... The critics of counterinsurgency have gotten better. Sure, there are still some yahoos out there whose criticisms can be safely dismissed. But I have always said that I thought people like Gian Gentile made counterinsurgency theory better, and this is also true for other critics -- not all of whom want to throw the baby out with the bath water and just want to make counterinsurgency more effective...
For counterinsurgency to remain relevant as an art, its practitioners and theorists must be its harshest critics. In effect, we need to join the Gian Gentiles of the world. (Or at least the Eli Bermans.) I have no doubt, for example, that a lot of what is in the literature on counterinsurgency is simply wrong. What assumptions, when tested by Iraq and Afghanistan, have proven in need of amendment? How do we need to examine wars against insurgents differently? Have we gone too "soft" in Afghanistan? Have we spent too much time fretting over tactics and operations and not enough time thinking hard about the politics? ...
Much more at Abu Muqawama.
Comments
Mike,
Very good points. Yes, some of these "rebels" can get out of control and lose sight of their original objectives. This is another observation that Camus discussed in "The Rebel." He points out that almost all of the revolutions of modern times (circa the regicides of the late 19th and early 20th centuries) replaced one set of oppressors with a worse set of oppressors. In fact, I believe in that book he claims that really only the American Revolution and the French Revolution were exceptions to this case, though they both occurred earlier.
There is case whereby "rebellion" can be viewed as a sociopathic psychosis.
Miguel,
First, my critique was just that- a critique. I agreed with the rest of Mike's thoughts. That essay is one that needed to be written.
Second, interesting thoughts. I'm a white, southern baptist boy, and my relatives fought for the losing team, but I was raised to treat every man equally regardless of creed, color, religion, etc. Shows you how far we've come in some ways :).
My concern with your call that a man must rebel for his freedom is that it opens up a darker side of our nature. Two examples.
1. Take a look into the roots and foundations of La Familia, one of the Drug cartels currently terrorizing California. I read through their constitution. They started as a human rights movement for Hispanic Americans.
2. Study up on one of the most sadistic leaders of this modern conflict- Abu Masab al Zarqawi (AMZ). According to some reports, in his youth, he was merely an alchoholic street thug. Because of the AQ movement, he was able to ascend to infamy and kill a lot of innocent people.
One of my favorite quotes is from MLK's letter from a Birmingham jail,
"In any nonviolent campaign there are four basic steps: collection of the facts to determine whether injustices exist; negotiation; self purification; and direct action."
Mike
Mike
When I say the Civil Rights Movement was the last real US COIN it is more rooted in that it was indeed a (largely nonviolent) insurgent movement that was effectively resolved domestically. COIN is inherently a domestic function of Civil Government.
Those new to COIN, who root their understanding in foreign interventions and our experience in Iraq have latched onto the mantra of "Development - Security- Governnace" as the road to success for "COIN". I offer merely that that is a fair assessment based upon a very narrow perspective of this type of natural popular push-back to poor governance.
As to ANON's assessment that contrarian opinion's are not allowed, I disagree. The real truth is that they either do not exist (I engage senior 0-5 through 0-8 leaders who quote Kilcullen or McChrystal like the Gospel, but who lack a single original thought of their own on the topic daily), or the action officer is just too fearful of their career to present them for fear they will upset the boss. Such officer's sell McChrystal short.
My work is hanging on the ISAF COIN blog, and has been presented and received with great interest at the US Embassy in Kabul as well. The Aussie Colonel from the ISAF J5 who co-chaired the meeting at the Embassy was floored. "Why has no one put this out before?"
I think I agree with you, and thank you for your kind words regarding Mike.
Having read the non-fiction treatise "The Rebel" by Albert Camus, I do not believe a man can be given his freedom, he has to take it. Two White armies battling it out in the 1860's whereby the victor gives the Black Man his freedom, did not in effect release Blacks from "bondage" in my opinion. I feel the militancy of the 1960's did more as this became a true battle where Blacks were leading Blacks against Whites. I do recall the times vividly, being that for the most part I grew up in a Black/Latino neighborhood in Los Angeles just a few blocks from where I was born in downtown L.A. Riots plagued all the major cities of the US back then, and Whites took fear and viewed Blacks as an enemy to be dealt with, as opposed to Blacks just being an entity that they could condescendingly patronize. A physical threat is a game-changer. This changed the game psychologically, whereby by Blacks took their freedom as opposed to being given freedom. While I am not a big fan of Camus, I think he was correct in this regard.
Miguel,
Thank you for the link. Mike is quickly moving on to my list of authors that I look forward to reading their work. Here's a couple points of critique to pass along.
One could argue that the 1960's were not all that dynamic within the context of American history. Rather, America is a nation of constant revolution (mostly non-violent), and the internal peace in the 1980's and 1990's were outliers caused by a great period of prosperity.
In the past, the government has confronted Tories, Native Americans, Abolitionists, Civil War, Anarchists, Prohibitionists, Communists, Hippies, Drug Czars, religious extremists, and corrupt money lenders. I've lost track of the amount of times South Carolina has threatened to seceed from the Union :).
One interpretation of the Constitution would argue that these trials and tribulations help us learn perseverance in order to strive towards a more perfect union.
From the government's perspective, the "non-violence and integration" crowd would be labeled subversion, and the "confrontational and separatist" crowd could be labeled insurgency once they move towards violent revolt.
Mike
Robert C. Jones commented above:
"...The US hasn't done serious COIN since the Civil Rights movement..."
As a sidebar to the main discussion, I find the above to be an interesting comment. Mike Guardia, author of "American Guerrilla," opines about the CRM as a form of insurgency in a paper he wrote in 2007. See http://74.125.155.132/scholar?q=cache:Ld_IJjZDNB4J:scholar.google.com/&…
The Anon post at 12:30 really and accurately condemns the entire COIN and Intel effort.<blockquote>"my observation of the center was that very little innovative thought is permitted below the highest levels of leadership. Most of the information produced was a restatement of known information or innocuous updates on current situations. Very little original work was done."</blockquote>That summarizes the state of the Armed Forces in general as far as I can tell and of the US Army in particular. It is simply the current state of several trends that started years ago.
Original work is not tolerated because it may crack a Rice Bowl -- or dribble unwanted liquids into the Rice. It can be tolerated provided the senior persons on site can get credit for a microscopic improvement -- and that improvement is not too innovative; that might actually overturn a Rice Bowl or two...
The word "center" is indicative of part of the problem. Attempts to over centralize <i>everything</i> in a farcical attempt to gain 'efficencies'(read: total control) and place every action under direct vision of a Flag Officer are symptoms of a control fetish gone amok.
I include 'COIN,' a theory of dubious provenenance and potential because if ever an operational effort requiring a decentralized approach existed, that is it -- yet the reins are tightly held. Poor and inadequate training contributes to that -- consider the fact such poor training is itself in part a symptom of over control. Can't have Privates and Lieutenants that know what they're doing, they are threats...
The lack of trust of subordinates is mind boggling. The risk aversion shown in order to 'protect the institution' is literally deadly. Attempts by sensible and caring people which are the bulk of the Armty to lessen these unhelpful trends are frequent -- they usually are halted by Flag Officers somewhere in the chain who fear such efforts or change. Sad.
Until the Army smartens up, ceases attempts to over control every action and person to the point of stultification it will only get worse.
The troops deserve better. The Nation deserves better. The Oath we all took <b><i>requires</i></b> better...
Pogo had it right, "We have met the enemy and he is us."
This came off of Abu M's blog on the Afg-Pk COE Conference and it is quite telling and it goes to the heart of the COIN and intel failures in Afghanistan. Now let's finally get a more thorough discussion going via SWJ on intel failures and how to overcome those intel failures and question whether COIN is really working regardless of what version? If one really reads between the lines of countless reports coming out of Afghanistan over the last week or so we are in fact losing COIN operations.
Comment by Visitor on June 9, 2010 - 9:02pm
Speaking from previous personal experience working in the Center Of Excellence, the entire center is truly well intentioned. The goal of the center is to replicate the intelligence successes which led to the shift in momentum in Iraq. That said, my observation of the center was that very little innovative thought is permitted below the highest levels of leadership. Most of the information produced was a restatement of known information or innocuous updates on current situations. Very little original work was done.
The atmosphere was (and likely still is) geared towards not rocking the boat or postulating new or controversial theories or courses of action that would identify failings of either Afghan or American operations or policies. It was an unwritten rule that analysts would not bring anything up that would make anyone look bad, especially US operations. In the rare instances where criticism was levied, it was couched in such a way that it did not highlight any particular individual(s). The general attitude was never to be wrong and to never make a mistake- it was easier to not say anything at all.
I and many other have moved on to other areas where we are able to do work as analysts, where our insight, experience and knowledge are able to make a deeper impact. In my view, this indicative of not just the COE, but the entire Afghanistan intelligence environment. In the Afghan theater, very few people are held accountable for wrong calls. The mindset seems to be focused on not failing rather than being successful, from the top levels of ISAF leadership to ground level analysts
"For counterinsurgency to remain relevant as an art" Are you serious? Insurgency is a naturally occurring condition that is as timeless as man; so COIN as well is equally timeless.
The relevance you are arguing is your version of COIN. That, I suspect, is far less timeless. The US hasn't done serious COIN since the Civil Rights movement; the fact that so many believe our efforts in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan are COIN points to the essence of our challenges in all three locations.
"For counterinsurgency to remain relevant as an art, its practitioners and theorists must be its harshest critics. In effect, we need to join the Gian Gentiles of the world."
Thanks for the memo. Perhaps we should change the name of the blog from the father of the resistance to captain obvious?
For the last three years and more before my time, the serious practisioners and theorists have attempted to test and deconstruct the theory without succombing to dogma. Welcome to the conversation.
I am glad to see that Andrew finally realized this importance. Instead of concentrating on self-proclaimed expertise in small wars and executive ramblings, I hope that he will spend the next year in study of special forces and foreign internal defense. He has much to learn.
I will forecast that as he learns more, within the next nine months, he will produce a new CNAS report proclaiming that Special Forces should take the lead in Iraq through FID with regular Army support as the best, next option.
I claim no expertise. Some things that I propose have merit. Others are disregard through debate. I am a mere student in warfare. Maybe, I'm just wise enough to realize that.
At least I waited until after I commanded to opine.
<blockquote><em>"In effect, we need to join the Gian Gentiles of the world."</em></blockquote>
<a href=http://www.google.com/#hl=en&source=hp&q="we're+all+gentiles+now"+schme… saw this day coming</a>. We're all Gentiles now. <a href="http://www.cfr.org/publication/18119/israels_tragic_gaza_dilemma.html">… the Jews</a>.