US Army Captain and Small Wars Council member Captain Ryan Kranc e-mailed us yesterday with his thoughts on advising indigenous forces. CPT Kranc is a two-tour Operation Iraqi Freedom veteran who served as a platoon and troop commander with the 3rd Armored Regiment.

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Advising Indigenous Forces

Captain Ryan T. Kranc

Introduction

As the Long War continues, reaching its tactical, operational, and strategic objectives requires training and advising the security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan to take control of their country from insurgents, sectarian violence, and lawlessness. General George Casey said in September 2005 that "The sooner we can shift [to Iraqi security forces] the better. A smaller U.S. footprint, that is allowed to decline gradually as Iraqi forces get stronger, actually helps us." The November 2005 National Security Council publication, The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq emphasized that point, quantifying victory in Iraq according to three distinct time metrics:

In the short term:

• An Iraq that is making steady progress in fighting terrorists and neutralizing the insurgency, meeting political milestones; building democratic institutions; standing up robust security forces to gather intelligence, destroy terrorist networks, and maintain security; and tackling key economic reforms to lay the foundation for a sound economy.

In the medium term:

• An Iraq that is in the lead defeating terrorists and insurgents and providing its own security, with a constitutional, elected government in place, providing an inspiring example to reformers in the region, and well on its way to achieving its economic potential.

In the longer term:

• An Iraq that has defeated the terrorists and neutralized the insurgency.

• An Iraq that is peaceful, united, stable, democratic, and secure, where Iraqis have the institutions and resources they need to govern themselves justly and provide security for their country.

• An Iraq that is a partner in the global war on terror and the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, integrated into the international community, an engine for regional economic growth, and proving the fruits of democratic governance to the region.

The result of this command emphasis on developing indigenous forces capable of taking the lead in security and stability operations within their country stimulated the parallel development of 200 Military Transition Teams (MiTT) by February of 2005. Each MiTT has 12 officers and NCOs advising Iraq battalions, brigades, and divisions. According to a February 2006 media event regarding MiTT structure and future, there were somewhere in the arena of 2000 US soldiers on MiTTs, with 5,000 as "a fair estimate" for those who will eventually serve in the MiTT capacity.

We have done this before. On 1 July 1949 the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) was established in order to replace the Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG) and tasked with continuing to improve the competence of the Republic of Korea Army. In September 1950 Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indochina was established to advise the French in their fight with the Viet Minh. By 1968, the peak of the Vietnam conflict, the number of advisors at the battalion or below level had reached an apex of 9,430 soldiers. Additionally, before deployment, potential advisors were schooled through the Military Assistance Training Advisors (MATA) course, a four-week course that incorporated both language and counterinsurgency training. Indeed, the United States has in excess of fifty years experience as advisors in Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador, and a number of other countries around the globe.

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines the US Army Special Forces (SF) mission of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) "participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency." Additionally, the Department of Defense (DoD) defines Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) as "the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society."

Given the need for SF units outside the theaters in Iraq and Afghanistan and the tremendous need for FID/IDAD inside those theaters, conventional forces and conventional Soldiers have had to take on what was an unconventional role, training and advising foreign security forces. Moreover this has become a role for joint conventional forces with JCISFA serving as it the DoD proponent. Certainly conventional forces faced a steep learning curve in the past four years taking on missions that in the past centered on SF's core competencies of intercultural communications (to include both language proficiency and area and cultural orientation), warfighting, and training of foreign security forces. The establishment of consolidated MiTT training facilities at Fort Riley, Kansas under one command boosted progress in this arena over the past few years. Shifting that MiTT training to the Joint Readiness Training Center so that MiTTs can train alongside their U.S. conventional unit partners will further improve it.

But no matter how good the training, nothing can match the value of actual advisor experience when it comes to training and advising another human being in a cross-cultural environment. You cannot train "experience"; you can share that experience in training others. In this paper, I will share of my experiences as an advisor to an Iraqi Army brigade and as the commander of a multi-national troop containing one Iraqi Army platoon.

The Law of Realistic Expectations

Realistic is defined by Merriam-Webster as "interested in, concerned with, or based on what is real or practical." Expectation is defined as "the degree of probability that something will occur." To compare a 6th grade geometry student with a high school senior calculus student is mixing apples and oranges. Chances are the indigenous force you have been tasked to advise (the apples) through no fault of their own are not of the caliber you would expect in US Army units (the oranges). Clearly one can make a nice dessert using both; just don't expect pure orange juice.

The advisor's role, as Dr. David Kilcullen has so eloquently stated, is not to have the indigenous force mirror our forces, but for them to mirror the enemy. The Law of Realistic Expectation calls for progress, however slight, over a period of time; the objective is improvement. This law recognizes that the infantry battalion you advise during your tour will not transform into SEAL Team 6 or 3-325 AIR at the end of your 12- month advisory tour. Violating this Law by thinking in those terms will not only frustrate the advisor, but the advised force as well. The Law of Realistic Expectations focuses on the improvement and refinement of procedures as a vehicle to the desired end state without sacrificing standards. Forward progress is the engine. A good working relationship and partnership is the fuel. In our eagerness to do well, often we will place unrealistic expectations upon our partnership unit, which turns out to be unfair and frustrating. Understanding where you wish to be in twelve months will place into perspective where you should go with your training tomorrow.

Ignorance is Not Stupidity -- Don't Stupidly Assume They Are Ignorant

Often, we Americans erroneously equate ignorance with lack of intelligence. Ignorant people can learn and be taught; stupid people cannot be taught and will not learn. The wise advisor separates these two fundamentals to reduce misinterpretation or stereotyping by either advisor or advised. Understand that the ignorance you perceive in the partner unit is nothing compared to your actual ignorance of their way of life. It is virtually certain that those who you have been tasked to advise do not come from the same social, religious, political, or economic background as do you. It so follows that their customs and everyday activities will be dissimilar to anything you have seen before. As such, remember that in your everyday activities you will probably make mistakes that may be termed offensive to your partner force. The higher the quality of pre-deployment training is, the lower the proportionality or frequency of these occasions. Understand that they are much more tolerant of your inevitable social mistakes in their country than you will be of their tactical mistakes in training.

You Will Learn More Than You Teach

If you approach your advisory role with the misconception that you know it all and are there exclusively for the purpose of teaching anyone who will listen, you will have a disappointing and unproductive year. A method of introduction is to tell your partner force commander up front that you look forward to learning as much from him as you can. Advisory roles can be flipped quite easily. As a young captain advising battalion and brigade commanders in Iraq, I would have been foolish and arrogant to assume that I could learn nothing from them. Truthfully, at the end of my time with my partner unit, I had learned far more from them than I ever could have taught them.

Al-tikrar yi'allim al-shuttar -- Repetition Teaches the Clever

The quoted Arabic proverb has as much application for an advisor as it does on the high school football field. Repeating any act over and over instills muscle and behavioral memory. Rehearsals are the most overt method of teaching, which require both advisor and partner unit to go through the steps to achieve a task. In repetitive actions good and bad habits are formed. Repeating the same drills not only will increase your partnership unit's proficiency, the unit will begin to correct its own mistakes. Few successes will be as sweet as seeing your partner unit begin to train to standard on tasks that you have been training their leaders.

Treat Them as You Would Your Own Soldiers

Understand that your success as an advisor is directly proportionate to the success of those around you, much like the success of the platoon leader is directly tied to the abilities of his or her platoon. Taking ownership, though not in a command role or relationship, vests interest into the well being and totality of the unit. Shortcomings, when taken personally, are apt to receive greater concentration so that they are not repeated. Additionally, success shared is sweeter than private satisfaction. When pointing out the successes of others, ensure that achievement is recognized. If one of your partner unit jundis (soldiers) does well, make sure that his leadership, peers, and subordinates know that he did well. Recognize him in public, making a point to reward his hard work and dedication. Conversely, correct in private, particularly those in leadership positions. Consider how you would want to be treated if you erred and knew it. Consider how you have felt in the past when corrected. Implement lessons learned from your own past into tangible and usable lessons in your advisory role.

Rapport and Relationships Build Progress

Your abilities to connect with your partner unit on a level transcending your professional military relationship will allow both of you to accomplish more together. We played soccer with our counterparts, watched television, drank chai, talked of our families (after a period of time), played ping pong, air hockey, and told old war stories. We connected in ways outside of our official capacities; in turn, these growing personal relationships fostered significant progress over time. Think of your relationships, particularly those friendships bred from an initial working relationship. How did those friendships support better working relationships? How did you get to that point? How will you incorporate lessons learned in this arena throughout your life into your advisory role? You will be amazed at how much impact getting to know your advisory partner will have both personally and professionally.

Mistakes are Training Tools

"Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is." Chances are that as a child or teenager, there was a time of your life where you were told that a particular action would cause some sort of negative reaction. If you were like me, and your parents told you this, chances are you did not listen. And like me, you probably found out the hard way that doing something incorrectly precipitated a reflex mechanism meant to teach you never to repeat said action again. Just as these formative experiences from our youth have conditioned us to, perhaps, the correct path, mistakes made by the partner unit may have significant consequences.

The following is a summary of an article that will appear in Volume 8 of the Small Wars Journal online magazine to be published in April. Scott Swanson is an intelligence specialist who advises military and government special projects in the area of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency. He can be reached at s2@delphiresearch.us.

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Viral Targeting of the IED Social Network System

By Scott Swanson

Extremist groups, insurgents, and resistance elements continue to use Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) to attack coalition forces to thwart "infidel Crusaders'" occupation activities and assault rival sectarian factions. The effective and low-cost IED weapon in Iraq hides as a tool created within an elusive social network system and its use will persist in opportunistic attacks if the status quo does not shift. This IED system further devastates Iraq with evolving ambush accuracy and component sophistication, creates supply-chain income opportunities within the community, and beckons the youth who require a social-psychological outlet. Regrettably, IEDs will continue to be a weapon to channel the three "Rs" attributed to insurgencies: resentment, resistance, and revenge, unless social improvements can be rapidly implemented or the supporting networks can be debilitated.

Cutting off the regenerative hydra- heads of disparate insurgent networks is nearly impossible. Excessive direct action without timely intelligence runs the risk of civil infringements and insurgent propaganda opportunities. Capture and kill counter-IED solutions being used today have significant counter-effects of alienating and angering many Iraqis. The perceived social infractions create more discontent within the Iraqi communities and increases resistance participation.

Iraq's IED use persists as a highly effective weapon against coalition forces. Many counter-IED solutions appear to be focused on reactive tactics (sniffers, frequency jammers, convoy procedure changes, etc.) and conventional mindset, with an outcome of specific incident successes. To change the counterinsurgency advantage, a full understanding of the IED's complex system is required to shift from reactive conventional approaches to more aggressive small-war initiatives that stun and damage the IED sources.

Most reading this would agree that social networks enable resistance activities, and outsider military forces soon find an inability to penetrate tight family, tribe, and clan relationships. The IED system in Iraq leverages this network requiring a solution to destroy elusive alliances from within without adding to insurgency growth. Viral network penetration built on adversarial insights is a disruptive tool that can change COIN targeting.

This seemingly germ-warfare associated "viral" attack does not actually use bio weaponary but is built on similar physiological weaknesses.

In short, social and psychological information operations are conducted to push misperceptions and rumor carried by a human communication "virus" in a lytic cycle similar to a biological or computer system attack. The virus is created by a contrived solution that directly correlates to the target and damages or ostracizes the group from within. While it damages individuals' credibility and trust, it also decelerates the flow of knowledge and information, creates some bottlenecks, and reduces IED innovation enablers.

Viral targeting is highly effective in counterinsurgency for a number of reasons. First of all, it directly concentrates on the human factors that are involved in resistance activities: demographics, culture, tribes, clans, class, ethnicity, and key actors. Second, threats are often indistinguishable between insurgents, active/tacit supporters and general population, so a solution must not inflict irreparable "friendly casualties" to incite more sympathy towards resistance. Third, and only the final for this particular argument, is the targeting follows decentralized operations that can slip outside of pattern and incident network analysis used to formulate typical COIN tactical missions. All of these reasons are contrary to most Conventional Operations and a conventional solution to the current IED threat.

The white paper, "Viral Targeting of the IED Social Network System" assesses the IED system and further defines this unconventional method of disruption.

It has been an interesting few weeks here in Baghdad. Myself and the other advisors felt that a comment on recent developments might be in order. It is still early days for Fardh al-Qanoon (a.k.a the "Baghdad Security Plan") and thus too soon to tell for sure how things will play out. But, though the challenges remain extremely severe, early trends are quite positive. Counter-intuitively, the latest series of car bombings includes some encouraging signs.

On March 17th Al Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) set off a truck bomb, including chlorine gas canisters, in a Sunni marketplace. Though everyone affected by the gas walked away, there were about 250 injured, and the attack happened on the 19th anniversary, to the day, of Saddam's use of poison gas against the Kurds at Halabja. Local Sunnis were appalled and furious.

Think about that for a moment. If insurgents are the fish, and the community is the sea in which they swim, then AQI just showed an incredible level of desperation -- attacking its own potential constituents, applying a uniquely repellent form of attack, and emulating Saddam on the anniversary of one of his worst atrocities, into the bargain. What were they thinking?

Or consider another recent attack, where extremists bombed a Sunni moderate mosque because its Imam dared to suggest that maybe it's time to stop fighting, that there is an honorable path of resistance through political participation and the ballot box rather than pointless violence. Many Sunnis were killed -- again, extremists targeting moderates for fear that they are about to lose the influence conferred by intimidation.

Both of these attacks were political "own goals" for the terrorists - the mask is slipping, and people are seeing the real face beneath.

With this kind of inept political action by the insurgents, it's small wonder that in al Anbar, where only one out of 18 major tribes supported the Iraqi government a year ago, today 14 out of the 18 tribes are actively securing their people, providing recruits to the Iraqi police and hunting down al Qa'ida.

And then there are the car bombings in market places. Since the cooperative coalition-Iraqi effort to secure Baghdad's population, extremists have continued trying to target Shi'a communities, particularly markets. But efforts to harden market places and public areas have paid dividends -- almost all the recent bombs exploded at checkpoints well away from their intended targets, killing far fewer people than intended, and far fewer than in similar attacks last year. And several failed to explode at all, showing a loss of skill as key bomb-makers are taken off the streets.

To cap it off, this week coalition forces captured the leader of the Rusafa car bomb network, the AQI organization responsible for some of the most horrific recent bombings in East Baghdad. Along with captures of bomb-making gear, explosives, and a vehicle rigged as a bomb, this puts a severe dent in the network's capabilities.

What does this all mean? Well, as I have previously said, car bombs -- in terms of size and frequency -- are not a good indicator of progress since it will always remain possible to pull off an attack, even when all other aspects of security have developed fully. So as professionals we need to be wary of rushing to judgment, either positive or negative, here. But events of the past few weeks tend to suggest that the extremists have begun targeting their own potential supporters, indicating a degree of political desperation, and a likely drop in support. And the attacks -- though still atrocious -- have become less effective. Both of these are significant indicators, independent of the bombings themselves.

Though we still need to be extremely cautious and realistic about progress, these are positive signs. We are into the fifth year of the war, and only the fifth week of this operation - so it is still very early days. Tough times and setbacks undoubtedly lie ahead. But the general trajectory of the campaign seems to be changing, in subtle ways that may yet prove decisive.

David Kilcullen is Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor, Multi-National Force -- Iraq. These are his personal views.

Do timetables work? So asks Small Wars Council member TROUFION on this Council thread.

The Wall Street Journal also addresses the issues surrounding the House's micromanagement of the war and the implications -- with a spot-on editorial today titled 'A Triumph for Pelosi':

That's how the Associated Press described yesterday's vote by the House to demand a U.S. retreat from Iraq, and in the perverse calculus of Capitol Hill we suppose it was. Speaker Nancy Pelosi has demonstrated she can pile on enough pork to bribe enough Democrats to cobble together a bare, partisan majority to "send a message" that has no chance of becoming law. Congratulations.

"Today is an historic day," Ms. Pelosi said on the House floor. "The new Congress will vote to end the war in Iraq." But of course the bill does nothing of the sort. If she truly wanted to end the war, the Speaker and her fellow Democrats could simply have used their power of the purse to refuse to fund it. But that would have meant taking some responsibility for what happens in Iraq, which is the last thing Democrats want to do. So they have passed a bill that funds the war while claiming it ends the war.

The bill's "benchmarks" and deadlines certainly have nothing to do with achieving victory in Iraq, or assisting General David Petraeus's campaign to secure Baghdad. They are all about the war inside the Democratic Caucus. On the one hand, they appease the antiwar left by pretending to declare the war illegal if certain goals aren't met by Iraqis or U.S. forces. But on the other, they allow "moderates" from swing districts to claim they are nonetheless "supporting the troops." Acts of Congress don't get much more cynical than that...

'General Pelosi's' triumph is surely hailed in all quarters of the West's adversaries as a win-win proposition. Thank you Pelosi, Murtha, etal for snatching defeat from the jaws of any possibility of victory. It's a 'Long War' -- remember? -- you left the field in the 2nd inning. The opposition will be looking for a rematch -- bet on it.

Professor Colin Kahl of the University of Minnesota's Political Science Department has been kind enough to permit the Small Wars Journal to post an e-mail of his that was widely circulated. This e-mail concerns U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts in Iraq and a briefing presented by Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments titled The "New" Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Baghdad Surge: Formula for Success?

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There is a lot of confusion about precisely what approach to COIN the U.S. military has pursued since the fall of Saddam's regime. The [widely disseminated] Krepinevich briefing [discussing the evolution of the surge] is very helpful in this regard, although the bullet points, by their nature, only tell a surface level story. Part of the problem in generalizing about U.S. COIN in Iraq is that the approach the U.S. military has taken to COIN has varied by region and commander, and changed over time. That said, at the broadest level of generality, I think U.S. COIN efforts can be usefully divided into 4 phases.

Phase 1: Denial. This period lasted from the fall of the regime until April 2004. During this time, DoD civilians and some within the military denied that there was an insurgency or, if there was one, that it was growing in support and lethality. CJTF-7 under Sanchez had no campaign plan to conduct successful COIN ops, and division, brigade, and battalion commanders were left to "wing it" in their areas of responsibility. Some made attempts to engage and provide security for the population, like the 101st under Petraeus in Mosul (and, to a lesser degree, the 1st AD in Baghdad under Dempsey), while others, like the 4th ID under Odierno (and, to a lesser degree, the 82nd Airborne out west under Swannack) used overly aggressive, enemy-centered search-and-destroy tactics that proved counterproductive and alienated the Iraqi population in their areas. Denial began to erode from the late summer of 2003 (after the bombing of the UN and the substantial uptick in insurgent attacks), but it lingered until the simultaneous Fallujah and Sadr uprising happened in April 2004.

Phase 2: Learning curve. From the spring of 2004 to the late summer of 2005, the U.S. military woke up to the seriousness of the insurgency. CJTF-7 was replaced by MNF-I/MNC-I, a COIN campaign plan was finally developed, efforts were made to rapidly rebuild the Iraqi Security Forces, and American units employed a mix of direct, harder approaches ( e.g., the Marines in Fallujah -- but note: the Marines originally intended to adopt a softer approach, but after the butchering of four contractors in Fallujah in late March 2004, they were overruled and forced by the White House to lay siege to the city), and indirect, softer approaches ( e.g., Task Force Baghdad under Chiarelli and the 1st Cav). Overall, however, the U.S. approach to COIN during this period was still overwhelmingly enemy-centric/search-and-destroy/kill-capture. Only in 2005 does the military appear to really start systematically learning from its mistakes (and some successes), gradually figuring out that the Iraqi population is the center of gravity.

Phase 3: Getting it. By the late summer and early fall of 2005, the mindset of the U.S. military had changed substantially. Training back home was being altered, education revamped, doctrine reworked, etc. In Iraq, the U.S. military began to move gradually to focus more on the Iraqi population and indirect, less-kinetic approaches to COIN. The poster child for this shift was Tal Afar in September 2005, but similar approaches were taken in Anbar, especially by the joint Marine-Army task force in Ramadi, in 2006. Still, despite some limited efforts to implement this new approach in a handful of areas and the November 2005 announcement by the White House of a new "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" designed around the intent to "clear, hold, and build" Iraqi population centers, the ability to effectively implement these changes in much of the country was complicated by a number of factors.

First, beginning in 2004, an effort was made to reduce the American military footprint by removing smaller bases within many Iraqi cities and villages and consolidating into larger Forward Operating Bases in outlying areas. The goal was to lessen the perception of occupation thought to be driving the Sunni insurgency while also improving force protection. The military's conceptual shift to population security failed to reverse this process. Throughout 2006, most American forces remained hunkered down in large bases rather than nested within communities to provide local security, and plans were made to consolidate forces further.

Second, insufficient troop levels devoted to the "hold" portion of the administration's strategy also thwarted implementation. For political reasons, the Bush administration had long resisted sending more troops to Iraq. At the same time, knowing that a large influx of U.S. forces was politically untenable and that pressure was building for withdrawal, Casey and Abizaid increasingly focused on substituting American forces with Iraqi ones. Iraqi army and police units were thus given the responsibility of providing local security in areas cleared by American forces. Indeed, coterminous with the administration's announced intent to shift toward population security was a determination to hand ever larger swaths of Iraq over to Iraqi Security Forces, and significant U.S. force reductions in Iraq were expected by 2007-2008. But, due to a mix of incompetence and infiltration by insurgent and militia groups, Iraq's fledgling security forces were not up to the task. The resulting security vacuum, especially in Baghdad, accelerated the action-reaction spiral between Sunni insurgents and Shia militias that tipped Iraq into all-out sectarian warfare in the spring of 2006.

Phase 4: Doing it. None of this changed until January 2007, when Bush announced his intention to "surge" 17,500 additional forces to Baghdad (and 4,000 more to Anbar). More support troops have since been tapped to also go to Iraq. But, it is vital to remember, the surge is not the strategy -- it is a means to implement a strategy. The strategy is to to provide actual population security, tamp down sectarian violence, and create space for national reconciliation and reconstruction. To implement this strategy, Bush replaced Casey with Petraeus, who appears committed to implementing the COIN manual he co-sponsored, spreading American troops out into smaller bases from which they can work with Iraqi forces to provide local security. Moreover, even Odierno, the new MNC-I commander, appears to have learned something from his early mistakes, and he seems to be committed to treating the Iraqi population as the focus of operations.

As the Krepinevich briefing makes clear, this shift makes sense from the perspective of COIN best practices and the new COIN field manual. There are other successful approaches to COIN, including what the briefing calls "the Roman Strategy" ("make a desert and call it peace"), which was basically the approach Saddam used to prevent sustained insurgency in Iraq. But, as the briefing properly notes, adopting this approach (or even somewhat softer, but still highly coercive COIN practices, such as those used by the Americans effectively in the Philippines between 1899-1902), is incompatible with norms against targeting civilians embraced by the U.S. military and political leadership. So, with the Roman strategy off the table, that leaves the "clear, hold, and build" option. However, as the briefing makes clear, this strategic shift may simply be too little, too late. What the briefing doesn't say is that it is also unclear whether employing COIN best practices will work in the context of not only a raging insurgency (in Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala), but also a sectarian civil war (in Baghdad, Diyala, and increasingly Kirkuk), diffuse criminal anarchy and militia rivalry (in the South), and endemic separatist tendencies (in Kurdistan).

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Update and a Hat Tip (where I first ran across Colin Kahl's essay): Juan Cole at Informed Comment: Kahl: The US Military and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq.

Update: Badger at Missing Links addresses COIN in Iraq and the Krepinevich brief in his post Flim-flam.

When Andrew Krepinevich briefed senior congressional staff on the government/military thinking behind the current "surge" at the end of February, what he left with them by way of "materials" was only a bullet-point outline. Colin Kahl tried to flesh out the presentation in his listserve essay that Juan Cole excerpted...

That's the flim-flam. If you say "civil war" enough times, you create the illusion that America doesn't have a dog in the fight, and staying would be the only morally-right thing to do.

Who can we expect to beat the drum for this? That's what Krepinevich wanted to know. As he said on page 18 of his presentation: "The administration has lost control of the narrative, and lost popular confidence--who can/should explain the war to the American people?" That's easy, really: start with political scientists.

Much more at the link...

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Read more by Colin Kahl:

How We Fight at Foreign Affairs

Time for a National Debate on Plan B at Foreign Policy

I've been on Jim Guirard's (TrueSpeak.org) e-mail list for years and have found his discussion of 'the power of words' quite fascinating, to say the least. Jim is an 'out of the box' thinker in regards to information operations and has taken on the West's choice of Arabic terms and the message they convey as a life-mission.

For those interested in Jim's work I recommend beginning with the following as an introduction and reference point for further research.

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Mini Glossary For Fellow Word Warriors

At the request of several "word warriors" on my lists, here is an update of a late-2006 memo which lists quite a number of the Arabic and Islamic words we will need to break out of the habit-of-language box which today makes makes us the "bad guys" and the "infidels" and so falsely anoints the al Qaeda-style suicide mass murderers as the so-called jihadi "holy guys" and shahidi "martyrs."

Importantly, the ubiquitous (it's everywhere! it's everywhere!!) word Jihad is entered four times in order to more clearly define its several meanings and to deprive al Qaeda killers of its halo.

irhab (eer-HAB) -- Arabic for terrorism, thus enabling us to call the al Qaeda-style killers irhabis, irhabists and irhabiyoun rather than the so-called "jihadis" and "jihadists" and "mujahideen" and "shahideen" they so badly want to be called. (Note: "Here we are, more than five years into a Global War on Terrorism, and most of us do not even know this basic Arabic word for terrorism.)

Hirabah (hee-RAH-bah) -- Unholy War and forbidden "war against society" or what we would today call crimes against humanity. Among the many al Qaeda-style crimes and sins which constitute this most "unholy war" are such willful, and unrepented transgressions as those listed in the next section of this memo.

Jihad al Akbar (gee-HAHD ahl AHK-bar) -- this "Greater Jihad" is a personal and spiritual struggle or striving to become closer and more faithful to Allah and his teachings as set forth in the Qur'an.

Jihad al Saghir (gee-HAHD ahl Sahg-HEER) -- "Lesser Jihad" is a physical -- and even a military -- struggle to protect or to free Muslims and non-Muslims from oppression, but only in strict accordance with reasonable, compassionate and non-terroristic standards set forth in the Qur'an, which provides that only the Caliph (or head-of-state?) can legally declare such a Jihad. (Note: UBL was neither and had no authority whatever to issue his 1996 and 1998 faux fatwas of purported "Jihad Against America and the West.")

Jihad al Kabir (gee-HAHD ahl kha-BEER) -- the spiritual and intellectual quest to promote common knowledge of Divine Revelation through all of Allah's Prophets and to carry out what is called ijtihad (consultative efforts throughout the Umma) in applying both Revelation and Natural Law to human affairs.

"Jihad" (gee-HAHD, so called) -- al Qaeda's false label for Hirabah, which is at heart an anti-Islamic, apostate and forbidden "war against society" and a satanic assortment of "crimes against humanity," such as the many ruthless and willful violations of Qur'anic standards listed below.

mufsiduun (moof-see-DOON) -- Islam's word for evildoers, sinners and corrupters whose criminality and sinfulness, unless ended and sincerely repented, will incur Allah's ultimate condemnation on Judgment Day; Islam's optimum antonym for al Qaeda's so-called "mujahideen."

muharibuun (moo-hah-ree-BOON) -- barbarians and ruthless transgressors who are guilty of the heinous crimes and mortal sins of irhab and Hirabah (terrorism and forbidden "war against society").

munafiquun (moon-ah-fee-KOON) - hypocrites to Islam who pretend to be faithful to the Qur'an but who willfully violate many of its basic rules, mandates and prohibitions. Once again, please refer to the ten AQ-style transgressions listed below.

hizb (hizb) - a political party, as in Hizballah (Party of God), or as the senior Saudi cleric Sheik Jafar Hawali recently called this radical and arguably apostate Shi'a organization Hizb al-Shaitan (Party of Satan, Party of the Devil).

Jahannam (jyah-HAH-nahm) -- Islam's antonym for Paradise and meaning the Eternal Hellfire to which Allah on Judgment Day condemns unrepentant, unforgiven evildoers and hypocrites of the unholy war variety.

khawarij (kha-WAH-reej) -- outside-the-religion and outside-the-community individuals and activities; derived from the ancient al Qaeda-like militant Khawar or Kharajite sect, eventually suppressed and expelled as apostates and enemies of authentic, Qur'anic Islam.

istihlal (eesh-tee-LAHL) -- Islam's cardinal sin of "playing God," as Osama bin Laden is doing when he attempts to pervert Islam into his own suicide mass murderous image, and turning it into nothing but a perpetual killing machine -- of all Christians, all Jews and all Muslims who happen to disagree.

murtadd (muur-TAHD) -- apostasy, a certifiably correct conviction for which is punishable by death in this life and by Allah's eternal damnation in the next, with al Qaeda's murderous extremism eventually to be labeled "The al Qaeda Apostasy."

takfir (takh-FEER) -- the Wahhabi and al Qaeda-style practice of making wholesale (and largely false and baseless) accusations of apostasy and disbelief toward Allah and the Qur'an. Those who engage in this divisive practice of false witness are called "takfiri."

Shaitan and shaitaniyah (shy-TAHN and shy-TAHN-ee-yah) -- Islam's Arabic words for Satan and satanic [example: Osama Abd' al-Shaitan, Osama Slave or Servant of Satan]

So, what is the point of this new and improved mini-lexicon of Arabic and Islamic words and frames of reference? In terms of the vital hearts, minds and souls aspects of the Long War on AQ-style Terrorism, the rewards could be great, indeed.

Just for starters, imagine the al Qaeda killers' great difficulty in winning the approval of any truly devout and faithful Muslims whatever once these genocidal irhabis (terrorists) come to be viewed by the Umma (the Muslim World) as mufsiduun (evildoers) engaged in Hirabah (unholy war) and in murtadd (apostasy) against the Qur'an's God of Abraham and surely on their way to Jahannam (Eternal Hellfire), instead.

TrueSpeak Institute

Jim Guirard, President

1129 Cameron Road

Alexandria, Virginia 22308

703-768-0957 Justcauses@aol.com (Truespeak.org)

Even the liberal-leaning and oft anti-war Los Angeles Times has concerns, as expressed in an editorial this morning - Do We Really Need a Gen. Pelosi?

Though the focus is on the surge, the LA Times - in their own way - seems to be reaching an understanding that the surge is not the strategy. And if Congress overwhelmingly confirmed General Dave Petraeus to lead our efforts in Iraq, then it makes sense to give him the time and tools to do his job and, more importantly, not micro-manage the war from inside the beltway.

... But if Congress accepts Bush's argument that there is still hope, however faint, that the U.S. military can be effective in quelling the sectarian violence, that U.S. economic aid can yet bring about an improvement in Iraqi lives that won't be bombed away and that American diplomatic power can be harnessed to pressure Shiites and Sunnis to make peace -- if Congress accepts this, then lawmakers have a duty to let the president try this "surge and leverage" strategy.

By interfering with the discretion of the commander in chief and military leaders in order to fulfill domestic political needs, Congress undermines whatever prospects remain of a successful outcome. It's absurd for House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-San Francisco) to try to micromanage the conflict, and the evolution of Iraqi society, with arbitrary timetables and benchmarks.

Congress should not hinder Bush's ability to seek the best possible endgame to this very bad war. The president needs the leeway to threaten, or negotiate with, Sunnis and Shiites and Kurds, Syrians and Iranians and Turks. Congress can find many ways to express its view that U.S. involvement, certainly at this level, must not go on indefinitely, but it must not limit the president's ability to maneuver at this critical juncture...

Congress is getting trapped by many members' foolish mantra that they support the troops but not the war. Their current course could well get more troops killed or wounded and sabotage any chance of reversing the current state of affairs in Iraq.

Otherwise, just stop the funding now and get the troops out as soon as possible. Congress must not be permitted to have one's cake and eat it too.

Vice President Cheney made reference to this sad state of affairs today -- he called it a "slow bleed".

The U.S. war effort in Iraq is being undercut by members of Congress calling for deadlines and funding restrictions that simply encourage the enemy to "wait us out," Vice President Dick Cheney said on Monday.

"When members of Congress pursue an anti-war strategy that's been called slow bleed, they're not supporting the troops, they're undermining them,"...

UPDATE: Tuesday's Washington Post editorial - The Pelosi Plan for Iraq.

... The only constituency House Speaker Nancy Pelosi ignored in her plan for amending President Bush's supplemental war funding bill are the people of the country that U.S. troops are fighting to stabilize. The Democratic proposal doesn't attempt to answer the question of why August 2008 is the right moment for the Iraqi government to lose all support from U.S. combat units. It doesn't hint at what might happen if American forces were to leave at the end of this year -- a development that would be triggered by the Iraqi government's weakness. It doesn't explain how continued U.S. interests in Iraq, which holds the world's second-largest oil reserves and a substantial cadre of al-Qaeda militants, would be protected after 2008; in fact, it may prohibit U.S. forces from returning once they leave.

In short, the Democratic proposal to be taken up this week is an attempt to impose detailed management on a war without regard for the war itself...

Tuesday's National Review editorial - The "Let's Lose Now" Caucus.

... Although this doesn't go as far as John Murtha's proposal for readiness requirements that would have kept troops from deploying to Iraq, it is still a brazen attempt by the legislature to occupy executive territory. Congress hasn't the power -- and was not intended -- to supervise the execution of military objectives, nor is its approval necessary for the commander-in-chief to use the armed forces as he sees fit. Congress can cut off funding from the military, and Pelosi has inched in that direction with this bill. Yet the bill does not actually exercise Congress's power of the purse. It would expire at the end of September, and any actual defunding of Iraq operations -- whether this year or next spring -- would require the passage of additional legislation.

The bill does succeed in showing the emptiness of Pelosi's claim that her Democrats support U.S. troops even as they oppose the war. The message is: We don't believe you should be there; we don't believe you can win (even as the surge shows early signs of progress); so be warned that we mean to pull the rug out from under you as soon as we can get away with it...

Just below the 24/7 "if it bleeds it leads" MSM headlines there is another story -- an encouraging story -- concerning our worldwide counterinsurgency efforts. What follows is a sampling of recent reporting on COIN efforts in the Philippines.

First up, a Stars and Stripes special report series:

Officials Say Philippine Fight Much Different Than Iraq, Afghanistan

It's unfair to compare the Iraq or Afghanistan insurgencies with the one being battled in the southern Philippines, officials stressed during recent interviews.

U.S. troops with the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines provide "assistance and advice" to the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. troops are fully engaged in combat operations. Recently, the Philippine military has killed several high-value targets and appears to have the Abu Sayyaf Group on the ropes on Jolo Island. Soldiers told Stars and Stripes that Abu Sayyaf hasn't been able to mount any sort of attack in months...

Finding the Root of Home-grown Terrorism

There is no magic fix when fighting an insurgency, according to officials who are working that problem now in the southern Philippines. Col. David Maxwell, commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines, briefed Stars and Stripes about the issue during recent interviews in Manila and at his headquarters compound on Mindanao Island.

Key to countering an insurgency is understanding that it is a political problem first and foremost, with implications for the military, Maxwell said. "An insurgency will be defeated if the underlying political and socioeconomic causes are properly addressed," Maxwell said.

"You've got to be here and engaged, which we are, as a country ... as a country team," Maxwell said. "You've got to have patience. This takes a long time."...

Special Forces Lend Hand to Counterparts

Dozens of U.S. Special Forces soldiers, many fresh from combat tours in Afghanistan and Iraq, have found themselves in a new role fighting the war on terror in the southern Philippines.

As one soldier with experience in Afghanistan explained, it's tough to transition from actively fighting an enemy downrange to "advising and assisting" the Philippine military in the fight against the Abu Sayyaf terror group in the steamy jungles of Jolo, Mindanao and Basilan islands. But, he added, he understands the local population has to learn to trust its own government and military.

The U.S. soldiers -- National Guardsmen with the 19th Special Forces Group -- are part of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines. They are not allowed to actively engage the enemy, and they can return fire only if attacked.

They're organized into 12-man "Liaison Command Element" teams and they eat, live and work with their Armed Forces of the Philippines counterparts...

Making Friends in Abu Sayyaf's Territory

A tiny two-room school that sits off a dusty road in the middle of the jungle on Jolo Island could play a role in the battle between Abu Sayyaf terrorists and the Philippine government.

With its cracked foundation, peeling paint and major structural damage, it looks like hundreds of other rural schools scattered across the southern Philippines. But what makes the Tayungen Elementary School special is its location.

"The school is smack dab in the middle" of a north-south migration route used by Abu Sayyaf terrorists, said U.S. Army Capt. Steve Battle, a civil affairs officer with the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines. Battle runs a four-man Army civil affairs team in a strategically important location on the kidney-shaped island, where the land pinches together into just a three-mile strip from shore to shore...

Civil Affairs Team Members Roughing It at Remote Camps

When civil affairs soldiers with Team 761 head home after a day's work on the island, it's hard to tell if they're on a military camp or the set of "Survivor."

They live on Jolo's "Seit Poblasion" Philippine marine base overlooking a volcanic crater lake, surrounded by a beautiful jungle and monkeys that screech through the night. Most of the buildings are bamboo with thatched roofs, though the team's house is a bit sturdier.

U.S. Army Capt. Steve Battle, the team leader, lives there with a sergeant, a medic and an engineer. And recently they've added a U.S. Marine staff sergeant who is gathering information on a mission that will help the Marine Corps work on setting up its own civil-affairs teams...

Navy Helps Philippine's Sea Defense

U.S. Navy Special Warfare sailors are helping the Philippine navy learn to control the waters around islands where they're fighting Abu Sayyaf terrorists.

Special Warfare Combatant Craft crew and their MK V special operations craft and rigid inflatable boats have followed the Philippine navy on more than 4,000 "visit, board, search and seizures" since arriving in the Philippines in October, said Chief Petty Officer Michael Andre, a RIB detachment commander.

The crewmen and an accompanying group of Navy SEALs are based at Coronado, Calif., and are supporting the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines by training counterparts in the Philippine naval special operations units...

Christian Science Monitor - Where U.S. is Helping to Make Gains Against Terrorism

Gaining the trust of residents in Panamao, a stricken village on the edge of a combat zone, is why US and Philippine troops are dug in here. In counterterrorism jargon, this Muslim community is a "center of gravity" that can be swayed with targeted projects -- a new well, a school classroom, or a toilet. "It's not the amount of people that you affect. It's who you affect," says Captain Battle, a civil-affairs officer.

At a time when success stories in the US-led war on terror have been all but eclipsed by failures in Iraq, recent developments in the southern Philippines offer a degree of hope to Pentagon planners. But they also show the complexity of waging war in a contested, chaotic area, as well as the long slog needed to stand up a national army equal to sure-footed militants...

USA Today - In Philippines, U.S. Making Progress in War on Terror

Thousands of miles from the bazaars of Iraq and the mountains of Afghanistan, U.S. military forces are quietly helping defeat terrorists in the jungles of the southern Philippines, a forgotten front in the global war on terrorism.

Working behind the scenes with a rejuvenated Philippine military, U.S. special forces have helped kill, capture or rout hundreds of Abu Sayyaf guerrillas who have links to the Islamic terror groups Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda, Philippine and U.S. military commanders say...

Voice of America - Southern Philippine Island Plays Out Drama in War on Terror

Far from the headlines and the rest of the world a drama in the global war on terror is playing out on Jolo island in the southern Philippines. A Muslim guerrilla group called Abu Sayyaf is on the run from the Philippine military while U.S. water, road, and health projects are making life better for the people. But is it yet time to declare victory? Douglas Bakshian recently traveled to Jolo for a look at things.

There is much talk these days in Philippine and U.S. military circles about winning the war on terror on Jolo island, and ending a long struggle against the Abu Sayyaf Islamic terrorist group.

Years of fighting the guerrillas failed to produce peace. So the Philippine military, with the help of U.S. advisers, began addressing civilian needs - roads, schools, water systems and medical care.

By alleviating some of the desperate poverty on Jolo, the military defused some of the anger and frustration that fuels violent movements.

General Juancho Sabban, commander of the Philippines Marines who are in the forefront of the operation, says this is all about winning public support...

The Smithsonian - Waging Peace in the Philippines

"They'll slit your throat on Jolo," people told Col. Jim Linder, head of a U.S. military task force in the Philippines. He recalled the prediction as we buzzed toward Jolo Island in a helicopter. Linder, a 45-year-old South Carolina native who has the remnants of a Southern drawl, has led Special Forces operations in the Middle East, Central and South America, Eastern Europe and Africa for the past 20 years. His latest assignment is the remote 345-square-mile island at the southernmost edge of the vast Philippines archipelago. Jolo is a known haven for Al Qaeda-linked terrorist groups, including Abu Sayyaf, or "Bearer of the Sword," which has used the island for 15 years to train terrorists and to coordinate attacks.

Curiously, Jolo was also one of the first places where the United States ever battled Muslim insurgents. On March 7, 1906, less than a decade after the United States seized the Philippines in the Spanish-American War, the people of Jolo—known as Moros, after the Spanish for Moors—revolted, among other reasons because they feared that the American effort to enroll their children in schools was part of a plan to convert them to Christianity. The Moros, armed with little more than swords, launched an insurgency against U.S. troops.

"They chased a bunch of Moros up that old volcano and killed them," Linder said to me, pointing out of the helicopter window. Below, the island rose into a series of steep volcanic ridges, each one glowing a lush green against the silvered surface of the Sulu Sea. In the Battle of the Clouds, as the confrontation on Jolo 100 years ago is called, U.S. forces killed 600 to 1,000 people. "It was commonly referred to as a massacre," Linder added quietly.

Today, a crucial but little-known battle in the expanding war on terror is under way on Jolo Island. Designed to "wage peace," as Linder says, it's an innovative, decidedly nonviolent approach by which U.S. military personnel—working with aid agencies, private groups and Philippine armed forces—are trying to curtail terrorist recruitment by building roads and providing other services in impoverished rural communities. The effort, known to experts as "the Philippines model," draws on a "victory" on the Philippine island of Basilan, where U.S. forces in 2002 ended the dominance of Abu Sayyaf without firing so much as a single shot. "It's not about how many people we shoot in the face," Linder said. "It's about how many people we get off the battlefield."...

For top-notch blog coverage on PI COIN efforts go here ---> The Belmont Club.

Maybe there is an advantage to not being the only show in town...

In the April 2007 edition of Vanity Fair - The Night of the Generals by David Margolick.

The six retired generals who stepped forward last spring to publicly attack Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's handling of the Iraq war had to overcome a culture of reticence based on civilian control of the military. But while each man acted separately, all shared one experience: a growing outrage over the administration's incompetence, leading some of the nation's finest soldiers to risk their reputations and cross a time-honored line.

The six generals are LtGen Greg Newbold (USMC), MG Paul Eaton (USA), MG John Batiste (USA), LTG John Riggs (USA), MG Charles Swannack Jr. (USA) and LtGen Paul Van Riper (USMC).

The 16 page (printed) article provides a brief background on each of the generals' careers, some background on their thoughts while on active duty (excepting Van Riper) concerning the lead-in and the war in Iraq, reasoning behind their decision (or in one case another's decision) to retire, what prompted them to speak out and any regrets they may have in doing so.

LtGen Greg Newbold

Newbold began reviewing the plan to invade Iraq, several years old by that point, which called for 500,000 troops—a figure Rumsfeld summarily dismissed. Surely 125,000 would suffice, he said, and with a little imagination, you could probably get away with far fewer than that.

MG Paul Eaton

Among the six, Paul Eaton has one clear distinction. He was dealt the worst hand: to create a new Iraqi Army from scratch.

MG John Batiste

John Batiste, 54, may bear the greatest burden of the group. In the middle of Iraq, in the midst of the war, Batiste actually met with Donald Rumsfeld, who asked him point-blank whether there was anything that he, the commander of the First Infantry Division, had asked for that he had not in fact received. Batiste did not answer his question.

LTG John Riggs

Three-star general John Riggs, 60, should have been Donald Rumsfeld's kind of guy. He was the head of the army's Objective Force Task Force, the group charged with developing a lighter, lither army, built around "Future Combat Systems" of high-tech armored vehicles, drones, and sensors.

MG Charles Swannack Jr.

Swannack had all of the usual gripes, about troop shortages, de-Ba'thification, underestimating the insurgency, problems equipping Iraqi soldiers. Sometimes, at press conferences, he aired his complaints.

LtGen Paul Van Riper

At 68, Van Riper is the oldest of the six generals, old enough to have had two tours in Vietnam, where he left behind his spleen and a piece of his intestines. He is also the most famous, highlighted in Malcolm Gladwell's Blink, and, on martial matters, the most erudite.

While the Vanity Fair article presents the generals views it also touches on another issue - does such dissent undermine civilian control of the military?

Some scholars of military-civilian affairs said that the six had imperiled civilian control, undermined military mores and morale, jeopardized the military meritocracy and the trust between senior and junior officers. The time for these men to have spoken out, these critics said, was while they were still in uniform, through the chain of command; past retired generals with bones to pick had had the decency to wait for administrations to change before writing books, rather than popping off against incumbents in real time, practically before the ink on their retirement papers had dried.

Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld plays heavily in the article to include his styles of management and leadership.

I recommend this as a must read. I'm glad I did not have to "walk a mile" in their shoes. The decision to go or not to go public in dissent, either on active duty or in retirement, was not a decision these men made lightly.

Based upon a February 2007 trip revisiting locales in Anbar and Baghdad that I had tracked for years, permit me to offer the following observations.

Overview. What is shaping up in Iraq? There are four ongoing wars. 1) Shiite mafias in the south, 2) Anbar Sunni extremists 3) Shiite ethnic cleansing around Baghdad 4) Sunni extremist car bombings in Baghdad.

1. In the South the U.S. is doing little. The energy sector funnels billions to corrupt officials, criminals, militias and insurgents. The Brits weren't able to impose control. The hope is that the south remains a long-term mafia-type mess, and does not spill north to Baghdad.

2. In Anbar about 60% of the tribes are tilting toward the Marines and fighting the al-Qaeda types. Police ranks are swelling with tribal members. Anbar is improving, but how the Sunni tribes will work with the Iraqi Army, let alone the central government, is moot.

Prognosis for the next six months: Progress but no breakthroughs. The central government has to woo the sheiks and offer terms, figure out how police chiefs and Iraqi army commanders share power in the cities, and crack down on the insurgents captured in Anbar (put them away for life). Jails in Anbar are filling up, and the central government is not stepping up.

3. In Baghdad, as the Shiite ethnic cleansing advances, the front lines are easily marked by the blocks of abandoned houses. Checking the cleansing can be done by military means -- barriers, patrols and the like. The Americans are likely to stop this and turn around the trend.

4. Also in Baghdad, the Sunni extremists strike with suicidal murderers and car bombs. It is unlikely, given a million cars, that a technique will be developed to curtail this inside six months. In most countries, bombers are stopped by effective policing and spy networks, and Iraq is years away from that. This is the Achilles Heel. No matter the progress on other fronts, the persistence of gore and Shiite mass deaths is likely to continue to fuel hatred.

What, then, is the biggest problem? How the Americans can infuse into the Iraqi army and police in Baghdad a sense of mission and even-handedness such that the Americans can withdraw from neighborhoods in eight to twelve months without backsliding.

Existing American military tactics and techniques are adequate to staunch the ethnic cleansing; to transfer those conops or to design substitute techniques that the Iraqi army and police can use -- and to meld the army and police into a unity of effort -- is a far more problematic task. On the other hand, I've seen enough examples of tough Iraqi leadership at the battalion and police chief level to believe that some leadership is emerging. Right now, though, the glue is the presence of the American troops. They have to be out on the streets first, then the Iraqi forces fall in behind them.

The places in Baghdad where I saw clean streets, open shops, and guards on every corner were the Shiite areas. It's too early to tell whether we're dealing with a rope-a-dope feint by the Shiite politicians. It is in their short-term interests for them to help us purge bad elements, and restore order and services. But whether they believe a compromise with the Sunnis is possible or necessary -- who knows?

Specific Observations and Comments.

1. Open disclosure of Iraqi pay. At every joint US-Iraqi ops/intell update, one slide should address the advisors' update of payroll, equipment and food support for IP/IA. The higher up the US chain I moved, the more I heard how dramatically Iraqi ministries had improved. If so, terrific. If not so, then embarrassment is deserved at this late time.

2. Erratic standards of patrolling. The patrol is the basic tool in the US military inventory. Without patrols, there is no US presence or influence. The variation in the size and duration of patrols from location to location is astounding. One MiTT persuades an IA battalion to conduct twelve patrols a day; another in the same locale does six. One US company runs 15/day; another, 5. The variation is not caused by the actual threat; some of the toughest locales have the most patrolling. It is caused by an extreme variation in intuitively assessing the threat and setting the balance between force protection and mission accomplishment. A little ops analysis by experienced infantry of how often we are really on the streets and how one determines patrol size and mounted vs. dismounted would go a long ways.

3. Persistence of lack of population identification. It is impossible to reduce an insurgency if the insurgents cannot be identified. Most of our rifle companies, after several months in the same area, begin their own census and ID programs. I am a broken record on this, but I do urge that we systematically fingerprint and take census in critical locales, and provide the Iraqis with simple gear and templates to do likewise. OpSec firewalls can be built in to avoid subversion.

4. "Catch and release" swells the ranks of the opposition. Every battalion I spoke with was convinced the "rules of law" for arrest, imprisonment and release favor the insurgent. The Iraqi judiciary system cannot be straightened out for another five years. At higher levels, this is disputed. I remain on the side of the battalions. We must lock up tens of thousands until the violence subsides.

4. Under-utilized information tool. The loud speakers linked to news broadcasts several times a day in Ramadi is a terrific innovation that should be immediately installed at IA, IP and JSS locales.

5. A sound early warning system. In the Red Zones in Baghdad where ethnic cleansing is creeping forward, provide several cell phones per block and pay for the calling time. Each side will call in when threatened and provide the best early warning system.

6. Stop ethnic cleansing for profit. JAM systematically evicts Sunnis and moves Shiites into houses complete with furniture and electronics. The suddenly rich occupants then have great incentive to push Sunnis farther away so that the original owner can never come back to that neighborhood. We should take away this enormous economic incentive to cleanse neighborhoods. On a photomap in every JSS and COP, mark every abandoned house and refuse new occupancy JAM will lose adherents if the economic gain is removed. This step can be taken immediately, with substantial effect. It also insures that our patrols interact constantly with the people, who are sure to offer their opinions and tips.

7. Combat pay for the jundis in Anbar is essential. The tribes are encouraging local police enlistment. But the jundis have it much harder, and the strain will tell over the next year.

8. Anbar sheik movement merits US resources. In Anbar, the Awakening movement by the sheiks merits a crash program to pay, equip and advise what might be called a 'rural constabulary'. Analogies to the 2004 "Fallujah Brigade" -- a total disaster -- are misplaced. The Fallujah Brigade was controlled by the enemy and refused to cooperate. The Awakening is cooperating, although Anbar can only be resolved by political compromise on the part of the central government.

9. Negative habit of fixed positions. IA and IP devote >50% of resources to fixed positions. Given their aversion to unity of command and to patrolling, it is not clear what TTPs will allow them to control their own battle space, once Americans are not present. The counter that they "know the locals" is simply not true. The IA is as blind in many locales as we are, while the IP are years away from being trusted in many areas.

On the other hand, given that Iraq is a Rubik's cube, my discomfit may reflect only my own cultural bias. I measure by practical conops on the ground, and that may not be the right measure of effectiveness. As I was leaving a new Combat Outpost, an interpreter who had served with US units since 2003 told me, "The new strategy may work. It's a mental thing. We're out here. It's set them (Sunni insurgents and JAM) back."

10. Improving metrics for a police war. In essence, Iraq is now a police war. Yet our briefings, our metrics and our frame of reference -- how we organize, analyze and solve problems -- are military. Our basic tool to combat this insurgency and sectarian war is the patrol, too often mounted. In contrast, a police station -- the equivalent of our Combat Outpost -- is divided into patrolmen and detectives (of which we are woefully short because we have not thought in those terms.)

It would be interesting to invite a few senior cops from the States to visit, say, Ramadi and three districts in Baghdad. Then ask them to present how they would organize their daily brief -- what metrics they would demand from their police subordinates and what conops they would put in place.

11. Trust will decide this war. We know the essence of the problem: Whether the Iraqi central government and security forces are led by deceivers who tell us they believe in a stable federation with power-sharing, while they abet sectarian division. In my most recent visit, there was the pervasive, open acknowledgement by the police, IA and the residents that they trusted the Americans, but not each other.