People often ask, "What did you learn from Iraq that might be transferable to Afghanistan?" he said. "The first lesson, the first caution really, is that every situation like this is truly and absolutely unique, and has its own context and specifics and its own texture," he said.
Counterinsurgents have to understand that in as nuanced a manner as possible, and then with that kind of understanding try to craft a comprehensive approach to the problems.
The COIN Center's OPSO, Major Niel Smith, put out the challenge - We would like to ask for feedback - what lessons from Iraq are applicable to our operations in Afghanistan? - and in the October COIN Center SITREP, the Director - Colonel Daniel Roper - summarized the key points from the responses as follows:
(1) Basic COIN principles of protecting the population, connecting the government with the people and permanently isolating insurgents from the population apply in either conflict but must be adapted for local conditions.
(2) Shift emphasis from top-down (strong central government) to bottom-up (locally provided security) to leverage tribal structure in Afghanistan.
(3) Seek neither to apply directly the Anbar strategy to Afghanistan nor simply surge more forces; more troops (2--4 BCTs) are unlikely to measurably change the effort with the current strategy.
(4) Increase efforts in advisory and PRT initiatives to enhance Afghan capabilities.
(5) Put an Afghan face on all CERP. Use Jirgas to solicit needs from the local populace to bolster local government entities.
And in a note - the COIN Center continues to solicit additional feedback on the CERP issue and invites comments on a blog entry titled "Money as a tool in COIN, mission enhancer or detractor?"
Comments
You are such a pessimist. ;)
When I was a young Corporal they told me never to give an order I couldn't enforce and to always have a Plan B. So that's what I've always done. Surely you aren't saying I'm smarter than the Army? I don't believe that.
One could say that in attempting to remove the Talibs, the Narco traffickers and AQ from Afghanistan, build a functioning democracy there and establish an economy that possibly someone gave an unenforceable order. Now you're trying to tell me there is no Plan B.
Can't believe that either, there's got to be a Pony in there somewhere. We're going to fix the unity of command problem, greatly increase trainers and training for the ANP, continue to build up an re-equip the ANA, keep about the same troop levels in country with only a one or two Brigade increase -- and that for only a year or so, significantly increase the political effort to find an acceptable solution. Other, better things I haven't thought of will be done. There is or will be a Plan B. Surely...
Because Plan A isn't working.
I agree with you that a big troop increase makes no sense -- other than that's what many said we would do mostly because it apparently seemed a good idea at the time. I'm not sure that's a good reason to do it, though...
I also agree that a long term American combat presence doesn't make much sense.
Good point on W. Scott. Not only did he perform that little bit of innovative Generalship, he was a great trainer of troops -- whom he insured were well cared for -- and he was in large measure the man behind the Union victory in the Civil War. Grant got the credit but it was Scott's plan. It worked well and was called Anaconda. Shame the more recent Anaconda in Afghanistan wasn't as successful.
Ken:
There can be no plan B as you call for.
Why?
Because the first point made by Colonel Ropers summary of comments from the field demands an adherence to Plan A, or currently what we are doing now. Yes of course there will be some tweaking here and there; add a few more brigades here or there; work from the bottom up instead of the top down; cut a deal with this tribe but not that one; dont try to replicate Anbar in Helmand, etc. But when all is said done it is still the same wine in the same skein.
The reason is because of point number 1 which states:
"(1) Basic COIN principles of protecting the population, connecting the government with the people and permanently isolating insurgents from the population apply in either conflict but must be adapted for local conditions."
This is the current American Way of Coin, which essentially has become code for nation building. If a basic principle that can not be altered in coin is to "protect the population," and link them to the government, then this is nothing but a recipe for nation building and it demands a very specific method of operation to do it: Long term American combat presence on the ground dispersed amongst the people to protect them, win their hearts and minds, and build a new nation. Until the American Army can come off of this dogmatic view of counterinsurgency operations there will never really be even the serious consideration for a Plan B.
What if I said that in a conventional or higher intensity war the principle that must always be applied is annihilation of the enemy forces army? Most folks would say, well, that might be the object of the war but depending on what one is trying to accomplish, the devising of strategy or linking ends with means, that might not at all be the case. The use of American military power in Kosovo comes to mind. If we had adopted a mind-numbing principle in war that anytime the nation commits its military forces it must use them to destroy the enemys main ground army folks would simply think to be an absurd proposition.
But that is essentially what we have done with our ability to think creatively about counterinsurgency.
Thinking historically can further my point. Imagine the world of the small American Army at the start of the Mexican American War in 1846. A standard view of war at the time among American Army officers was heavily shaped by the Jominian view of Napoleonic War that had as its main object the throwing of ones own weight in ground military power against the decisive point of the enemys, thereby crushing its Army. Yet senior American Army general at the time, Winnfield Scott, because he was not dogmatic in his thinking did not follow that principle and devise a strategy of the American Army seeking out the Mexican Army and annihilating it on a field of battle. Instead, because he knew the political aims of the war were limited in nature--convincing the Mexican government to give-up territories that the US wanted--he devised a strategy that sought to conduct a military campaign that saw as its ultimate object the occupation of Mexico City with the idea that in so doing it would force the Mexican government to give into US demands. It worked. If Scott had sought out the destruction of the Mexican Army in a decisive battle it very well might have kept the US Army there much longer and fostered a long and bloody military adventure in that country. Such a strategy would have also called for an American Army to be much larger in size which would have placed further strain on an already divisive war among the American people and its political leadership. So Scott broke out of the conceptual box of the time defined by the Jominian principle of decisive battle.
It seems today that the American Army is incapable of thinking creatively about options when it comes to confronting problems of insurgencies and instability throughout the world.
Until we can break free of this mind-numbing principle of "population-centric" coin and its demand for a derivative operational method there can never even be the possibility of a Plan B.
Hence, we are mired in dogma.
Cross posted from the Small Wars Council Discussion Board.
All the key points summarized make sense. Point 3 is critical.<blockquote>"(3) Seek neither to apply directly the Anbar strategy to Afghanistan nor simply surge more forces; <b>more troops (2-4 BCTs) are unlikely to measurably change the effort with the current strategy</b>." (emphasis added / kw)</blockquote>It is easily the most important point raised.
Afghanistan is too large geographically, too demographically large and diverse and the terrain is too inhospitable -- particularly on and near the critical border with Pakistan -- to achieve much using COIN strategy and current techniques unless well over 8 to 12 BCT, possibly more, are moved in-country and retained there for several years. That is obviously not possible.
We do not have the troop strength; most of NATO is neither inclined nor does it have many more troops available in any event and other nations have not shown much interest in providing personnel.
It is equally critical that everyone realize that Afghans are not Iraqis and there are significant cultural and behavioral differences so different techniques are necessary. I'm not at all sure that is fully realized...
Hopefully, someone is working on Plan B.