Seminar Panel Members. Colonel Stephen Davis, USMC. Col Davis is currently the Deputy Commander of Marine Corps Special Operations Command. Previously, Col Davis commanded Regimental Combat Team 2 in Iraq. Colonel David Maxwell, USA. COL Maxwell is currently the G-3 (Operations Officer) of the US Army Special Operations Command. Previously he commanded the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, USA. LTC Yingling is the Commander of 1st Battalion, 21st Field Artillery and is currently deployed to Iraq performing detainee operations. He has served two previous tours in Iraq and has also deployed to Bosnia and Operation Desert Storm.

Moderator. Colonel Daniel Kelly, USMC. Col Kelly is the Director of the US Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare. He has held a wide variety of command and staff billets and participated in numerous operations to include Operations Restore Hope / Continue Hope (Somalia), Operations Allied Force / Joint Guardian, (Kosovo) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF I and II).

COIN Leadership Seminar - Information Paper and Map

The Little Battles We Must Win - Linda Robinson

Out of Conflict, a Partnership - Frederick Kagan

A Wartime Presidency, On Two Fronts - Anthony Cordesman

One Surge Does Not Fit All - Donald Rumsfeld

How to Leave Iraq, Intact - Peter Mansoor

Thanks, But You Can Go Now - Ahmad Chalabi

The 'Good War' Isn't Worth Fighting - Rory Stewart

People often ask, "What did you learn from Iraq that might be transferable to Afghanistan?" he said. "The first lesson, the first caution really, is that every situation like this is truly and absolutely unique, and has its own context and specifics and its own texture," he said.

Counterinsurgents have to understand that in as nuanced a manner as possible, and then with that kind of understanding try to craft a comprehensive approach to the problems.

The COIN Center's OPSO, Major Niel Smith, put out the challenge - We would like to ask for feedback - what lessons from Iraq are applicable to our operations in Afghanistan? - and in the October COIN Center SITREP, the Director - Colonel Daniel Roper - summarized the key points from the responses as follows:

(1) Basic COIN principles of protecting the population, connecting the government with the people and permanently isolating insurgents from the population apply in either conflict but must be adapted for local conditions.

(2) Shift emphasis from top-down (strong central government) to bottom-up (locally provided security) to leverage tribal structure in Afghanistan.

(3) Seek neither to apply directly the Anbar strategy to Afghanistan nor simply surge more forces; more troops (2--4 BCTs) are unlikely to measurably change the effort with the current strategy.

(4) Increase efforts in advisory and PRT initiatives to enhance Afghan capabilities.

(5) Put an Afghan face on all CERP. Use Jirgas to solicit needs from the local populace to bolster local government entities.

And in a note - the COIN Center continues to solicit additional feedback on the CERP issue and invites comments on a blog entry titled "Money as a tool in COIN, mission enhancer or detractor?"

Colonel David Gurney (USMC Ret.), Editor of Joint Force Quarterly and Director of National Defense University Press, has again kindly permitted SWJ to post a Point - Counterpoint that will appear in the January 2009 issue of JFQ.

First up; from SWJ, this 14 August 2009 memo by General James Mattis, Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command.

Attached are my thoughts and Commander's guidance regarding Effects Based Operations (EBO). The paper is designed to provide the JFCOM staff with clear guidance and a new direction on how EBO will be addressed in joint doctrine and used in joint training, concept development, and experimentation. I am convinced that the various interpretations of EBO have caused confusion throughout the joint force and amongst our multinational partners that we must correct. It is my view that EBO has been misapplied and overextended to the point that it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations.

This brings us to January's JFQ Point - Counterpoint in reaction to General Mattis's memo. First, from Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC, (ret.) - EBO: There Was No Baby in the Bathwater.

We should not be surprised that one of our most combat-seasoned and professionally informed leaders, General James Mattis, USMC, who commands U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), recently issued a memorandum that calls for an end to the effects-based operations (EBO) nonsense that has permeated much of the American defense community for the past 6 years. Nor should we be surprised that other leaders with similar operational experience promptly applauded General Mattis' actions. They all saw effects based operations as a vacuous concept that has slowly but surely undermined professional military thought and operational planning. One can only hope that the general's action, coupled with a similar effort by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command in 2007,will halt the U.S. military's decade-and-a-half decline in conceptual thinking.

U.S. Air Force Colonels Paul M. Carpenter and William F. Andrews take issue in Effects Based Operations - Combat Proven.

The USJFCOM directive to "turn off" EBO concepts is not well advised. Although the command has vigorously pursued development of EBO concepts, over time efforts have rendered a valuable joint concept unusable by promising unattainable predictability and by linking it to the highly deterministic computer-based modeling of ONA and SoSA. Instead of pursuing a constructive approach by separating useful and proven aspects of EBO and recommending improvements, USJFCOM has prescribed the consumption of a fatal poison. General Mattis declares that "the term effects-based is fundamentally flawed... and goes against the very nature of war."

We disagree. EBO is combat proven; it was the basis for the success of the Operation Desert Storm air campaign and Operation Allied Force. A very successful wartime concept is sound and remains an effective tool for commanders. It is valuable for commanders to better understand cause and effect - to better relate objectives to the tasks that forces perform in the operational environment. While there are problems associated with how EBO has been implemented by some organizations, they can be easily adjusted. As a military, we must understand the value of EBO, address concerns in its implementation, and establish a way ahead to gain the benefits and avoid the potential pitfalls of the concept.

The current issue of the U.S. Army War College's Parameters also reprints the General Mattis memo in article format with a counter by Tomislav Z. Ruby entitled Effects-based Operations: More Important Than Ever.

Whether effects-based operations (EBO) and the effects-based approach to planning have led to negative warfighting results is a topic well worth our collective time and study. In fact, it is a healthy activity of any defense institution to question and evaluate its doctrine, policy, and procedures. The current debate on EBO brought about by General James N. Mattis's memorandum to US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) directing the elimination of the term from the command's vocabulary has not put the issue to rest. Quite to the contrary, the Mattis memo reinvigorated the debate, and this article aims at being part of that debate. Effects-based operations are not dead. No one individual can kill a concept, and this concept has staying power. When the underlying rationale for General Mattis's decision is analyzed, one can see that EBO as a concept for planning will be around for some time.

A lively discussion concerning EBO can be found at SWJ's Small Wars Council.

The United States faces three primary existing and emerging strategic challenges that are most likely to preoccupy senior decision-makers in the coming years:

- Defeating both the Sunni Salifi-Takfiri and Shia Khomeinist brands of violent

Islamist radicalism;

- Hedging against the rise of a hostile or more openly confrontational China and the potential challenge posed by authoritarian capitalist states; and

- Preparing for a world in which there are more nuclear-armed regional powers.

Addressing these specific challenges should be at the forefront of the incoming administration's strategic calculations, particularly during the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which will help shape US defense strategy, planning, and force structure over the next twenty years.

Read the full report here and the presentation slides here.

I'm surprised we missed this blog -- and we've probably missed some more - let us know of any other senior officer blogs out there on the 'Net. Thanks.

Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World (PDF - 33.5 MB) is the fourth unclassified report prepared by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) in recent years that takes a long-term view of the future. It offers a fresh look at how key global trends might develop over the next 15 years to influence world events. The report is not meant to be an exercise in prediction or crystal ball-gazing. Mindful that there are many possible "futures," the report offers a range of possibilities and potential discontinuities, as a way of opening our minds to developments that might otherwise be missed.

Several preliminary assessments are listed below:

1. The whole international system - as constructed following WWII - will be revolutionized. Not only will new players - Brazil, Russia, India and China - have a seat at the international high table, they will bring new stakes and rules of the game.

2. The unprecedented transfer of wealth roughly from West to East now under way will continue for the foreseeable future.

3. Unprecedented economic growth, coupled with 1.5 billion more people, will put pressure on resources - particularly energy, food, and water - raising the specter of scarcities emerging as demand outstrips supply.

4. The potential for conflict will increase owing partly to political turbulence in parts of the greater Middle East.

As with the earlier NIC efforts - such as Mapping The Global Future 2020 - the project's primary goal is to provide US policymakers with a view of how world developments could evolve, identifying opportunities and potentially negative developments that might warrant policy action. The NIC also hopes this paper stimulates a broader discussion of value to educational and policy institutions at home and abroad.

In the News:

Nuclear Arms, Scarce Resources as Seeds of Global Instability - Washington Post

NIC Expects Al Qaeda's Appeal to Falter - New York Times

NIC: Sun Setting on the American Century - The Times

NIC Says US Influence will 'Substantially' Decline - Daily Telegraph

The Year 2025: Oil, Dollar Out; Russia, Islam In - Associated Press

US Power, Influence will Decline in Future, Report Says - CNN News

US Influence Will Fade By 2025 - CBS News

US Global Dominance 'Set to Wane' - BBC News

Intelligence Study Sees Risks in Rapid Global Power Shift - McClatchy

US Clout Down, Risks Up by 2025 - Reuters

Nuclear War Threat to Grow by 2025 - Agence France-Presse

Europe: a Hobbled Giant - Financial Times

New US Intelligence Report: A Gloomy Future - Military Watch

American troops in Afghanistan are fighting what will soon become Barack Obama's war - not just because he will inherit it, but also because he has claimed it. This is "the right battlefield," Obama has said. The war in Afghanistan "has to be won."

How can that mission be accomplished? Extensive interviews with American military commanders, European diplomats, and Afghan officials lead to this conclusion: Although we are not currently defeating the Taliban and other belligerent groups in Afghanistan, we can prevail - if the incoming administration is prepared to fully resource a sophisticated counter-insurgency strategy similar to that implemented by General David Petraeus in Iraq.

A subtle and often misunderstood point: The war in Iraq was not turned around by "surging" more troops into the country to do more of the same. Rather, the key was transitioning to counterinsurgency - COIN - a form of warfare that requires many boots on the ground.

More at National Review.

Reappointing Robert Gates as secretary of defense would be magnanimity with a purpose, a show of something better than cleverness, and that is wisdom.

We are at war, in two countries. The stakes don't get much higher....

What does Mr. Gates bring to this? Two years, next month, of success, and a professional lifetime of experience and knowledge. He is a bipartisan figure of respect—truly an object of across-the-board admiration. He is not part of the old crew that got us into war and bungled it but the new crew that stabilized it and created progress. And the point is to keep him not only for continuity, which may be virtue enough in a difficult and dynamic situation, but for his particular gifts and acumen.

More at The Wall Street Journal.

A war that once seemed likely to end in a panic of helicopters fleeing the American Embassy now seems destined to conclude as the result of a parliamentary process. A landmark status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) -- requiring the withdrawal of US combat troops from Iraqi cities by the end of June and from Iraq itself by the end of 2011 -- is headed for a final reading in the Iraqi parliament next week.

The approval of the SOFA would leave a chapter of history decorated with paradoxes. President Bush -- who once called withdrawal timelines "arbitrary" and "unacceptable" -- ends his term accepting them. President-elect Barack Obama will inherit a more peaceful Iraq because of policies he strongly opposed. And the Iraqi government -- so often criticized by Americans as weak and ineffectual -- is now asserting its sovereignty in a decisive manner, for good or ill.

More at The Washington Post.