When Ray Odierno took over the top military post in Iraq from General David Petraeus in September, there was a lot of hand-wringing among folk at defense think tanks in Washington worried that he was the wrong man for the job. They pointed to Odierno's reputation from his first tour in Iraq, in 2003, as a heavy-handed division commander who had neither a grasp of the subtleties of fighting an insurgency nor the political acumen to sell his ideas back home. Some correspondents who covered Iraq in the months after the fall of Saddam Hussein also came away with that opinion.

But rightly spends the bulk of his article discussing the remarkable outcomes

from the in-stride transformation of an agile, adaptable leader.  The Anbar

Awakening is not the only amazing 180 of this operation writ large, and we're

glad to be on the same team as great leaders of principle, vision, and open

minds.

But the doubters didn't take into account the evolution of Odierno's thinking during his second tour in Iraq, in 2006, when he helped develop the military's surge strategy--which contributed hugely to the reduction of violence in much of the country. Petraeus sold Washington on the surge, but it was Odierno who gave him something to sell. "It is clear that by late 2006, he was as important as Petraeus, if not more important, because he was the guy on the ground," says Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution.

The success of the surge has led to a reassessment of Odierno, 54. Retired General Jack Keane, who consulted closely with Odierno on the surge in late 2006, was so impressed that he later used his powerful connections in the Administration to push for promoting Odierno to Petraeus' job. "He went through a complete metamorphosis," says Keane. "He educated himself and became the pre-eminent operational commander we have in conducting irregular warfare."...

Much more at Time.

A review of:

The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower

by Robert Baer.  Published

by Crown, 2008.

Reviewed by:

Thomas (Tom) P. Odom

LTC US Army (ret)

Author,

Journey Into Darkness: Genocide In Rwanda

A good friend of mine lent me this book to read with the caution, "This will

piss you off."  I was not sure exactly what he meant by that remark but I took

the book.  I liked Bob Baer's first book and have recommended it to others. 

After reading this one, Baer's latest, I would recommend it but with some very

strong cautions.  I will address those later.  For now, let me highlight its

strengths.

The Good

On Iran as a Nation

Despite the title and its inherent hyperbole, Baer offers some clear insights

into the entity we know as Iran.  He correctly takes the reader beyond the

recent and ongoing to demonize Iran as a country of religious fanatics led by

outspoken, out there, President Ahmandinejad.  Baer instead lays out his

argument that the Iran we know today is not the Iran we knew in 1979.  Rather he

argues that Iran in 2008 has long abandoned the mob fanaticism of 1979.  Instead

Iran has returned to the deeper, longer nationalistic tendencies toward empire

that drove the Persians centuries ago and more recently the Pahlavi Dynasty

under the Shah. Baer's thesis--and I will admit to agreeing with him on this—is

that most of what Iran does these days driven by long standing grievances toward

West colored very brightly by the psychosis of Shia Islam's cult like

persecution complex.  So that while Iran sees those wrongs as a case of long

standing injustices that must be set right, the mechanisms and the ultimate

motives for correcting said wrongs are very much the stuff of realpolitik.  Baer

makes the point that Iran despite Ahmandinejad's rhetoric is not on a holy war

tear to destroy Israel.  Rather Iran seeks to use the injustices it sees in the

West's support for Israel as a club to force concessions furthering Iran's own

desires for regional supremacy.  I would offer a parallel in the recent actions

of Putin's Russia.  Many have used the phrase "return to a Cold War" as if Putin

is trying to resurrect the Soviet Union.  I believe Putin's actions and desires

are more like the Czars than the Commissars.  Baer is in my view suggesting that

Khamenei and Rafsanjani have more in common with Xerxes or Reza Shah than they

do with Khomeini.

On the Sunni versus Shia Split

Baer makes a very valuable contribution with his analysis of Shia Islam's

political structures as compared to the wide paths of interpretation open to

Sunni Islam.  Shia Islam is inherently more political because Shia Islam does

have a rigidly controlled clergy whose traditions drive it to challenge secular

power.  Sunni Islam does not have that hierarchy and its traditions have been

generally more secular. But in the context of today's radical Islam, the Shia

longstanding political traditions also serve as a limiting factor.  Not everyone

in Shia Islam can claim clerical status.  Calls for religious-based actions are

therefore limited in their scope and ultimately more reasonable in their

application.

In contrast, the Al Qaeda "thinkers" are at once unhindered by such traditions

and limited by their vision of reinstating a caliphate that never really was and

certainly could not survive the modern world. Baer's point in offering these

thoughts are two fold: first that the Shia are by the nature of their religion

self-limiting when it comes to religious fervor and two that the Iranians use

that fervor to further nationalistic aims. His key example in that is the

metamorphosis of Lebanon's Hezbollah from a terror-driven organization to a

political, social, and governmental force capable of challenging Israel in a

fight to hold ground.  In contrast, radical Sunni Muslim organizations have

consistently failed on efforts to shift from the terror front to the political

front—at least until Hamas benefited from Hezbollah and Iranian tutelage.

A Pan-Islamic Nationalism

Baer rightly points out that the longstanding dominance of Sunni Islam is

clearly in decline if not openly under attack.  Secular pan-Arabism as a social

and political force drew its strengths from Sunni Islam's rejection of a clergy

and religion-based political system.  Arab socialism and near communism took

those anti-religious tendencies even further while maintaining a faí§ade of

pan-Arab ideology. Neither secular pan-Arabism nor socialist/communist

pan-Arabism has advanced Arab causes in the past 50 years.  Baer again rightly

points to Israel as a symbol of that impotency and frustration.  The upsurge in

radical Sunni Islam has done nothing to bolster that image of consistent

failure.

In contrast, Iran and its contacts and supporters have made progress.  Baer

offers the critical insight that Iran is not about to collapse in social

upheaval as many in the West would like to see.  Rather Iran is quite capable of

managing its internal pressures through its own complex system of cultural

safety valves even as it seeks to expand its influence across the region.  As

you should expect, Baer uses Lebanon as a key case study in examining that

effort.  He then uses the Lebanese success story to explain Iranian motives

elsewhere in the Middle East.  At its central core, Baer's thesis postulates

that the inherent political disciple of Shia Islam is perfectly capable of

creating a pan-Islamic nationalism, at once accepting of Iranian hegemony and

accommodating both Shia and Sunni partners. He offers Hamas as an example of

that cross-secular and cross-national cooperation. Baer's point that neither

Nasrallah nor Khamenei is akin to wide-eyed, radical mullahs we typically

associate with the Iranian Revolution is essential to understanding this

movement is more about building power than it is about destroying all things

Western.  

The Not So Good

The Sky is Not Falling

I liked Baer's book because of its subtle but substantive points.  I did not

like his penchant for doom and despair.  I almost felt like I was watching

300, and I kept waiting for someone to throw a spear at Xerxes.  No

one did.  The Spartans in this version surrendered.  To make his points, Baer

seems driven to the overstatement.  For example is Iran's desire for regional

influence the same as a desire for empire?  Maybe it is then again maybe it's

not.  I see it more as a desire for regional influence than a need for

conquest.  I suspect that Baer sees it the same way but if you read this book

without a strong grounding in the area, you probably will get a bit angry.  My

friend reacted to Baer's statement that we have lost Iraq and handed Iran a

strategic victory.  I would say that Baer is probably correct in offering that

as an Iranian view.  Personally I believe any such Iranian "victory" to be

doomed to ultimate defeat. 

Shared Interests Do Not a Proxy Make

I offer similar concerns over Baer's portrayal of Hezbollah.  Certainly

Hezbollah is an Iranian client and its actions serve Tehran's interest in

portraying itself as a champion against the West in general and Israel in

particular.  I offer the same cautions when it comes to seeing Hamas as an

Iranian proxy.  Time is the greatest test to any such relationship and long

standing alliances in the Middle East are non-existent.  Hezbollah likes Iranian

support because it is easier to send Iranian advisors home than it was to kick

the Syrians out.  Iraqi acceptance of Iranian interests and support with US and

Coalition Forces on the ground is a wedding of convenience not love.   Put

another way, common borders do not good friends make when forming such alliances

in the Middle East.  Long distance relationships are much safer and easier to

manage.

The Really Useful

Baer's real contribution in this book comes in the epilogue.  You have to

read the book to get to the epilogue if you are going to understand the author's

intent.  It is all content and context based.  A warning however is in order; neocons will not like the book and they will most likely hate Baer's

conclusions.  I found them thought provoking and in that regard quite useful for

fresh discussions regarding Iran and Iranian intentions toward the region and

the West.  The book did not piss me off but it did make me think. 

Thomas (Tom) Odom

LTC (ret) U.S. Army

They have been called upon to serve in bloody and complicated wars on two fronts, many for more than half of their short careers. As a result, lieutenants and captains often have more combat experience than the generals who command them. "They are wise beyond their years," Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said about junior officers in an address this year to the Army War College. "We owe them our attention and our time." He urged their superiors to listen to them and called upon junior officers to question their superiors as well.

And they have. Indeed, the experience of junior officers has occasionally created strained relationships with senior leadership. Many have been frustrated by what they view as a lack of accountability at the highest levels of leadership. "It has created some tension," says Nathaniel Fick, author of One Bullet Away: the Making of a Marine Officer and a platoon leader in Iraq in the spring of 2003. "A private who loses a rifle gets into more trouble than a general who loses a war."

Much more at US News and World Report.

World Grapples with Pirate Problem - Peter Spiegel and Henry Chu, Los Angeles Times

The Saudis chose to negotiate. The Indian navy opened fire. The US Navy said shipping companies should do more to protect their vessels, and the ship owners said governments should guard the high seas.

But everyone wants the barely functioning government of Somalia to control the pirates who sail from its ports to seize the cargo ships and tankers that ply past.

Mightily armed, but slightly baffled, 21st century civilization appears to have no collective answer to piracy, a scourge once considered banished into history.

More at The Los Angeles Times.

Somali Pirates Seize Ninth Vessel in 12 Days - Catherine Philp, The Times

The battle with pirates operating off the coast of Somalia grew yesterday when raiders seized two more ships but lost one of their own in an uneven firefight with the Indian Navy. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) described the situation yesterday as "out of control".

The surge in hijackings came as Saudi Arabia confirmed that a ransom demand had been made for the freeing of the Sirius Star supertanker, seized at the weekend with her crew of 25 and a cargo of oil worth $100 million (£65 million).

Two more vessels -- a Thai fishing boat with a crew of 16 and a bulk carrier, believed to be Greek, with an unknown number of people aboard -- were seized by pirates in the Gulf of Aden yesterday, bringing the total to nine vessels in 12 days.

Late on Tuesday night the Indian frigate Tabar destroyed the raiders' "mother ship" after coming under attack from pirates firing rocketpropelled grenades, the Indian Navy said. The confrontation was the first involving one of the vessels used by the pirates to extend their range. Shipping groups said that the loss of a vessel did not mean that the pirates' activities would be curtailed. "The situation is already out of control," said Noel Choong, head of the piracy reporting centre at the IMB in Kuala Lumpur. "With no strong deterrent, low risk to the pirates and high returns, the attacks will continue."

More at The Times

Indian Naval Warship Destroys Pirate Vessel - Emily Wax and Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post

An Indian navy frigate battled with and sank a vessel described as a pirate mother ship in the Gulf of Aden, one of the world's busiest and most lawless shipping lanes, the navy said Wednesday.

Amid a surge of piracy around the hijacking-plagued Horn of Africa, the Indian navy said in a statement that fire from its INS Tabar set the pirate vessel aflame after it failed to stop for investigation.

The overnight battle in the Gulf of Aden, the gateway to the Suez Canal and the main shipping route from Asia and the Middle East to Europe, occurred days after the Saudi-owned Sirius Star supertanker and its 25 crew members were seized. It is the biggest tanker hijacked to date and is carrying 2 million barrels of oil -- a quarter of Saudi Arabia's daily output, valued at $100 million.

More at The Washington Post.

A Surge to Wipe Out Pirates of the Horn - Everett Pyatt, Real Clear World opinion

Last night the Indian Navy Ship Tabar struck a long overdue blow for freedom of the seas by sinking a pirate mother ship in the pirate-infested waters of the Gulf of Aden. At last, the pirates will know that the hijacking party has been crashed.

Some are questioning whether the Tabar acted in self-defense. Ridiculous, they acted in the cause of law and order in support of freedom - a much higher calling.

Perhaps this event will shake other nations out of their unwillingness to address the threat and put together a meaningful military force to eliminate these nautical terrorists who prefer to call themselves businessmen. They make the Mafia look like kindergarteners.

More at Real Clear World and:

Indian Navy Destroys Pirate Ship in Gulf of Aden - Voice of America

Indian Navy Says It Sank Pirate Ship - New York Times

Indian Warship Destroys Suspected Pirate Vessel - Los Angeles Times

India Leads Fight Against Somali Pirates - Christian Science Monitor

Pirate Boat Sunk But Attacks Continue - Daily Telegraph

Indian Navy Sinks Pirate 'Mother Ship' - Associated Press

Negotiations Begin for Sirius Hostages - The Australian

Somali Pirates Talk Ransom for Supertanker - Voice of America

Saudi Owners 'Talking to Pirates' - BBC News

Somali Pirates Transform Villages into Boomtowns - Associated Press

Military, Shippers Must Work Together to Deter Pirates, Official Says - AFPS

Time for an Anti-piracy Coalition of the Willing - Forbes opinion

Bring Justice to Somalia's Fisheries - Christian Science Monitor opinion

19 November

US Admiral 'Stunned' by Pirates' Reach - Agence France-Presse

The top US military officer said Monday he was "stunned" by the reach of the Somali pirates who seized a Saudi supertanker off the east coast of Africa, calling piracy a growing problem that needs to be addressed.

But Admiral Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said there were limits to what the world's navies could do once a ship has been captured because national governments often preferred to pay pirates ransom.

"I'm stunned by the range of it, less so than I am the size," Mullen said of the seizure of the Sirius Star Sunday by armed men.

The huge, oil laden prize, which is three times the size of a US aircraft carrier, was some 450 miles east of Kenya when it was boarded, he said.

More at Agence France-Presse.

Tanker Capture Raises Alarm over Somali Piracy - Lee Keath and Jennifer Quinn, Associated Press

It seems inconceivable: Somali pirates in speedboats foil warships from the world's most powerful navies to prey on shipping lanes crucial to the oil supply.

How do they do it? Basically, it's a big ocean and no one wants to be top cop.

NATO and the US Navy say they can't be everywhere, and American officials are urging ships to hire private security. Warships patrolling off Somalia have succeeded in stopping some pirate attacks. But military assaults to wrest back a ship are highly risky and, to this point, uncommon.

More at The Associated Press.

Call for Navies to Seek Out Pirates' Ships - Robert Wright, Financial Times

Naval forces off Somalia must take firm action to tackle the vessels pirates are using as bases for long-range attacks, shipping organisations said on Tuesday after Saturday's audacious seizure of a huge oil tanker.

Since the weekend hijack of the Saudi tanker, pirates have seized two more ships - a Greek bulk carrier, in the Gulf of Aden with about 25 crew on board, and a Hong Kong-flagged ship carrying grain and bound for Iran.

Peter Hinchliffe, marine director of the International Chamber of Shipping, said naval forces could identify the "motherships" from which attacks were launched and that there was a legal right to search them and seize weapons.

"We want [naval forces] to go on board, look for evidence of piracy, confiscate the weapons, confiscate the ships if possible and arrest the pirates," he said.

More at Financial Times.

After Hijacking, Saudi Foreign Minister Says Nation Will Join Anti-Piracy Efforts - Faiza Saleh Ambah, Washington Post

Saudi Arabia's foreign minister on Tuesday condemned the hijacking of a Saudi supertanker carrying $100 million in crude oil, calling piracy "a disease that has to be eradicated."

The 1,080-foot Sirius Star was seized by Somali pirates Sunday off East Africa. Its owner, Vela International, said the tanker is now believed to be anchored off the coast of Somalia.

Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal said his country would join international efforts to battle piracy, which has surged to levels unseen in modern times.

More at The Washington Post.

Pirates' Delight - Wall Street Journal editorial

The latest ship to fall into the hands of pirates off the coast of northern Africa is a Hong Kong-registered cargo vessel captured yesterday in the Gulf of Aden. The unfortunately named Delight is now steaming toward Somalia, where it presumably will be held for ransom. It joins the Saudi supertanker, Sirius Star, seized over the weekend.

The assault on the Delight is one of 90-plus attacks on ships this year by Somali pirates, more than double last year's tally, according to the International Maritime Bureau. It says that pirates are currently holding 15 ships and more than 250 sailors. That includes a Ukrainian ship carrying Russian tanks intended for southern Sudan; it was captured in September.

The pirates' headquarters is Somalia, whose dysfunctional government lacks basic law-enforcement agencies, on or off shore, to disrupt pirates. It has a 1,000-mile coastline along the Gulf of Aden, where marauders and their boats can hide easily. Yemen and Djibouti, which also border the Gulf of Aden, are more politically stable, but have few capabilities. The same is true for Kenya, off whose coast the supertanker was taken.

More at The Wall Street Journal and:

Oil Capture Spotlights Somali Pirates' Reach - Christian Science Monitor

Conflicting Reports on Seized Saudi Oil Tanker - Voice of America

Seized Tanker Anchors off Somalia - BBC News

Hijacked Supertanker Drops Anchor - New York Times

Grain Ship Seized as Pirates Hold World to Ransom - The Times

Pirates Hijack Another Merchant Ship off Africa - Los Angeles Times

Hong Kong Grain Ship Hijacked by Pirates - Reuters

Ships Diverted after Saudi Oil Tanker Hijacked - Associated Press

Indian Navy Battles Pirates off Somalia Coast - Voice of America

Indian Navy Says it Fought Off Pirate Ship - Associated Press

Somali Pirates Try to Seize British Ship - Daily Telegraph

Somali Pirates Hijack Thai Fishing Boat - Associated Press

Impoverished Land Awash with Millions of Dollars - The Times

Maritime Terrorism - The Times editorial

At War with Pirates on the High Seas - Los Angeles Times editorial

We Must Defend our High Seas - The Times opinion

CNAS Press Release - 19 November 2008 - David Kilcullen Joins CNAS as a Senior Fellow.

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) is pleased to officially announce that Dr. David Kilcullen has joined CNAS as a senior fellow. Kilcullen was a non-resident senior fellow with CNAS for more than a year and collaborated with CNAS on Iraq and Afghanistan reports, as well as violent extremism and grand strategy Solarium projects in 2007 and 2008.

Kilcullen's position as the Special Advisor for Counterinsurgency to the Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, will conclude in December 2008, at which time he will also become a partner at the Crumpton Group, a Washington, D.C.-based strategic advisory firm.

Prior to joining CNAS, Kilcullen was senior counterinsurgency advisor to General David Petraeus, then Commanding General of United States and international forces in Iraq. He was part of the small team that designed the "surge," and subsequently spent several months in the field directing counterinsurgency programs and providing hands-on advice to Iraqi and coalition military, diplomatic, aid and intelligence agencies. In 2005-2006 he was chief counterterrorism strategist at the U.S. State Department, working in the Middle East, South Asia, Europe, Africa and Southeast Asia, including operational activities in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Agencies. He designed and implemented the Regional Strategic Initiative, the policy that drives U.S. counterterrorism diplomacy worldwide.

He previously served in Australia's Office of National Assessments, worked in the Pentagon where he wrote the counterterrorism strategy for the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, and served on the writing team for Australia's 2004 Terrorism White Paper. He is a former Australian infantry officer with 22 years of service, including operational deployments in East Timor, Bougainville, and the Middle East. His doctoral dissertation, on insurgency in traditional societies, drew on residential fieldwork with guerrillas and terrorists in Indonesia during the 1990s. He is fluent in Indonesian and conversant in Arabic and French. He is a fellow of the Royal Geographical Society (elected in 1996) and holds several honors and decorations, including the United States Army Superior Civilian Service Medal, "for exceptionally meritorious service to the United States as Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor, Multi-National Force-Iraq, during Operation Iraqi Freedom," the first such award to a foreign national serving in combat alongside U.S. Forces.

His forthcoming book, The Accidental Guerrilla, to be published by Oxford University Press in spring 2009, analyzes the complex interplay between local guerrillas and global terrorists in contemporary war zones from Africa to Southeast Asia.

At the request of the small group of think-tankers I was travelling with, General David McKiernan's headquarters has agreed to release an unclassified version of the ISAF Campaign plan specifically for posting on Small Wars Journal. Things I find particularly interesting in this plan include the upfront acknowledgement that this is a counterinsurgency (vice peacekeeping) campaign (obvious to us, but hugely important in the NATO context); the addition of "Shaping Operations" to the classic "Clear, Hold, Build" COIN methodology; an acknowledgment that in this still critically under-resourced theater, ISAF cannot be strong everywhere and must therefore prioritize areas to clear and hold (a point Dave Kilcullen made well on Sunday with Fareed Zakaria); and the overt emphasis on buildling Afghan governance capability and capacity as the objective of all of our operations.

The top US intelligence panel this week is expected to issue a snapshot of the world in 2025, in a report that predicts fading American economic and military dominance and warns of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

The predictions come from the National Intelligence Council (NIC), part of Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell's office.

The NIC report, a draft copy of which is titled "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World," is slated for release as early as Thursday.

The report also predicts "a unified Korea" is likely by then, and that China will be the world's second-largest economy and a major military power.

"The United States will remain the single most powerful country, although less dominant," according to a "working draft" of the document obtained by The Washington Times. "Shrinking economic and military capabilities may force the US into a difficult set of tradeoffs between domestic and foreign-policy priorities."

More at The Washington Times.

The Autumn 2008 issue of the US Army War College's Parameters is posted.

Parameters, a refereed journal of ideas and issues, provides a forum for the expression of mature thought on the art and science of land warfare, joint and combined matters, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and Department of Defense.

Here is the line-up:

In This Issue - Parameters Editors

Tying US Defense Spending to GDP: Bad Logic, Bad Policy by Travis Sharp

As the war in Iraq drags into its sixth year and cumulative spending approved by the Congress for the "global war on terrorism" surpasses $850 billion, both the American public and security experts are becoming increasingly concerned about the present and future direction of US defense spending. One proposal under consideration is to allocate the defense budget each year as a specific percentage of America's gross domestic product (GDP). Advocates of this approach typically recommend pegging "base" Department of Defense (DOD) spending, which excludes both supplemental appropriations for ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and Department of Energy-administered nuclear weapons activities, at four percent of GDP.

USJFCOM Commander's Guidance for Effects-based Operations by James N. Mattis

Herein are my thoughts and commander's guidance regarding effects-based operations (EBO). This article is designed to provide the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) staff with clear guidance and a new direction on how EBO will be addressed in joint doctrine and used in joint training, concept development, and experimentation. I am convinced that the various interpretations of EBO have caused confusion throughout the joint force and among our multinational partners that we must correct. It is my view that EBO has been misapplied and overextended to the point that it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations.

Effects-based Operations: More Important Than Ever by Tomislav Z. Ruby

Whether effects-based operations (EBO) and the effects-based approach to planning have led to negative warfighting results is a topic well worth our collective time and study. In fact, it is a healthy activity of any defense institution to question and evaluate its doctrine, policy, and procedures. The current debate on EBO brought about by General James N. Mattis's memorandum to US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) directing the elimination of the term from the command's vocabulary has not put the issue to rest. Quite to the contrary, the Mattis memo reinvigorated the debate, and this article aims at being part of that debate. Effects-based operations are not dead. No one individual can kill a concept, and this concept has staying power. When the underlying rationale for General Mattis's decision is analyzed, one can see that EBO as a concept for planning will be around for some time.

The Next Wave of Nuclear Proliferation by Nader Elhefnawy

In recent years record oil prices, long-term concerns about fossil fuel supplies (particularly oil), and worries about the contributions of fossil fuels to the accumulation of greenhouse gases such as carbon and methane have helped revive interest in nuclear energy production. Indeed, it has become commonplace to advocate renewed investment in nuclear energy production in the United States. There has been, however, little consideration as to what a global turn to nuclear energy on an enlarged scale would actually entail, let alone the security implications of such.

A Concert-Balance Strategy for a Multipolar World by Michael Lind

The United States is a superpower in search of a strategy. Following the end of the Cold War, no new grand strategy has won the bipartisan support that underpinned America's strategy of containment from President Truman to President Reagan. Enthusiastic promoters of globalization occasionally argue that international trade will be a panacea for conflict, at least among developed nations. The neoconservative vision of unilateral US global hegemony always lacked adequate military forces and funding to realize its ambitious goals. Now, in the aftermath of the Iraq War, the hegemony strategy also lacks public support. Most critics of the hegemony strategy, however, have failed to propose a credible alternative capable of guiding US national security.

Contractors: The New Element of Military Force Structure by Mark Cancian

Mercenaries," "merchants of death," "coalition of the billing," "a national disgrace" all have been used to describe the use of contractors in war. The extensive use of contractors on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan has engendered strong emotion and calls for change. An ever-expanding literature and much larger volume of opinion pieces have led the discussion, most expressing shock and disappointment that such a situation has occurred. Unfortunately, little of this literature is useful to planners trying to design future forces in a world characterized by extensive commitments and limited manpower. The purpose of this article is to examine what battlefield contractors actually do, consider how we got to the situation we are in today, and provide force planners with some useful insight regarding the future.

Why Contractor Fatalities Matter by Steven L. Schooner

The true US death toll in Iraq and Afghanistan recently reached the 6,000 threshold. But that is not what the media are reporting and as a result, the public remains generally unaware. At the end of July 2008, mainstream media reported that 4,673 service members have died in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Counting only military fatalities, however, understates the human cost of America's engagements in these regions by nearly a fourth. On the modern, outsourced battlefield, contractors are sustaining injuries and fatalities in increasing numbers. Specifically, the losses chronicled in The Washington Post's ongoing "Faces of the Fallen" series fail to recognize the little-known fact that, as of 30 June 2008, more than 1,350 civilian contractor personnel had died in Iraq and Afghanistan in support of US military and political operations. Another 29,000 contractors have been injured; more than 8,300 seriously. Yet contractor fatalities (and injuries) remain generally outside the public's consciousness.

Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War by Daniel S. Roper

Though policy initiatives since the attacks of 11 September 2001 have positively influenced certain agencies and processes within the US government in their efforts to secure America, some steps have worked at cross purposes and limited the nation's effectiveness in countering the threats it faces. One entrenched policy that inhibits clear analysis and understanding of the threat is the continued framing of this global struggle as a "War on Terrorism" (WOT). Words have consequences in shaping understanding and framing potential courses of action. The broad use and narrow connotations of the term WOT have cultivated a widespread, erroneous intellectual paradigm for dealing with both terrorism and insurgencies. This false strategy conflates a single tactic into the overall characteristic of a diverse number of enemy organizations, who exercise terrorism as just one tool. Continuing to frame the conflict as a war against terrorism alone serves to mischaracterize the enemy, obscures an understanding of the techniques they employ, distorts the challenges posed, and impedes the development and implementation of a strategy for countering their impact.

Time for a New Strategy by William McDonough

On 10 January 2007, during an address to the nation, President George W. Bush announced the United States' third strategy to achieve several goals in Iraq. The goals were to improve security conditions; develop Iraqi Security Forces' capabilities and transfer security responsibilities to the Government of Iraq (GoI); assist GoI efforts to draft, enact, and implement key legislative initiatives; assist full expenditure of budgets; and help the GoI provide essential services to its people. This strategy, known as The New Way Forward or more commonly as the Surge Strategy, established a 12- to 18-month timeframe to achieve these objectives. The strategy reiterated the Administration's long-term goal of a unified, federal, and democratic Iraq that could govern, defend, and sustain itself, and be an ally in the war on terrorism.

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The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, released his guidance for 2008-2009 on 17 November.

S. Dawn Casey of Talk Radio News Service on a recent press briefing by Admiral Mullen:

This is the first administration transition during wartime in forty years, and traditionally, a crisis will occur during that period, said Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, during a press briefing at the Pentagon.

Mullen said he believes it's critical to pursue all the issues in the CJCS Guidance memorandum, which includes defending vital National interests in the broader Middle East; Resetting, Reconstituting, and Revitalizing our Forces; and properly balancing our global strategic risk. In addition to these issues, he said, there is a whole range of other global concerns such as tensions in Eurasia and Africa, and the impact of the economic crisis.

Excerpts from an e-mail by Admiral Mullen to members of the Joint Staff follow.

My top three priorities have remained the same:

1) Defend our Vital National Interests in the Broader Middle East.

2) Reset, Reconstitute and Revitalize our Armed Forces.

3) Properly Balanced Global Strategic Risk.

We must also prepare for the arrival of a new Commander-in-Chief. President-elect Obama is forming a transition team to prepare for his leadership of the Defense Department. As I said to you in my transition guidance, I expect us all to support his team to the very best of our ability - staying responsive to their requests for information, while at the same time executing faithfully the policies of this administration.

Mullen Issues Guidance Listing Priorities for Joint Staff - Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service

Dealing with the greater Middle East, avoiding the militarization of U.S. foreign policy, resetting the forces and speeding up the Joint Staff are among the priorities the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has set for the coming year.

Navy Adm. Mike Mullen issued his guidance for the coming year yesterday. Some of the guidance has not changed since last year, when Mullen first took office, some has been fine-tuned after the experiences of the past year, and some new items have made the list.

The chairman said he issued the guidance to give the 1,500 members of the Joint Staff the path ahead and to prioritize the strategic objectives for the future.

Mullen said the U.S. military is the most combat-hardened force in the world today, and that the force has global responsibilities and will continue to have them.

"The sustained presence and persistent engagement of our forces are the most effective way to develop the lasting relationships and cooperation necessary to secure our vital national interests," Mullen wrote in the guidance.

The chairman said the U.S. military advantage could slip if not maintained. Still, he said, not all problems in the world will respond to a military solution.

"We cannot meet the challenges of today and those of tomorrow with military power alone," he wrote. "We must guard against further militarization of our foreign policy."

The chairman said he wants not only military capabilities, but also the capabilities of other U.S. agencies and foreign partners, to be successful against the threats facing the free world. He called on Joint Staff members to "think ahead on the strategic level, stay current at the operational level and be informed by tactical developments." He said the U.S. military and Joint Staff still are more reactive than anticipatory.

The greater Middle East remains the focus of the chairman's guidance. This area stretches from North Africa to Pakistan, and includes the Horn of Africa. "Combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan remain our immediate priority," he wrote. "We must do all we can to win these two wars."

Afghanistan and Pakistan are linked throughout the chairman's guidance. "I believe the nexus of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains the greatest threat to the United States and our vital national interests," he wrote. "Al-Qaida sanctuaries in the under-governed regions of Pakistan further contribute to regional instability." He said the safe havens in Pakistan are the greatest potential source of an attack on the United States.

He called on the Joint Staff to conduct continuous assessments of strategies and campaign plans for the United States, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. He also called on the Joint Staff to work to develop a military strategy to support the national security strategy for the greater Middle East.

Resetting and revitalizing American forces is another priority for the chairman. The pace of operations since Sept. 11, 2001, has precluded full training for many American servicemembers, he noted. Further, he said, many men and women have deployed multiple times.

"We have been at war for more than seven years, and I remain concerned that the high pace of operations will further degrade our warfighting systems, equipment, platforms and people if we fail to deliver on initiatives such as grow the force and reset funding," he wrote.

The chairman said he wants to change peacetime processes that continue on the Joint Staff and the services, and that he also is concerned about the metrics used to measure the health of the force. He also said it is important to develop and fund an operational reserve within the reserve components.

The chairman also asked the members of the Joint Staff to look at the global and long-term view of American military posture.

"It is imperative that we remain capable of executing our war plans and engaged around the world -- building partner capacity, improving international and interagency cooperation and fostering both security and stability," he wrote.

He also wants no let-up in deterrence as the new administration takes the reins of power in January. The chairman said he wants to work with the new administration to craft the National Military Strategy and ready the ground for the next Quadrennial Defense Review. He also called on planners to "articulate a vision for the future force, including an estimate of future threats and the military requirements to counter those threats."

The chairman made it clear he wants to speed up the decision process on the Joint Staff. He said the organization "must be capable of responding at the speed my job requires, not the speed a particular process currently allows."

Processes on the Joint Staff will change, and the guidance calls on the director of the Joint Staff to act. "No process is sacrosanct -- [the director of the Joint Staff] shall break and redesign as needed -- outcomes are what counts," Mullen wrote.