Commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan have been reluctant to launch more secret operations because of an excess of caution about violating military rules and international law, a top Army officer says. The tentative approach to "deception operations" has cost the U.S. military opportunities to weaken the enemy without firing a shot, said Army Lt. Gen. Michael Oates, commander of the Pentagon's task force to counter improvised explosive devices.

The anti-IED task force has advocated dismantling insurgent networks as an effective way to combat improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. Earlier this year, Marines in Afghanistan's Helmand province read announcements over a loudspeaker to trick insurgents into thinking their specially modified roadside bombs couldn't be found by U.S. minesweepers.

As a result, the insurgents didn't bother hiding them well and Marines were able to easily find the bombs, said Marine Maj. Don Caporale, an information operations officer. "We started finding all kinds of mines with this (modification), which, of course, was a complete hoax," Caporale said. Still, Oates said in an interview, "there's a Gordian knot of law, regulation, procedure and risk aversion. We have got to do some due diligence on this problem." ...

More at USA Today.

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I show what the U.S. and Afghan governments can learn by studying how Colombia reformed its army and greatly improved its security situation.

An excerpt:

Ten years ago, Colombia faced a security crisis in many ways worse than the one Afghanistan currently faces. But over the past decade, Colombia has sharply reduced its murder and kidnapping rates, crushed the array of insurgent groups fighting against the government, demobilized the paramilitary groups that arose during the power vacuum of the 1990s, and significantly restored the rule of law and presence of government throughout the country.

Over the past decade, with the assistance of a team of US advisers, Colombia rebuilt its army. In contrast to the current plan for Afghanistan, Colombia focused on quality, not quantity. Its army and other security forces have achieved impressive success against an insurgency in many ways similar to Afghanistan's. Meanwhile, despite the assistance of nearly 100,000 NATO soldiers and many billions of dollars spent on security assistance, the situation in Afghanistan seems to be deteriorating.

Afghan and US officials struggling to build an effective Afghan army can learn from Colombia's success. This article explores the similarities and differences between the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Colombia, examines how Colombia reformed its security forces, and discusses how to apply Colombia's success to Afghanistan.

I discuss the similarities and differences between the security challenges in Afghanistan and Colombia. I then argue that Colombia's relatively small but elite professional army, its emphasis on helicopter mobility, and its local home-guard program provide a model for reforming Afghanistan's security forces.

Click here to read the essay at ASPJ.

A few years ago, during a different surge, I visited a small Reconnaissance Squadron in the Diyala Province of Iraq. In their operations center was a sign that said, "What would you do differently today if you could not leave until the war was won?" Recently, the Secretary of the Army signed the approval for a Presidential Unit Citation for the combat action and valor of this unit. It is this mindset, this culture, that compelled them to decisive action. They were committed to not just leave their area of operations better than they found it, but to leave the area in the capable hands of a host nation force. It is this spirit, this commitment, and this urgency that will make us successful in our current endeavor. And so I ask you, "What would you do differently today if you had to stay until your responsibilities were transitioned to a capable Afghan counterpart that you trained?"

This is not to say that a professional Afghanistan National Security Force (ANSF) can be built overnight. However, dedication to the mission and a desire to achieve tangible results each day -- to produce a product, an outcome, should drive each and every one of us every day. We cannot be satisfied with merely getting "first downs" and moving the ball down the field. We are here to win! Winning in this context means getting an Afghan partner to stand on their own -- underpinned by the sustainable systems for an enduring security institution.

With that in mind, I'd like to share with you a memorandum I recently sent to all NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan / Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan staff, trainers, and instructors entitled A Call to Action: Command Philosophy.

William B. Caldwell, IV

Lieutenant General, US Army

"Shohna Ba Shohna"

10 June - Washington, DC

1) Introduction and Opening Remarks - Dr. Richard Danzig (CNAS Board of Directors) and Dr. Leo MacKay (CNAS Board of Directors).

2) Panel Number 1: Future of the Force -- Thomas Ricks (CNAS Senior Fellow / Panel Chair), Admiral Eric Olson (Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command), Dr. John Nagl (CNAS President), Dr. Peter Singer (Brookings Institution), and Jim Thomas (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments).

3) Panel Number 2: Beyond Afghanistan: America's Enduring Interests in Central and South Asia -- Lieutenant General David Barno (CNAS Senior Advisor / Panel Chair), Ambassador Ryan Crocker (Texas A&M University), Richard Fontaine (CNAS Senior Fellow), Dr. Paul Pillar (Georgetown University), and Dr. Ashley Tellis (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).

4) Keynote Address -- Honorable Michí¨le Flournoy (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense).

5) Panel Number 3: Strategy in the Age of Obama: Engagement and its Limits -- Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns (Harvard University / Panel Chair), Elliott Abrams (Council on Foreign Relations), Dr. Patrick Cronin (CNAS Senior Advisor), Dr. Kristin Lord (CNAS VP), David Sanger (New York Times), and Dr. Anne-Marie Slaughter (Director of Policy Planning, U.S. Department of State)

6) Closing Remarks -- Nathaniel Fick (CNAS CEO).

The United States has discovered nearly $1 trillion in untapped mineral deposits in Afghanistan, far beyond any previously known reserves and enough to fundamentally alter the Afghan economy and perhaps the Afghan war itself, according to senior American government officials.The previously unknown deposits - including huge veins of iron, copper, cobalt, gold and critical industrial metals like lithium - are so big and include so many minerals that are essential to modern industry that Afghanistan could eventually be transformed into one of the most important mining centers in the world, the United States officials believe.

An internal Pentagon memo, for example, states that Afghanistan could become the "Saudi Arabia of lithium," a key raw material in the manufacture of batteries for laptops and Blackberries. The vast scale of Afghanistan's mineral wealth was discovered by a small team of Pentagon officials and American geologists. The Afghan government and President Hamid Karzai were recently briefed, American officials said...

More at The New York Times.

Pakistan's military intelligence agency directly funds and trains the Afghan Taleban and is officially represented on its leadership council, according to a report by a British academic. The study, published by the London School of Economics, also alleges that Asif Ali Zardari, the Pakistani President, met Taleban leaders imprisoned in Pakistan and promised them early release and future support.

Pakistan dismissed the report by Matt Waldman, a Harvard fellow who interviewed current and former members of the Taleban, as "baseless" and "naive". A spokesman for the Pakistani Army said that the state's commitment to opposing the Taleban was demonstrated by the number of soldiers killed fighting on the Afghan border. Western officials and analysts have often accused elements within Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency of supporting the Afghan Taleban, even as its army combats the Pakistani Taleban on the northwestern frontier.

However, Mr Waldman's report goes further, arguing that support for the Afghan Taleban is "official ISI policy" and is backed at the highest levels of Pakistan's civilian administration. "Pakistan appears to be playing a double game of astonishing magnitude," the report says. "There is thus a strong case that the ISI orchestrates, sustains and shapes the overall insurgent campaign," it said. "Without a change in Pakistani behaviour it will be difficult if not impossible for international forces and the Afghan Government to make progress against the insurgency." ...

More at The Times.

The 21st Century has been dubbed an era of persistent conflict by U.S. military leaders. As a result, United States' defense forces will have to operate in environments requiring a variety of full spectrum operations|| for the near future. Stability operations are now considered as having equal importance to major combat operations and this thesis will explore an institutional approach to prepare U.S. military forces to conduct these types of operations. This thesis will analyze four themes: U.S. views on future stability and security operations, the United States' conventional force role in future stability and security operations, current efforts to institutionalize stability and security operations, and past U.S. institutional changes in response to threats in the strategic environment. Unfortunately, there is little unity of effort and ownership to institutionalize stability operations in the U.S. Army. This thesis recommends a new institution to educate and develop leaders to maximize unity of effort, flexibility and responsiveness for stability operations: the Stability and Security Center of Excellence.

A Rainbow in the Dark: The Stability and Security Center of Excellence.

The Origins of Marshal Lyautey's Pacification Doctrine in Morocco from 1912 to 1925 - Major (P) Grégoire Potiron de Boisfleury (French Army), U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2010.

The work achieved by Marshal Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey (1854-1934) in Morocco between 1912 and 1925, while he served as the résident général, occupies a special place in French military history. Lyautey's work still applies today, and is seen as a model in the difficult domain of counter-insurgency operations. Far from conquering with raw strength alone, Lyautey acted as a statesman and pacified the country while strengthening the authority of the Sultan. Based on the principles of peaceful penetration and the "oil drop" theory, his actions allowed the simultaneous development of infrastructure and economy, while facilitating the reform of Moroccan institutions, decisively contributing to the birth of modern Morocco. Simple but effective because of its flexibility Lyautey's doctrine is the joint fruit of his experience and of the progressive maturation of colonial thought, which he knew how to apply and promote better than anyone else. From the numerous documents written by Lyautey himself, his detractors, his critics and modern historians, this thesis examines the doctrine which guided Lyautey's actions in Morocco. The primary aim is to determine the value and relevance of what Lyautey accomplished in Morocco, by examining the origins of Lyautey's doctrine and design.

The Origins of Marshal Lyautey's Pacification Doctrine in Morocco from 1912 to 1925.

When terrorists in the Middle East attack innocent civilians, observers in the West often ask a pained question: Where's the outrage in the Muslim world? Why don't Islamic religious authorities speak out more forcefully against the terrorists and their wealthy financiers?

It remains a potent issue: Terrorism has damaged the Islamic world far more than the West, and too many Muslims have been cowed and silent. But a powerful and so far largely unreported denunciation of terrorism emerged last month from Saudi Arabia's top religious leadership, known as the Council of Senior Ulema.

The Saudi fatwa is a tough condemnation of terror and of the underground network that finances it. It has impressed senior U.S. military commanders and intelligence officers, who were surprised when it came out. One sent me a translation of the fatwa, and Saudi officials provided some helpful background...

More at The Washington Post.

Britain's most senior military officer is to be axed as the new government seeks to draw a line under past failures in Afghanistan. Liam Fox, the defence secretary, told The Sunday Times the chief of the defence staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, would resign in the autumn before the end of his term.

Sir Bill Jeffrey, the top civil servant at the Ministry of Defence (MoD), will go at the same time. The clean sweep at the top is intended to improve the military's performance on the Afghan front line, as well as cutting Whitehall waste. In an interview Fox indicated that Stirrup and Jeffrey, both close to the old Labour regime, would be replaced at the conclusion of a strategic defence review (SDR).

Fox said he wanted "the best people to be in the appropriate posts" once the review was over. "We have to be able to maintain full stability and the full confidence of the people who work for us, not least because we're in a very dangerous armed conflict," he said.

Stirrup has been criticised for not doing enough to support frontline troops. The decision to replace them coincides with one of the worst weeks for Nato forces since the start of the war in Afghanistan in 2001. Thirty-two Nato troops, including three Britons, have been killed since last Sunday. The latest Briton to die was a soldier in the 1st Battalion, the Mercian Regiment, who was killed in an explosion in Helmand province yesterday...

More at The Times.

Troops Could be Cut as Fox Sharpens his Axe - Michael Smith and Jonathan Oliver, The Times.

The number of Britain's soldiers, sailors and airmen could be cut as part of the government's new security review. In an interview with The Sunday Times, Liam Fox, the defence secretary, said nothing had been been ruled out — even cuts to the numbers of uniformed personnel.

"Every single bit of the operation must come under scrutiny. Every single thing must be justified," Fox said. Until now the coalition government has insisted that savings would come principally from cuts in the bloated bureaucracy and over-budget equipment programmes of the Ministry of Defence (MoD).

Fox conceded last week that there might not be as much "fat in the system" as he had previously thought. While the overall defence budget would be protected, dramatic savings would still have to be made, he said.

More at The Times.