New Realities, New Priorities

by Lawrence J. Korb, Peter Juul, Laura Conley, Major Myles B. Caggins III and Sean Duggan; Center for American Progress

The next administration will have to contend with two wars, a military readiness crisis, recruitment and retention problems, mounting equipment shortages, and an out-of-control defense acquisition process.

In a little over one month, a new administration will have the opportunity to manage a significant realignment of U.S. defense and national security priorities. To be sure, this process will not occur in a vacuum. Today's security imperatives and budgetary realities will require the next administration to make hard decisions and difficult trade-offs on competing visions of the military and its role in implementing national security strategy. These trade-offs will have wide-ranging consequences for the size and structure of the force, and what procurement and modernization options are feasible in order to advance overall U.S. national security interests.

Pentagon planners have already begun to warn the incoming administration about the choices it will have to make. A Pentagon advisory group recently notified the president-elect's office that the Department of Defense, "cannot reset the current force, modernize and transform in all portfolios at the same time. Choices must be made across capabilities and within systems to deliver capability at known prices within a specific period of time."

Full Report.

Africa Command Welcomes Army Component

Southern European Task Force cased its old colors, ending the airborne chapter of its history, and uncased its new colors signifying acceptance of its new mission as the Army component in support of US Africa Command in a ceremony here today. The ceremony followed an official announcement by the US and Italian governments Dec. 3 in Rome that SETAF would become US Army Africa.

"We are honored and privileged to be the first members of US Army Africa," Army Major General William B. Garrett III, SETAF commanding general, said. "This is a huge responsibility, as our decisions and actions will establish the foundation that others will build upon in the years ahead."

Army General William E. "Kip" Ward, commander of US Africa Command, and Army General Carter Ham, commander of US Army Europe and 7th Army, attended the ceremony, which highlighted SETAF's long, proud history.

"I welcome all of you to the US Africa Command team," Ward said. "I am confident that this great command is up to the challenge."

Garrett, who was promoted from brigadier general to major general earlier today, said that while SETAF's mission has changed, its relationship with the command's Italian partners will not.

"The enduring relationship between the United States and Italy will only get stronger; new opportunities will spring from common objectives and a shared vision for a prosperous Africa," he said.

SETAF, stationed in Italy since 1955, has a long history of operating on the African continent and working with African nations. During the past 15 years, SETAF has provided crisis response, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance on the continent.

During the next year, SETAF soldiers will learn and grow to lay the foundation for future success as US Army Africa, Garrett said. This foundation includes building and strengthening relationships with African army organizations, along with national and international partners, to promote peace, security and stability in Africa, he said.

Also - check out Information Dissemination's main page for a lively discussion of piracy issues and Secretary Gates' recent Foreign Affairs article entitled A Balanced Strategy.

And while I'm at it - check out Seven Questions: Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper on How to Kick Pirate Booty at Foreign Policy.

by Adam Weinstein, MNC-I Public Affairs

Sons of Iraq: A Vote of Confidence for Reconciliation (Full PDF Article)

In early November, as U.S. Soldiers looked on, Baghdad-based members of the Sons of Iraq got their monthly paychecks from a new boss: the Iraqi government.

"It was a critical step in the turnover of the mostly Sunni volunteers from Coalition to Iraqi control. And the Baghdad transfer has become a model for similar moves in four other key provinces," according to Lt. Col. Jeffrey Kulmayer, the chief of reconciliation and engagement for Multi-National Corps - Iraq. "The government is doing the right thing. Baghdad has gone quite well, and we expect that the rest of the provinces will do the same."

The Sons of Iraq, one of the war's good-news stories, occupy what Maj. Gen. Michael Ferriter, the deputy commanding General of MNC -- I, calls "the leading edge of reconciliation." A few years ago, many of the group's members considered Coalition forces their enemies; some fought against U.S. troops and their allies. But in June 2007, armed militiamen in Anbar province found they shared a goal with the Coalition: taking back their neighborhoods from al Qaeda in Iraq. "We helped organize them and eventually began to fund them to provide critical infrastructure and security throughout Anbar," said Ferriter, "and it quickly spread to many of the other provinces."

Sons of Iraq: A Vote of Confidence for Reconciliation (Full PDF Article)

As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Fort Monroe, VA, Monday, December 08, 2008.

Today, we pay tribute to the career and achievements of one Army leader, welcome another, and reflect on the ways that this command has transformed itself and the Army.

General Scott Wallace's retirement and relinquishment of this command brings to a close nearly four decades of training, mentoring, and leading soldiers at every level. The arc and trajectory of that career -- culminating in the changes General Wallace has led here in TRADOC -- in many ways tracks the story of the U.S. Army over the past two generations:

- From the Vietnam War and the draft;

- To the all-volunteer force and victory in Desert Storm;

- To draw-downs and drift after the Cold War; and finally

- To the post-9/11 campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Spurred by the demands of fighting brutal and adaptive insurgencies in two theaters, the Army has seen a dramatic and historic shift in the way it is organized, equipped, and, above all, trained. Under General Wallace's leadership and guidance, this Command has become the institutional and intellectual "ground zero" of that transformation -- in its school houses and training ranges, in classrooms real and virtual.

This mission -- to recruit and train the next generation of soldiers, and develop the next generation of adaptive leaders -- could not be more crucial in light of the threats that have emerged in this dangerous new century: a toxic mixture of the conventional and irregular, the high-tech and the low, the internet and the I.E.D. General Wallace saw this firsthand in the opening phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, as commander of V Corps. En route to the expected showdown against the Republican Guard, Scott's soldiers found themselves fending off the swarming, paramilitary fighters of the Fedayeen Saddam -- a harbinger of things to come.

This experience well positioned General Wallace to take on a daunting set of tasks here at TRADOC:

- To recruit more and more young people over a period of time when fewer and fewer were qualified for military service, and to do so while images of violence and news of casualties filled the TV screens of parents, teachers, and other influencers;

- To re-orient the thinking, assumptions, and skill sets of a force designed for high-tech sprints towards the capabilities needed to succeed also in grinding asymmetric marathons -- the wars we are in and are most likely to see in the coming years; and

- To do all this while re-organizing the force in the middle of two major ground wars with an Active Army about one-third the size it was when Scott first entered the service.

His achievements, and the achievements of TRADOC, have been impressive -- and historic:

- The Army has met its annual recruiting goals for the last three years.

- Basic training has been overhauled to instill the warrior ethos in every new recruit -- with more time devoted to the skills needed to survive and succeed on today's battlefield: marksmanship, physical fitness, urban warfare, convoy security, cultural awareness, and much more. Because of Scott's efforts, new soldiers arrive at their units today far more ready to deploy and fight than in years past.

- At our national training centers, Iraqi cities and Afghan villages inhabited by Arabic and Pashtu speakers have sprung up to provide the most grueling, realistic training possible in the sands of Fort Irwin and the forests of Fort Polk.

During General Wallace's tenure, the best brains inside and outside the army were brought together to publish new doctrine on counterinsurgency and stability operations -- bolstered by a substantial increase in the amount of instruction devoted to irregular and asymmetric conflict in the Army's staff colleges.

As one of the last Vietnam veterans on active service, General Wallace has been uniquely positioned to ensure that the "lessons learned" in Iraq and Afghanistan become a permanent part of the Army's DNA, and do not become "lessons lost," as happened too often in the past.

I am told that over the years from the rice paddies of Bac Lieu province to the Karbala Gap -- General Wallace has accumulated a set of truisms that he imparts to the best and brightest coming through TRADOC's school houses. One of them is to never forget that "no matter how spiffy and brilliant the plan," operations will always be executed by scared and tired 19 year olds. Due in no small part to Scott's efforts these past three years, those 19 year olds will be very well trained, expertly led, and far more likely to succeed in their mission and come home safely to their families.

A word about Sharon Wallace: In a lifetime of service she has inspired and led volunteers at every post -- improving the lives of soldiers and their families, endeavoring, as she's been known to say, "to leave [a community] a better place than when you got there." So, Scott and Sharon: best of luck as you begin a new chapter of your lives together in Florida.

As I said at U.S. Central Command a few weeks ago, General Marty Dempsey -- with his experience commanding U.S. troops in Baghdad, overseeing the training and equipping of Iraqi Security Forces, and his leadership of CENTCOM -- is uniquely suited to take the helm of this organization at this critical time. We all expect great things from you, Marty, and wish you and Deanie well here at Fort Monroe.

I just finished reading a book about Henry Knox, the first Secretary of War and in many ways the father of professional military education. Knox once said that soldiers "can never act with confidence until they are masters of their profession." This fundamental truth is reflected in the work that you -- the men and women of TRADOC -- do every day. It is a daunting responsibility. We know you are more than up to the task. Thank you, and I thank your families for their service. God speed.

-----

Retiring General Hands Over Army's Training Command - AFPS

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

TRADOC News Service Interview with Gen. William S. Wallace

Robert M. Gates - Biography

Army Gen. William S. Wallace - Biograpy

Great conversation on complex issues led into today's seminar -- adding into the mix an informed and experienced audience made for quite a day. We will have more on this later as we sort through the notes for an AAR and format the video of today's panel discussion as well as the Q&A for CD and web posting.

With that, I'll leave you with a couple of pics and the opening remarks of LTC Paul Yingling.

COIN Leadership Conference Opening Remarks By LTC Paul Yingling:

First, I'd like to thank the USMC Center for Irregular Warfare's Colonel Dan Kelly and JFCOM Irregular Warfare Center and Small Wars Journal's Dave Dilegge for coordinating this event, and note what an honor it is to appear today with Colonel Dave Maxwell and Colonel Steve Davis. I'd like to ask by a show of hand how many of you have been deployed on at least one combat tour. Two? Three or more? I'm honored to be here with you today; thank you all for your service.

I'll keep my comments short; given your experiences, your questions and comments will be far better than my responses. Today I'd like to open a dialogue with you about adaptive leadership. I'm mid-way through my third tour in Iraq. Each time I return, I'm struck by how much our combat forces have adapted to the challenges of warfare in the 21st century. In 2003, I was involved in raising a battalion of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, a poorly trained, poorly equipped force that deserted upon first contact with the enemy. In 2005, I served with the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tall Afar, as part of the first large-scale application of the clear-hold-build strategy that would later become a cornerstone of our counterinsurgency doctrine. In 2008, I serve with Task Force 134, applying the practices of counterinsurgency operations inside the wire -- emphasize intelligence, provide security and essential services to the population, isolate extremists, enable the rehabilitation and reintegration of those —to support the government, and build host nation capabilities to provide security under the rule of law. My experiences are in no way unique; every multiple tour veteran I meet has similar accounts of adaptation under fire.

Every time I return to the United States, I'm struck by how little the institutional military has adapted to the challenges of the wars we're fighting. I've spent the last seven years in conventional Army tactical units; it might be that I'm missing something going on in other services, the special operations community, or even in other parts of the Army. However, from my perspective much remains the same. Our system of senior officer development remains essentially unchanged since the Cold War -- the same system that produced the officers who for the last generation failed to prepare for irregular warfare. Our force structure has changed only modestly from the pre-911 era -- and still lacks sufficient intelligence, civil affairs, special operations, military police, linguist, and security force development capabilities necessary for irregular warfare. Our procurement priorities have deviated incrementally from their pre-911 patterns only after the Secretary of Defense publicly pleaded with the services to 'fight the wars we're in." After nearly four years of conducting counterinsurgency operations, the Army and Marine Corps published a counterinsurgency doctrine, and a pretty good one at that. While these modest changes are welcome, they pale in comparison to the rate of adaptation of combat forces.

Why is the institutional military so much less adaptive than combat forces in the field? It's not the people -- service members routinely rotate between the institutional military and the operating forces in the field. Instead, I believe it's the incentive system, and it's that system I'd like to discuss with you today.

Combat forces operate under a simple, brutal incentive system -- adapt or die. Forces in combat are not by virtue of their location intellectually or morally superior to their counterparts in the institutional military. Rather, their priorities are clearer -- when the failure to adapt carries a death sentence, every other consideration -- service and branch loyalties, core competencies, organizational cultures -- pales in comparison.

The institutional military operates under a different incentive system. Those responsible for acquisition operate under powerful incentives to procure expensive, high-tech weapons, even if those weapons are not the ones combat forces need. Those responsible for force structure design operate under powerful incentives to defend existing organizations from claims by other branches and services, even if the existing force structure does not meet the needs of combatant commanders. Finally and most importantly, military officers operate under powerful incentives to conform to senior officers' views, even if those views are out of touch with battlefield realities. Unlike combat forces, the institutional military operates under an incentive system that rewards conformity and discourages adaptation. These are good people, but they work in a bad system. It's simply not reasonable to expect that large groups of people over long periods will behave in ways contrary to the incentives under which they operate.

Having described the problem, I'll conclude with some proposed solutions that I hope will generate further questions and comments in our discussion:

First, our Armed Forces are incapable of internal reform on the scale necessary to prepare for the wars of the 21st century. Such reform will require political intervention; preferably by Congress, as statutory reforms are far more durable than executive ones.

Second, the most urgently needed reform lies in our system for developing senior officers. A few high-profile exceptions notwithstanding, our system for developing senior military officers rewards conformity, suppresses innovation advances parochial interests at the expense of the public good.

Third, we must institutionalize adaptation; we cannot rely solely on battlefield experience to drive innovation. We must replace our insular, top-down Cold War organizational culture with one that learns from the bottom up and the outside in. As current conflicts recede into memory, our hard-won adaptations may be lost in a rush to 'reset' and return to so-called 'core competencies.'

Fourth, we must speed the pace at which we learn and adapt. We've lost thousands of lives and spent hundreds of billions of dollars in the last seven years in our ongoing efforts to bring stability to two medium sized countries; we can't afford to adapt this slowly in the future.

Fifth and finally, junior leaders cannot wait on institutional change to build adaptive leaders. Leaders at the battalion level and below can take action right now to build the leaders we need for the wars of the 21st century. These actions include 360-degree counseling and evaluations, professional development programs focusing on unstructured problem solving, multi-player, free play tactical exercises, and all-ranks combatives.

I've written about these reforms in professional journals and implemented these leader development practices in my battalion; I look forward to discussing them further today. I recognize that my views are controversial; I appreciate your patience in hearing me out and look forward to your questions and comments. Thank you.

by Ken White

The tendency in the United State Armed Forces to micromanage is inimical to competency in combat and has adverse implications for doctrinal development. We should train to eliminate it yet instead we tacitly -- some would say overtly -- encourage it.

Colonel Daniel S. Roper, Director, USA/USMC COIN Center, 10 Dec 07 Iraq visit briefing (extract):

Delegation. OODA loop so tight, if capabilities, lethal or non-lethal, (e.g., AH, $, Intel, PSYOPs) not pushed to executor, may miss window of opportunity. Delegate beyond point of comfort. (emphasis added)

Why should such an obvious thing have to be said?

Because our egos are so large that we discard the lessons of history and sometimes even our training for our own determination of what is required and we know we cannot trust our subordinates to do it our way? Since we have been successful, obviously our way is correct...

That may be unfair and it certainly does not apply to all but it does apply to many; more importantly, we often forget it does not have to be our way to be correct and when we do remember that, we recall that our subordinates are not as capable as we'd like. Thus we eschew delegation and micromanage. We do this in the face of historical precedent in all our wars that this is practiced on entry and is discarded as dangerous as we gain experience in that war. See First Manassas or Kasserine Pass and compare those with later unit and soldier actions at Yellow Tavern and penetrating the Siegfried Line in the same wars.

I applauded when I was told that had been stated by Colonel Roper. Seemed like a long overdue observation to me. I have watched the progress of micromanagement in the Armed Forces of the United States since World War II. Watched it with considerable fear and trepidation. Even got to operate under it for many years...

While my comments apply to all four services and to the Department of Defense as an entity, I am more familiar with the US Army and will address just it in detail.

Brain McAllister Linn in his excellent book The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War discusses the doctrinal battles and squabbles of the US Army from its birth through last year. He well captures the current arguments between major war and Counterinsurgency warfare proponents -- and illustrates that is not at all a new argument but one with ancient roots. It's an excellent book and it has some cautionary words for today's leaders.

He suggests that Army leaders fall into three broad categories he describes as 'Guardians, Heroes and Managers.' My observation over many years is that he gets much of that right. Guardians are 'big war' proponents; Managers have obvious tendencies and the Heroes tend to elevate the Soldier above technique or equipment. Heroes also tend to be accepting of if not proponents of small wars, Guardians oppose them and Managers also tend to lean that way (they are 'inefficient'). Obviously any categorization of an institution as large as the Officer Corps of the US Army into three subsets is somewhat simplistic but it suffices in the case of that book. Those in the Armed Forces will immediately recognize their acquaintances as belonging to one group or another.

Doctor Linn does not spend much time on the topic of delegation versus micromanagement though he does address it in passing -- it is after all a matter of historical record and reality. I suggest that tension has every bit as much if not more to do with the future direction of the Army as does that between his cited categories.

Perhaps much more.

There has long been a tension between Officers and NonCommissioned Officers who prefer well disciplined soldiers who obey orders with few questions and their leader counterparts who wish to command or lead thinking soldiers, encourage questions and don't get too upset at minor indiscipline. While there is a slight tendency for the Linn Heroes to prefer the thinking soldier, the two schools of thought have proponents in all his categories. However, in the division between micromanagers and delegators, the former tend to strongly prefer unthinking obedience while the latter obviously require thinking soldiers.

Briefly consider ramifications of that thought...

There is a further complication. Branch or Combat Arm modalities and experience produce pressures that encourage micromanagement or decentralization. Artillerists require mathematical precision, can do great damage and thus do not encourage 'out of the box' thinking. Armor and Mechanized Infantry need focused efforts, good gunnery and pretty strong adherence to plans in vehicles that do not break down. Aviators have truly significant safety concerns and know that use of the checklist precludes error. All those arms have peacetime and training routines that emphasize 'metrics' -- Tankers and Bradley unit Commanders are effectively graded on their gunnery and maintenance statistics. Tactical training is considered but pales into insignificance in comparison to the tables and OR rates. Artillery and Aviation Commanders also have range and maintenance efforts that take primacy. There is no question that gunnery and maintenance are imperative -- but so also are the people who do those things and the tactical aspects. Regardless, the point is those efforts encourage a degree of micromanagement.

Consider, on the other hand the Infantry Commander. People are his primary concern as he can do nothing in his mission set without them; his range scores are not indicative of much, his maintenance requirements are slight in comparison to other arms. Thus he has some inclination to not micromanage. The Cavalryman tends for many reasons to blend armor and infantry attributes. These two tend to favor decentralization and delegation.

That said micromanagers are almost as prevalent in the Infantry and Cavalry as they are elsewhere so we are confronted with the fact that it must be at least in part, a human predilection. The thing that must be considered is just how much we reinforce that tendency. It is important to recall that the tendency has been prevalent throughout our history and that it goes by the wayside as the war progresses. It does this as experience replaces inadequate training and as the tempo of operations becomes (sometimes -- Counterinsurgency and Foreign Internal Development are usually not fast paced overall) more rapid and greater dispersion becomes necessary.

A look at that last 50 years in the Army can offer some illumination. In 1958, the Army had just completed the shift into a Pentomic organization. This, effectively, placed one Colonel and two Lieutenant Colonels in charge of a large Battalion. This was done not because the organization required the knowledge and experience of a Colonel but to justify and not lose those Colonel spaces. Regardless of why, it taught a number of Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels to worry about echelons below their skill level as those senior officers had experienced Company, Battery and Troop Commanders, many commanding their second or even third company level unit.

Then came Robert Strange McNamara with Whiz Kids, Ford Motor Company (Haven't I heard something about them lately...) management techniques, an ego bigger than Alaska and the introduction of the zero defects mentality. This was followed by our entry into Viet Nam. A system of one year individual tours to the combat zone was in effect. Due to several factors, by late 1968, there was a shortage of Captains and experienced Non-Commissioned Officers. The former problem was addressed by producing more Lieutenants, the latter by developing a NonCommissioned Officer Candidate Course that was conducted at several Posts and produced a plethora of new Sergeants.

Battalion Commanders in Viet Nam post late 1968 quickly discovered they had few Captains and Senior NonCommissioned Officers but plenty of truly dedicated young Lieutenants and Sergeants who would try to do anything you asked of them. Problem was, they were inexperienced and didn't know much -- so they had to be watched extremely closely. Thus as a result of a very senior exemplar of micromanagement, a very flawed personnel policy and inadequate training, a generation of future Generals learned to micromanage.

They also learned that Counterinsurgency was tedious, dirty, unfulfilling and to be avoided -- but that is another story.

Micromanagement has always been about. However, as a result of occurrences in the 1958-1975 time period the techniques was elevated to an art form and for the first time became firmly embedded in the US Army as the preferred way to do business. Sporadic attempts in the 1970s and 1980s by visionary senior people like Generals Edward C. Meyer and Lieutenant General Walter Ulmer to stop this insidious trend were derailed by the bureaucracy that simply waited until they were gone and reemployed its strait jacket. Compliance and mediocrity were desired.

In the past, we have had time in all our wars -- though at the cost of unnecessary casualties and losses -- to discard the peacetime tendency to micromanage. The most recent example of this phenomenon is of curse Iraq. We had 18 moths of initial lost time and many missteps; it took another 18 months to work out the kinks and only in the last 18 months have successes been achieved. A very significant question today is will that time be available in the future? Given the size of the force, can those unnecessary casualties be afforded?

We are now in a new Century. We have a fully professional Army that is hobbled in performance by an archaic training system and what is essentially a World War and draftee based personnel system that insists all persons of like grade and specialty are equal. This is obviously a patently incorrect assumption and policy. Inadequate initial entry training for both Officers and Enlisted persons -- as well as some shortfalls in professional military education -- and insistence on retaining that personnel system literally force us into micromanagement.

Congress is a big driver in personnel matters in an attempt to be fair and equitable. I applaud their intent. Unfortunately, they don't seem to understand that being fair and equitable in such a manner causes significant death and destruction to their voter's sons and daughters because combat is not fair and equitable. Surely that can be explained to them.

The Army -- all the services -- must consider the ramifications of micromanagement on force design. They also need to train people to avoid micromanaging their subordinates. More importantly, the US Army needs to acknowledge that micromanagement occurs because too many are afraid to trust their subordinates. It's really that simple.

People are micromanaged because of the perception they can't be trusted.

They, in the case of the US Army, can't be trusted because too many subordinates are inadequately trained and too many leaders are in jobs they should not have. Whatever the force structure decisions those errors need to be remedied.

A great balanced paper on the capabilities and limitations of airpower... Read it all, some sacred cows get slain, both for groundpounders and airpower advocates...

This study rests upon two vital assumptions, both of them anathema to post-modern minds. First, it believes that historical truth can be found, or at least approached. Second, it believes in the utility of ambitious theory. The discussion here flatly rejects the proposition that "history" simply comprises competing "fables" told by historians with interests and attitudes.

Similarly, it dismisses almost out-of-hand the belief that one theory is worth about as much as any other, which is not very much. This analysis seeks to find plausibly verifiable truth and, as a consequence, to identify error, the "fallacies" in the secondary title. To understand airpower, most especially American airpower, is a task imbued with high significance for national and international security. But, this task is harassed and frequently frustrated by both unsound history and incompetent theorizing. The problem is that those who debate airpower typically seek the history that they can use to advantage, not the history that strives honestly to be true. As for the theory of airpower, it never did take off safely; it continues to fly in contested skies or to taxi indecisively on the runway. No single short study can aspire to correct for 90 years of poor history and shoddy theory, but it can at least make a start.

The hunter who seeks to find and slay fallacies about airpower finds himself in a target-rich environment. Paradoxically and ironically, airpower's most forceful advocates, from the time of Billy Mitchell (1920s) to the present, also have served as its worst enemies. The prime loser has been US national security.

Understanding Airpower: Bonfire of the Fallacies by Colin Gray

Larry Gwin, former US Army captain, Silver Star, Purple Heart, XO of Alpha Co., 2/7 Cav, 1st Cav Division, veteran of the Ia Drang battles of 1965 and author of Baptism: A Vietnam Memoir, spent many years trying to understand war and find some context for his own horrific combat experience by exploring war literature. It is useful exercise, because in this manner the combat veteran may learn from other people, find commonality in what they write, ease the alienation and find his or her place in history. It is an important part of the post-combat normalization process. Make that post-combat normality transcendence process. There is the risk of obsession, but if that is an issue, take it up with your shrink.

In any case, Larry got bored the other morning, drafted his quick combat reading list, and emailed it. A couple of his buddies, on an email list that runs from Guadalcanal through Korea and Vietnam to Petraeus' Baghdad staff and the Afghan Counterinsurgency Academy, added to it...

A Combat Vet's Reading List at Forward Movement.

Via the Center for a New American Security:

On December 5, as part of our ongoing discussion with veterans returning from the front line, the Center for a New American Security was pleased to feature Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling for the latest installment in our Voices from the Field Project. The discussion focused on the need to internalize valuable insight from our experienced junior officers and the importance of decentralized decision making throughout the ranks. LTC Yingling described the need for 'adaptive leadership' specifically from returning veterans and further outlined institutional changes to re-incentivize the military's internal promotion structure. However, Yingling stressed junior officers should not wait for institutional adaptation. Instead veterans should better integrate first-hand combat experience into the central dialogue regarding the future of American forces. In his often cited article A Failure in Generalship published in the Armed Forces Journal, LTC Yingling describes the role of the general in preparing and executing effective and adaptive warfare for the 21st century:

To prepare forces for war, the general must visualize the conditions of future combat. To raise military forces properly, the general must visualize the quality and quantity of forces needed in the next war. To arm and equip military forces properly, the general must visualize the materiel requirements of future engagements. To train military forces properly, the general must visualize the human demands on future battlefields, and replicate those conditions in peacetime exercises.

To listen to LTC Paul Yingling's opening remarks, please click here.

And for those in the DC Metro area on Monday:

Counterinsurgency (COIN) Leadership Seminar. On 8 December 2008 the US Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare (CIW) will host a Counterinsurgency Leadership Seminar at Little Hall (Base Theater), Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia, featuring Colonel Stephen Davis (USMC), Colonel David Maxwell (USA) and Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling. This seminar is cosponsored by CIW, US Joint Forces Command Irregular Warfare Center (IWC), the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center (COIN Center) and Small Wars Journal (SWJ).

Seminar Panel Members. Colonel Stephen Davis, USMC. Col Davis is currently the Deputy Commander of Marine Corps Special Operations Command. Previously, Col Davis commanded Regimental Combat Team 2 in Iraq. Colonel David Maxwell, USA. COL Maxwell is currently the G-3 (Operations Officer) of the US Army Special Operations Command. Previously he commanded the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, USA. LTC Yingling is the Commander of 1st Battalion, 21st Field Artillery and is currently deployed to Iraq performing detainee operations. He has served two previous tours in Iraq and has also deployed to Bosnia and Operation Desert Storm.

Moderator. Colonel Daniel Kelly, USMC. Col Kelly is the Director of the US Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare. He has held a wide variety of command and staff billets and participated in numerous operations to include Operations Restore Hope / Continue Hope (Somalia), Operations Allied Force / Joint Guardian, (Kosovo) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF I and II).

COIN Leadership Seminar - Information Paper and Map