A main selection of the Military Book Club and a selection of the History Book Club.

With his parting words "I shall return," General Douglas MacArthur sealed the fate of the last American forces on Bataan. Yet one young Army Captain named Russell Volckmann refused to surrender. He disappeared into the jungles of north Luzon where he raised a Filipino army of over 22,000 men. For the next three years he led a guerrilla war against the Japanese, killing over 50,000 enemy soldiers. At the same time he established radio contact with MacArthur's HQ in Australia and directed Allied forces to key enemy positions. When General Yamashita finally surrendered, he made his initial overtures not to MacArthur, but to Volckmann.

This book establishes how Volckmann's leadership was critical to the outcome of the war in the Philippines. His ability to synthesize the realities and potential of guerrilla warfare led to a campaign that rendered Yamashita's forces incapable of repelling the Allied invasion. Had it not been for Volckmann, the Americans would have gone in "blind" during their counter-invasion, reducing their efforts to a trial-and-error campaign that would undoubtedly have cost more lives, materiel, and potentially stalled the pace of the entire Pacific War.

Second, this book establishes Volckmann as the progenitor of modern counterinsurgency doctrine and the true "Father" of Army Special Forces- a title that history has erroneously awarded to Colonel Aaron Bank of the ETO. In 1950, Volckmann wrote two Army field manuals: Operations Against Guerrilla Forces and Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare, though today few realize he was their author. Together, they became the Army's first handbooks outlining the precepts for both special warfare and counter-guerrilla operations. Taking his argument directly to the Army Chief of Staff, Volckmann outlined the concept for Army Special Forces. At a time when U.S. military doctrine was conventional in outlook, he marketed the ideas of guerrilla warfare as a critical force multiplier for any future conflict, ultimately securing the establishment of the Army's first special operations unit-the 10th Special Forces Group.

Volckmann himself remains a shadowy figure in modern military history, his name absent from every major biography on MacArthur, and in much of the Special Forces literature. Yet as modest, even secretive, as Volckmann was during his career, it is difficult to imagine a man whose heroic initiative had more impact on World War II. This long overdue book not only chronicles the dramatic military exploits of Russell Volckmann, but analyzes how his leadership paved the way for modern special warfare doctrine.

... The critics of counterinsurgency have gotten better. Sure, there are still some yahoos out there whose criticisms can be safely dismissed. But I have always said that I thought people like Gian Gentile made counterinsurgency theory better, and this is also true for other critics -- not all of whom want to throw the baby out with the bath water and just want to make counterinsurgency more effective...

For counterinsurgency to remain relevant as an art, its practitioners and theorists must be its harshest critics. In effect, we need to join the Gian Gentiles of the world. (Or at least the Eli Bermans.) I have no doubt, for example, that a lot of what is in the literature on counterinsurgency is simply wrong. What assumptions, when tested by Iraq and Afghanistan, have proven in need of amendment? How do we need to examine wars against insurgents differently? Have we gone too "soft" in Afghanistan? Have we spent too much time fretting over tactics and operations and not enough time thinking hard about the politics? ...

Much more at Abu Muqawama.

Key points from the conference:

1. Major Indian military challenges/strategies

a. "Cold start" (near-zero mobilization time) punitive limited ground offensive into Pakistan. Why a "cold start"? Fear of Pakistan nuclear missile attack into Indian mobilization bases.

b. Defense of India's extreme northeast against a surprise Chinese ground attack from Tibet (much of the India-China border remains in dispute). Challenges: lack of strategic warning, logistics support/reinforcement through the narrow "chicken neck" near Nepal.

c. Naval campaign in Bay of Bengal against Chinese naval forces, which might in the future have access to naval bases in Burma, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka.

d. Domestic Maoist insurgency which Indian police may not be able to contain.

e. Strategic nuclear balance between Pakistan and India could become unstable due to increased warhead count on both sides, increased missile quantity and accuracy, better ISR, and arrival of missile defenses.

2. Problems with Indian military modernization

a. Indian officer corps is highly professional, but

b. India's top civilian leadership has given minimal strategic guidance/grand strategy to the general staff.

c. India's parliament doesn't know and doesn't care about strategic or military issues.

d. India's civilian defense bureaucracy is no better.

e. Military acquisition programs lack any strategic coordination and are not tied to any doctrine or planning. Corruption in acquisition system is a major problem.

f. Indian military staff thinking seems stuck in the 1985 AirLand Battle concept, with little consideration given to indirect strategies, irregular warfare, hybrid techniques, cyber/electronic attack, etc.

3. Bottom line: Indian military modernization is a big story in Asia. India is far behind China both in capacity and its modernization effort. India needs deep political and bureaucratic reform before it will be able to adequately address the challenges and implement the strategies described in point #1.

President Obama fired Adm. Dennis Blair as director of national intelligence last month because of frustration with the lack of coordination among spy agencies and a fear that the former Navy four-star was too prone to give personal opinions rather than hard information. Blair also lost points with the president and his advisers when he let his critique of the CIA become too apparent during high-level meetings. Like many military officers, Blair believed that the agency lacked the training and background for some of its missions and that its officers had a covert "can-do" philosophy that often led them to act before thinking.

The decision to sack Blair, which had been brewing for months, opens the way for the Obama administration to reshape the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, an ill-defined position that hasn't worked well in the five years since it was created. White House officials say Obama wants a manager and coordinator as his DNI, rather than an intelligence czar who will try to steer the 16 individual intelligence agencies that report to him. White House officials use words such as "orchestration," "collaboration," "integration" and "synchronization" when they talk about what Obama is seeking...

More at The Washington Post.

James Clapper: Another Military Man for a Civilian Post - Bruce Ackerman, Washington Post opinion.

President Obama's nomination of retired Air Force Lt. Gen. James Clapper as director of national intelligence continues a tendency of appointing military men to positions that generally should be reserved for civilians. Obama is already relying on retired Marine Gen. James L. Jones - who served as commandant of the Corps - as his national security adviser. If Clapper is confirmed, Obama will get his daily intelligence briefing from a retired military man, then turn to another former officer to hear about his national security options.

Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush displayed sounder judgment. Both relied on civilian national security advisers throughout their terms. When Congress created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence five years ago as part of post-Sept.11 intelligence reforms, Bush chose John Negroponte for the job. But this distinguished diplomat was succeeded by two retired admirals. By appointing yet another retired military officer - currently the undersecretary of defense for intelligence - Obama is placing a decisively military mark on the new office...

More at The Washington Post.

The prospect of a robust military push in Kandahar Province, which had been widely expected to begin this month, has evolved into a strategy that puts civilian reconstruction efforts first and relegates military action to a supportive role. The strategy, Afghan, American and NATO civilian and military officials said in interviews, was adopted because of opposition to military action from an unsympathetic local population and Afghan officials here and in Kabul.

There are also concerns that a frontal military approach has not worked as well as hoped in a much smaller area in Marja, in neighboring Helmand Province. The goal that American planners originally outlined - often in briefings in which reporters agreed not to quote officials by name - emphasized the importance of a military offensive devised to bring all of the populous and Taliban-dominated south under effective control by the end of this summer. That would leave another year to consolidate gains before President Obama's July 2011 deadline to begin withdrawing combat troops...

More at The New York Times.

Via e-mail from Sterling Yee of Human Rights Watch:

The Human Rights Watch Film Festival returns to New York, 10-24 June. This year we are proud to present two astounding documentaries that focus on the obstacles the Afghan citizens and US military face during times of war and rebuilding.

Camp Victory, Afghanistan - Drawing from nearly 300 hours of vérité footage shot between 2005 and 2008, Camp Victory, Afghanistan skillfully explores the reality of building a functioning Afghan military. We are delighted that filmmaker Carol Dysinger will be present for a discussion after the screenings. Find out more.

Restrepo - Winner of the Sundance Grand Jury Prize for Documentary, Restrepo chronicles the deployment of a platoon in Afghanistan's Korengal Valley, one of the most dangerous postings in the US military. This is war, full stop. The conclusions are up to you. We are delighted that filmmaker Tim Hetherington will be present for a discussion after the screenings. Find out more.

"We think your colleagues and readers would be interested in these films because they touch upon issues facing not only Afghan society, but also the international community. With so much global attention on US involvement in Afghanistan -- we hope that the films will teach and inspire New Yorkers to learn more about Afghanistan and become more active in their communities."

On the one hand, we are encouraged:  we put our hand out and asked for your

financial support in one little blog entry, and it has come.  Thanks very much

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On the other hand, we're reminded how fickle this fundraising business is. Although

it is a nice round number, we didn't pick $50,000 because of its roundness. We have

a gap to fill, and we're not on the glide path that will fill it by our goal of

the 4th of July. I guess that incessant nagging from your favorite public station

is not because they are all incessant nags by choice or nature, but rather because

they have to be. Apparently, so do we.

Our current budget is going to get us through our long-awaited upgrade, put some

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populate, expand, and manage the rich content that will be supported by the new

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We will grow bigger with a more mature approach to fundraising, as well. 

We are working to approach more sponsors, advertisers, etc.  As mentioned in

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page, your qualified leads in that area would be huge, although we don't need any

more windmills to tilt at if the leads aren't promising.  We're also working

on some ways to appreciate and recognize our supporters, but at this point, each

coffee cup we don't have and therefore don't mail out for your gift of $30 or more

is another article we can review and post.  We'll get get better at expressing

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to those handy contribution methods below. If we had operators, they'd be waiting

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The United States faces a myriad of challenges in the 21st century including fighting and paying for two wars, building America's economic strength, rising powers that contest established orders, international and domestic terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change and resource scarcity. The Obama administration's National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review lay out an ambitious agenda to protect and promote American interests in this rapidly changing environment. Yet, questions loom as to how the administration will implement its priorities, especially in a constrained budget environment and a period of deep economic uncertainty. Given the heightened need to prioritize spending, has the administration laid out a sustainable vision?

The Center for a New American Security will address these issues and more in nine reports released today ahead of its fourth annual conference, Shaping the Agenda: American Security in the 21st Century, which will take place this Thursday, June 10. All publications are available for download now at www.cnas.org and will be available in hard copy at Thursday's conference.

Contracting in Conflicts: The Path to Reform

By Richard Fontaine and John Nagl with a foreword by Allison Stanger

In both Iraq and Afghanistan today there are more private contractors than U.S. troops on the ground. This exploding reliance on contractors costs U.S. taxpayers tens of billions of dollars and has grown with inadequate government oversight. According to this report by Richard Fontaine and John Nagl, the need for comprehensive reform is urgent. The United States must embark on a path of ambitious reform that will require: new laws and regulations; an expansion of the government's contracting workforce; a coordination mechanism within the executive branch; greater scrutiny, more transparency and clearer standards for private contractors; a strategic view of the roles contractors play in American operations; and a change in culture within the government.

Restraint: Recalibrating American Strategy

By Patrick Cronin

Faced with a shifting and complex global environment, America is likely to encounter heavier security burdens in the years ahead. These burdens, coupled with an ongoing financial crisis and runaway deficits, will force the United States to make tough choices about strategic priorities. Report author and CNAS Senior Advisor Patrick Cronin calls for a recalibration of American strategy, noting, "The United States can best pursue a protracted period of global order by resisting the temptation to solve all the world's problems. The United States must pursue a strategy characterized by, in a word, restraint, as the only viable means of sustaining U.S. power." Cronin lays out recommendations for achieving a pragmatic combination of engagement and restraint.

Rhetoric and Reality: Countering Terrorism in the Age of Obama

By Marc Lynch

President Barack Obama shifted away from the rhetorical framework of former President George W. Bush's "Global War on Terror" because he believed this would allow America to more effectively combat the challenge posed by violent extremists such as al Qaeda. Despite this change in rhetoric, and dramatic changes from the early years after 9/11, the Obama administration's approach demonstrates striking continuity with the policies and philosophies adopted by the Bush administration in its final two years. This report's author, Marc Lynch, examines the administration's efforts to change America's rhetoric and adapt to new threats. Lynch calls on the Obama administration to more clearly articulate its counterterrorism strategy, adapt to new domestic threats, coordinate efforts to engage publics and counter extremist narratives and prepare for a successful attack well in advance. He also warns of the inherent tensions that arise from the administration's rhetorical commitment to the rule of law as essential to a durable, legitimate campaign against violent extremists, even as it escalates its covert drone operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan and counterterrorism partnerships in ungoverned territories.

Crafting a Strategic Vision: A New Era of U.S.-Indonesia Relations

By Abraham Denmark with Rizal Sukma and Christine Parthemore

In the 12 years since its transition to democracy, Indonesia has emerged not only as a powerful political and economic actor in Southeast Asia, but as an important player on the global stage. A new strategic partnership between the United States and the world's third largest democracy is essential to both nations. As the United States and Indonesia negotiate the bilateral Comprehensive Partnership Agreement, report author Abraham Denmark recommends strengthening economic and security cooperation between the two countries while helping them build capacity to contribute to regional and global challenges like climate change, economic integration and increased security cooperation. Also included in this report are chapters by leading Indonesian strategist Rizal Sukma, who lays out a vision of the U.S.-Indonesia relationship, and CNAS Fellow Christine Parthemore, who explores the natural security issues Indonesia faces and proposes areas of cooperation to address mutual interests and concerns.

Sustaining Security: How Natural Resources Influence National Security

By Christine Parthemore with Will Rogers

In the 21st century, the security of nations will depend increasingly on the security of natural resources, or "natural security." Countries around the world rely on the availability of potable water, arable land, fish stocks, biodiversity, energy, minerals and other renewable and nonrenewable resources to meet the rising needs and expectations of a growing world population. Yet the availability of these resources is by no means assured. Authors of this report - Christine Parthemore and Will Rogers -point to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Mexico and Yemen as examples of how natural security challenges are directly linked to internal stability, regional dynamics and U.S. security and foreign policy interests.

To Serve the Nation: U.S. Special Operations Forces in an Era of Persistent Conflict

By Michele L. Malvesti

U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are currently experiencing their most extensive use and greatest transformation. In playing direct and leading roles in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in the broader U.S. effort to defeat al Qaeda and violent extremism across the globe, these forces have become more operationally adept, endowed with more resources and organizational capacity. They are encountering greater demands for their leadership and expertise than ever before. Yet despite these developments, SOF are not optimized for success. This report's author, former National Security Council Senior Director for Combating Terrorism Michele Malvesti, examines three specific challenges facing U.S. Special Operations Forces today, and presents recommendations on how best to utilize this invaluable corps of elite soldiers.

America's Extended Hand: Assessing the Obama Administration's Global Engagement Strategy

By Kristin Lord and Marc Lynch

This report analyzes the Obama administration's public engagement strategy in three key foreign policy areas -- relations between the United States and the Muslim world, combating violent extremism, and promoting democracy and human rights -- and four countries of strategic importance: Iran, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan. In addition, the report examines how the administration has employed public engagement to advance its broader national security agenda and assesses reforms to date in the National Security Council, Defense Department, State Department, and Broadcasting Board of Governors. Authors Kristin Lord and Marc Lynch identify strengths and weaknesses of the administration's efforts, and glean early lessons learned to ensure the administration's foreign policy goals are met.

Leverage: Designing a Political Campaign for Afghanistan

by Andrew Exum

"Politics is the blind spot in America's counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan" argues Andrew Exum in this report. Exum opines that good counterinsurgency tactics cannot in and of themselves win a campaign and that the United States has not identified the extent to which U.S. and allied interests may not align with those of our Afghan partners. "To a large extent, U.S. and allied success in Afghanistan depends on what the Afghan government does and fails to do." If this is the case, success there will rest on our ability to influence the strategic choices of actors in the Afghan government.

Broadening Horizons: Climate Change and the U.S. Armed Forces

By Christine Parthemore, Commander Herb Carmen, USN, and Will Rogers

The effects of climate change and the way we use energy are significant U.S. national security challenges. Addressing them will be increasingly important for our nation's defense. This report examines the dual pressures of climate change and energy on each U.S. military service and regional combatant command. The report's authors -- Christine Parthemore; Commander Herb Carmen, USN; and Will Rogers -- map a road ahead to improve the country's ability to promote national security in the face of a changing climate.

In addition to these reports, stay tuned for CNAS Senior Fellow Robert Kaplan's book Monsoon, CNAS Non-Resident Fellow David Kilcullen's book Counterinsurgency, CNAS Writers in Residence Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker's book Counterstrike and CNAS Senior Fellow Tom Ricks's book on the history of U.S. generals and their leadership.

How one brigade turned Ramadi, Iraq's most violent city, into a model of stability. The riveting book by USA TODAY's Jim Michaels is scheduled for release June 22, 2010. A Chance in Hell: The Men Who Triumphed Over Iraq's Deadliest City and Turned the Tide of War is available for pre-order on Amazon.com.

Colonel Sean MacFarland's brigade arrived in Iraq's deadliest city with simple instructions: pacify Ramadi without destroying it. The odds were against him from the start. In fact, few thought he would succeed.

Ramadi had been going steadily downhill. By 2006, insurgents roamed freely in many parts of the city in open defiance of Iraq's U.S.-backed government. Al-Qaeda had boldly declared Ramadi its capital. Even the U.S. military acknowledged the province would be the last to be pacified.

A lanky officer with a boyish face, MacFarland was no Patton. But his soft voice masked an iron will and a willingness to take risks. While most of the American military was focused on taming Baghdad, MacFarland laid out a bold plan for Ramadi. His soldiers would take on the insurgents in their own backyard. He set up combat outposts in the city's most dangerous neighborhoods. Snipers roamed the dark streets, killing al-Qaeda leaders and terrorist cells. U.S. tanks rumbled down the streets, firing point blank into buildings occupied by insurgents. MacFarland's brigade engaged in some of the bloodiest street fighting of the war. Casualties on both sides mounted. Al-Qaeda wasn't going to give up easily. Ramadi was too important. MacFarland wasn't going to back down either. The two sides had fought to a stalemate.

At least until Sheik Abdul Sattar Bezia al-Rishawi emerged. A minor tribal leader, Sheik Sattar had earned his reputation as a smuggler. He carried a large six-shooter on his hip and had a taste for whiskey. But he hated al-Qaeda and was watching MacFarland's brigade as they battled militants toe-to-toe. This was a different group of Americans, Sattar thought. Sattar approached MacFarland and said he was ready to join with the Americans and fight al-Qaeda. Other officers might have kept their distance. MacFarland didn't hesitate. He promised Sattar his support.

What followed was one of history's unlikeliest - and most successful - partnerships. Together, the Americans and Sattar's growing band of fighters drove al-Qaeda from Ramadi. A Chance in Hell is compelling tale of combat leadership and how a handful of men turned the tide of war at a time when it looked most hopeless.

Jim Michaels is a military writer for USA Today and an experienced war correspondent. He is also a former U.S. Marine infantry officer. Again, A Chance in Hell: The Men Who Triumphed Over Iraq's Deadliest City and Turned the Tide of War is available for pre-order on Amazon.com.