Small Wars Journal

U.S. Intelligence Analyst Arrested in Wikileaks Video Probe

Mon, 06/07/2010 - 4:49pm
U.S. Intelligence Analyst Arrested in Wikileaks Video Probe - Kevin Poulsen and Kim Zetter, Wired.

Federal officials have arrested an Army intelligence analyst who boasted of giving classified U.S. combat video and hundreds of thousands of classified State Department records to whistleblower site Wikileaks, Wired.com has learned. SPC Bradley Manning, 22, of Potomac, Maryland, was stationed at Forward Operating Base Hammer, 40 miles east of Baghdad, where he was arrested nearly two weeks ago by the Army's Criminal Investigation Division. A family member says he's being held in custody in Kuwait, and has not been formally charged...

He said he also leaked three other items to Wikileaks: a separate video showing the notorious 2009 Garani air strike in Afghanistan that Wikileaks has previously acknowledged is in its possession; a classified Army document evaluating Wikileaks as a security threat, which the site posted in March; and a previously unreported breach consisting of 260,000 classified U.S. diplomatic cables that Manning described as exposing "almost criminal political back dealings." "Hillary Clinton, and several thousand diplomats around the world are going to have a heart attack when they wake up one morning, and find an entire repository of classified foreign policy is available, in searchable format, to the public," Manning wrote...

Much more at Wired.

'Catch-22' comes to Afghanistan

Mon, 06/07/2010 - 3:03pm
Today's New York Times featured a story by Dexter Filkins that described how millions of dollars the U.S. government is paying Afghan security contractors is very likely going to the Taliban. The long and growing truck convoys from Pakistan that are required to keep U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan supplied have long been suspected of being the objects of a lucrative Taliban protection business. Filkins' story has now filled in some specifics:

After a pair of bloody confrontations with Afghan civilians, two of the biggest private security companies — Watan Risk Management and Compass Security — were banned from escorting NATO convoys on the highway between Kabul and Kandahar.

The ban took effect on May 14. At 10:30 a.m. that day, a NATO supply convoy rolling through the area came under attack. An Afghan driver and a soldier were killed, and a truck was overturned and burned. Within two weeks, with more than 1,000 trucks sitting stalled on the highway, the Afghan government granted Watan and Compass permission to resume.

[...]

Although the investigation is not complete, the officials suspect that at least some of these security companies — many of which have ties to top Afghan officials — are using American money to bribe the Taliban. The officials suspect that the security companies may also engage in fake fighting to increase the sense of risk on the roads, and that they may sometimes stage attacks against competitors.

The suspicions raise fundamental questions about the conduct of operations here, since the convoys, and the supplies they deliver, are the lifeblood of the war effort.

"We're funding both sides of the war," a NATO official in Kabul said.

The Afghan logistics and security contractors (and their associates in the Taliban) did not need to read Joseph Heller's Catch-22 or study Lt. Milo Minderbinder's business methods; in Afghanistan, these arrangements are second nature. And the planned tripling in the U.S. headcount in Afghanistan since early 2009 has resulted in more and longer convoys and thus more money for all sides in the convoy protection business.

One conclusion we might be able to draw from Filkins' article is that the Taliban are not overly concerned about ISAF's strategy. Having influence with the Afghan logistics and security firms, the Taliban are opting for the moment to take the bribes and allow the convoys to pass. If the coalition's military pressure on the Taliban became painful enough, we would expect to see a different Taliban calculation, with more attacks on the convoys, perhaps enough to constrain ISAF operations. If this conclusion is true, it would reveal a broader point -- that the Taliban retain the initiative and retain the ability to regulate not only their own operations but ISAF's as well.

More importantly, Filkins' story has the potential to damage political support for the war inside the U.S. As stories such as this reinforce the impression (true or not) that the war in Afghanistan is descending into murky corruption, more of the public is likely to throw up its hands in disgust.

Murky corruption, side deals, tangled relationships, and the power of money are all integral elements of irregular warfare. After a decade of renewed experience, many U.S. soldiers are very good at the game. But what remains unknown is whether all of America is ready for the murky deals that irregular warfare requires. America's adversaries don't think so, which is why America has found itself on this playing field.

Junger's War , Review by Karaka Pend

Mon, 06/07/2010 - 8:26am

WAR, Sebastian Junger, Twelve (New York), 2010.

Review by Karaka Pend of Permissible Arms.

On May 21, 2010, I saw Sebastian Junger speak on the subject of his book War. It was standing room only, with several servicemen and women present; but the audience was mostly older folks. The parents of Private Misha Pemble-Belkin, one of the soldiers Junger writes about in his book, were present that evening, and Junger took care to welcome them. It was clear from that moment on, even before his reading or before I had the chance to read the book, that Junger had written about people who had come to mean a great deal to him. To understand that is to understand the impetus of his account.

War is divided into three parts: Fear, Killing, and Love. There is no distance in Junger's narrative, only detailed accounting of action and feeling with some background explanation that strings along the broad jumps in time, tone, and place. That seems to be what he was striving for--when asked (predictably by the second question at the event) how he viewed his role as a war correspondent and the tenet of journalistic objectivity, Junger answered that he was going for the inverse of objectivity. He wanted to understand and embrace his subject, become a part of it almost to a point. That point, it seems, was carrying a weapon. Junger refused repeated offers by the men he was embedded with to fire at the enemy or carry a weapon because, as he writes:

It was a hard thing to explain to them that maybe you could pass someone a box of ammo during a firefight or sneak 100 rounds on a SAW down at the firing range, but as a journalist the one thing you absolutely could not do was carry a weapon. It would make you a combatant rather than an observer, and you'd lose the right to comment on the war later with any kind of objectivity (212-3).

That seems like a very weak line in the sand. Junger's grasp of his own motivations stutters as much as it does for the men he documents, and as he works to form an understanding of Battle Company, he also confronts the realities of his choice to embed. From several pages earlier than that passage, after one of the soldiers offers him a uniform blouse so he can better blend in with the patrol:

If we get compromised I'll be the only guy in civilian clothes, and suppose someone gets hit? Suppose someone gets killed? Like every other reporter out there I'm eating Army food, flying on Army helicopters, sleeping in Army hooches, and if I were in the Korengal on my own, I'd probably be dead in twenty-four hours. Whatever boundaries may have blurred between me and the Army, the blurring didn't start with a shirt (204).

Part of the purpose of Junger's exercise is to engage as fully in the experience of being at Restrepo, of living with the men of Battle Company, as he can given the constraints of his embed. He mostly succeeds in that, in part because he let himself get swept up in the life-and-death fraternitas of it all, and perhaps more importantly because Battle Company allowed him to become a part of their brotherhood. It would have be a rather different story had he not won his way into the human terrain of that mountaintop.

From how he approached his speaking engagement, and now from having finished the book, it seems as though there were two points Junger wanted to convey. First, that there is a very compelling reason that draws specifically young men into the military, and into war; the second being that there is something fundamental about the experience of combat that changes such young men perhaps irrevocably.

Junger suggests that being a part of a company, particularly an effective company, draws on the sense of group loyalty and necessaryness of one's place in a group under threat. "Loyalty to the group drove men back into combat--and occasionally to their deaths--but the group also provided the only psychological refuge from the horror of what was going on. It was conceivably more reassuring to be under fire with men you trusted than to languish at some rear base with strangers who had no real understanding of war. It's as if there was an intoxicating effect to group inclusion that more than compensated for the dangers the group had to face" (240). Referencing studies conducted post-World War II and works from the journalist Jack Belden, Junger develops a theory of the attractiveness of combat--not because being fired at is inherently appealing, but rather that the relationship of one individual soldier to the others in his company represents a level of commitment to those men greater than any other commitment they, or he, might ever know.

To the second point, Junger's final exchange conveys his meaning with all the subtlety of a wrecking ball:

"A lot of people tell me I could be anything I want to be. If that's true, why can't I be a fucking civilian and lead a normal fucking life? Probably 'cause I don't want to."

You got me there, O'Byrne; you got me there, brother. Maybe the ultimate wound is the one that makes you miss the war you got it in (268).

Throughout, Junger's soldiers describe combat, describe firefight, as an addiction or a high; and perhaps that is the only real framework in which their longing for conflict or engagement with the enemy can be understood. If there is no greater high than when you are protecting your brother, how do you return to a world where you need not always watch your brother's back?

That is one question Junger, nor the soldiers of whom he writes, seems capable of answering. In the end Junger poses the question to the nation these men serve: how do we welcome home men who long for a bullet-stained combat outpost? How does one heal from that wound?

Karaka Pend is an independent scholar and blogger at Permissible Arms. With thanks to Gulliver from Ink Spots and Abbie Evans.

Mountain Runner on SC/PD, NSS, and NowMedia

Mon, 06/07/2010 - 7:35am

Take a look at some recent posts over at

MountainRunner.  Matt Armstrong observes the tangled web of inadequate

terminology in

The

need for a national strategy on Communication and Engagement, and notes that

the recent National Security

Strategy punts on strategic communication and public diplomacy. 

Perhaps the White House is "in charge" in the Gulf now, by whatever

sophomoric understanding of in charge fits the sound bit media but does not

really apply to such a massive federated (not federal) approach to a response. 

But the federated approach for cohesive SC/PD is awfully optimistic, and as Matt

observes,

If the authors of the National Security Strategy intended to provide "overall

guidance and direction" while deferring to individual agencies, they failed.

What "guidance and direction" appears in the strategy is inadequate to serve as

a forcing mechanism to drive subsequent nested strategies, some of which have

already been written.

Matt, et al, offers a one day training event on

Now Media: engagement

based on information not platforms, coming up in DC on July 6.  I've

caught the old media / new media => Now Media convergence part of his story

before, and it is well done.  I hope to catch the rest soon.

Time is on the Taliban's Side

Sun, 06/06/2010 - 7:56pm
Time is on the Taliban's Side - Richard Beeston, The Times via The Australian.

War is a dirty word in Afghanistan. Use it before US and British generals and you can expect frowns and headshakes. At times it feels as though spin doctors have infiltrated every coalition base, eliminated the commanders and put on their uniforms.

Instead of "offensives" and "assaults", we have "activities", "ongoing process", or "restoring order". Operations are no longer called "Anaconda" or "Mountain Fury", but "Together" and "Co-operation". Detainees are no longer terrorists, but misguided youths in need of an education and some vocational training.

The man responsible is General Stanley McChrystal, commander of forces in Afghanistan. If his superior, General David Petraeus, rewrote the book on US counter-insurgency warfare for Iraq, then McChrystal has turned it into a dogma, now practised daily by US troops.

The strategy appears sound. Pour more troops into the Taliban strongholds of southern Afghanistan. Deploy them around main population centres, force out militants, and protect civilians while Afghan officials and forces impose authority and deliver services to the population. Wait for the tipping point when life for ordinary Afghans begins to improve, the economy picks up and the people change sides. Open the door to negotiations with the Taliban who are by now prepared for a negotiated rather than a military solution...

More at The Australian.

Is Israel's Naval Blockade of Gaza Legal?

Sun, 06/06/2010 - 7:24pm
Q&A: Is Israel's Naval Blockade of Gaza Legal? - Reuters.

Israel has said it will continue a naval blockade of the Gaza Strip despite growing global pressure to lift the siege after a navy raid on a Turkish ferry carrying aid killed nine activists this week.

What is the legality of the blockade and did Israel's intervention breach international law? At the link above or below you will find some questions and answers on the issue.

More at Reuters.

A Forceful Voice on Obama's Security Team

Sun, 06/06/2010 - 12:26pm
Counterterror Adviser John Brennan: A Forceful Voice on Obama's Security Team - Anne E. Kornblut, Washington Post.

When President Obama wanted an investigation into the intelligence failures that led to the attempted airline attack on Christmas Day, he turned to the man who has emerged as one of his most trusted advisers: John O. Brennan. Within two weeks, Brennan had produced a sharply written report that caught other intelligence heads by surprise -- and caused an uproar in some quarters for its harsh assessment of intelligence agencies' performance. Moreover, Brennan showed the final draft to his colleagues just hours before it was to be made public, a move that his critics said was an example of his tendency to exert tight control.

Eventually, one of the casualties of the report would be Adm. Dennis C. Blair, who was forced out as director of national intelligence last month. But the report and its aftermath also demonstrated the skillful maneuvering of Brennan, who after being forced to withdraw from consideration for CIA director in 2008 has transformed his role into that of the president's closest intelligence adviser. His dominance complicated efforts to find a new director of intelligence: Who would want the job if Brennan is already doing it? ...

More at The Washington Post.

Brother, Can You Spare a Dime?

Sat, 06/05/2010 - 6:42pm

Small Wars Journal has kicked off our

first fundraising campaign.  During June 2010, or more precisely through the 4th of July, we have a goal of raising $50,000 for Small Wars Foundation,

the 501(c)(3) that operates Small Wars Journal. While we dearly appreciate the donations so far - our community of interest and practice needs to do more here to help us keep the lights on - seriously. For many this site has been a free ride, for others a serious investment in time and money that can no longer sustain itself with pats on the back.

 

When we reflect back on where we are now, damn, we're thankful. We are

where we are now, first and foremost, because of the quality of thought and writing

by our content contributors (all volunteers), the substantive participation of commenters

on the Journal and SWJ Blog, and the richness of discussion in the Small Wars Council. 

We have benefitted immensely from the early endorsement and continued participation

of some of the greats in the field.  We have received some individual contributions

and we have efforts underway enabled by some generous grants. We are humbled by

the way the community has embraced Small Wars Journal.

Even more humbling is the amount of work we need to do to keep up with your interest

and continue to be worthy of the value you seem to place in us.  We have a

criminal backlog of good content submissions that we need to be able to work through

faster, since timeliness in so important to our dialog. We have a lot to do to update

and expand the site's other content, particularly to exploit the potential of an

upcoming platform and usability upgrade made possible by a grant. We are doing a

lot, we can do a lot more, and we need some resources help to close the gap. Call

it capacity building.

So to better serve you, the small wars community of interest, we are in the unpleasant

but necessary position of coming to you, hat in hand, in an NPR-like scenario. We

are counting on your contributions, coupled with support from grants and foundations,

collateral income (advertising and referrals), and volunteer contributions of effort

and content, to help us do more of what you seem to value and want us to do.

Please see our Support

pages for more ways you can help.  Here are the most blunt ones:

Give a one-time

donation:

Set-up a monthly

donation:

$

for

months.

Mail checks payable to:

Small Wars Foundation

4938 Hampden Ln, #560

Bethesda, MD 20814

Track the

campaign's progress here.

Have We Stormed Our Last Beach?

Sat, 06/05/2010 - 5:07pm
While these pages have seen more than a fair share of debate concerning the future of the US Army, little attention has been given concerning their "ground force" brethren in arms - the US Marine Corps.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has challenged the Marine Corps to define its future - and this is especially important as the Corps' Commandant, General James Conway, is nearing retirement.

Gates has been quoted as unsure just where Marines would be asked to storm a beach in the future - especially as "potential foes continue fielding more and more advanced weapons". He has also been critical of the Marine's Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) stating the need "to take a hard look" at the practicality of such expensive acquisition efforts.

But Gates said that America "will always have a Marine Corps," and "we will need some amount of amphibious capability."

What say you?

The Marine Corps answered yesterday by conducting the largest amphibious landing exercise 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and the Navy's 3rd Fleet have staged since before 11 September 2001.