A RAINBOW IN THE DARK: THE STABILITY AND SECURITY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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# A Rainbow in the Dark: The Stability and Security Center of Excellence

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**Abstract**

The 21st Century has been dubbed an “era of persistent conflict” by U.S. military leaders. As a result, United States’ defense forces will have to operate in environments requiring a variety of “full spectrum operations” for the near future. Stability operations are now considered as having equal importance to major combat operations and this thesis will explore an institutional approach to prepare U.S. military forces to conduct these types of operations. This thesis will analyze four themes: U.S. views on future stability and security operations, the United States’ conventional force role in future stability and security operations, current efforts to institutionalize stability and security operations, and past U.S. institutional changes in response to threats in the strategic environment. Unfortunately, there is little unity of effort and ownership to institutionalize stability operations in the U.S. Army. This thesis recommends a new institution to educate and develop leaders to maximize unity of effort, flexibility and responsiveness for stability operations: the Stability and Security Center of Excellence.

**Keywords:** Brigade Combat Teams, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Transition Teams, U.S. Army, Department of the State, Human Resource Command, Full Spectrum Operations, Operation Eagle Claw

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


The 21st Century has been dubbed an “era of persistent conflict” by U.S. military leaders. As a result, United States’ defense forces will have to operate in environments requiring a variety of “full spectrum operations” for the near future. Stability operations are now considered as having equal importance to major combat operations and this thesis will explore an institutional approach to prepare U.S. military forces to conduct these types of operations. This thesis will analyze four themes: U.S. views on future stability and security operations, the United States’ conventional force role in future stability and security operations, current efforts to institutionalize stability and security operations, and past U.S. institutional changes in response to threats in the strategic environment. Unfortunately, there is little unity of effort and ownership to institutionalize stability operations in the U.S. Army. This thesis recommends a new institution to educate and develop leaders to maximize unity of effort, flexibility and responsiveness for stability operations: the Stability and Security Center of Excellence.
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<tr>
<td>AAB</td>
<td>Advise and Assist Brigade</td>
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<td>ACC</td>
<td>Army Capstone Concept</td>
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<td>AFPAK</td>
<td>Afghanistan Pakistan Hands Program</td>
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<td>ALDS</td>
<td>Army Leadership Development Strategy</td>
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<td>BCT</td>
<td>Brigade Combat Team</td>
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<td>CALL</td>
<td>Center for Army Lessons Learned</td>
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<td>Center for a New American Study</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
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<td>E-TT</td>
<td>Embedded Transition Team</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<td>GPF</td>
<td>General-Purpose Forces</td>
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<td>HRC</td>
<td>Human Resource Command</td>
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<td>ILE</td>
<td>Intermediate Level Education</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>MiTT</td>
<td>Military Transition Team</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
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<td>S-TT</td>
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TT  Transition Team
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
ILLUSTRATIONS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Introduction to the Problem

The United States’ recent experience has shown that it can be drawn into wars
with two nations based on attacks by non-state actors. The 9/11 attacks and subsequent
U.S. reactions have demonstrated that the spectrum of conflict can change rapidly, and
enemies will adapt and be innovative no matter how primitive their appearance. In
response to this change in warfare, the U.S. Army has transformed doctrine and changed
a significant portion of its force. With a predicted “era of persistent conflict” on the
horizon, the U.S. continues to search for the types of institutions will be needed to better
prepare the leadership and its military for the challenges and complexity of the 21st
century. If the United States intends for the Army to be the dominant land force in the
world, then it will need to continue to adapt and change in order to meet the challenges of
this new era of conflict.

Many theorists and U.S. Army strategists agree that the international security
environment changed at the turn of the new century, to an “era of persistent conflict.”
The U.S. Army’s military operation Field Manual (FM) 3-0 defines a persistent conflict
as “a period of protracted confrontation among states, non-state, and individual actors
who are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological
ends” (2008, Foreword). This new operational environment involves complex problems
and rapidly changes and for the military includes missions ranging from dealing with
“enemies of the state” to providing humanitarian relief after a natural disaster. As a result,
United States’ defense forces will have to operate in environments requiring a variety of
“full spectrum operations” for the near future. Stability operations are now considered as having equal importance as major combat operations and this thesis will explore an institutional approach to prepare U.S. military forces to conduct these types of operations.

**Background of Study**

In reaction to rapid changes in the overall “spectrum of conflict” and international security environment, the U.S. Army made significant changes to its operational doctrine. This is demonstrated in the updated edition of FM 3-0, *Operations*, from a previous focus on major combat operations, to capabilities to operate within a “full-spectrum” which requires U.S. forces to be able to simultaneously conduct offensive, defensive and stability or civil support operations (FM 3-0 2008). While the U.S. Army has historically proven it is adept at offensive and defensive operations, stability operations remain a concept that has often been relegated to secondary status. Yet Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 dictates that stability operations: “Shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, material, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning” (3000.5 2005). The U.S. Army’s current approach to stability operations is to employ brigade combat teams (BCTs)\(^1\) and ad hoc groups of advisors with military and interagency personnel. Unfortunately, these types of units and

\(^1\)A Brigade Combat Team is a relatively small and independent military unit (usually around 4,000 individuals) within the U.S. Army that is able to conduct a wide range of military operations to include high-intensity combat through stability operations. These “teams” are normally utilized to conduct stability-type operations and have a combination of military capabilities to include infantry, armor, field artillery, aviation, engineer and other supporting units. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-09.6, *The Brigade Combat Team* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 2-1.
the U.S. Army itself have struggled with stability-type operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and will most likely continue to do so without significant institutional change.

Stability operations are complex, usually lasting much longer than major combat operations and require the effective integration of U.S. military and civilian capabilities. Recent efforts between the various U.S. agencies involved in stability operations thus far have been plagued by cultural differences and other bureaucratic issues. For the entire U.S. government, achieving effective stability operations capabilities remains a “work in progress.”

As the U.S. Army adapts to the complexities of the international security environment, its Chief of Staff, General George Casey admits that the U.S. faces a difficult future. He stated, “The United States will confront complex, dynamic and unanticipated challenges to our national security and to the collective security of our friends and allies” (2009, 25). The most complex challenge for the U.S. government is stability operations and Army doctrine has had to change in order to reflect the emerging importance of successful stability operations. In reaction to the increased importance of stability operations, the U.S. Army is confronted with a number of questions it must answer. For example, where does the U.S. Army train for stability operations and does it have the right personnel with which to conduct stability operations? How does the U.S. Army currently help other nations build stability capacity? Will future conflicts involve civilian populations (as well as armies or irregular combatants)? With the examples of Iraq and Afghanistan in mind, the U.S. Army must have institutions that can prepare leaders for the complex challenges of the future, which will surely include interactions with civilian populations.
Perhaps the biggest challenge is how to prepare Army leaders for this evolving operating environment. The 21st century soldier will operate within civilian populations and requires the ability be culturally astute and communicate in the local language to conduct successful stability and security operations. These types of skills will lead to better intelligence, less confusion and will help foster positive relationships with the host nation’s citizens. Currently, most U.S. Army officers in Iraq and Afghanistan have rudimentary knowledge of the language and culture of their current operational environment. Yet these leaders’ actions in these complex environments can often dictate whether the host population will support the adversary or U.S. forces and objectives within the host country.

**Primary Research and Secondary Questions**

The primary research question was “How can the U.S. military more effectively train its officers for stability and security operations?” In particular, this effort explored whether there is a need for an institution that can fuse its advisory functions, teach language skills and prepare soldiers to operate in a complex environment. The argument of this paper is that there is a need for a new stability-focused training organization, the Stability and Security Center of Excellence (SSCOE). Additionally, this thesis proposes a conceptual design for the SSCOE, centered on preparing the leaders of the 21st century to conduct stability operations in an “era of persistent conflict.”

Four secondary questions were explored—all focused on the foundational aspects of how the U.S. prepares for and conducts stability and security operations. These questions examined the following issues: (1) How have U.S. military leaders publically approached stability and security operations? (2) What is the role of the conventional
forces for future stability operations? (3) How is the U.S. currently institutionalizing stability operations? and (4) What is an example of a past institution created by the U.S. in response to an international security threat?

The study is limited in focus to the concept of an institution to more effectively train its officers for stability and security operations. In addition, while the funding for such an institution is certainly a key component, the study does not address the costs involved in order to limit the scope of the paper to a manageable size. Lastly, while enlisted soldiers and non-commissioned officers fulfill essential roles in stability operations, this study focuses on the key leaders (commissioned officers) and the preparation for their roles within these types of mission.

Significance of the Study

This study seeks to contribute to U.S. Army efforts to better train its forces and leaders for full spectrum operations. The author has served two tours in Iraq as a rifle company executive officer and rifle company commander, witnessing many struggles with advisory functions and stability operations. Additionally, the author has also served at the U.S. Army’s Human Resource Command (HRC) as an assignments officer, charged with the daily challenges of assigning U.S. Army personnel to advisory teams. Based on these experiences, the purpose for undertaking this study is an effort to provide a viable option for the Army’s leadership as it looks to better prepare future leaders for stability and security missions.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter discusses the overall basis for this research to include U.S. defense policy, doctrine, case studies, and contemporary research on stability and security operations focused on both current and future operating environments. In order to conceptually design an institution that can prepare future leaders which fuses training of advisory forces, language skills, and stability operations capabilities, an awareness of the current problem and what organizations have been created in the past to answer to an unknown threat is important. A review of the relevant literature on the current problems involved with how the U.S. Army both employs advisory forces and conducts stability operations provides the basis for this research effort.

Currently, the United States is still at war with troops deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan for almost nine years. During this time, combat operations have repeatedly transitioned from major combat operations to stability operations and the U.S. (quite capable in major combat operations) continues to struggle with stability operations. To address challenges involved in stability operations, the U.S. government has employed provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), advisory teams such as military transition teams (MiTTs), embedded training teams (ETTs), and stability transition teams (S-TTs). Information about the manning requirements and the process of how these transition teams function is necessary to understand how stability operations are conducted in current and future environments.

2The numerous stability teams that operate in Afghanistan and Iraq include Military transition teams (MiTTs), embedded training teams (ETTs) and stability transition teams (S-TTs). These teams are also referred to as transition teams (TTs) throughout the text.
teams (TTs) are manned will come from the author’s experience as an assignments officer at HRC.

Provincial reconstruction teams were designed to serve as civil-military organizations focused on rebuilding tasks which combat forces were normally not trained or manned. The purposes of the PRTs are to provide assistance with rule of law, local government functions and essential services as shown in figure 1.

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**Figure 1. Provincial Reconstruction Team Focus**

*Source: CALL, PRT Playbook (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army, September 2007), 3.*
As of December 2009, there were 26 of these teams in Afghanistan and 31 in Iraq. In Afghanistan, the U.S. leads 12 PRTs, while the other 14 are manned and controlled by other nations. In Afghanistan, a U.S.-led PRT can range from 60-100 individuals, mostly military personnel, with the commanding officer from the Army, Marines, Navy or Air Force (Malkasian and Meyerle 2009, 5). Other military personnel on the team come from a variety of active military units or from the U.S. Army Reserve. Civilian personnel are generally from the U.S. Department of State (DoS), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or other government agencies. The PRTs in Afghanistan operate under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) command while the PRTs in Iraq are led by the DoS (GAO-09-86R Provincial Reconstruction Teams 2008, 2). The U.S. government views these teams as vital for achieving its national objectives in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States and other governments will continue to use these types of organizations for stability operations, yet since the time of their inception, these teams have continued to be plagued by a number of recurring difficulties in how they are both employed and manned.

These challenges are evident in the area of security force assistance (SFA) and its relationship to conventional forces. Security force assistance is defined by FM 3-07.1 as “the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority” (2009, 1-1). Traditionally, these types of missions have been conducted by Special Forces units, but the demands placed on those organizations in counterinsurgency environments in Iraq and Afghanistan has gradually moved SFA over to the conventional forces. Security force missions can be conducted across the spectrum of conflict ranging from stable peace to general war. As operations
continue in this new era of conflict, security force assistance tasks will continue to require the participation of the conventional force.

The United States’ use of transition teams in Afghanistan and Iraq provide a recent example of security force efforts. In Iraq, the U.S. uses advisor teams to train both the Iraqi Army (military transition teams) and the Afghanistan National Army (embedded training teams). In Iraq, the U.S. military uses a brigade combat team in a security assistance role, designated as an “advise and assist brigade” (AAB). The typical SFA advisor, generally an officer or a senior non-commissioned officer (NCO), and often have previous experience as small unit leaders in combat.

Currently, HRC assignment officers assign military members to transition team positions. The assignment officer determines who serves on a team based on the officer’s previous experiences and amount of time spent in a garrison environment. Once selected, the officer will attend an advisory training course at Fort Polk (Louisiana) for approximately 90 days prior to fulfilling his role in Iraq or Afghanistan. During this three-month period, the officer will learn the role of an advisor and meet the other team members with whom he will deploy. Upon completion of the training period, the individual on the transition team will collectively deploy for a one-year deployment to their assigned country. At the conclusion of the advisory mission and one-year deployment, the individual will redeploy together back to Fort Polk. There, the officer will participate in debriefings and then prepare to move to their new individual duty assignment, usually within two to three weeks after returning from their deployment.

Because of this ad hoc approach to security force assistance, issues have arisen to include inadequate advisor training, command relationships and individual evaluations
among units in sector, and failure to capture lessons learned for future operations. As previously mentioned, training for transition teams is completed during the 3 months prior to the deployment, a significantly compressed timeline for team-building and unit training. Unfortunately, the team members must continue to learn and train during the initial months of the deployment, rather than providing advice and mentoring to the host nation\(^3\) security forces. The disadvantage of the limited training times is the lack of preparation prior for the upcoming deployment. Additionally, individual evaluation reports have also been an issue, as rating chains for transition teams are not often formally established. Normally, the unit to which the team is assigned to during the deployment is the unit responsible for writing the evaluation report. This implies that a BCT commander who is also responsible for writing the evaluation reports for his own subordinates is also responsible for rating the transition team officers and NCOs. Inherently, the BCT commander may write an evaluation report differently (often resulting in a lower rating) for the team member due to the lack of an established working relationship.

Additionally, if the transition team members trained for an extended period prior to the deployment, relationships would be established to reduce confusion and better understand both the mission and military commander’s guidance during the initial phases of the deployment. Lastly, when the transition team returns from the deployment, they are afforded little time to capture their lessons learned during their brief stay at Fort Polk. If there were opportunities for the members to spend some additional time in order to

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\(^3\)A “host nation” is an overseas state in which the U.S. government is operating and assisting.
capture lessons learned, the training and preparation of the following transition team members would be greatly enhanced.

The DoD addressed the changing international environment in its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Some of the key issues identified in the 2010 QDR include the need to increase the competency and capacity of general-purpose forces (GPF) in stability operations (QDR 2010, 24). It also proposes to strengthen and institutionalize the GPF capability for security force missions (QDR 2010, 28). By addressing these issues, the QDR has validated the importance of institutionalizing U.S. capabilities with security forces and stability operations. Additionally, the requirement for language and regional experience is also addressed in the QDR (QDR 2010, 29).

These three essential issues could be addressed through the creation of a single institution to fuse both stability expertise and training capacity, conforming to the concept of unity of effort. Joint Publication 1-02 defines unity of effort as the “coordination and cooperation toward common objectives” and notes that this “unity” does not necessarily have to involve units in the same chain of command (2009, 570).

Given the issues identified in the 2010 QDR, it appears that military leaders are advocating some sort of new institution that could train and expand capabilities for security force and stability operations; however, the design for this institution has not yet been specified. Meanwhile, even though the Army will continue to train and expand its capabilities in stability operations and security assistance, it will most likely not combine its stability training efforts with other services or interagency organizations unless directed to do so. Thus, if there were an institution that could bring together the interagency and military organizations involved in stability operations, there would be
less duplications of effort and all could potentially benefit from a single stability-focused institution.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the methodology in which the primary and secondary questions are analyzed in this thesis. The primary question posed is: How can the U.S. military more effectively train its officers for stability and security operations? This is a monumental question and the purpose herein is to research whether the current operating environment even requires such an institution, and if so, what would such an institution look like? Thus, both the primary and secondary questions must be answered and appropriate methodologies applied to each.

Jack Kem’s article entitled Military Transformation provides the model which best supports the methodologies used to answer both the primary and secondary questions. In his article, Kem states that transformations in organizations require four specific considerations: the strategic context, the ends, the ways, and the means (Kem 2006, 3). The following secondary questions are discussed using Kem’s premises:

Secondary Question #1: What has the leadership of the U.S. government and military discussed concerning the future of stability and security operations?

First (following Jack Kem’s model), the “strategic context” includes determining what the leadership of the United States and military has discussed concerning future operations. The purpose of this question is to determine the leadership’s concept of the necessary force structure to allow for effective full-spectrum operations. One way to measure the future force structure is to examine the content of the U.S. administration’s speeches and articles. The Departments of State and Defense websites are the means by which transcripts from speeches and other relevant articles can be accessed.
Secondary Question #2: Will the conventional force have a larger role in the future for stability and security operations?

The strategic context (in relation to Kem’s model) surrounds the notion of whether the current operating environment, dubbed an “era of persistent conflict” by the U.S. Army’s leadership, will occur over the next few years. If this atmosphere continues to characterize the international environment, it will require that U.S. forces can conduct stability and security operations just as capably as major combat operations. The ends will require that conventional forces conduct some of these operations traditionally belonging to the special operations communities. The Army’s “Capstone Concept” (ACC) is one way of measuring future threats, challenges, and opportunities, and then determines how best to meet them. The document *The Army Capstone Concept—Operational Adaptability: Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict* (TRADOC Pam 525-3-0) indicates how the U.S. Army foresees and plans for future conflicts. Two other documents serve as references for understanding the future role of the conventional force: *Army Leadership Strategy of the 21st Century* and *Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America’s Military Officer Corps*.

Secondary Question #3: What is currently being done to institutionalize stability and security operations?

The strategic context for this question involves determining what is being accomplished today with regard to stability and security operations. This leads to many issues, such as the appropriateness of the current ad hoc approach of utilizing PRTs and AABs for stability and security operations the correct method for achieving the nation’s future strategic goals and desired ends. The way in which to measure the success or
failure of the current practices is to review recent literature and reports on stability and security operations and highlight the strengths and weaknesses (using Kem’s model) noted in the literature. The means for researching the answers to this question will be through the review of a variety of articles and reports, which focus on stability and security operations.

**Secondary Question #4:** What U.S. institutions have been created in the past in reaction to threats or challenges in the strategic environment?

The U.S. Army’s Ranger Regiment and the Army’s Delta Force occurred in response to strategic threats posed by the international security environment, which required specialized units to conduct overt and covert military operations. The formation of these two organizations resulted from failed practices of using ad hoc conventional forces for clandestine and highly specialized operations. A historical case study, such as Operation Eagle Claw, provides a way by which to measure the success and necessity of these forces. The Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) repository contains after action reports (AARs) for the aforementioned military operations, which provide the means of capturing lessons learned for these organizations as they relate to secondary question #3.

**Summary**

Chapter 3 discussed the methodologies that will be used to answer the secondary questions in chapter 4. The methodologies address the strategic context for each question, and then to apply the ends, ways, and means in order to properly analyze and answer the secondary questions to be addressed (Escandon 2008, 31). Chapter 4 will focus on analyzing the secondary questions in order to draw a fundamental conclusion. The
conclusion will help answer the primary research question. Once the conclusion has been addressed in chapter 4, a recommendation and concept will follow in chapter 5. Table 1 provides references for the secondary questions being researched and the methodologies being applied.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Strategic Context</th>
<th>Ends</th>
<th>Ways</th>
<th>Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What has the leadership of the U.S. government and military discussed concerning the future of stability and security operations?</td>
<td>Determine what the leadership of the U.S. and military have discussed concerning future operations.</td>
<td>What is the necessary force structure to engage the future’s operational environment?</td>
<td>Examine speeches and articles pertaining to transformation.</td>
<td>DoD and DoS websites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will the conventional force have a larger role in the future for stability and security operations?</td>
<td>Will the future operating environment be an era of persistent Conflict in the foreseeable future?</td>
<td>Conventional forces may have to conduct operations that have traditionally belonged to the special operations communities.</td>
<td>The ACC is the way by which to measure the future threats, and opportunities, and then determines how best to meet them.</td>
<td>Army TRADOC Pam 525-3-0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is currently being done to institutionalize stability and security operations?</td>
<td>Current setting is that manning for forces engaged in stability operations is ad hoc.</td>
<td>Is the current employment of ad hoc forces sufficient to accomplish the desired ends?</td>
<td>Review and analyze recent and past literature on stability ops and highlight strengths and weaknesses of current practices.</td>
<td>Articles found in military journals and other relevant publications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What U.S. institutions have been created in the past in reaction to threats or challenges in the strategic environment?

Formation of the Ranger Regiment and the Army’s Delta Force came about in response to the strategic threats in the international security environment.

Formation of these organizations followed the failed practice of using ad hoc conventional forces in covert and highly specialized operations.

Historical case studies such as Operation Eagle Claw, measure the necessity and success of these forces.

CALL AARs provide lessons learned for each historical case study.

Source: Created by author, based on Jack Kem’s methodology.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

This chapter analyzes U.S. defense policy, doctrine, case studies, and contemporary research on stability and security operations focused on both current and future operating environments. Specifically, I address five topic areas to identify, capture, and understand the current trends and gaps within stability and security operations and to answer the primary and secondary research questions. The chapter begins with a discussion centered on the thoughts and remarks of the U.S. Secretary of Defense (Robert M. Gates) and the U.S. Army Chief of Staff (General George W. Casey) as their policies will have a lasting impact on the future employment of U.S. defense. Secretary Gates’ public speeches and General Casey’s article, “The Army of the 21st Century” (2009) help understand their predictions for stability operations within the future operating environment and how they envision the United States’ role.

The next section examines the impact of future stability operations on the U.S. Army leadership, specifically the officer corps. Three key documents were recently published emphasizing how the leadership of the U.S. Army will have to adapt to meet the challenges of the changing international operating environment. The first, entitled “The Army Capstone Concept–Operational Adaptability: Operating under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict 2016-2028” (ACC), describes the complex future operating environment and identifies required changes for U.S. Army leaders. The second document, The 21st Century Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) examines proposals that call for a change in the way the U.S. Army develops its leaders. The final article, Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America’s Military...
Officer Corps, published in February 2010, addresses the shortfalls of the current officer corps, recommended fixes, and a transition to focused preparations for increased stability and security missions rather than major combat operations.

The third section examines the current doctrine and types of specialized teams being employed for stability and security operations to include current U.S. Army doctrine described in FM 3-07, Stability Operations. Additionally, this section describes and scrutinizes the current types of specialized organizations and teams used for stability operations to include PRTs, Transition Teams, and the Afghanistan Pakistan Hands Program (AFPAK). This helps to identify common trends and issues preventing these teams from achieving optimal results in their conduct of stability and security operations, whose success or failure often have strategic-level implications.

The chapter concludes with an examination of Operation Eagle Claw and its aftermath as well as a comparison of the challenges encountered by U.S. military Special Forces with current trends and issues now faced by specialized teams in their conduct of stability and security operations. The case study of Operation Eagle Claw helps demonstrate how the U.S. and its military responded to an emerging terrorist threat during the 1970’s, one for which it was not prepared, similar to United States’ current institutional and practical challenges in the employment of conventional forces conducting stability and security operations.

U.S. Views on Future Stability and Security Operations

In May 2003, U.S. President George Bush stood aboard the carrier U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln and declared that major combat operations had ended in Iraq and that coalition forces would soon begin security and reconstruction efforts. He also declared
that new tactics and precise weapons could achieve military objectives while protecting the civilian population (Bush 2003). Unfortunately for the American public (and President Bush), a regional insurgency would soon create chaos, stalling U.S. reconstruction plans and efforts to establish democracy in Iraq. It would not be until 2007 that the United States would acknowledge the presence and effectiveness of this detrimental insurgency. This resulted in President Bush’s new strategy “The New Way Forward” which extended the tours of soldiers in Iraq and deployed an additional 20,000 soldiers to the region (Bush 2007). Bush acknowledged that America had entered into a new type of warfare where the “spectrum of conflict” could range from major combat operations to stability operations in a relatively short period and other requirements that the U.S. was ill prepared for.

Figure 2 shows the U.S. doctrinal view of the “spectrum of conflict” and the relationship between the different types of military operations it conducts. According to this model, after major combat operations approach conclusion, effective reconstruction efforts can begin only after an environment relatively free from an insurgency is established. Many scholars have concluded that a new type of warfare has emerged from the conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, Thomas X. Hammes described the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq as an evolution of warfare which he describes as a “fourth-generation war” which includes insurgent forces, long term strategies, and the use of all means available (political, economic, social, and military) to defeat an aggressor (Hammes 2004, 6). Additionally, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff stated that in the early stages of the 21st Century, the future is defined by an “era of persistent conflict”, in which U.S. forces will have to contend with a multitude of threats, which
will include major combat operations, insurgencies, stability, and humanitarian operations (Casey 2009, 25). Due to the current evolution of contemporary warfare, which will require a much larger role for stability and security operations, U.S. national and military leaders have responded with a variety of statements and subsequent policies.

![Spectrum of Conflict and Operational Themes](image)

Figure 2. The Spectrum of Conflict and Operational Themes

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates has had to contend with two wars (one in Afghanistan and one in Iraq), two presidencies and a military in transformation. As the principal advisor to the President of the U.S. for military matters, Secretary Gates’ views on the contemporary and future operating environment shapes how the U.S. military prepares for future operations and his 2010 speeches serve as a comprehensible gauge for this vision. At the Pakistan National Defense University, Secretary Gates stated,
I have characterized the central challenge for our Defense Department as one of finding the right *balance*—between training for conventional wars, and training for counterinsurgency and stability operations; between funding weapons programs that take decades to develop, and getting our troops the equipment they need for today’s wars. (Gates 2010d)

Budgeting priorities and policies are also vital to Secretary Gates’ vision for the future and in February 2010, he addressed key military issues and required improvements for the future. In discussing the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the defense budget request for 2011, Secretary Gates stressed that one of his objectives was to “Rebalance our programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our ability to fight the wars we are in today, while at the same time providing a hedge against current and future risks and contingencies” (Gates 2010b). This indicates that the U.S. military is not adequately training for current and future operations. Regrettably, at least in this case, Secretary Gates is not clear on the type of programs he has in mind and how he plans to ensure current programs will be successful in preparing for the future operating environment. Additionally, in his Quadrennial Defense Review announcement (February 2010), Secretary Gates stated that one of the major U.S. objectives was to prevent and deter conflict:

> And in a world where arguably the most likely and lethal threats will emanate from failed or fractured states, building the security capacity of partners has emerged as a key capability for this department – one that reduces the need for direct U.S. military intervention, with all of its attendant political, financial, and human costs. (Gates 2010f)

In order to achieve the objectives mentioned by the Secretary of Defense, one of the key requirements will be for the U.S. to have the ability to build the security capacity required by a host nation. This task will most likely be given to the land forces of the U.S. military—Army or Marine Corps. Unfortunately, both of these organizations have
limited institutional capacities by which to train other nations in order to enhance security structures. Yet, these types of tasks will undoubtedly fall upon the combat units of these two organizations with the officers using their individual real world experiences and ad hoc training as their only foundation for security training missions. Although they will be required by the U.S. leadership to conduct these types of tasks, military officers will continue to encounter training difficulties due to the lack of a comprehensive U.S. institution focused on the key requirements for stability and security operations such as cultural, language, and operational art.

Another key U.S. military leader, Army Chief of Staff General George Casey published an article entitled “The Army of the 21st Century” in which he identifies the impending stability challenges the U.S. will face in the contemporary environment (Casey 2009, 26). General Casey called for a number changes required for the U.S. Army, to include his support of Secretary Gates’ concept of “balance.” General Casey noted that the U.S. must apply this concept to all of its operations to include training management of forces in both conventional and unconventional environments, unit deployment predictability, and the amount of time that unit will rest and train prior to its next deployment. This viewpoint supports the Army’s overall doctrinal focus on full spectrum operations. General Casey’s article intends to provide a roadmap for the U.S. Army through an unpredictable future and states that U.S. land forces (as part of both joint and interagency efforts) should be prepared to:
1. Prevail—prevail in protracted counterinsurgency campaigns.
2. Engage—engage to help other nations build capacity to assure friends and allies.
3. Support—support civil authorities at home and abroad.
4. Deter and Defeat—deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile state actors. (Casey 2009, 30)

For stability and security operations, the objectives of these four domains can be interpreted as follows:

1. Prevail—The U.S. must understand that a victory against an insurgency will most likely not happen rapidly and therefore must tailor its forces to be able to counter the threats that an insurgency brings.

2. Engage—The U.S. must provide the resources and capacity to help other nations train their security forces and provide the support necessary to prevent an impending conflict within that nation.

3. Support—The likelihood of multiple government agencies operating in conflict areas is far greater now (and in the future) than it has been in the past. The U.S. Army will have to relook at how it operates with civilian counterparts, as the spectrum of combat requires both military and civilian forces to work in cohesion for operations to achieve “unity of effort.”

4. Deter and Defeat—While the likelihood of hybrid threats will be greater than past conventional threats, the U.S. must be capable of fighting against one or the other, or both simultaneously.

Consequently, to perform any of General Casey’s four roles, the U.S. Army will have to train for operations within a full spectrum environment. The initial operations in

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4A “hybrid” threat is a “diverse, dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal capabilities” (Casey 2008, 24).
Iraq (2003) and Afghanistan (2001) demonstrated that U.S. forces are capable of successful *offensive* military operations, but much less proficient in stability operations. Stability operations contribute to all four roles mentioned above, are long-term and often lacking immediate visible results. If the U.S. chooses to perform these roles, the Department of Defense’s training institutions must be changed in order better train and equip its forces to match the prolonged requirements of stability and security operations.

The remarks by the Secretary Gates and the article published by General Casey illustrate common areas of concern identified by U.S. military leaders, which include flexibility, adaptability, greater institutional knowledge and the need for language and cultural skills. Flexibility pertains specifically to the officer career model, which does not encourage officers to seek non-traditional (i.e. stability-focused) as a prerequisite for promotion and selection for command-position assignments. For the U.S. military to achieve adaptability in stability operations, its members must be trained to deal with and solve complex problems through an institution-oriented approach that includes instruction in difficult problems such those encountered in stability and security operations. Increasing institutional capabilities will be a challenge as the U.S. Army officer corps (which often bears the brunt of stability operations) remains fully engaged with current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

One of the solutions the U.S. Army presents in order to address the need for language and cultural skills is the use of distance education and self-study. Unfortunately, language and cultural skills education normally requires off-duty or distance education. This results in a doubling of the burden on these individuals, who are still expected to do their “normal jobs” while completing additional training requirements. The U.S. Army
will have to make fundamental changes at the institutional level to educate its officers in language and cultural skills and other skills required to be successful in stability operations. In summary, the four domains identified by General Casey involve complex issues, however a viable solution, as described in Chapter 5, may be to deal with these challenges within the context of a single U.S. government institution dedicated to stability and security operations.

The Conventional Force Role in Future Stability and Security Operations

In reaction to the threats caused by international instability, the U.S. Army published its new vision for understanding the emerging operational environment in a manual entitled The Army Capstone Concept (ACC)–Operational Adaptability: Operating under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict 2016-2028 (December 2009). This document provides a projection of what the near-term operational environment will look like and how the U.S. Army intends to engage the complex problems it envisions.

The Army Capstone Concept examines recent conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Second Lebanon War (2006) to determine common trends that apply to future U.S. military operations. One trend that was identified as critical to operational success was information superiority. Information superiority is defined as, “the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same” (JP 3-13 2006, I-5). While the concept of “information superiority” was previously achieved by dominating technology and networks, the ACC argues that it is now achieved by understanding the language and
culture and by establishing a working relationship with the local population. A major theme of the ACC is the concept of operational adaptability, defined as “the ability to shape conditions and respond effectively to changing threats and situations with appropriate, flexible, and timely actions” (TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 2009, 51). This concept requires that U.S. Army leaders be trained in solving ambiguous problems, decentralization, rapid decision-making skills, and to be able to assess the situation and understand the overall effects of U.S. military or government actions at all levels. To support the concept of operational adaptability, there are six supporting ideas that are applied where operational adaptability can be used for future operations (TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 2009, 17). These include: “develop the situation through action, conduct combined arms operations, employ a combination of defeat and stability mechanisms, integrate joint capabilities, cooperate with partners, and exert a psychological and technical influence” (TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 2009, 17-23). Two of the concepts mentioned (“employ a combination of defeat and stability mechanisms” and “integrate joint capabilities”) are especially important with regards to stability and security operations for the future as stated by the ACC. Specifically, Experience in Afghanistan–like those in Iraq–highlighted the need for the Army, in cooperation with the joint force and other departments within the U.S. government, to develop capabilities in the areas of security force assistance, establishing governance, and rule of law, developing police forces, improving basic services, building institutional capacity, and setting conditions for economic growth and development. (TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 2009, 13)

The concept of “employ a combination of defeat and stability mechanisms” pertains directly to the U.S. Army’s ability to use its maneuver forces to both defeat an enemy through combined arms warfare and to secure the population in order to establish a stable
environment. Future U.S. military operations will require forces that are able to operate in a full spectrum environment and be able to rapidly transition between offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The U.S. Army must adapt to this future environment and develop ways to institutionalize training for stability and security operations to ensure competence at the same level as major combat missions.

In conjunction with the concept of integrating joint capabilities, the ACC acknowledges that within a changing environment populated by an adaptive adversary, it will require more than just the Army to accomplish the U.S. objectives. The other military services as well as civilian agencies must be involved. Establishing stability and security within an operational environment requires elements and expertise from a broad range of U.S. government agencies. And by increasing the number of actors (agencies) and other organizations operating within a given area, the principle of unity of effort becomes paramount in order to maximize the best possible results. The ACC states, “Achieving unity of effort will require Army leaders to have a high degree of cultural understanding and social skills to mediate and collaborate with diverse partners to help direct efforts towards mission accomplishment” (TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 2009, 21).

As a result, the challenges formulated by ACC provide a clear framework of the type of military officers the U.S. Army must be capable of producing to achieve success in stability and security operations. With its “blueprint” for the future, the ACC emphasizes the idea that change will be required within both the Army’s institutions and how it procures equipment. An enormous challenge lies ahead for these departments within the U.S. Army, as they will have to embrace the idea of operational adaptability and achieving unity of effort proposed by the ACC. To conform to the conditions and
requirements within this document, the U.S. Army will have to create and further refine its institutions through changes in doctrine, training and material procurement.

In addition to the ACC, *A Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army* (the “ALDS” mentioned above) identified three major paradigm shifts in leader development and eight leadership imperatives (ALDS 2009). In January 2010, Secretary of the Army John McHugh and General Casey endorsed the ALDS under the *Calendar Year (CY) 2010 Objectives* memorandum sent to all U.S. Army subordinate commands. The memorandum stated that, “We want to develop leaders that are competent in their core competencies yet broad enough to succeed at operations across the spectrum of conflict” (Casey and McHugh 2010). Having received Secretary McHugh’s and General Casey’s endorsement, the U.S. Army leadership has been charged with determining how it will employ this new leadership strategy.

The ALDS strategy’s three major paradigm shifts are: (1) the effect of complexity and time, (2) the effect of decentralization, and (3) the need to frame ill-structured problems (ALDS 2009, 4). The *21st Century Strategy* document states that these are responses to the changing contemporary environment and that past military officer training revolved around employing mass and solving problems with as little time as possible. During major combat operations, decisions have to be made very quickly and mass employed at the proper place to ensure that the decisive point is achieved to achieve victory. In contrast, the stability operations within the contemporary environment revolve around population centers. In these situations, the ability to mass forces and technology are not necessarily as vital as compared to cultural awareness, language skills and the
ability of individuals to be comfortable with solving complex problems (FM 3-07 2008, 3-1).

The first paradigm shift, “the effect of complexity and time,” is a response to ambiguous and complex problems with many solutions available. This is vastly different from conventional military operations of the past where the problem at hand is typically clear and there is only viable one solution. Additionally, the concept of time takes on a new meaning in the contemporary operating environment as there may not be a clear timeline of when the problem needs to be solved and when it is most advantageous to employ available means to accomplish the task. Recognizing the effect of complexity and time, the ALDS intends for the U.S. Army to relook its training curriculum and to develop leaders that are comfortable with ambiguous problems with unclear timelines (ALDS 2009, 5).

The second paradigm shift, “the effect of decentralization,” describes how military leadership in the future will have to be redistributed due to the many decisions that have to be made by various key individuals throughout an area of operations. It also states that decisions will have to be made at the lower ranks (i.e. platoon sized operations will provide intelligence through the bottom-up process rather than the traditional top-down process) in order for the higher-level decision-makers to understand the problem at hand. During decentralized operations, decisions made at the lower levels require little input from the higher leadership and leaders must trust and be comfortable with their subordinates to make the right decisions with little guidance. The ALDS states, “we must develop military and civilian leaders who can create an environment of collaboration and trust to promote adaptation and innovation” (2009, 5). In order to accomplish this goal,
the U.S. Army will have to increase its institutional capacity to develop the types of leaders (at all levels) that are able to operate in situations involving multiple organizations and are able foster both unity of effort and unity of command within those environments.

The third and final paradigm shift, “the need to frame ill-structured problems,” addresses the need to develop leaders who can navigate challenges lacking clear solutions and who can effectively collaborative with other agencies in order to solve these problems. To train officers to deal with these types of issues, the ALDS advocates the addition of “Design” concepts to planning efforts for military units. This strategy notes “Design is a methodology that provides leaders with the cognitive tools to understand a problem and appreciate its complexities before seeking to solve it” (2009, 6). This methodology is not intended to replace other decision making processes such as the “Military Decision Making Process” or the “Troop Leading Procedures,” but to complement these processes to assist leaders at all levels with their decision making process. The result is that the addition of the concept of Design provides more mechanisms for leaders to solve complex problems in hopes of reducing mistakes or misguided solutions (ALDS 2009, 6).

Along with the three major leadership paradigm shifts, the ALDS also identified eight imperatives for leaders to better prepare them for both present and future operations. Two of these, “Prepare leaders for hybrid threats and full spectrum operations through outcomes based training and education” and “Prepare our leaders by replicating the complexity of the operational environment in the classroom and at home station” (ALDS 2009, 10-11) pertain directly to stability and security operations. These are
focused on hybrid threats and full spectrum operations through outcomes-based training and education to prepare leaders by replicating the complexity of the operational environment in academic and real world training environments. Additionally these imperatives emphasize that the U.S. needs to address on how it trains and educates for full spectrum operations (ALDS, 2009, 13).

In sum, the ALDS addresses the challenges that face the U.S. Army leadership and provides solutions to enhance the quality of leadership in both the contemporary and future operating environments. Among the changes proposed by the ALDS, stability operations (within the full spectrum framework) could be among the most difficult in which to train officers. Within the U.S. government, there is no institution that specifically trains military officers for stability operations. Officers have to rely on real world experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan and other areas to guide their understanding of how to conduct stability and security operations. Although there is limited educational exposure to the doctrinal facets of these operations at the U.S. Army’s institutional level (for example, at the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College), an officer’s comprehensive understanding comes later in his career only after a deployment to a stability and security mission. Thus, it is important that a solution be found that can implement the key recommendations described in the ALDS.

In another key research effort, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) published *Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America’s Military Officer Corps* in February 2010. This study focuses on the current officer corps and identifies changes that need to be made within institutions, promotion systems, and other officer skills and knowledge in order for the current and future officer corps to adapt to the changing environment. In
February 2010, General James Mattis (Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command) delivered the keynote address during the public launching of this document to endorse its validity and importance, demonstrating that the U.S. military hierarchy is addressing the problems identified in the document.

The CNAS study identifies four distinct trends that will affect the current and future officer corps and recommends that the current range of officer skills and knowledge be adjusted in response (CNAS 2010, 5). The four trends that are articulated in the CNAS document are (1) increased incidence of “wars amongst the people”; (2) likelihood of humanitarian and peacekeeping missions in parts of the world with which the U.S. has little experience; (3) widespread access to highly destructive weapons; and (4) 24-hour global media environment (CNAS 2010, 5). This study notes that military operations in the past did not necessarily need to address these four trends; however, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven that these are valid modern developments. Unfortunately, the current officer career and training models continue to reflect an emphasis on a conventional style of warfare rather than adapting to these changes. The CNAS report states that in order to meet these emerging challenges, the officer corps must change how it manages its officer career model, education, joint/interagency experience, and its efforts to instill linguistic and cultural abilities (CNAS, 2010, 7).

In summary, the military will have to make a significant number of changes to its traditional training organizations in order to adopt the CNAS recommendations. As of now, the U.S. Army leadership’s response is that it has increased language proficiency opportunities for the Reserve Officer Training Corps and United States Military
Academy cadets who study foreign languages and cultural disciplines while in their commissioning programs. However, this effort does not address the larger problem of educating the mid-grade and senior level Army officers. Though there are a limited number of courses available on stability and security operations through distance education and as elective courses at the Command General Staff College, no comprehensive program exists within the U.S. Army at large. Additionally, based on the current officer career model, there is little time for an officer to receive quality instruction in a foreign language, despite the requirements that these same officers need foreign language skills in order to serve in numerous overseas tours. As expressed by the CNAS report, “Our training and education programs must accurately reflect the situations, environments and peoples that service members will face and interact with” (CNAS 2010, 34). This study clearly reflects that the U.S. military needs to address these training shortfalls for officers in both language instruction and overall cultural education.

Current Efforts to Institutionalize Stability and Security Operations

Since the implementation of the Defense of Defense Directive 3000.05, the U.S. Army has begun the process of treating stability operations with the same amount of emphasis as major combat operations. The U.S. Army recognizes that the complexity of stability operations require agile and adaptive leaders. In response to the changing environment, the U.S. Army updated its FM 3-0, Operations, in 2008 to reflect the requirements for leaders and types of operations, to include stability missions, now required. Stability operations are now categorized as key components of full spectrum operations. In fact, Army doctrine now states that full spectrum operations now consist of
elements of offensive, defensive, stability or civil support tasks in order to be successful (FM 3-0 2008, 3-7). Although offensive and defensive operations have been historically viewed as more important in achieving victory, stability requirements are now on par with these traditional types of military tasks.

In addition, the U.S. Army recently published FM 3-07, Stability Operations to serve as a guide for land forces who train and operate in an environment requiring the application of stability operations. This field manual focuses on planning for and understanding the framework of stability operations, and the requirements for other government and nongovernment agencies that operate in a post-hostilities environment. This document is significant as it establishes official doctrine for stability operations and provides a framework for military planning and operations, which involve these types of tasks.

In conclusion, both of these Army field manuals (FM 3-0 and FM 3-07) share the common theme that complexity and unpredictability will be the dominant factor in operating in an environment involving stability operations. Another trend revealed is the importance of the individual mindset and the ability of government (especially military) organizations to change and adapt when faced with the challenges of stability missions. Additionally, this new doctrine requires leaders to demonstrate patience (as success is often not apparent or delayed) and to collaborate with the civilian agencies. The latter can be difficult as the U.S. Army and civilian organizational cultures and mindsets are often vastly different, but finding common ground between all individuals involved is a must in order for stability operations to succeed.
Although the U.S. Army’s recent doctrinal emphasis on stability operations has increased, similar focus has not been conducted in the actual planning for and execution of these types of tasks. One example is the current “ad hoc” approach taken by the U.S. Army in providing manpower to the PRTs, Transition Teams, and the AF-PAK Hands program. While these organizations are functioning as parts of the overall U.S. stability and security efforts, the U.S. Army does not maximize the potential of these organizations due to problems with current manning structures and procedures.

Provincial reconstruction teams were formed as interim civil-military organizations designed to assist with reconstruction efforts in order to improve stability, essential services, and economic viability following major combat operations (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2007, 1). After the fall of the Taliban, the first PRT was created in the city of Gardez, Afghanistan in 2003. These units were used because it was deemed too dangerous for civilian-led agencies to follow in the wake of combat operations. The PRT was designed to fill the void until the region became safe enough for civilian agencies to provide services and assist with reconstruction.

Each of these teams are manned by individuals from both the U.S. military and various civilian government agencies. The DoS typically advertises open positions for PRT member openings through the U.S. government’s USAJOBS website while the military services fill their PRT requirements through internal methods of selection. By going to this website, current or potential federal employees can view what jobs are open and view the job description, professional requirements and the salary. If military

5The USAJOBS website, http://www.usajobs.gov/, is the official website that lists available U.S. federal government jobs.
members have not deployed overseas to a combat zone recently, they are eligible to become a member of a PRT, often regardless of their previous experiences or skills. Additionally, since these teams are assembled on an ad hoc basis, individuals receive little training together prior to their deployment, which is usually one year long.

With the PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq falling under different chains of command, there are differences in mission focus and task priorities. Currently, PRTs may not receive its mission and specific guidance until the team is fully formed, manned, and equipped, which often occurs just prior to deployment. Funding for PRTs also comes from multiple sources such as DoD, DoS, and the USAID, often creating competing interests among the various departments represented in each PRT.

The organization of the PRT (manned by both civilian and military personnel) often creates friction and due to short-notice deployments, the PRT members are usually not given adequate time to work through their “cultural differences” between personalities or professions. Often they have to work through their differences during the initial months of their PRT assignments. Upon completion of the PRT, members of the team often return to their area of expertise as a military member or civilian employee. The lessons learned during their service with the PRTs are often not captured since there is no dedicated overarching institution capable of gathering these lessons and sharing them with individuals headed to future PRT assignments and missions.

To summarize, the U.S. government continues to treat the role of PRTs as an interim solution for stability requirements rather than enduring organizations, which will continue to cause problems with cohesion and effectiveness. The PRT concept is effective in filling the “vacuum” of stability requirements, which follow major combat
operations, failed states or natural disasters. However, if provincial reconstruction team manning continues in an ad hoc manner, overall effectiveness will remain hampered. Additionally, service members who understand the PRT’s ad hoc nature and role as a temporary fix will rarely volunteer for these missions since these organizations lack cohesion, mission focus, are not supportive and have no impact on career progression.

Another organizational structure that has been established to assist with stability and security operations are the U.S. Army’s advise and assist brigades (AABs), established to complement the withdrawal of combat forces in Iraq. AABs were created, in part, as a reaction to President Obama’s declaration that the U.S. combat mission in Iraq would end in August 2010. President Obama declared to end the combat mission in Iraq by August 31, 2010, and “that up to 50,000 troops would remain after the deadline to train, equip and advise Iraqi security forces and conduct counterterrorism missions” (Bellantoni 2009). The U.S. Army used either a light infantry or mechanized brigade combat team (depending on the unit trained) as the foundation for the AAB’s force structure. These brigade combat teams are augmented by up to fifty officers specializing in stability and security assistance tasks, transforming the brigade combat team into an advise and assist brigade. The BCT would remain a training brigade through its preparation and deployment and revert to the light or heavy brigade combat team upon its completion of the AAB mission.

While these training brigades have been initially successful in Iraq, the methods used by the U.S. Army to provide personnel to augment these units continues to be done in an unorganized manner which decreases their overall potential during these advisory and assistance missions. The ad hoc manning of the AABs, normally with the addition of
16 to 48 field grade officers, reduces the training they receive, creates personal
inconveniences for the officers and their families as a result of relocation requirements,
and often results in assignments that do not fit the individual officer’s skills.

U.S. Army officers designated to augment the AABs are assigned to stability and
support transition teams (S-TT) and include field grade officers from the rank of major
through colonel selected by their career managers at the Army’s HRC. Selection criteria
for the officer to serve is based on time between deployments, cumulative deployment
time, the officer’s own assignment preference, and the individual’s own career timeline.
Previous experience with stability and security operations, language ability or past
performance may not be a factor in the selection process, as the demand for these officers
remains high. Generally, officers do not seek an assignment to an Advise and Assist
Brigade and their career manager typically notifies them that they are being considered
for the assignment based on the “needs of the Army.”

Once selected for an assignment as an S-TT member, the officer will receive
assignment instructions and will have the option to move his family anywhere in the
continental United States or move his family to the AAB’s home station. If the officer
decides to move his family to the location of the designated brigade (AAB), then upon
completion of his transition team assignment, he will remain at that location and be
assigned to the same unit or a different organization at the same duty station. Regardless
of the situation, assigned officers will likely arrive to their assignment approximately
ninety days prior to the deployment—which is minimal time in which to train and prepare
for their role as advisors within the brigade. Some officers may arrive later depending on
their situation from their previous assignment, causing difficulties for their families as
they move and then quickly deploy for a year. Once the officer finishes the S-TT assignment, he might move again (depending on his career timeline) in order to attend military education or receive an assignment outside of the AAB based on his preference or the Army’s requirements. Therefore, an officer could potentially move his family two to three times in a fifteen-month period, creating a significant amount of personal stress on the family and requiring the U.S. Army to pay for each of these moves.

Because of the strain of deployments on U.S. Army personnel and operational requirements for the advise and assist brigades, career managers at HRC may not necessarily select the right person for the transition team. As stated earlier, officers selected for this assignment are chosen based on their availability and the amount of time since their last deployment, rather than training or qualifications. Because of these constraints, the process of choosing the right officer for the right job is fundamentally flawed and could potentially prove detrimental to the effectiveness of the AAB.

Unfortunately, despite the issues mentioned above, the current practice will most likely continue due to operational requirements. Although the U.S. Army will continue to use the AAB model in Iraq and potentially in Afghanistan, the methods for personnel Manning decreases the overall potential for these unit to operate at their most effective levels in both countries.

One final organization used by the U.S. government to conduct stability and security operations is the Afghanistan Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands Program. In late 2009, Admiral Mike Mullen created this initiative, which is designed around a cadre of officers to serve as regional experts in the Afghanistan and Pakistan region. These cadre of officers would come from services within the DoD and would be selected by either a
volunteer or nominative process and once selected, would be expected to serve a three to five year assignment in the AFPAK Hands Program. Part of this program includes four months of language training in Dari, Pashto or Urdu at the DoD’s Defense Language Institute prior to deployment (Kruzel 2009). Deployments are expected to last six to twelve months and each AFPAK Hands officer would have a counterpart with whom they would switch at the end of each deployment.

This fledging program has been given the highest priority for assignments, according to a memorandum sent by Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the military chiefs. Mullen stated, “AFPAK Hands is the military’s number one manpower priority and requires your continued attention” (2009). Admiral Mullen also addresses potential detrimental effects on officer careers by directing that “Every effort must be made to protect the careers of . . . participants and ensure their progression” (Mullen 2009). Admiral Mullen’s personal attention to the AFPAK Hands program provides evidence that the military continues to struggle with staffing this program with the proper individuals. Through these actions, it seems apparent that the U.S. military has yet to fully institutionalize and accept stability operations as a core mission comparable to major combat operations. Until the emphasis on staffing forces for stability operations matches the emphasis placed on current doctrine, it will be difficult to ensure that the right officers are being chosen for these important assignments.

**Past Institutional Changes in Response to Threats in the Strategic Environment**

In the 1970s, terrorist groups such as the Red Army Faction, Weather Underground Organization, and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, were deemed significant
threats to the overall strategic international environment. This situation caused the U.S. and other nations to create specialized ad hoc military or police forces to respond to this emerging threat of terrorism. Operation Eagle Claw was one example of a U.S. response. This operation required the use of special military organizations and ultimately resulted in an improvement of capabilities to counter the strategic threat of terrorism. The following discussion provides an example of how the U.S. government institutions were changed in reaction to a new strategic environment, similar to current changes required due to modern U.S. requirements for stability and security operations.

To establish capabilities to counter international terrorism, the Department of Defense approved the creation of the Delta Force (also known as 1st Special Forces Operations Detachment-Delta) to specifically counter the terrorist threats. In November 1979 (shortly after Delta Force became operational), Iranian students stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took over fifty U.S. citizens as hostages. President Carter subsequently approved a hostage rescue mission be carried out by Delta Force if in the event negotiations failed. The founder and commander of Delta Force, Colonel Charles Beckwith soon found that he had a complex problem to solve with his newly formed counter-terrorist unit. Designated “Operation Eagle Claw,” this operation would serve as the first Delta Force mission and, although it ultimately failed, it would later serve as the genesis for the creation of the United States Special Operations Command.

Once directed to begin planning for the rescue of the American hostages, Colonel Beckwith faced an enormous task of bringing together all the elements outside of Delta Force required to support the mission. As the newly formed Delta Force began to rehearse for the operation, challenges that immediately affected the operations included
lack of transportation, command and control authorities, and budget issues (Zimmerman and Gresham 2008, 107). The most difficult challenge was to coordinate elements of the Air Force, Marines, Navy and the Central Intelligence Agency to support the mission. Ironically, Colonel Beckwith’s encounters with lack of unity of command and unity of effort in this mission resemble current challenges in the employment of stability and security operations.

Unity of effort proved to be very elusive initially as Colonel Beckwith had to acquire transportation to deploy his forces to Iran. He had to work with liaisons assigned from various military departments to include the U.S. Navy, which was tasked to supply the helicopters for the mission. The Navy utilized RH-53D helicopters (naval minesweepers) and pilots trained only to fly above the surface of the ocean, rather than the desert floor (as required by Operation Eagle Claw). A majority of the pilots selected to fly for the mission came from the U.S. Marine Corps and unfortunately, the pilots selected were qualified in a different variant of the RH-53D and inexperienced with the Navy version. The planning and rehearsal for Operation Eagle Claw proved difficult and time consuming, as individuals and units from different services were required to work together as a team, something in which no one had trained nor for which they were prepared. This lack of preparation and the inability to do military operations across multiple services (“joint operations”) were contributing factors to the failure of Operation Eagle Claw.

As Operation Eagle Claw began on 24 April 1980, problems immediately arose because of unexpected dust storms and coordination errors with refueling arrival times for the mission’s eight helicopters. The dust storms forced two helicopters to abort and
when the remaining six arrived to the refueling point, one had a hydraulic malfunction that could not be repaired on site. Colonel Beckwith then aborted the entire Eagle Claw Operation, as the five helicopters available for the mission were one short of the minimum six required as prescribed by the plan’s abort criteria. Shortly after Colonel Beckwith aborted the mission, one of the helicopters crashed into an EC-130 airplane causing both a number of deaths and the abandonment of the helicopters. Left behind in the Iranian desert were eight American dead and the helicopters with classified documents concerning the details about the operation. The Iranian government subsequently televised images of the remains of the helicopters and American dead, which led to a significant strategic-level military and diplomatic defeat for the United States.

In the aftermath of Operation Eagle Claw, the U.S. Congress and the Hollaway Commission conducted investigations into these tragic events. The Holloway Commission was appointed by the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff to “examine all aspects of the failed mission” and offer, “a professional critique of the failed rescue operation” (Palumbo 2010, 40). The Hollaway Commission recommended that Special Forces units from all the services be consolidated into one joint and unified command structure (Zimmerman and Gresham 2008, 133). JP 1-02 defines unified command as “a command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments” (2009, 567). The commission concluded that if Operation Eagle Claw had been under the control of a single command, the results could have potentially been a successful rescue of the hostages. In fact, some observers argue that this failure was a contributing factor in
President Carter’s 1980 election defeat against Ronald Reagan (Zimmerman and Gresham 2008, 99). Operation Eagle Claw’s failure served as the impetus for the creation of the United States Special Operations Command, an institutional change spurred by an evolving international threat.

**Conclusion**

This chapter researched four secondary questions to provide evidence that the U.S. government requires a new method to address its stability and security requirements. The four secondary questions cover a broad range of topics and help demonstrate the complexity of stability and security-related issues. The discussion also helps to identify trends in what U.S. Army and its leaders envision for the future of these types of operations.

The first secondary question (What has the leadership of the U.S. and military discussed concerning the future of stability and security operations?) was examined by a review of articles and speeches by key military leaders to include the United States’ Chief of Staff of the Army and Secretary of Defense. Both of these leaders acknowledge that they are aware of a new operational environment that has emerged and that the military will have to adapt to this changed situation. This environment requires that future Army leaders will need to be competent in cultural awareness, language skills, and able to work with a variety of both government and civilian agencies. Although Secretary Gates and General Casey both identify the need for change, neither offer a prescriptive solution concerning institutional changes to better prepare for and conduct stability and security operations.
The next secondary question (What is the role of the conventional force in stability and security operations?) was addressed through a number of articles and reports to include the “Army Capstone Concept,” the Army Leader Development Strategy, and the CNAS report military officer training. All three documents identified an increased role for stability and security operations for conventional forces in the future and that the U.S. Army currently uses an archaic officer career model that focuses on a career in major combat operations, not full spectrum operations. The future operating environment points to instability and therefore stability and security operations will most likely dominate future operations. The future operating environment, characterized by a need for competent leaders who can operate in stability and security scenarios, will require officers just as competent in these stability missions as in major combat operations.

To address the third question (How is the U.S. institutionalizing stability operations?), research showed that the U.S. Army will continue to treat stability and security operations as part of the requirements for its forces to conduct full spectrum missions. Additionally, complexity of stability and security operations require different personnel, mindset and expertise than major combat operations. Regrettably, the U.S. Army continues to provide manpower to its PRTs, S-TTs, and AFPAK Hands programs in an ad hoc manner resulting in limited training and poor unit cohesion prior to the deployment. Because of the lack of a formalized system to provide skilled individuals to these teams, the unity of effort principle, a key component in the successful execution of stability operations, remains difficult to attain.

Stability operations require that military personnel work with a variety of individuals outside of the military, often resulting in duplication of effort due to limited
preparation time. Other effects of the current method of manning include difficulties in capturing lessons learned and inefficient identification and selection of personnel to serve on these advisory teams. Stability operations remain a strategic priority for the U.S. government, but its system of providing resources (personnel) to this effort hampers the effectiveness of the teams tasked to complete these types of missions.

The final secondary question (What is an example of a past institution that has been created in the past by the U.S. in response to an international security threat?) is addressed through the analysis of a case study involving Operation Eagle Claw and the institutional changes that resulted from that event. Because of this unsuccessful operation, the U.S. government identified organizational modifications that were needed to ensure joint and Special Forces operations would be conducted successfully in the future. The lessons learned from Operation Eagle Claw spurred the concept and implementation of a unified command for Special Forces, U.S. Special Operations Command. Examining this question provided clear historical evidence of an organization that was manned in an “ad hoc” fashion and the resulting lack of both unity of effort and command. The method in which Operation Eagle Claw was assembled and resources greatly diminished its likelihood of success.

Based on the analysis of the four secondary questions, the primary research question (How can the U.S. military more effectively train its officers for stability and security operations?) can be answered. The research addressed the need to capture and convey lessons pertinent to stability and security operations and ensure those leaders assigned to stability and security operations missions are successful. The next and final chapter will provide a recommendation for a new U.S. government education and training
institution that could potentially provide the military with leaders and teams that are well
led, culturally aware, adept at foreign languages, and fully prepared for operations in
stability-type environments. The best solution to the United States’ dilemma in stability
operations is a new separate institution dedicated to training for these types of missions—the Stability and Security Center of Excellence.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

Research throughout this thesis has shown that the U.S. government expects that, for the immediate future, stability and security operations will be essential for the United States to achieve its foreign policy goals. By synthesizing the data and analysis from the previous chapters, the primary research question, focused on the means in which the U.S. military can train its officers for stability and security operations, can now be addressed.

As a result of the analysis in Chapter 4, the following trends were identified as challenges for personnel and units conducting stability and security operations:

1. Lack of unity of effort.
2. Lack of unity of command.
3. Minimal emphasis on the “art and science” of conducting stability and security operations.
4. Minimal instruction on language and cultural awareness.

The contributing factor to all of these above trends is the “ad hoc” method for manning and training individuals assigned to provincial reconstruction teams and stability/support transition teams. The ability to execute stability and security operations will continue to be a challenge for the U.S. government unless a more formalized method for training and personnel management is established.

The United States government needs a stability and security “center of excellence” that would serve as the primary personnel management and education conduit for personnel assigned to stability and security missions. This “stability and
security center of excellence” (SSCOE) could serve as an the intellectual center that
gathers lessons learned from previous stability mission experiences, trains and educates
personnel, resulting in both unity of effort and command for future stability operations.
Personnel that will serve on stability and security advisory teams would be selected and
developed through this venue and the problems associated with the current approaches
could potentially be alleviated as a result. The following sections describe the conceptual
design and importance of establishing this new education institution – the Stability and
Security Center of Excellence.

Recommendation

The SSCOE’s mission would be to serve as a flexible and adaptable institution
with the purpose of developing and preparing leaders for stability and security operations
within the current operating environment. The SSCOE would also act as the lead agency
for the training and development for U.S. military stability advisory teams to include
integrating capabilities, concepts and doctrine to provide a unity of effort for military and
civilian personnel. The figure 3 shows a proposed organizational structure for the
SSCOE.
The SSCOE would include five departments, each focused on one of the key training pillars of the school. The Advisory Team Department would be composed of the PRT, TT, and AFPAK Hands Program. The Cultural and Language Department would teach culture and language skills to the advisory teams. The Training Department would be responsible for the tactical training of the advisory teams. The Doctrine Department would develop and preserve doctrine in stability and security operations. The last department, the Interagency Department would serve as the administrative department for the interagency elements. Each department will be discussed in further detail later in this chapter.

The SSCOE, aside from being the leading U.S. government institution for the training and development of personnel conducting stability tasks, would also be responsible for filling the world-wide personnel requirements of the PRTs, transition teams, and the AFPAK Hands Program. Personnel assigned to the SSCOE would come from both the military service and civilian government agencies, such as the U.S. State Department, Department of Justice or Department of Treasury. An assignment to the
SSCOE would be a “nominative assignment” for military personnel, constitute “joint duty credit” and normally span three years.\textsuperscript{6} The schedule for this assignment would include one year of initial training, a yearlong deployment and the final year dedicated to service as an instructor, mentor or doctrine developer within the SSCOE. For military attendees, this would allow for a proper training and development period, career enhancement, and stability for the officer and their family.

\textbf{Command Structure}

The leadership of the SSCOE would include both U.S. military members and government civilians in order to foster both unity of effort and unity of command throughout the organization. The commander of the SSCOE could be civilian or military, but would be equivalent of the rank of major general to ensure that the SSCOE has credibility and a voice within both the military and civilian communities. Figure 4 shows the proposed command structure.

\footnote{A nominative assignment is where an officer has to apply for a position and if deemed qualified is selected by a group of individuals or by a board. Joint duty credit is a requirement for officers to have served in a joint assignment prior to being appointed to the rank of general or flag officer (Baker 2007).}
The commander could come from any of the services or government civilian agencies, but if the commander is a military officer, then the deputy commander should come from a civilian agency. Conversely, if the commander of the SSCOE is from a civilian agency, then the deputy commander is a military officer at the rank equivalent to a brigadier general. This command structure would result in an interoperability “mindset” between agencies and their leaders attending as students to ensure cohesive civil-military relationships during training and actual operations.

Advisory Team Department

The advisory team department will be robust as a majority of personnel will be assigned to this directorate, making it the most important department in the SSCOE. The
leadership of the advisory team department would be the rank equivalent of a colonel and is shown in figure 5.

![Diagram of Advisory Department Organization](image)

Figure 5. Advisory Department Organization

*Source:* Created by author.

This department would screen attendees to determine individual capabilities, experience, and other attributes to determine which the organization for which officers are best suited (PRT, Transition Team, or the AFPAK Hands Program). While assigned to this department, personnel would work with others with whom they could potentially be assigned during future deployments. This department would also foster opportunities for personnel to coordinate with and train alongside the military organizations (such as BCTs). By establishing a habitual relationship with military units and participating in pre-deployment exercises, these students (and the military units) would establish needed working relationships and an awareness of both capabilities and limitations.
The Culture and Language Department would be dedicated to helping students acquire the skills necessary to cope with one of the biggest challenges of a deployment – the language and culture barrier. A current problem with advisory teams is the lack of time available to receive language and culture training; thus, the instruction provided from this department would drastically increase the effectiveness of the advisory teams. Fluency in a critical language such as Arabic, Dari and Pashto would enable these leaders to create positive relationships with the local population they are tasked to assist. This department could be the first step in creating a stability-focused corps of officers fluent in a foreign language.

The Training Department would be responsible for the tactical training of the advisory teams. This department would include a dynamic curriculum (managed by the Doctrine Department) that would be flexible and adaptive to the changing doctrine for stability and security operations based on lessons learned and other doctrinal changes. Additionally, the Training Department would be responsible for other tactical training such as basic force protection ("soldiering skills") and more advanced subjects, such as how to interact with the local population. The instructors in this department would include a mix of military and civilian instructors as the skills required to conduct stability and security operations require both military and civilian expertise.

The Doctrine Department would be responsible for the design of the course curriculum as well as updating the overall military doctrine and contribute to civilian policies required in the dynamic operating environment. The doctrine department would work closely with other military and civilian organizations to include the State Department and the U.S. Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned to ensure that
previous experiences are integrated into the doctrine. This department would also consist of military and civilian to serve as the school’s representatives for military doctrine formulation and changes within the realm of stability and security operations. By integrating both military and civilian experts in one doctrine department, unity of effort is ensured in doctrine development, policy discussion, and publishing.

The final section would be designated the Interagency Department and would be responsible for the administrative management and other requirements for personnel other than military that will be serving on the advisory teams. By having this separate department, emphasis can be placed on the interests and needs of the non-military attendees.

**The SSCOE and U.S. Army Officer Career Path**

The risk for officers attending the SSCOE is that their career progression could potentially be interrupted and they could become less competitive for promotion as a result. Figure 6 below shows a tentative career progression model, which includes assignment as a student at this institution.

![Figure 6. The U.S. Army Officer Career Path SSCOE Model](source: Created by author.)
This model provides a roadmap of an officer assigned to the SSCOE, which would potentially occur for U.S. Army officers after their company command assignments are complete. Company command for a U.S. Army captain is his most significant duty at this rank. Success as a company commander often dictates whether an officer will later be selected to the rank of major. U.S. Army captains are currently the most likely candidates for stability advisory teams and would an ideal group to attend the SSCOE. Normally, a U.S. Army captain will have two or three years after their company command assignment before being promoted to the next grade (major). These “senior” captains can have a wide range of assignments and this is normally a time for broadening experiences, and is typically an ideal period for this type of institutional assignment. Senior captains normally serve in a wide range of assignments to include military academy instructor, graduate school student, specialized unit assignment (such as the U.S. Army Ranger Regiment), high-level headquarters staff, recruiting company command, and military maneuver training centers. An assignment to the SSCOE would be an ideal broadening experience a senior captain that would benefit both the U.S. Army and the officer.

Additionally, an assignment to the SSCOE for Army officers would be “nominative” as Army leaders, such as General Casey, have stressed the importance that the very best officers serve in advisory team positions. Unfortunately, many military officers view advisory team missions as less important than traditional assignments (which typically involve units focused on preparing for combat operations) and thus few volunteer for them. However, if the U.S. Army leadership makes an assignment to the
SSCOE nominative and rewards those who attend the school, these assignments will attract the best officers.

Once selected for the SSCOE, the officer could bring his family members given that this assignment is a normal permanent change of station (PCS). Upon arrival to the SSCOE, the officer would attend the training portion for approximately one year and during this period, the SSCOE would determine where the officer would best serve based on their skills and attributes. Once selected for a particular “track” (such as reconstruction Team, Transition Team, or AFPAK Hands Program) the officer would start the language and cultural immersion based on that selection and would train with the same team through the entire deployment. The team would train with the same military unit or civilian organization with which it would serve with during the actual deployment. This type of pre-deployment training does not currently occur and would be beneficial for all team members, as it would create a more cohesive unit, which would be better prepared for the complex operating environment.

During the second year, the team will deploy for operations based on their areas of training and expertise. During this deployment, the team will be able to offer expert advice and assistance, develop relationships with the host nation and work as a cohesive unit. Relationships with friendly forces will have already been established during the train up period and the yearlong cultural and language immersion, the team should be able to immediately establish relationships with the local population. Requirements for interpreters would be decreased and language skills demonstrated by the team members would both help with interaction with the local population and could help ease fears concerning the level of commitment by the U.S. to assist with long-term stability support.
During the third year of an assignment to the SSCOE, the officer could serve as a trainer and mentor, or could immediately attend the Command General Staff College for intermediate level education (ILE), which is required for U.S. Army officers as shown in Figure 4. The ILE course serves to prepare officers for their next ten years in the U.S. Army, focusing on planning and operations from battalion level and higher. During this same time, captains are often promoted to major and assignment to the SSCOE would not be detrimental to their overall career progression. If the officer remains for the third year, he or she could serve in the Doctrine or Training Department, helping to ensure valuable lessons learned from the previous experiences are captured and communicated. Upon completion of a “broadening experience” tour in the SSCOE, the officers would be on track with their peers who may have served in traditional senior captain assignments and would be able to attend ILE with their peers. An ideal location for the SSCOE would Fort Leavenworth (Kansas), the home of the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College. This institution is viewed by the U.S. Army as its “intellectual hub.” Thus, by co-locating the SSCOE on the same military post as ILE, both ILE and the SSCOE could enjoy institutional synergy.

Following completion of the intermediate level education, the officer would re-enter the traditional military force to serve in combat-focused units or higher-level staffs. These experienced officers would provide a high level of expertise to any unit involved in executing or directing stability and security operations. This would also be an excellent step in the U.S. Army’s efforts to achieve greater competency in stability operations at the same level as major combat missions. If managed correctly, these officers would serve in positions that would be enhanced by their previous experiences and from
attendance at the SSCOE (making them more capable advisors to unit commanders in the art and operational science of stability operations). As more officers attend the SSCOE, more experienced individuals would be available to the general Army population, facilitating better preparation for and operation in full spectrum environments.

Suggestions for Further Research

While many topics remain unexplored by this thesis, one of the most important would be the financial cost of establishing the Stability and Security Center of Excellence and where it would be located. While the initial cost to SSCOE could be high, potential benefits in terms of U.S. ability to conduct stability operations could be realized through more effective operations resulting in shorter deployments. The location determination would be based on both the cost involved and which geographic area could potentially benefit both the military and interagency organizations. The next area recommended for further research would be the inclusion of non-commissioned military officers (NCOs) for assignment to the SSCOE. The NCO corps serves as the immediate supervisors for the enlisted soldiers. NCOs are often experts in small unit tactics, training and administrative functions, and can offer other expertise that commissioned officers often lack. By conducting further research on the financial cost and allow NCOs to be assigned to the SSCOE, a feasible plan for establishment could be created.

Conclusion

In stability and support operations, assumptions can potentially yield catastrophic results when improperly applied to the problem. The Joint Publication 1-02 manual defines an assumption as “A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on
the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action.”

United States government and military leaders have not made the right assumption when planning for operations that include the application of stability operations following major combat operations. These errors are demonstrated by the U.S. military’s experiences in both Operation Just Cause (1990) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003).

Following the conclusion of major combat operations in Panama in January of 1990, General Maxwell Taylor, commander of U.S. forces in Panama during Operation Just Cause admittedly stated, “we did not follow a plan, rather we responded to the evolving situation on the ground… no one had foreseen [many of] the developments” (Torrisi 1999, 30). Despite the major combat victory of Operation Just Cause, U.S. Army was unprepared for injured and displaced civilians following surrender of the Panamanian forces. Additional forces from the U.S. such as civil affairs units had to immediately be flown in to help with the rebuilding process. Proper planning and emphasis on the transition to stability operations earlier during the operation would have resulted in fewer American and Panamanian lives lost.

Likewise, during the planning phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. government and its military leaders made the assumption that following combat operations the Iraqi governmental and economic institutions would resume their daily activities at pre-war levels. However quite the opposite occurred, as massive looting and anarchy filled the streets of Baghdad while U.S. forces sat ill-prepared to transition to stability operations which could have lessened the level of damages that occurred. Since
there was no law being enforced by police forces, theft and murder became rampant and the citizens of Iraq were left to fend for themselves with little initial support from U.S. forces. Once again, an incorrect assumption was made, and stability operations were not given the same planning priority as major combat operations at the cost of many lives. In both of these instances, having a cadre of experienced “SSCOE” officers at both the tactical and planning levels could have helped avoid the chaos that often ensues in stability and security environments.

Figure 7 displays the overall SSCOE model and its relationship to military and civilian agencies, training objectives and effective stability operations. As the model shows, this system would involve individuals formed into initial advisory teams, educated in the core functions of stability operations and then deployed in their trained roles.

Figure 7. The SSCOE Model

Source: Created by author.
The “building block” illustration on the right side of the Figure 7 demonstrates how the PRT or transition team would integrate with a brigade combat team that is conducting full spectrum operations. Because of the one-year training period and the establishment of a relationship with the combat unit prior to the deployment, the reconstruction team and transition team would be able to integrate easily into the BCT’s operations. The PRT and transition team would be able to enhance the BCT’s effectiveness in stability operations with the organizations formed as one cohesive unit. As a result, unity of effort, unity of command, economy of force and simplicity would be achieved during operations. Establishing the SSCOE would lessen the possibility of the U.S. government and the Army from making the same mistake repeatedly in dealing with persistent conflict requiring an agile military able to operate on a full spectrum basis. An institutional approach is needed to foster current and future generations of officers versed in stability operations and the SSCOE is essential for the United States if it expects to achieve its overseas security and stability objectives. In sum, the SSCOE is a potential venue to better prepare military leaders for the complex and unstable environments they will undoubtedly encounter in the future.
REFERENCES


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