on troop command: It may be surprising to you that many units go into an area without one. This ties back into points 1-4.

CPT Holzbach: This will rest heavily on your commander's intent. Depending on how much freedom you have to control your own AO, you may need to develop a fairly detailed, long-term plan.

MAJ Custis on battle captains: Treat the deployment as a marathon, not a sprint. Rehearse your actions in garrison and develop a rough plan to support ops in the area of operations, but don't become enamored with that plan. Don't be afraid to employ tricks you pick up during the relief in place and transfer of authority (RIP/TOA). It wasn't until we'd been in country for over four months and had fought the second battle of Fallujah that our battle captain system really started to click and run smoothly. During a RIP in Ramadi, we even stole some tactics, techniques, and procedures from the Army.

MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: Here the advisor helps the counterpart to develop a "vision" with the understanding that you the advisor have a one-year shelf life!

MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: This starts at your training location. Whether its at Fort Riley or another location, sit down with your team and start building a game plan. Include rapport, culture, advising and team survivability in that plan. Will it change once you get with your unit? Absolutely. Your plan is like a fighting position...you are constantly improving it whenever you have time. But It is better to take the time while in CONUS to develop a plan rather than wait until you are in the 130 degree heat worried about IEDs in country. Start planning EARLY!!!

MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: It is critical to develop a game plan or vision, but not a rigid one. When reality smacks you in the face, your plan or vision will change once in theater due to a number of competing priorities. Don't resist it, "knowing your neighborhood" means being able to remain flexible and change your priorities based on the needs of your clients-the people of your sector.

LTC Odom on country teams: Anything you do outside a plan is probably reactive or at best opportunistic. As Defense Attaché in Goma, Zaire I had a 6-person team drawn from missions in four different countries. As Defense Attaché in Kigali, Rwanda I wrote an inter-agency campaign for Rwandan recovery plan that was accepted at U.S. European Command. In the same capacity, I made sure that my team --whether my non-commissioned officer assistant and me or a larger group--understood what we were trying to do and how we would seek to do it. The only times that my team and I had problems was when someone got "off plan".

MAJ McDermott on company command: Understand where you make a difference as a Company Commander. Have a plan that will support what you have to achieve in the non-lethal range of operations as an individual against what you have to do as a leader. This means you are going to have to develop what your command team is going to divide up as far as responsibilities. You are going to have to empower subordinates to make decisions in your absence, you have to plan on this. You are going to have to develop a plan based on your pre-deployment training of how you and your company leadership are going to interact with the local leadership. Do you as the commander always take the lead, or are you going to appear for special events in order to increase the bargaining power of your subordinates, and therefore your own bargaining power. You have to develop this plan before you deploy, and you have to make sure all of your subordinates understand it.

MAJ McDermott on MiTT: You have to plan on living with your unit, and sticking to that plan. You might get the opportunity to live elsewhere, you have to avoid the temptation to become a "commuter" advisor by living on an American FOB. The important plan you have as an advisor is realizing that you are not fighting with a US unit, and that you have to plan on reducing the friction between your unit and the American units in the area. Your primary responsibility as a MiTT is increasing your unit's capability. This means that you have to focus your plan on your unit, not the individuals. Define your success on the improvement and success of your unit, not your individual counterpart. For everything else, plan on being flexible.

10. Be there. The first rule of deployment in counterinsurgency is to be there. You can almost never outrun the enemy. If you are not present when an incident happens, there is usually little you can do about it. So your first order of business is to establish presence.

CPT Kranc on troop command: Near and dear to my heart. As a reconnaissance tactics instructor, it's my job to communicate to the force that reconnaissance and surveillance planning and operations work in COIN just like they do in high intensity environments. If you're unable to place effective fires at the critical point and time (which in COIN is 3-7 seconds) you'll lose the engagement. Developing named areas of interest (NAIs) on areas that have high improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and over watching them will eliminate IEDs in given area. Again, goes back to IPB and planning

CPT Holzbach: If you know what's going on in your neighborhood, you can be present for any important local events (if your invited). But this mostly goes back to spending as much time with the locals as is feasible. Living amongst them is the ideal.

MAJ Custis on battle captains: As a battle captain, you can't be there if you are exhausted. Those days will come for sure, but the companies outside the wire deserve better, and if you are starting a 12-hour watch after only fours hours of sleep because you were playing Xbox, then you are simply negligent. Build a duty rotation like Marine Security Guard duty. Try to give the battle staff time off, if possible. At one point when we were in Ramadi for a few months, our rotation had it where the battle captain and his NCO could have 36 hours off, after a 3-day duty period. It keeps everyone rested and maintains his or her sanity. You will need it when the worst days come. Another component to "being there" is to have a semblance of depth. My task force had to split to support the Fallujah fight, and we learned the hard lesson that we did not have enough well-trained battle captains to do so without incurring more risk than we needed to. The senior personnel went forward and the junior guys did a stellar job, but they had to violate the first point in this paragraph.

MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: The fact that our battalion lived in a combat outpost (COP) on key terrain allowed us to influence the population directly and continuously. Out of the entire brigade MiTTs we were the only ones who lived in the same building as our counterparts. This scared many a CF guy who feared we might be compromised. But when somebody had to know what was really going on, we got the call. Finally on tactics random patrolling of contested areas is the next best thing to HUMINT that allows you to get the bad guy in his house the day before he plans to hit a target.

MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: You MUST embed with your unit. Advisors who "commute" to work do not share the same dangers, hardships and experiences with their unit. Advisors need to be there, 24/7 with their unit. If higher commanders try and unembed your MiTT, jump up and down screaming. Unless there is a verifiable threat against your MiTT, you not only lose most if not all your credibility with your unit, you expose yourselves to increased risk while traveling back and forth to see your unit. Live with them, fight with them!

MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: Enough cannot be said about living among the population in combat outposts. Our small advisory detachment had had a better feel for our sector, had more informants, and gathered more intelligence than the rest of the task force combined. This is critical in developing an IO campaign, a vision, and objectives during a tour. The populace respects you more and your rapport with them grows as does your credibility.

LTC Odom on country teams: If a tree falls in the forest and no hears it, did it make a noise? Yes. If you are not out and looking at your area of operation, will "trees" fall unheard in your absence? No. The locals will hear them. If you do not get out and look you will never establish what is normal for your area; that means you will never really know what is abnormal.

MAJ McDermott on company command: You have to figure out your battle-rhythm based on what you see as decisive activities. This means you have to accept that you are not going to be as involved in the "exciting stuff" (i.e. hunting down insurgents), as the more important yet mundane and often frustrating roles that you will have to perform based on your rank and responsibility (negotiating with the tribal and local political leaders). You have to understand ahead of time where you can make the biggest difference and enable the greatest level of success.

MAJ McDermott on MiTT: You have to plan on living with your unit. Opportunities might arise to live elsewhere and commute, but you are more effective if you are enduring many of the same conditions that your unit is as well. Don't be a commuter advisor.

11. Avoid knee jerk responses to first impressions. Don't act rashly, get the facts first. The violence you see may be part of the insurgent strategy, it may be various interest groups fighting it out, or it may be people settling personal vendettas. Or, it may just be daily life: "normality" in Kandahar is not the same as in Kansas.

CPT Kranc on troop command: First reports are wrong 95% of the time. Insurgents know when RIP/TOA is happening. Depending on where you are, some lay low and some hammer the new unit. Those laying low can paralyze a new unit into inaction. Going into the game with a plan and sticking to it is better than initial improvisation.

CPT Holzbach: Due to the high impact your face time with the locals creates, you must think shrewdly about what to say and what to do. We're all trained on what to do when under fire, and that's great. But what about when a local asks you to arbitrate some disagreement? Do you strictly enforce the law, even to the detriment of the greater good or your mission? What if the person you rule against is one of your best informants? Is that really wise? Would doing otherwise be favoritism? Would that tarnish your Honor and Integrity? In the often dirty world of COIN, does it even matter? You must think out the impact your words and decisions will have, as much as time permits.

MAJ Custis on battle captains: I'll trump CPT Kranc a bit and say that initial reports are wrong 99% of the time. Every time you press an RTO for more details, the urge to embellish creeps in and reporting morphs into speculation. Give the unit 30 minutes to submit a follow-up report, and preferably after the senior man on the scene has made his assessment of just what the hell happened. In a running gunfight, remember that silence on the net probably means the commander has a helmet fire going on. He is busy...give him some space.

MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: Absolutely! It takes time and effort to understand the AO. Our desire to impose our rules and standards in some ways works against us. This goes back to points 1 and 2.

MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: This goes for what you see in your FSF unit. Just like good commanders take time to assess the climate in their unit, do not try to make rapid changes to your FSF unit. Also, understand the difference between a cultural norm and a professional military culture. You have to understand what the cultural norm. However, we need to work on a professional military culture which is rooted in that FSFs culture, but also allows that unit to perform its mission, regardless. Take the time to look at your unit from all sides and keep in mind the culture from which they are coming from. Do NOT judge a FSF using U.S. standards. This sets you up not only for disappointment, but also to make rash decisions or snap judgments of your unit.

Former Captain Bill Meara on the role of military advisor in Central America: Regional expertise and experience are obviously important. People working on insurgencies shouldn't be doing so on their first trip to the region. In Yamales I found myself making use of lessons learned as far back as my student days in Guatemala. Insurgency is serious business and amateurs should not be allowed to dabble in it. From "Contra Cross --- Insurgency and Tyranny in Central America, 1979-1989" by William R. Meara Published by Naval Institute Press, 2006.

MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: Important to keep in mind and instill in your soldiers that "tactical patience" is even more important in COIN than most other environments. Insurgents plan their actions to elicit overreaction on our part. This is part of their strategy and key in their support base.

LTC Odom on country teams: See point 10. Also remember that different cultures define normality differently.

CPT McDermott on company command: CPT Holzbach brought up a lot of good points. As company commander, you have to accept that you are the "adult leadership" on the ground. You have to understand how to balance immediate security fixes against systemic repairs.

MAJ McDermott on MiTT: You have to truly figure out what you are being told. This goes back to understanding your unit. You have to separate legitimate information from hyperbole, listen to what your trusted HN members are telling you. Often your trusted unit members are the first to give you a more accurate report of what happened.

12. Prepare for handover from Day One. Believe it or not, you will not resolve the insurgency on your watch.

CPT Kranc on troop command: We reinvent the wheel on each rotation. It has been said we fought the Vietnam War for one year 11 times, rather than for 11 years. Many units get the RIP/TOA files and paperwork and never look at them again. That's a travesty. Additionally, some units are preparing to RIP/TOA with indigenous forces. That needs to be planned from Day 1.

CPT Holzbach: Don't set up your relief for failure. Teach them everything you know. Don't assume they know anything about the local situation, the country at large, or even COIN in general.

MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: Yes, but in the MiTT case what you want to do is work yourself out of a job. During your RIP/TOA you can make recommendations about where to redistribute effort. We went with electronic products for handover and that worked. But all transitions demand context and even if you do a good handover, that context does not become apparent until the new guys have a chance to understand the problem they face differs from what they expected. If possible bring the new team in on your thoughts prior to their deployment, it will help them get read in.

MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: Working yourself out of a job is great...but do not expect it to happen on your watch. Work on a continuity file from the first day you get on the job. Keep copies of all your assessments, reports and files on members of your unit. Try and conduct internal (MiTT) AARs, capture these comments and have them accessible to the new team that will eventually take your place, whether in 90 days or a year. This gives your replacements and idea of what steps you have taken, training you have conducted and operations which occurred during your time as an advisor.

MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: Turnover was on my list of "coulda, shoulda, woulda" things. My biggest regret is that I did not do the electronic version in a legible, coherent, organized manner, mostly due to time issues. I should have made time. I did hand over three "green pocket size, NSN, field books" crammed with information on the sector, informants, caches, and other tips to my successor. All grids were coded for OPSEC but they proved invaluable to him. I wish I had done a better job of keeping a day-to-day journal. I would prefer that from the guy I am doing RIP/TOA with more than an electronic copy.

LTC Odom on country teams: Understand that you will leave and they --the locals--will not. Fight for an effective transition before you go and fight for one when you leave. My longest running "dispute" with headquarters from Rwanda was the need to make the Defense Attaché Office in Kigali permanent. I succeeded. Had I not persisted in that effort, the National Command Authorities' ability to get reliable information on the Congo Wars from 1996 until present (2007) would have been severely crippled. On a related note in the fall of 1994, I was fortunate that the officer who would ultimately replace me in 1996 came out for 60 days to help me. He was and still is a great officer and a great analyst who never stops asking hard questions and seeking harder answers. His very first night in country, I had to tell him to slow down, as we were unlikely to "fix" Rwanda before dinner. Much later he thanked me for that, saying it helped him keep the issues in proper perspective.

MAJ McDermott on company command: Determine what your piece of the bigger picture is, and then determine what you can truly achieve in 15 months. Back on point nine, in developing a game plan, you already know that you are going to perform security/combat operations. You have to figure out what types of realistic objectives that you can establish on other lines of operations. Your PDSS could potentially serve you well in this area.

MAJ McDermott on MiTT: You have to develop an early assessment of your unit. Find out as much as you can before you arrive. WITH YOUR COUNTERPART, establish some realistic goals on where you two would like the unit as far as capabilities are concerned in a year. Explain to your counterpart, that this is not a fixed mark on the wall but a goal. Therefore, adjust accordingly. Furthermore, temper these goals with reality, and reinforce with your counterparts, what activities and actions support reaching the goal. Also develop a draft proposal of the way ahead for the unit after your year is up. Many things can change, but if you have a concept that you can share with your replacement it will help make the transition less painful for all involved, especially for the client unit.

Within this context, what follows are observations from collective experience: the distilled essence of what those who went before learned. They are expressed as commandments, for clarity, but are really more like folklore. Apply them judiciously and skeptically.

David Kilcullen intended his Twenty-Eight Articles, Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency as a guide for the company commander facing a COIN operation. Since the article first circulated, hundreds of officers have served as company commanders and in other positions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this article some of those officers comment on how Kilcullen's thinking applied to their mission in theater. Other former or retired Soldiers measure Kilcullen's points against their own experiences in other countries, conflicts, and years. All -- including David Kilcullen -- are members of the community of interest at the Small Wars Journal and Council.

Captain Ryan Kranc, U.S. Army, served as regimental training officer and then a troop commander in 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar, Iraq; he offers his comments on Kilcullen from the perspective of a troop (company) commander.

Captain Mike Holzbach, U.S. Army, served in a variety of staff positions before taking over the Mortar Platoon of 1-64AR, 3ID in Baghdad from April 05 until Oct 05 during OIF after which he returned to his position on staff.

Major Jon Custis, U.S. Marine Corps, has two tours in Iraq; he comments here as a battle captain in a combat operations center (COC) (tactical operations center) during the second Battle of Fallujah.

Major Robert Thornton, U.S. Army, is just completing a tour as a battalion executive officer and S3 advisor on a Military Transition Team (MiTT) in Mosul, Iraq. He comments on how Kilcullen's points applied to MiTTs.

Major Michael Sullivan, U.S. Army, served on one of the original Advisor Support Teams (AST), the precursor to today's current MiTTs. MAJ Sullivan stood up the 6th Iraqi Army Battalion from scratch, starting in Taji and conducting the majority of the training and operations in Kirkush, Iraq. He is currently working for the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and will begin the Advanced Military Studies Program this summer.

Major Mark Leslie, U.S. Army, is currently the Deputy Chief of Training and Organization for the Stryker Transformation Team, FT. Benning, Ga. He is a graduate of OCS and earned a Bachelor of Science in Criminal Justice from Troy State University and is currently pursuing an MBA. Major Leslie has served in numerous Infantry assignments to include: LRS Team Leader, Ranger Instructor, Rifle platoon leader, BN S-4 and multiple Company Commands. He has served in numerous deployments to include Operations Just Cause in Panama, Operations Desert Shield/Storm, and Operation Iraqi Freedom II. He served as an Advisor to the Iraqi National Guard with the 1st Cavalry Division in Iraq.

Major John (Jim) McDermott, U.S. Army, served as rifle company commander in the 4th Infantry division during the initial parts of OIF I in 2003. He then served as a MiTT with the Iraqi Army from January 2005 until January 2006. MAJ McDermott is currently a military liaison and project officer at the States Department's Interagency COIN Initiative in Washington DC and will begin the Advanced Military Studies Program this summer.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Odom, U.S. Army, retired in 1996 after 15 years as a Foreign Area Officer for the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. His final 30 months was as the U.S. Defense Attaché in Zaire 1993-1994 and then Rwanda 1994-1996. His comments on Kilcullen are from the perspective of the senior military representative on a U.S. embassy country team. Colonel Odom is the author of three books concerning COIN, contingency operations, and unconventional warfare. These include: Leavenworth Paper #14 The Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo 1964-1965, Combat Studies Institute, 1988; Shaba II: The French and Belgian Intervention in Zaire in 1978, Combat Studies Institute, 1993; and Journey into Darkness: Genocide in Rwanda, Texas A&M University Press, 2005. Colonel Odom was also a co-writer with MG Robert Scales and Lieutenant Colonel Terry Johnson on Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War, Government Printing Office, 1993.

Other contributors to this project include:

Former U.S. Army Special Forces Captain William (Bill) R. Meara was a psychological operations advisor in the military advisory group in El Salvador in the 1980s. After leaving the military and joining the Foreign Service, U.S. Department of State, Mr. Meara became the U.S. Ambassador in Honduras' main liaison to the Contras. Mr. Meara recounts those experiences in his book, Contra Cross --- Insurgency and Tyranny in Central America, 1979-1989, published by Naval Institute Press, 2006. His comments in this paper are taken from the conclusions of his book.

Sergeant First Class Stan Reber, U.S. Army, retired after more than 15 years continuous service overseas in the US security assistance and defense attaché system. As the operations coordinator for the US Defense Attaché Office in Kinshasa, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) SFC Reber was cited for his resourcefulness and bravery during two full scale military rebellions in 1991 and 1993 as well as Operation Support Hope in 1994 when he worked with Colonel Odom in Goma.

Lieutenant Colonel Steve Franke, U.S. Army retired from active duty after a career as a Special Forces and Foreign Area Officer. He was the Assistant Army Attaché in Amman, Jordan and has served throughout the Middle East in various capacities.

Part I (Articles 1 -- 5).

1. Know your turf. Know the people, the topography, economy, history, religion and culture.

CPT Kranc on troop command: Very little difference from saying "Conduct IPB"

CPT Holzbach on platoon leadership: Do the book studying before you deploy. Learn what you can all the way from "Who's Mohammad?" to "What impact did the recently deceased or dying government/authority/power structure have on the city I'll be operating in?". Once you're in country, it has to switch to the local situation, and knowledge of that is very time sensitive and specific. It will be best garnered by constant patrolling, living amongst the locals, and talk, talk, talk.

MAJ Custis on battle captains: Kilcullen makes reference to developing a mental model of your area of operations. Try as we might to study imagery, review the maps and gain situational awareness, it took us in excess of three months to realize that battle captains need to physically see the battle space with the naked eye. We eventually caught helicopters, which flew over the turf or went out when the battalion commander went forward to check on the companies.

MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: I would say this is linked to point 2. Diagnose the problem. If you do not understand relationships, people, cultural economics, human terrain and all of those you will only see the symptoms rather than actually diagnosing the problem. You really need to analyze in depth the linkage between your turf and the problems to understand the solutions you must pursue. As advisor you must consider how your counterparts see the problems; failing to do that means you are likely to be ignored.

I would also add that you need to research your area or city. You can do this in discussions with your counterparts about politics, culture, and religion. You can also do some online research and read a few books. If you try to understand the culture and politics based solely on the context of the moment, you are going to misunderstand it. For example, you cannot define normality for Mosul based on its current status. You have to understand what it could be or what it was. .

MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: This starts way before the MiTT members ever reach Kuwait. As soon as future advisors find out which country their advisor mission will take them, research into where they will serve. There are dozens of books, on-line resources, subject matter experts, etc where you can start to understand ALL the terrains including physical, personal and historical. Although understanding the religion of the people is important, try and delve deeper into the tribal structures both within your foreign security forces (FSF) unit and the area you will operate in. Do not wait until you are in country to start trying to find out your turf.

MAJ Leslie: We called this "knowing your neighborhood". It is imperative that units understand that every sector and every insurgency is different and that "knowing your neighborhood" may require a different skill set in each sector. In an insurgency, as recorded here many times, HUMINT is everything. Knowing your neighborhood is HUMINT. Not only for intelligence but to gauge the demeanor in your neighborhood as well as template possible responses and reactions to planned operations.

LTC Odom on country teams: Whether you are serving as a Defense Attaché as I did, a battle captain or troop commander, you can never know enough about your area of responsibility and you will certainly never know everything. Nothing replaces first hand observation, especially first hand observation backed with an unquenched thirst for knowledge.

MAJ McDermott on company command: IPB, but you have to expand the understanding of "Order Of Battle". You have to do some research and reading on your own beyond what the handy country guide says. Understanding underlying currents and historic examples of the political and economic systems that people utilize will make you more effective. It will also help you generate realistic expectations of what to expect on the ground in your AO, the old human terrain is decisive in COIN concept.

MAJ McDermott on MiTT: You have to know and learn who you are working with. When you are tasked to go on MiTT duty attempt to find out as much as possible before you leave CONUS, this will help you understand who and what you are working with. It will also increase your effectiveness because you can help make the advisor team transition appear more seamless to the Host Nation you are assisting.

2. Diagnose the problem. Once you know your area and its people, you can begin to diagnose the problem.

CPT Kranc on troop command: Looks like Mission Analysis

CPT Holzbach on platoon leadership: At the platoon level, the problem will likely be something along the line of better government services and better security, but not always. These issues will be very specific and will need very specific remedies. The neighborhood full of police and military personnel may be able to protect themselves, but the one without any such residents may not.

MAJ Custis on battle captains: A battle captain's problem is not the same tactical problem a company or platoon faces. He needs to move information (reporting) as quickly as possible, have a clear understanding of what needs to happen when a commanders critical intelligence requirement is tripped, when he must roust the quick reaction force out of the ready room, and which means of communication to use in order to expedite a casualty evacuation request. Battle captains have to share lessons learned and offer ideas, and get the rest of the COC staff in synch so that they do not add to the friction when troops are in contact.

MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: see comments on point 1.

MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: Agreed. Define the tactical problem. This includes not only determining the easily-seen surface issues, but the deeper undercurrents which will continually shift under you like plates under the Earth's surface. Getting to know both the FSF and the local population will clue you into a few different things. 1) You gain a better understanding on the interaction between the local populace, the insurgents and the local security forces. Don't forget about local police, border guards and facility guards. Just because they may not work for the same Ministry as your unit, they are key players in your AO and will effect operations, interactions and are part of your tactical problem.

MAJ Leslie: I too see this as mission analysis but on a more complicated level. This deals with the human factor. You must look at the insurgents' potential threats and at the same time detail, template, and gauge the response from your neighborhood. Again this comes back to the need to "know your neighborhood".

LTC Odom on country teams: Ignorance combined with hasty decisions often equates to stupidity. Take the time to understand your AO before you start making decisions. As you do make those decisions, you will become the subject matter expert on your area of operations.

MAJ McDermott on company command: You have to do this to support point number one. When you do your analysis and begin to develop your plan. You must have realistic facts and assumptions on what capabilities and capacities that your organization has in order to manage the expectations that you, your subordinates, your higher, and the populace have as to what the problem is and how to fix it.

3. Organize for intelligence. In counterinsurgency, killing the enemy is easy. Finding him is often nearly impossible. Intelligence and operations are complementary.

CPT Kranc on troop command: Companies don't have intelligence sections. Smart and innovative companies have developed intelligence sections that collect and analyze intelligence from the platoons. These ad-hoc sections were more often than not better suited and outperformed BN intelligence sections with actual intelligence MOS soldiers.

CPT Holzbach on platoon leadership: It's been said before and for good reason: everyone is an intelligence gatherer. The individual soldier will have his hands full with providing security, but rarely so much that he cant spare a moment to smile and say a few greeting words to the people around him. This can encourage a local who may be unsure if he really wants to talk to us. If he does, it should become the patrol leader's job to do the talking at that point. And now that single Joe just played a big part in adding a piece to the puzzle. Now it's up to the patrol leader to squeeze every drop of info possible from the source.

MAJ Custis on battle captains: The critical detail here is that COC staff needs to be organized to maximize the capture of information for analysis. Do not let the S-2 (Intelligence) staff stray out of reach of your daily battle rhythm. Because current operations and intelligence sections often report what should be the same information, up two separate paths, patrol, raid, and contact debriefs must be conducted with S-3 and S-2 representation. The patrol leader may conduct a more detailed debrief later with the intelligence rep, but ops has to reserve the right to final review of follow-on reporting offered up by the S-2. The night battle captain at regiment has queried me on significant events tidbits that the regiment briefed but regiment operations did not know. It is an unnecessarily painful experience.

MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: As an advisor this also means collecting information about your counterparts. I did this openly, telling my counterparts up front that I was collecting on them. It was not a surprise to them; certainly they had assumed all along this would happen. I also assumed they collected on me. The key point was that getting it out in the open let all of us know where we stood and actually created a stronger relationship.

As for the collection and analysis on anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) and others, I concentrated on building trust by following through on issues. As I helped the Iraqi Army (IA), they helped us. Before long, we had the coalition forces (CF) in our intelligence cycle as well. Timely dissemination of relevant information allowed different analysts to turn it into intelligence. At first it was hard to establish the right linkages, but after networking I knew who the relevant players were in both the IA and CF. In that regard I was a middle man as much as analyst.

MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: You are working with the greatest intelligence-gathering tool available in theater...indigenous forces! You will most likely have to rely exclusively on your interpreter to not only translate for you, but to clue you in on attitudes, hidden meanings and local variations on speech to appraise how your FSF are doing with gather intelligence. MiTTs are in a good position to leverage intelligence between coalition and FSFs. As a U.S. military member, you'll have access to places and intelligence your local counterpart may not have. On the other hand, your HUMINT gathering capability with your local troops is much greater than any asset U.S. forces have available. You will work both sides of the fence to help each unit out. In the end though, it is up to the MiTTs to serve as the conduit to the U.S. commanders regarding a current, local assessment on operations.

MAJ Mark Leslie as an advisor: I agree wholeheartedly with Maj Thornton. As an advisor, you must organize and prepare for intelligence because you are going to be flooded with it. The hard part is the sorting and filtering as well as classification before it simply inundates you. Our team was always better informed than anyone else in the Task Force because we lived with the populace, saw them every day, and had established a rapport based on the understanding that our best interests were their best interests. Daily information sharing is important across the whole team; it gives everyone a chance to compare notes and is often very revealing. Each unit should do this in whatever format suits them best.

LTC Franke on advisors: In serving as a contract-training advisor to an Arab military, setting rules of engagement with counterparts was important. Last month, I was on a MTT to train, advise, and coach, the staffs of a separate brigade with a mission to secure key facilities in an outlying province. My team briefed that we normally based our training and practical exercises on intelligence preparation of the battlefield and the military decision making process on a standard scenario set elsewhere. It was sort of like saying "Your brigade needs to plan and exercise on Fort Riley, even if your brigade is based in Germany." After we pitched that generic scenario in the initial coordination meeting, the brigade commander--a Major General--said that he reported directly to his country's leaders. He added that his troops and time were precious, and therefore, training on an unrealistic and artificial scenario "would not fly." Instead he demanded IPB and MDMP training using his actual contingency missions.

With that, he turned to his S2 and directed the S2 to provide our team the brigade's controlled-distribution maps and associated intelligence estimates, overlays, and other data. I actually signed for each sheet. As the intelligence trainer I was given complete access to this unit's war plans. The brigade commander--a Fort Leavenworth graduate--told the S2 to tell us anything we wanted to know that related reasonably to "mission training." It was an intelligence collector's dream.

But I was there as an advisor. The S2 and I achieved a delicate, discreet and productive balance. I declined to take detailed notes, and I only accepted whatever paperwork he or his Assistant S2 wrote down and provided about his unit. He was a master of the art of "say nothing and mean it" and an initial defensive "conspiracy of courtesy," which dissipated over time. At the end of the exercise, the S2 retrieved his maps and gratefully claimed our various overlays, offering many "thank you very too much indeeds" and put them in his safe until we returned for another iteration.

We were flabbergasted at receiving such access and cooperativeness, as was the resident detachment of U.S. Army advisors to the brigade. They said they had never seen any overlays nor had they ever discussed the brigade's actual mission sets.

Bottom line is that until discreet ROE and related appropriate guidance are resolved about normal and incidental collection and (un-normal) external reporting, we contract trainers strictly and strongly "stay in our lanes" to build, protect and sustain our two-way relationships with our counterparts.

LTC Odom: Most attachés grasp that they are intelligence officers and that their shop is an intelligence-gathering unit. Many attachés do not understand that they are also intelligence analysts; my goal as a Defense Attaché was to provide analyzed intelligence to consumers in the rear or on the ground. If you stick to merely reporting what happened, you are leaving it up to someone else to explain why it happened. If you were indeed the subject matter expert on your AO, why would you leave such explanations to lesser-qualified people?

MAJ Thornton's point on collecting on counterparts is especially relevant. I used a similar technique; I told my counterparts in Rwanda that I was there to help the U.S. government better understand what was happening. In doing that I would be reporting on our efforts--and if they wanted to make certain points clear to me, I would insure that their views went forward.

MAJ McDermott on company command: You have to ensure that you put good soldiers in your company and HQ. Don't let it become a dumping ground for marginal; performers from the platoons, even the drivers. These soldiers have to be able to help connect the dots as treports come in from the platoons. They also have to be smart enough to recognize when they are hearing "good info", and how that should trigger them contacting higher if the information is critical. You have to focus on every soldier as a collector. You have too make sure these guys are paying attention to the details of their surroundings, like patterns of activity amongst the locals, and changes in the physical environment. You have to help them develop TTP's for talking with locals and receiving information from locals that does not enable an insurgent to take revenge on the cooperative individual and thus intimidate the rest of the populace.

MAJ McDermott on MiTT: We have to determine how we are going to resource intelligence collection and analysis for the MiTT. The host nation forces, in my case Iraqi, are the greatest gathers of intelligence on the battlefield. They understand the area and its problems. We have to organize and develop methods that enable their intelligence to be acted upon. Often this intelligence is stuff they picked up while home on vacation. We have to develop methods that enable this intelligence to be distributed, verified, and acted upon when this intelligence affects other units outside the Iraqi or partner U.S. units' AOs. Example, if the soldier is from Ramadi, and he is based at Taji, comes off vacation in Ramadi with intelligence about Ramadi, how does that intel go from MND-B to MND-W.

4. Organize for interagency operations -- Almost everything in counterinsurgency is interagency.

CPT Kranc on troop command: in your typical mission rehearsal exercise, a company doesn't even touch inter-agency operations. In theater, maximizing the effectiveness of inter-agency operations, particularly in the realm of civil-military projects, can make or break your combat tour.

CPT Holzbach on platoon leadership: You'll be patrolling with the likes of civil affairs and who knows what else. Be ready to learn from them and provide the support they need to accomplish their mission. A good relationship with them can pay big dividends down the road, such as being able to "borrow" that soldier who can speak Arabic. He can listen to local chatter on the streets when the people think they're out of earshot of your interpreter.

MAJ Custis on battle captains: Even if the battle captain doesn't organize anything regarding interagency operations, he should know where these folks live, and stop by for a chat when they are on the forward operating base. A fellow battle captain and task force information operations officer introduced me to the civil affairs headquarters responsible for our AO. A couple of visits helped us explain matters to the company commander who was justifiably frustrated that his recommended pump house project hadn't seen movement for several weeks.

MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: This one was a work in progress. I was just getting to know the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) and some of the other players. The MiTTs are not Adapted for this. I recommend an additional smart guy at say the brigade or division MiTT level to become the inter-agency coordinator. I did this by default but never as much as I wanted.

MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: This is especially hard for a small MiTT element, especially if you are operating in a remote location. Find out who the State Department reps are (if any), NGOs operating in your AO, and make points of contact with your attached coalition unit. They have the resources to conduct the liaisons with interagencies. Harness what you can based on your location, your communications architecture and the availability of interagency personnel operating where you are. During your MiTT training, see if you can get out into the local government agencies to gain a better understanding how SWEAT-MS works in our country. Parcel out your team to familiarize themselves with trash removal, sewage systems, water companies, electric companies, police stations, etc. This will pay big dividends later on.

MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: Interagency coordination is a plus, but one often overlooked and not planned for in train up. Preparing for this prior to deployment and designating one team member for this is key. Consider having functional areas: give a staff Captain the additional duty of the "garbage guy" and another that of "water guy" and so on. Place one person in charge to coordinate the effort and develop a training plan would help out when doing interagency coordination. Talking intelligently to these agencies and having a narrow field of fire when requesting assistance is conducive to cooperation.

LTC Odom on country teams: Throw a rock in a place like Goma, Zaire during Operation Support Hope and you would probably hit an international aid worker, a soldier, or a refugee. Get the rock to skip a bit and you would probably tag all three. The international worker could have come from a long list of countries or agencies. The soldier could have been Rwandan, Zairian, French, British (in mufti), or Irish (also in mufti). The same was true inside Rwanda only with greater United Nations representation. The program that worked all available avenues was the program most likely to succeed.

MAJ McDermott on company command: Be —to provide combat power to secure these guys when they go do their interagency "thing". You also have to be aware that the interagency might not show up in a timely manner. That means that you need to think about what you can accomplish with organic resources in these areas because a little goes a long way. Make sure these plans have the ability to be handed to off to whoever with minimal heartburn for all involved. Be prepared to provide resources that enable reaching the agreed upon endstate that the interagency folks just don't have.

MAJ McDermott on MiTT -- Help your unit establish cooperative programs with other security forces owned by other ministries in your area. Encourage your Iraqi counter-part to develop rapport with the various police organizations operating in his Area of Operations.

5. Travel light and harden combat service support (CSS).

CPT Kranc on troop command: It doesn't take a Rhodes scholar to see that CSS convoys were getting hammered right off the bat (remember PVT Lynch). We didn't do a good job in training our logisticians to fight on the roads. Conversely, for every tank or Bradley with a good load plan in theater I saw eight "gypsy" wagons for tanks with all kinds of crap hanging off them that their crew would never use. Store what you don't use.

CPT Holzbach on platoon leadership: NCOs must enforce common sense equipment load out plans whether mounted or dismounted.

MAJ Custis on battle captains: All I can speak to is the travel light piece, and you've got to maintain the ability to revert to pens, maps, and acetate to fight the fight. For hardening, don't let digital communications rest on a single point of failure. Test back-up systems regularly.

MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: Using a hierarchical supply system does not work especially well; we coined the term "Wal-Mart Logistics" to describe the blend of local economy and regional support units (RSUs) that seems to work best. As for traveling light, my kit looked much different on the way out than it did on the way in; I'd stripped to one magazine in the weapon, with a ready magazine set up on the side, a bandolier with six extras in the truck, my side plates, and a PRC 148. I also had my 9mm with one extra magazine, helmet, and body armor.

MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: Think about your load plan while going through training, not once you get in theater. As a MiTT, you are alone and unafraid while out with your Iraqi unit. There is not a better potential propaganda coup for the bad guys than to capture a U.S. Advisor. Plan to sustain yourself long enough to either a) reach the nearest coalition FOB or b) wait until help arrives.

MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: Travel light is good, but tailoring the load to the mission is better. No need to "need and not have" when mounted. It is always better to have and not need with some common sense. If you tailor your load according to the operation and pre-package the rest for an "on the spot" delivery if needed, it is a safer method. I agree with the train of thought on "don't rely solely on technology". Carbon paper, grease pencils, alcohol pins, and a good old-fashioned paper maps are what I used daily. I could share these with my Iraqi counterparts, and could distribute them easily and quickly, no matter what my digital status.

LTC Odom on country teams: Travel light is good but traveling with a verified packing list is better. The most likely person to forget something is the solitary traveler. Traveling light does not mean going without communications, necessary supplies, and means of protection. It also means arming oneself with the latest information possible. Those who travel without a "flight plan" cannot even hope for assistance. I can attest personally that two brains are better than one when it comes to this type planning; I could communicate with the Joint Staff via cellular phone for hours from Goma, Zaire because my NCO jerry-rigged satellite communications batteries to work on a DC adaptor.

MAJ McDermott on company command: Optimize your load plans based on having to execute 72 hours of operations without resupply. Focus on necessities not "nice to haves". Understand that you going to have to provide combat power to support LOGPAC operations outside of secure areas. Furthermore, manage your platoons so that maintain a good rotation plan that doesn't compromise your security when conducting resupply operations.

MAJ McDermott on MiTT: Always have plan on having 96 hours of nothing but host nation forces. Always have a retrograde plan that factors only the advisors executing. This might appear drastic, but you have to have a plan. Travel heavy as advisors, because you are going to have be very self-reliant out and about.

Professor Luttwak is a famous defense policy expert, with publications on the Roman Empire, nuclear strategy, coups d'état and globalization, among others. He is not a specialist in counterinsurgency, but his opinions carry much weight and we should all welcome his recent foray into the field. I hope he will forgive this précis, but in essence he argues that "insurgents do not always win, actually they usually lose. But their defeats can rarely be attributed to counterinsurgency warfare, as we shall see". The means he argues are most effective (but does not himself advocate, of course) are wholesale reprisals and "out-terrorizing" the insurgents.

The first part of the article is a critique of the new counter-insurgency manual, FM 3-24. As Dr Luttwak acknowledges, he is actually critiquing the so-called "straw-man" draft (leaked onto the internet in early 2006) not the final version published last December (about three months before his Harper's piece appeared). This is a pity, because the official version differs substantially from the straw-man he critiques.

For example, Dr Luttwak criticizes the draft's focus on legitimacy as a means to popular consent, suggesting that coercion makes up for lack of consent: "government needs no popular support when it has obedience". If he had seen the final version he may have been more comfortable with these words (from Chapter 1):

All governments rule through a combination of consent and coercion...Legitimacy makes it easier for a state to carry out its key functions.... "police states" typically cannot regulate society or can do so only by applying overwhelming coercion. Legitimate governance is inherently stable; the societal support it engenders allows it to adequately manage the internal problems, change, and conflict that affect individual and collective well-being. Conversely, governance that is not legitimate is inherently unstable; as soon as the state's coercive power is disrupted, the populace ceases to obey it.

Some other comments seem based on incomplete information. Dr Luttwak observes that "better government...is certainly wanted in France, Norway and the United States but obviously not in Afghanistan or Iraq, where many people prefer indigenous and religious oppression". This differs markedly from my field experience in both countries. One night last summer, a member of a tribe that sits astride the Afghan-Pakistan border told me: "you want to bring us 'democracy' at the national level, but we already have democracy within the khel. What we want from the government is security, honor, justice and prosperity. If anyone offers us those things, we will fight for him to the death. If democracy only brings elections, what use is it?" In my experience, this is a fairly widespread view in both Afghanistan and Iraq. It reflects cultural differences in the way social groups conceive of the state, and varying notions of democracy and legitimacy. But ordinary Iraqis and Afghans have told me repeatedly that they want effective government that is responsive to people's needs. This is legitimate government, defined through their (emic) terms of justice, honor and responsiveness, not our (etic) categories of parliamentary elections and English common law.

Dr Luttwak argues that "the vast majority of Afghans and Iraqis, assiduous mosque-goers, illiterates or at best semi-illiterate, naturally believe their religious leaders" (who, Dr Luttwak suggests, incite violence with claims that America seeks to destroy Islam and control oil resources). Again, this is at variance with field observation. In fact, neither Iraqis nor Afghans are particularly assiduous mosque-goers. And religious figures are prominent on all sides of both conflicts, in moderate and extreme political groups; there is an extremely wide range of clerical opinion, ranging from quietism through support for democratic government, to extremism. More fundamentally, in these societies, religious faith is not a function of ignorance and credulity, as Dr Luttwak implies, but a widespread cultural norm that infuses all social classes, political orientations and education levels. Indeed, this is one criticism of FM 3-24 that others (including Ralph Peters) have raised, arguing that it minimizes the role of religion. Again, this is a valid criticism of the leaked straw-man, but was addressed in the final version.

In his discussion of intelligence work, Dr Luttwak draws a sharp distinction between intelligence problems and political problems, criticizing the manual for insufficiently addressing political issues. In my view, this is a fair point (though, again, the final version includes much more discussion of political factors than the unofficial draft). The U.S. government is currently preparing a whole-of-government counterinsurgency handbook, which will address political issues more fully.

Dr Luttwak's point about sectarian tendencies in security forces is useful. I am unsure when Dr Luttwak was last in Afghanistan, so he may have more recent information than me. But my impression of the Iraqis I work with now, and the Afghans I worked with last year, is that though such tendencies are real, the presence of U.S. forces, joint operations, and partnership of police with soldiers, provide "checks and balances" that mitigate them. And the growing professionalism of security forces is reducing these tendencies, particularly in Afghanistan. That is, in fact, the point of the Joint Security Stations, which resulted in a large drop in sectarian violence in areas of Iraq where they have been applied. So we may end up making some progress on this issue.

We have also had some success addressing Dr Luttwak's concerns about language proficiency. He writes of the "astonishing linguistic incapacity" of the U.S. military, comparing unfavorably the number of Arabic students at defense language institutes with historical training efforts in Chinese and Japanese. Again, he may not have the latest information on this. According to the Defense Language Institute, by 2005 there were over 300 Arabic instructors and more than 1000 Arabic students in training—a ten-fold increase since before 9/11. Language skills are still too rare in the field, but I have seen steady improvement in the past few years. The new manual pays a great deal of attention to developing and improving cultural and language capabilities.

More importantly, Dr Luttwak implies that only indigenous forces can do counterinsurgency, because only they have the local knowledge, cultural understanding and language ability to work effectively. I could not agree more: imagine how Californians would react if the Iraqi military tried to police the streets of Los Angeles. Commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan also agree, and have made major efforts all along to train local forces to do the job themselves. In addition, the partnership of Iraqi or Afghan forces with U.S. units in the field today gives commanders immediate access to cultural and linguistic understanding from local partners, while U.S. forces reinforce them (Iraqis use the term thabit) and help them ensure that their behavior accords with legal and human rights standards. Local forces are crucial, which is why the manual emphasizes partnership so heavily.

Another benefit of working alongside locals, right in the heart of an operating area, is that it encourages the population to report on the insurgents. Dr Luttwak argues that "many of the local inhabitants certainly know who the insurgents are...but they are not telling". Actually, they now are. Every U.S. unit that has applied the new manual's approach, living among the people and focusing on their security, has reported a flood of unsolicited tips from the population and volunteering of information about insurgents.

Having knocked the stuffing out of the straw-man, Dr Luttwak suggests an "easy and reliable way of defeating all insurgencies everywhere": essentially, to "out-terrorize" insurgents through reprisals, mass executions, and collective punishments. He cites German forces in the Second World War, claiming this approach was standard, "and very effective it was too in containing resistance movements with very few troops". Again, I beg to differ. One German officer on the Eastern Front remarked: "the German Army in Russia was like an elephant attacking a nest of ants. The elephant will kill millions. But in the end the ants will eat him to the bone". German methods in Yugoslavia, Greece and Russia proved extremely counterproductive. And as Barbara Tuchman argued in The Guns of August, earlier German brutality against civilians in Belgium and France in 1914 helped provoke worldwide revulsion, contributing to eventual American intervention and German defeat in the First World War. (These are historical observations, of course, and do not in any way impugn modern Germany or today's Bundeswehr).

The methods Dr. Luttwak mentions are thus not a prescription for success, but a recipe for disaster. As he quickly admits, U.S. and Coalition forces would never consider such methods for a moment. And this is just as well, since this approach does not work. The best method we know of, despite its imperfections, has worked in numerous campaigns over several decades, and is the one we are now using: counterinsurgency. I admit (and have argued elsewhere) that classical counterinsurgency needs updating for current conditions. But the Nazis, Syrians, Taliban, Iranians, Saddam Hussein and others all tried brutalizing the population, and the evidence is that this simply does not work in the long term.

Dr. Luttwak's final point is one of his strongest. He argues that there is ambivalence in the United States approach, that America is "—to start wars because of future projected threats...—to conquer territory or even entire countries, and yet is un—to govern what it conquers, even for a few years". What he calls "the critical ambivalence of occupiers who refuse to govern" is indeed worth discussing, though it is properly an issue of political will, strategic culture and national character, rather than counterinsurgency technique. As a colleague said to me in Iraq last year, "we need to either make a serious effort to govern these people, or get the hell out". But Iraq and Afghanistan now have sovereign governments; and we (with many other countries) are helping these governments to do exactly that—make a serious effort to govern their people effectively. And we have no plans for permanent presence: as the President said, we will stay as long as we are needed, and not a day longer.

Overall, I found Professor Luttwak's viewpoint fascinating, and a thought-provoking addition to our ongoing professional discussion, but ultimately not quite convincing. Perhaps that's just me—things do tend to look different, and more complicated, from here in the field. But I would encourage people to read both the Harper's piece, and the actual final version of FM 3-24, and make up their own minds. On-the-ground facts (like language improvements, partnering with Iraqi forces, the drop in sectarian violence, joint operations, and improved governance) are also worth taking into account.

None of this means we will automatically win in Iraq and Afghanistan; unlike some pundits, most of us with a professional background in counterinsurgency always expected this to be a forbiddingly difficult undertaking. Our approach remains fundamentally field-oriented and evidence-based, and clearly there are still many things that could go wrong, dark days ahead, and extremely demanding and complex challenges to be faced, as in every war. Admittedly, also, we waited a long time before adopting our current approach, which inevitably makes things harder. And as John Nagl so convincingly demonstrated, our counterinsurgency doctrine will undoubtedly need ongoing and agile adaptation as things develop. But to suggest that counterinsurgency is intrinsically flawed, that it is "malpractice", or that wholesale slaughter and oppression are the only viable solution (albeit one that we will never apply) is an argument that the facts simply do not support.

Dr. David Kilcullen is Senior Counter-Insurgency Advisor to the Commanding General, Multi-National Force Iraq. Though authorized to post at SWJ Blog, these are his personal views, do not reflect those of any government or organization, and have not been screened or vetted.

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SWJ Editors Note: Small Wars Council discussion: Edward Luttwak - Counterinsurgency as Military Malpractice

Several odds and ends from the Small Wars Journal and Council...

Bing West is off to Iraq again to research his next OIF / Telic book -- Do or Die. The third in his Iraq 'trilogy' (The March Up and No True Glory are one and two), Do or Die will focus on recent developments concerning our counterinsurgency efforts and prospects for the future. Here is a link to a recent National Review commentary by Bing also titled Do or Die. We are anticipating several blog reports from Bing while in-country.

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Bill Nagle (my SWJ / SWC partner in crime) and I spent a pleasant afternoon several weeks ago in the Washington D.C. radio studio of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. We were there to be interviewed by Stan Correy of Background Briefing on a range of Small Wars related subjects to include on-line 'communities of interest', lessons learned -- or not learned, Dave Kilcullen, counterinsurgency... Our segment is part of a show scheduled to be broadcast on 15 April - Iraq: New Team, New Strategy, New Tensions.

"America has a new policy for Iraq: soft power. It's cultural counterinsurgency. Possibly too little too late, it may even be impossible. Americans don't speak the language, and don't understand the many cultures."

We have no idea on which portions (if any) of our interview may be used.

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Recent Small Wars Council threads you should be reading -- and sharing your insights on:

Fighting for the Soul of Islam

3 Generals Spurn the Position of War "Czar"

Attitudes Towards the Media

Islamic Army of Iraq Denounces Al-Qaeda in Iraq

Beyond Lies in American Food Aid: The Dead Bodies

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And for those who have never visited our About page, here is who we are and what we do:

Small Wars Journal facilitates and supports the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field. We hope this, in turn, advances the practice and effectiveness of those forces prosecuting Small Wars in the interest of self-determination, freedom, and prosperity for the population in the area of operations.

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The characteristics of Small Wars have evolved since the Banana Wars and Gunboat Diplomacy. War is never purely military, but today's Small Wars are even less pure with the greater inter-connectedness of the 21st century. Their conduct typically involves the projection and employment of the full spectrum of national and coalition power by a broad community of practitioners. The military is still generally the biggest part of the pack, but there a lot of other wolves. The strength of the pack is the wolf, and the strength of the wolf is the pack.

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"Small Wars" is an imperfect term used to describe a broad spectrum of spirited continuation of politics by other means, falling somewhere in the middle bit of the continuum between feisty diplomatic words and global thermonuclear war. The Small Wars Journal embraces that imperfection.

Just as friendly fire isn't, there isn't necessarily anything small about a Small War.

The term "Small War" either encompasses or overlaps with a number of familiar terms such as counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, support and stability operations, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and many flavors of intervention. Operations such as noncombatant evacuation, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance will often either be a part of a Small War, or have a Small Wars feel to them. Small Wars involve a wide spectrum of specialized tactical, technical, social, and cultural skills and expertise, requiring great ingenuity from their practitioners. The Small Wars Manual (a wonderful resource, unfortunately more often referred to than read) notes that:

Small Wars demand the highest type of leadership directed by intelligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity. Small Wars are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions.

The "three block war" construct employed by General Krulak is exceptionally useful in describing the tactical and operational challenges of a Small War and of many urban operations. Its only shortcoming is that is so useful that it is often mistaken as a definition or as a type of operation.

We'd like to deploy a primer on Small Wars that provides more depth than this brief section. Your suggestions and contributions of content are welcome.

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Small Wars Journal is a private site. It is run by Small Wars Journal, LLC, a private company formed in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Its principals are Dave Dilegge (Editor-in-Chief) and Bill Nagle (Publisher). We do this in our spare time, because we want to. McDonald's pays more. But we'd rather work to advance our noble profession than try to super-size your order or interest you in a delicious hot apple pie. If and when you're not flipping burgers, please join us.

Monday, April 9, 2007 will mark the 4th anniversary of the liberation of Iraq from Saddam Hussein's regime. For many in Iraq and around the world, it will be a time for reflection on the early days after liberation in 2003 and on what has transpired since then.

As one of those who was part of the "fight to Baghdad," I remember well the hopes and dreams of the Iraqi people when coalition soldiers pulled down Saddam's statue in Firdos Square in April 2003. Looking back, I recall a sense of enormous promise -- promise that, in many respects and for a variety of reasons, has yet to be fully realized. If we are honest with each other, in fact, we will acknowledge that while there have been substantial accomplishments in Iraq since 2003, the past four years have also been disappointing, frustrating, and increasingly dangerous in many parts of Iraq for those who have been involved in helping to build a new state in this ancient land.

On this April 9th, some Iraqis reportedly may demonstrate against the coalition force presence in Iraq. That is their right in the new Iraq. It would only be fair, however, to note that they will be able to exercise that right because coalition forces liberated them from a tyrannical, barbaric regime that never would have permitted such freedom of expression.

Those who take to the streets should recall, moreover, that were it not for the actions of coalition forces in 2003 (and, to be sure, actions by Iraqi, as well as coalition, forces since then), they also would not have been able to celebrate the recent religious holidays as they did in such massive numbers. Nor would they have been able to select their leaders by free and democratic elections, vote on their constitution, or take at least the initial steps toward establishment of a government that is representative of, and responsive to, all Iraqis.

It is particularly important to me that "Najafis," the citizens of Najaf, recall these facts, for in 2003 I was privileged to command the 101st Airborne Division, the unit that liberated the holy city of Najaf and its sister city, Kufa. The battle of Najaf was, in fact, our first significant combat action in Iraq. Following its conclusion, we went on to defeat the elements of Saddam's army and the Saddam Fedayeen that fought us in Kifl, Karbala, and Al Hillah, before securing and stabilizing southern Baghdad, Haditha, and, eventually, Mosul and Ninevah Province. Our soldiers sacrificed greatly to give the Najafis and millions of other Iraqis the freedoms, however imperfect they may be, that they enjoy today.

While the establishment of the new Iraq has included a number of noteworthy achievements, it has also had its share of setbacks. Indeed, the coalition's efforts have not been without mistakes. I acknowledged a number of them during my appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee in January.

I would add, however, that the coalition has, at the least, consistently sought to learn from its mistakes. And, when those mistakes have involved unacceptable conduct, coalition authorities have taken administrative and legal action against those responsible. The coalition has, despite its occasional missteps, worked hard to serve all Iraqis and to bolster those who support a new Iraq founded on the principles now enshrined in the Iraqi Constitution.

Iraq, four years after liberation, faces serious challenges. The sectarian violence that escalated after the Samarra mosque bombing in 2006 was an enormous setback. Indeed, it tore the very fabric of Iraqi society. The damage done is still readily apparent in various neighborhoods of Baghdad and in many areas outside the capital.

Now Iraqi and coalition security forces are engaged in a renewed effort to improve security for the Iraqi people and to provide Iraq's leaders an opportunity to come to grips with the tough issues that must be dealt with to help foster reconciliation among the people of Iraq and to enable achievement of conditions that permit the withdrawal of coalition forces.

As the commander of the coalition forces in Iraq, and having given some 2-1/2 years of my life to this endeavor, I would like to take this opportunity to call for support of the new security plan. I ask all Iraqis to reject violence and the foreigners who fuel it with their money, arms, ammunition, training, and misguided young men. Beyond that, I ask, as well, for all Iraqis to notify Iraqi or coalition forces when those who would perpetrate violence on their fellow citizens or security forces enter their neighborhoods.

Coalition soldiers liberated Iraq from Saddam's "Republic of Fear." Now Iraqis must reject those who seek to drive wedges between people who have, in the past, lived in harmony in the Land of the Two Rivers. This is a time for Iraqis to demonstrate to the world their innate goodness, their desire to respect those of other sects and ethnic groups, and their wish to stitch back together the fabric of Iraqi society. Only in this way can Iraqis make the most of the opportunity that Iraqi and coalition security forces are striving to give them. And only in this way can the dreams of those who live in a country so rich in blessings and promise be fully realized.

With respect,

David H. Petraeus, General, United States Army, Commander Multi-National Force-Iraq

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Peter Beinert's "The War of the Words" essay in the Washington Post (Op-ed, April 1) is seriously lacking on several counts. He demonstrates the same blind spots and faulty analysis as the Pelosi-Murtha House Democrats do when they issue a cut-and-run document which, along with other nonsense, condemns use of the "Global War on Terrorism" label.

First, what has been going on in Iraq for over four years is, indeed, a War -- as opposed to a mere effort at crime control or law enforcement. The same was true of the Korean and Vietnam Wars, both of which were once mistakenly (but are no longer ever) called mere "Conflicts."

Second, all of this country's "Death to America" enemies are delighted to call it "war" -- beginning with al Qaeda's preposterous claim that it is a Holy War "Jihad" and continuing apace with all the "Illegal War" and "Bush's War" and "Immoral War" condemnations which have long been voiced by the President's cut-and-run detractors in this country, in Europe and elsewhere.

(Never have you heard or will ever hear these critics complaining of Bush's "law enforcement" surge or his augmented "Peacekeeping" efforts in Iraq. Such correct terms do not demonize the man sufficiently.)

Third, while Mr. Beinart spends several paragraphs concluding that "war" label is "increasingly problematic," he admits to having no preferred alternative. He then proceeds to reject the word "terror" -- which is, indeed, grammatically wrong but whose correct replacement is simply the word "Terrorism," al Qaeda-style and Hizballah-style Terrorism. (Recall, please, that the Cold War was not a war on communes but on fascist-Left, Soviet-style Communism.)

Fourth, a useful alternative label might be the "War on Irhabism" -- Irhab being the Arabic word for Terrorism, which even after five and a half years of same remains virtually unknown, unwritten and unspoken by any of us. Are we asleep at the linguistic switch, or what?!

Fifth, both Mr. Beinart's and our own "war of words" efforts -- and surely the Poop-on-Petraeus Democrats' pathetic postulations -- would be much better spent branding and loudly condemning al Qaeda's (and al-Sadr's and Hizballah's) suicide mass murderers

(1) NOT as waging so-called "Jihad" (Holy War) but ungodly "Hirabah" (unholy war, war against society) and forbidden "Irhab" (Terrorism), instead;

(2) NOT as the "jihadis" and the "mujahideen" they falsely claim to be but as the irhabis (terrorists) and the mufsiduun (evildoers, mortal sinners and corrupters) they really are;

(3) NOT as the Godly heroes of "Jihadi martyrdom" they falsely claim to be but as the Satanic perpetrators of "Irhabi Murderdom" (terroristic genocide) they really are;

(4) NOT as destined for a virgin-filled Paradise for killing all of us so-called kuffar (infidels) but to a demon-filled Jahannam (Eternal Hellfire) for killing so many thousands of innocents, fellow Muslims, "People of the Book" and "Sons of Abraham," instead;

(5) NOT as the abd'al-Allah (Servants of Allah) they falsely claim to be but as the abd'al-Shaitan (Servants of Satan), the murtadduun (apostates) and the khawarij (outside-the-religion deviants) they really are.

Clearly, when we counterattack al Qaeda's pseudo-Islamic scam of so-called "Jihadi Martyrdom" in Western secular words only -- criminals, thugs, killers, bring to justice, etc. -- we are simply shooting with blanks.

Worse yet, when we parrot the Terrorists' own words of self-sanctification, we even shoot ourselves -- by the perverse effects of "semantic infiltration," which the late great Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan defined thirty years in a Cold War context as follows:

"Semantic infiltration is the process whereby we come to adopt the language of our adversaries in describing political reality. The most brutal totalitarian regimes in the world call themselves 'liberation movements.' [Just as today's AQ-style Terrorists call themselves 'holy warriors']. It is perfectly predictable that they should misuse words to conceal their real nature. But must we aid them in that effort by repeating those words? Worse, do we begin to influence our own perceptions by using them?"

Both in his op-ed writing for the Washington Post and in his own excellent The New Republic magazine, Mr. Beinart (and the Post, as well) would do well to call our enemies the "Irhabis" and the "mufsiduun" they so desperately do NOT want to be called -- and to avoid anointing them as the holy-guy "Jihadis," the brave "martyrs," the "mujahideen" and the "Mahdi Army" saviors of Islam they so fervently DO want to be called.

Finally, to abandon the derisive term "Terrorism" (and perhaps the word "terrorist," as well...??!!) would place us squarely in bed with Reuters, the BBC and Al Jezeera . These far-left foreign news organizations have always avoided applying either of these powerfully negative terms to al Qaeda and other suicide assassins -- and have relied, instead, on the patently false and pro-UBL language of so-called "Jihadi martyrdom."

Thinking ahead to the media's, the terrorists' and the Bush-haters' likely reactions to a conclusion that the enemy is not really Global "Terrorism" after all, one can imagine an endless line of cynical comments and questions such as:

"Mr. President, you have been calling Terrorism the enemy for almost four years. But now you concede that this was wrong. You used to call al Qaeda's suicide mass murderers "evildoers," but now your own State Department has persuaded you that was wrong, too. Are there still other negative and erroneous labels for the al Qaeda, Hizballah and al-Sadr martyrs that you might also be changing? And if the proper word is 'Extremism,' what about the partisan Democrats and the Euro-Leftists who routinely condemn your policies as 'extremist,' also?"

To the "War on Bush" (but not on Terrorism) Democrats' delight, the propaganda barrage could become as unrelenting as the answers would be difficult for the Administration -- and most dangerously confusing to the American public, Western World opinion and the Muslim World (the Umma), as well.

Surely, that is not what either Mr. Beinart or the Post would want, particularly not at a time of War and of deadly threat to the national security. As for the "AWOL" and "ACE" -- Always Weak On Liberty and Aid and Comfort to the Enemy -- House and Senate Democrats, ons ne sais jamais. (This is French for the wartime unreliability of those who George Washington derisively referred to as "Sunshine Patriots.")

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Jim Guirard -- TrueSpeak Institute 703-768-0957 Justcauses@aol.com

A Washington, DC-area attorney, writer, lecturer and anti-terrrism strategist, Jim Guirard was longtime Chief-of-Staff to former US Senators Allen Ellender and Russell Long of Louisiana. His TrueSpeak Institute and TrueSpeak.org website are devoted to truth-in-history and truth-in-language in public discourse.

Sunni Tribes Battle al Qaeda Terrorists in the Insurgency's Stronghold

Last fall, President Bush, citing the violence in Baghdad, said that the U.S. strategy in Iraq was "slowly failing." At that time, though, more Americans were dying in Anbar Province, stronghold of the Sunni insurgency. About the size of Utah, Anbar has the savagery, lawlessness and violence of America's Wild West in the 1870s. The two most lethal cities in Iraq are Fallujah and Ramadi, and the 25-mile swath of farmlands between them is Indian Country.

Imagine the surprise of the veteran Iraqi battalion last November when a young sheik, leader of a local tribe outside Ramadi, offered to point out the insurgents hiding in his hometown. "We have decided that by helping you," he said, "we are helping God."

For years, the tribes had supported the insurgents who claimed to be waging jihad. Now, citing the same religion, a tribe wanted to switch sides. Col. Mohammed, the battalion commander, accepted the offer. "The irhabi (terrorists) call themselves martyrs. They are liars," he said. "I lost a soldier and when I pulled off his armor, there was the blood of a martyr."

With Iraqi soldiers and Marines providing protection, the sheik and his tribesmen rolled through town, pointing at various men. The sweep netted 30 insurgents, including "Abu Muslim," who was wanted for the murder of a jundi (Iraqi soldier). "He was just standing there waving at us with all the others," one jundi said during the minor celebration at the detention facility.

Six months ago, American intelligence reports about Anbar were dire. Although the Marines won the firefights, insurgents controlled the population--the classic guerrilla pattern. Among the groups, the extremists called al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had achieved dominance. In 2004, AQI briefly held Fallujah, where they whipped teenagers who talked back, bludgeoned women who wore lipstick and beheaded "collaborators"--hapless passersby and truckers. AQI preached a persuasive message: Our way or the grave.

In Anbar, AQI became the occupier, shaking down truck drivers and extorting shop owners. In the young sheik's zone, AQI controlled the fuel market. Each month, 10 trucks with 80,000 gallons of heavily subsidized gasoline and five trucks with kerosene were due to arrive. Instead, AQI diverted most shipments to Jordan or Syria where prices were higher, netting $10,000 per shipment and antagonizing 30,000 shivering townspeople. No local cop dared to make an arrest. The tribal power structure, built over centuries, was shoved aside. Sheiks who objected were shot or blown up, while others fled.

In late 2005, acceptably-trained Iraqi battalions began to join the persistent Americans in Anbar. AQI resorted to suicide attacks and roadside bombs, and avoided direct fights. Sub-tribes began to kill AQI members in retaliation for individual crimes, and discovered that AQI was ruthless, but not tough. Near the Syrian border, an entire tribe joined forces with the Marines and drove AQI from the city of al Qaim.

By the fall of 2006 AQI had become the oppressor, careless in its destructive swath, while the American and Iraqi forces persisted with their mix of force of arms and civil engagement. When an AQI suicide car bomb attacked an Anbar market in November, killing a Marine and nine civilians, the Marine battalion commander and his Iraqi counterpart offered medical care at the local clinic for the entire town, including the first gynecological examinations many local women had seen. This was not an isolated event, and the people noticed.

With a war-weary population buoying them, 25 of the 31 Anbar sub-tribes have pledged to fight the insurgents over the past five months, sending thousands of tribesmen into the police and army. Led by Sheik Abu Sittar, who has called this an "awakening," the tribes believed they were joining the winners.

Politics in Baghdad have swirled around reinstating former Baathists to their prior jobs, thereby supposedly diminishing the insurgency. The central government, though, has given Anbar such paltry funds that jobs are scant, Baathist or not. In Anbar, reconciliation theories count far less than that eternal adage: Show me the money.

When the sheiks delivered thousands of police recruits, they consolidated their patrimonial power by providing jobs, plus pocketing a fee rumored at $400 paid by each recruit. The tribal police then provided security that permitted American civic action projects profitable to contractors connected, of course, to the sheiks. Our Congress has just appropriated an emergency supplemental for our troops that included millions to grow spinach and store peanuts; in Anbar, the sheiks are filling potholes that can conceal IEDs.

There remain problems that require military solutions, however. Neither the coalition nor the Iraqi government is prepared to imprison the sharp increase in killers like Abu Muslim who are being netted in the surge in Baghdad and the tribal awakening in Anbar. No one wants to take the heat from the mainstream press that would accompany the construction of prisons and the indefinite incarceration of several tens of thousands of insurgents.

In response to the 2003 abuses at Abu Ghraib, the U.S. military and the Iraqi government instituted a catch-and-release system that Sweden would find too liberal. Unlike uniformed prisoners who in past wars were held until the war was over, in Iraq most detainees are released within a few months. To some, this represents a scrupulous adherence to the rule of law, with every insurgent provided the right of habeas corpus.

To the sheiks, it is both naïve and deadly. The Iraqi judicial system in Anbar is nonexistent. Locals are quick to relate stories of killers who returned to murder those who snitched. So it's no surprise that while most insurgents are arrested, some simply disappear. The American command in Anbar has issued a clear order barring support to any unauthorized militia. But guidance from the Iraqi ministries has been vague. If the insurgents have a complaint, they can take it up with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

In recent weeks, al Qaeda has struck back with suicide bombers, blowing up a Sunni mosque in the young sheik's area, killing 40 worshipers, and then detonating a series of chlorine truck bombs in residential neighborhoods outside Fallujah. They hope that if they murder random groups of women and children, the tribes will fall back in line. These tactics have locked AQI in a fight to the death against the tribal leaders. It reflects an enemy who has lost popular support for his jihad, clinging to fear alone. Had any American analyst predicted AQI would attack local Sunnis with weaponized chemicals nine months ago, he would have been laughed at.

In itself, the tribal shift is significant but not decisive. The intensity of tribal loyalty varies across the province and is weakest in the cities. While perhaps only a quarter of the males in Anbar heed the orders of the sheiks, their cohesion gives them larger sway. Others will follow their lead, provide tips or stay out of their way. Numerical estimates aren't possible because there has been no systematic effort to identify via biometrics the military-age males in the Sunni Triangle, a gross military error in combating an insurgency. The tribes aren't trained fighters. They occasionally engage AQI in a melee, but they need American or Iraqi soldiers to destroy insurgent bands, especially when holed up in houses that serve as concrete pillboxes.

The real value of the tribes lies in providing specific information and recruits for the police and army. The tribes openly acknowledge that it has been the personal behavior, strength of arms and persistence ofthe American forces that convinced them to join the fight. "The American coalition is the only thing," Sheik Abureeshah of Ramadi said, "that makes the Iraqi government give anything to Anbar."

The tribes want their share of oil revenues, more power and a cut of the American contracts. With American combat forces likely to leave within a year or two, it is the Iraqi Government that must determine the modesty of the demands. But to put the state of the province in perspective, six months ago the head of Central Command, Gen. John Abizaid, told the Congress that "Anbar was not under control." Last week the U.S. commander in Anbar, Maj. Gen. Walt Gaskin, said he was "very, very optimistic."

Gen. David Petraeus, the top general in Iraq, recently persuaded Mr. Maliki to visit Ramadi and meet with the tribes. That was the start of the bargaining. The Iraqi government faces a classic risk-versus-reward calculation. The reward is that the tribes will provide the information, recruits and local policing that shrinks the area where AQI operates. With less area to search, the Iraqi Army can concentrate wherever al Qaeda tries to rest or regroup, eventually drying up the swamp. The risk is that, if the Shiite-dominated government refuses reasonable terms, the tribes use their military muscle to reach a truce with AQI and the province reverts.

Baghdad is the critical battleground. But it is only in Anbar that the Congress agrees with the president that U.S. forces must combat the AQI terrorists. The tribes will learn to play that card to keep pressure onthe central government not to neglect them. Civil war between the Sunni tribes and the extremists has broken out in Anbar Province, the stronghold of the insurgency, and the U.S. and Iraqi government should support it. Anbar is like the American West in the 1870s. Security will come to towns in Anbar as it came to Tombstone--by the emergence of tough, local sheriffs with guns, local power and local laws.

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SWJ Blog Note: Bing's post is co-authored by his son Owen West who recently returned from Anbar where he was a U.S. Marine Corps adviser.

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Victory and Defeat - Operation Tigris Waves and the Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency

Captain John Shermer

In March 2006, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division planned and executed Operation Tigris Waves to stabilize the city of Tarmiyah, Iraq, set the conditions to create a local security force capable of protecting the populace of Tarmiyah, and to integrate the town government into the Shia dominated government of Iraq. This operation ultimately failed. Not for lack of planning, or allocation of military and interagency resources, but because early successes in the operation changed the environment to such a degree that other priorities in 1st Brigade's Area of Responsibility (AOR) began to pull resources away from the Tarmiyah area. Eventually security could no longer be maintained, and the coalition initiative was again lost. This essay examines Operation Tigris Waves, the successes and failures of the operation, and provides commentary on how well the operation utilized the Twenty Eight Articles : Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency by Dr. David Kilcullen.

Background

Tarmiyah, a city of largely Sunni Muslims (who were, or remain, Ba'ath Party members) of Iraqi descent with a significant, though dwindling, minority of Shia Muslims, is located 20 miles north of Baghdad along the western bank of the Tigris River. Population estimates of the urban area ranged from 50,000 - 200,000. The agricultural area surrounding Tarmiyah is largely palm and orange groves, with scattered raised-berm fish farms. Goats, cattle, and poultry and other livestock are farmed to a lesser extent. Several significant government complexes from the Saddam Regime are in the area; the largely rubbled Ibn Sinna Chemical Plant and the Karkh Water Treatment Facility, which continues to supply the majority of fresh water to upper class and government facilities in the Karkh area of Baghdad. Tarmiyah is located only 6-7 miles from Highway One (Main Supply Route (MSR) Tampa), a heavily patrolled U.S. Army Corps MSR route; but despite the relative proximity to near constant transient U.S. and Iraqi Army patrols, it is isolated enough to need dedicated security from insurgent attacks.

Insurgent attacks on U.S. forces and non-local Iraqi security forces persisted since the end of high intensity combat operations in 2003. Route (RTE) Coyotes, the main improved road linking Tarmiyah to the rest of Iraq, experienced improvised explosive device (IED) attacks or attempted attacks daily. Attacks on U.S. forces and security forces inside of Tarmiyah were less persistent, but tended to be of higher complexity and intensity than attacks on the roads, particularly attacks against fixed facilities, like the Tarmiyah Police Station, or U.S. checkpoints. Prior to 1st Brigade involvement, security in the city consisted of a police station with approximately 10 individuals "on duty." Supporting the police station were intermittent U.S. patrols. In early 2006, the Tarmiyah Police Station was abandoned by U.S. forces following coordinated attacks on a monthly basis.

A Joint Operational Graphic from 2000 placed an "approximate boundary for the Baghdad area" just north of Tarmiyah. These operational graphics were used by Corps planners in delineating division boundaries. These boundaries effectively sealed off the Albiyachi area from U.S. patrols in 1st Brigade and created an area north of Tarmiyah not patrolled by U.S. forces. This insurgent sanctuary north of Tarmiyah played a role in the outcome Operation Tigris Waves.

Operation Tigris Waves involved placing an Iraqi battalion and U.S. company in a fixed facility inside the city and sealing it off the with concertina wire. There were two entry control points for all traffic entering the city. From a patrol base, joint patrols were conducted in order to secure the populace and build indigenous combat power. Figuring prominently in the operation was the addition of local projects to increase the standard of living of the populace and a focus on information operations to inform the populace of the projects and the actions of their local government. Also included in the patrol base were combat support assets, such as local intelligence collectors and signal support. The base was supplied regularly from Camp Taji, 12 miles away.

The operation was, initially, a resounding success. Security in the city quickly increased, and Tarmiyah went from being one of the most feared places for U.S. forces to being the location showcased for VIPs. During the first few months of Operation Tigris Waves it was not unusual to see patrols shopping on the streets of Tarmiyah or eating in cafes. Locals hesitantly embraced the security that coalition forces brought to the city despite the inconvenience of a semi-sealed city and commerce flourished. Drives to recruit police officers were successful and locals were sent to police training. Multiple governance meetings were held and the city was deluged with projects to assist in rebuilding destroyed or neglected public areas in the city. U.S. leadership was invited to mosques, schools, and other events. Insurgents, wary of the U.S. presence in the city and fearful of U.S. operations, fled the area to either Albiyachi, villages south of Tarmiyah, or Baghdad. Intelligence collection initially surged as individuals previously too intimidated to come forward to provide information were now comfortable talking with U.S. patrols or at the Joint Patrol Base.

As 2006 continued conditions in other portions of the 1st Brigade sector changed. The Brigade focus shifted from stabilizing Sunni insurgent strongholds to patrolling Sunni/Shia demographic fault lines and combating a rise in IEDs on MSR Tampa near the town of Mushada. With the return of police recruits and a change in focus on other areas of the brigade sector, security forces began to be pulled away from Tarmiyah. The first drawdown was a relief in place of a U.S. infantry company by a U.S. engineer company half the size of the infantry company. Following this reduction was the displacement of the Iraqi army battalion in Tarmiyah to Baghdad. Insurgents, biding their time in non-U.S. controlled Albiyachi, saw an opportunity to reestablish dominance in Tarmiyah. Killings against citizens in Tarmiyah rose, and an infantry company was again brought in to regain control. Despite a lack of adequate security in the city, project money continued to flow. Consistent, unconfirmed reports emerged of project money flowing into insurgent hands to protect city officials from reprisal attacks from insurgents.

By the winter of 2006 the infantry company was removed leaving only a small contingent of U.S. military police assisting with the security of Tarmiyah. The local Iraqi police, recognizing that the security situation favored the insurgents and fearful of reprisal attacks on their families, quit. By late February 2007, Tarmiyah had come full circle, with U.S. forces manning an empty Iraqi police station, a lone outpost in enemy held territory and vulnerable to attack.

What Went Right

U.S. forces did a remarkable job of stabilizing the populace and, if judged by Dr. Kilcullen's Twenty-Eight Articles on Company Level Counterinsurgency, did very well at a number of his precepts. U.S. Forces knew the land they were going to operate on, diagnosed the problems in the area, and did passably well organizing for intelligence, by dedicating a human intelligence team to augment the company commander's organization. A local patrol base meant light walking patrols, easily augmented with reach-back combat power from the patrol base. Though a political advisor was not dedicated to the company at the patrol base, there was a dedicated brigade command and control node that furnished information operations support on a daily basis. The game plan of building a local security network through the police force was valid and well executed.

The most important dictate of Dr. Kilcullen, that of "being there" was executed daily. Networks were built slowly, over time, as patrol leaders interacted daily with the populace. Deterrent patrolling was done daily by both U.S. and Iraqi patrols through all areas of the city. Armed civil affairs operations were conducted through a series of projects, from relatively minor medical operations to large projects such as adding a distribution pipeline from the Karkh Water Treatment Plant to Tarmiyah. All of these facets of Operation Tigris Waves were well within the tenants of the Twenty-Eight Articles. This, in itself, was a remarkable accomplishment for a U.S. brigade tooled, not for counterinsurgency, but for high intensity warfare.

What Went Wrong

Operation Tigris Waves also failed on several of the precepts of the Twenty-Eight Articles. U.S. Forces did not ever truly organize for interagency operations. A brigade staff section was selected to oversee civil-military operations but at the company level there were no dedicated individuals to develop relationships with civilian agencies. Even if the company could have developed these relationships, they would have been lost as the U.S. components were forced to conduct relief in place operations to facilitate directives to other portions of the brigade AOR.

Another area that failed the Twenty-Eight Articles was that by starting in Tarmiyah, an insurgent stronghold, U.S. forces did not "start easy," as Article 14 suggests. This meant U.S. forces did not have an area to re-cock from when the Tarmiyah security situation disintegrated. However, Article 14 was hard to apply to Iraq in late 2005 and early 2006 as some estimates suggested that 80% of the Iraqi populace had the potential to act as a mass base for the insurgency and 45% of the Iraqi populace believed that attacking U.S. forces was justified. Given these statistics, a suitable location to begin focused counterinsurgency operations was difficult to identify at best.

Another article that was not implemented was Article 22, "local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves." In this, there appears to be a divergence from Dr. Kilcullen's beliefs, as U.S. forces have, and continue to be, focused on raising an Iraqi security apparatus that looks very similar to western military and police forces in doctrine and organization. In the microcosm that was Tarmiyah in 2005-2007, this Article played out in both victory and defeat as Iraqi reconnaissance squads were very successful at retooling into a paramilitary-like force that did their best work in civilian clothes in marketplaces, mosques, and other social circles, while Iraqi tank battalions were not particularly efficient uses of combat power in combating the Sunni insurgency in the area.

Perhaps the biggest deviation from the Articles was in Article 25, "fight the enemy's strategy, not his forces." As Operation Tigris Waves achieved its first objective of providing security to the built-up area of Tarmiyah, attacks in other portions of the brigade AOR increased, particularly in mixed Sunni/Shia areas. Over time, a focus on this rise in activity led to retasking of combat power out of the city of Tarmiyah, ultimately undermining the operation as a whole. In order to fight the Shia insurgency, U.S. forces ceded power to the Sunni insurgency.

Operational Security (OPSEC) is a very difficult problem in Iraq, and it is frustrated on an even higher scale by clockwork troop rotation plans, and the rise of internet and cell phone use. Because of this, Article 27, "keep your extraction plan secret," was another article that U.S. forces had difficulty with. Civilian leaders in Tarmiyah knew the end of 1st Brigade's troop rotation just as well the troops did.

Troop rotations are a particularly poignant problem in Iraq. Just when military leaders have a good handle on the civilian leadership and have built relationships, the entire area's U.S. military leadership changes hands. This seems to violate the last article of Dr. Kilcullen, "whatever else you do, keep the initiative." Months pass before the elements of operational friction from the troop rotation are overcome, ceding time to the Iraqi insurgencies to reengage the population and make up for lost ground due to previous coalition victories.

Despite applying most of the 28 articles to the security in Tarmiyah, ultimately it was the success of Operation Tigris Waves that led to its downfall. Tarmiyah was perceived as secure, and security forces initially dedicated to the operation were moved away from the center of gravity of the Sunni insurgency in 1st Brigade's AOR to contend with the other Iraq insurgency: the Shia insurgency in Baghdad and other enclaves. As stated previously, a superficial resemblance to coming full circle was perceived with the security situation in Tarmiyah, but this is not entirely true. Much like a biological organism will recover from a transient disease with a new resistance, so did the insurgency in Tarmiyah. A sporadic approach to security, with rapid task-organization changes and shifts in focus acts to harden an insurgency and the local populace against U.S. involvement. Coalition forces are perceived as transient. The superficial resemblance of the security situation in Tarmiyah in early 2007 to the security situation in Tarmiyah in 2006 is false. It is not the same. It is worse. The insurgency has come through another on-slaught from U.S. forces. The insurgent capabilities that were not able to make it through the security environment were destroyed; the insurgent capabilities and relationships in the community that survived are now stronger. Evolution has occurred, and not in the coalition's favor.

The U.S. Army will continue to contend with Dr. Kilcullen's' 28 Articles, as they are now doctrine (FM 3-24, Appendix A) and in time the Army may improve in the execution of these articles.

However, without significantly restructuring combat forces for counterinsurgency, realizing that withdraw or drawdown of forces currently in place is not possible until conditions affecting the targeted populace fundamentally change, and providing a sufficient force to address limited objectives in an increasingly prohibitive operating environment, decisive victory for U.S. objectives in Iraq remains in jeopardy.

Posted by Maximus on the Small Wars Council and Marine Corps Gazette discussion boards, I thought this Q&A with a Marine Corps lieutenant would be of interest to SWJ Blog readers.

Council member Maximus is an active duty Marine Corps captain (infantry). He served in Iraq as a rifle platoon commander, rifle company executive officer, and as a combined anti-armor team platoon commander.

Where a military acronym is used I have inserted an explanation or edited the original term for clarity sake.

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I thought you'd be interested in an After Action Review-type discussion with a Marine Corps lieutenant recently back from Ramadi:

Q: What was your billet?

A: Initially I was the 4th Platoon Commander / Mobile Assault / Quick Reaction Force (QRF) Platoon Commander for my company. I held this billet for 2 months until taking over a rifle platoon. I held that billet for 5 months.

Q: What was your Area of Operations (AO)?

A: Initially the northeast sector of Ramadi, but as my company had success our AO expanded to where we had most of the area north of Route Michigan and some areas to the south by the time we left.

Q What do you mean by success? My perception is that many folks think

all Iraqis in Ramadi hate Americans. Is this true?

A: Initially my company had a rough time and minimal positive relations with the people. This changed though right around the 2-month mark as we began using less aggressive tactics. For example, while serving as the MAP (Mobile Assault Platoon) Commander, I executed most of the raids for the company. At first our TTP (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) involved locking the target area down and then going into the building hard, sometimes using an explosive breach. After a while though, I / we began to realize that our intelligence was rarely 100% correct and even when it was we almost never found anything of significance at the target site or we messed up doing site exploitation / filling out paperwork. So we'd end up detaining a bunch of military age males with little evidence to justify detaining them only to have them released and back at their houses days or weeks later.

At about the 2-month mark, my company changed tactics. For example, unless given very specific intelligence that described an immediate threat, whenever conducting a raid or cordon and search, I'd still lock the target area down, but rather than kick down the door, break / blow open the gate, rush the building, etc., I tried knocking on the door and waiting for the family to answer. After all, I had the objective isolated and also had a lot of Marines / firepower with me. Once the home owner came to the door I asked to come in, took off my helmet and shook hands and then began asking him questions. Sometimes I spoke about random things for 5-10 minutes just to get a feel for whether the intelligence was legit. If yes, after 10 minutes I'd have my interpreter explain that I had to detain him for questioning from higher. I also calmly explained what was happening to his family.

Q: Did you search the houses?

A: At first yes, but after doing so many times we realized the insurgents aren't stupid; rarely will you find illegal weapons, IED (Improvised Explosive Device) making material, etc. in a house. They know by now to hide this stuff elsewhere. So, again, after the first 2 months we stopped searching houses for the most part. My thought process was for the 1 in 100 houses where we would actually find something chances are we'd piss off the other 99 families and thus create more enemies.

Q: How bad was the IED threat?

A: You're going to start noticing a trend. First 2 months real bad. Lots of QRF missions for casualty evacuations. The IED threat significantly decreased when we started doing things differently. For example, when I got the rifle platoon we generally operated out of a company firm base located in the middle of the town. From this position we were almost always out as individual squads or 3 squads operating separately doing ambush operations in the vicinity of known or suspected IED / ambush locations. This played a large role in reducing the IED threat.

Q: Please explain urban ambush ops more. What'd they look like? How'd

you occupy? What'd you bring with you?

A: Depends on whether going in an abandoned structure or a house with a family inside.

Abandoned structure: stepped off on a foot patrol in the dark and didn't occupy until late at night. Once inside we'd clear using NVGs (Night Vision Goggles) in order to maintain the element of surprise (white light equals immediate compromise) and then establish eyes-on with a fire team, 1 team would be responsible for security and 1 team on rest. We rarely occupied a platoon-sized ambush position. (After he said this I asked him about distributed ops and whether he had multiple squads out at the same time and if yes how they communicated). We often had squads occupying different buildings because angles in the urban environment usually only allowed Marines to observe a NAI (Named Area of Interest) from 1 or 2 windows. By occupying multiple squad-sized ambush sites that mutually supported each other, the platoon had much better observation. Each squad had plenty of communications capability.

If occupying a house with a family present: much like lessons learned from above, we would still occupy late at night but do our best to quietly get through gates before quietly knocking on doors and asking / politely telling owner that we were coming in. If lights were off in the house, we'd only use NVGs to do a cursory search before occupying. Again, 1 team eyes-on, 1 on rest / engaging family with squad leader and interpreter (critical asset that we didn't always have), and 1 on security. At first we separated the family and forced them to stay in specific rooms and also prevented them from going to work, school, etc. After a few days though we realized this wasn't helping our cause so we simply explained the ground rules and then let the family go about its normal life. My logic was let the father go to work. Chances are he's not going to tell the enemy that we're in his house because he doesn't want his family caught in a cross fire and / or house destroyed. Plus, by not letting parents work and kids go to school you're automatically raising suspicion levels. Worst case, someone tells that we're in the house so insurgents don't plant an IED or we get attacked while we're in a position of advantage. In a sense this is still a win for us.

Q: How'd the people respond to your living in their houses for multiple days?

A: We never had a problem. In fact, in every case the family offered us food and plenty of chai (tea) and eventually Marines not on security or maintaining eyes-on the NAI ended up having conversations with the older males and playing with the children. Operating in this way proved to be a great way to get to know the people and to build relationships with them.

(As he said this he remembered one particular ambush op....)

One night we occupied a little early, call it around 2000-2100. As I walked in the house I looked into a room and saw 30-40 middle aged to older men. Initial thought was what have we walked into! After having a short discussion with the home owner I found out that the men were in the house because they had just returned from a funeral. As I was expressing my sorrow for the loss the men began to explain that an IED had inadvertently killed a member of their family. Through sheer luck or simply because I treated them like human beings, the men then told me where 2 other IEDs were located and also who was responsible for planting them. I quickly called EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) and they eliminated the IEDs. We also detained the guys who set them up. Big picture - this taught me that the average person in Ramadi is fed up with the fighting and will help us if we give him reason to.

Q: Did your company ever kill / capture insurgents laying in IEDs or other

types of ambushes?

A: Yes, I don't recall exactly how many but at least 3 or 4 insurgents. As we did these ops though fewer and fewer IEDs were set-up in our AO so the opportunities decreased. That said it's critical that you do everything possible to maintain the element of surprise throughout the operation.

Q: What gear did you bring with you on these patrols?

A: Normally 80-90 pounds of gear. Operated a lot in the summer so we needed lots of water, enough food for 3 days, ammo, night optics, digital cameras, IR (Infra Red) marking devices, radios and extra batteries and we also often took 40-50 lbs pieces of ballistic glass (HMMWV windshield glass) with us. I had to force my Marines to take the glass initially but when we were compromised once and a sniper hit the glass directly in front of one of my Marines, the complaints ceased.

Q: After observing a recent DO (Distributed Operations) communications training package where Marines were taught to take pictures with digital cameras, download on small tough-book computers and then send imagery over their radios, I asked if he had this capability and if not would he have wanted it in order to get imagery / data to higher headquarters ASAP?

A: No we didn't have this capability. And, yes I definitely would have wanted it. There were multiple times where we had pictures / other intelligence that we wanted to get to higher but didn't want to leave the positions in daylight or before mission completion.

I was impressed with the lieutenant's ability and willingness to adapt, understanding of the nature of the fight, etc., as I am disappointed that we keep learning the same lessons over and over again - at great cost. Success in COIN (counterinsurgency) has proven in so many ways nothing more than understanding human relations 101.

From the NPR article:

Lt. Col. John Nagl wrote a book about fighting insurgents called Learning to

Eat Soup with a Knife.

He remembers working closely with an Iraqi police chief who provided

valuable intelligence. Then, he learned that the man he had trusted was supporting the enemy -- "providing weapons, ammunition, body armor to the insurgents in Fallujah who were then fighting the Marines. And against some of my soldiers."

Nagl said he found himself "faced with a horrible dilemma."

"What do I do to this police chief who has clearly risked his life to help

us? Every time I think about it, I wonder if I did the right thing. But ultimately what I decided to do was -- nothing. My assessment was that for Ishmael to stay alive this is the minimum he had to do -- this is the minimum tax he had to pay to the insurgents."

Part One of the NPR series: Training the Trainers at Fort Riley.