... It is commonplace to assert that there are economic foundations of national power. It is shameless to use a national security document to advance a debatable domestic agenda that shows scant understanding of how economies actually grow stronger. And it is doubly shameless - naked-on-a-downtown-bus shameless - for this administration to assert "responsible management of our federal budget" as a national security priority.

In most areas, the 2010 NSS expresses unobjectionable continuity. America frowns on nuclear proliferation. America likes democracy. America will act along with its allies -- except when it needs to act alone. Portions of the document are admirable, especially its emphasis on the promotion of development and global health as instruments of national influence. But it is not surprising that nearly everyone can find something to like in the NSS, since it reads like a State of the Union without space constraints. "The United States is an Arctic nation," we are informed, "with broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic region."

Much that is old in the NSS is obvious. Much that is new is not actually new. The contention that health entitlements, infrastructure construction and education spending are really national security priorities is a repolished version of an argument made for decades on the isolationist left. "How many schools could we build for the price of an aircraft carrier?" has become the claim that domestic spending is the national security equivalent of building an aircraft carrier...

More at The Washington Post.

National Security Strategy - White House Web Page

After eight years of war, more than 907 Americans dead and 4,400 wounded, and $227 billion in aid from the United States alone, Afghanistan was "deteriorating" badly, according to the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander, General Stanley McChrystal, in an August 2009 report to the Secretary of Defense. Although General McChrystal has been more optimistic of late, the fact remains that the Taliban's reach is more extensive now than at any time since being expelled from Kabul eight years ago. They have shadow governors in every province except Kabul. People turn to Taliban courts rather than state courts for justice in many parts of Afghanistan. And many Afghans prefer the Taliban's austerity over the Karzai government's corruption and incompetence. Why?

Why have the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies, who just a few years ago were reviled by the vast majority of Afghans for their brutality and fanaticism, grown in strength and popularity during nearly a decade of US and international assistance? More broadly, why has massive international development assistance in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere failed to defeat the grip of extremist ideologies among many people who have benefited from billions of dollars worth of aid? Is it even possible for international development aid to help defeat radical Islam and other ideologies hostile to the West and, if so, how?

The conflict in Iraq taught the US military many valuable lessons about how to gain the trust and cooperation of the local populace in the fight against radical Islamic insurgents, demonstrated in the new counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy implemented during the 2007 "surge." First, the Anbar Awakening established a successful precedent of the US military partnering with local tribes against insurgents, a tactical approach that could be consid¬ered "COIN 1.0." Next, COIN theorists led by General David Petraeus described the Clear-Hold-Build strategy to transition and expand tribal security alliances into long-term governance arrangements, a strategic advance that can be termed "COIN 2.0." General McChrystal and ISAF forces are applying many of these lessons in their current COIN operations in Afghanistan. There remains, however, a substantial doctrinal need to move from tactical methods that cultivate and develop tribal alliances to the strategic use of international aid to defeat insurgencies broadly and decisively. The authors term this new strategic approach to providing development aid in conflict areas "COIN 3.0." ...

Much more at Parameters.

Also in the latest issue of Parameters:

Integrating Civilian and Military Activities - Richard A. Lacquement, Jr.

Combating a Combat Legacy - Chad Serena

The Issue of Attrition - J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr.

The Strategic Failures of al Qaeda - Thomas R. Mccabe

Growing Strategic Leaders for Future Conflict - Barak A. Salmoni, Jessica Hart, Renny Mcpherson, and Aidan Kirby Winn

Clausewitz and the "New Wars" Scholars - Bart Schuurman

Our Visual Persuasion Gap - Martin Gurri, Craig Denny, and Aaron Harms

It began with a bridge. On the morning of March 1, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device detonated on Tarnak River Bridge near Kandahar, Afghanistan, killing multiple civilians and one American soldier. While the destruction of a single bridge might ordinarily pose a mere inconvenience to the U.S. war machine, in the oppressive terrain of Afghanistan it became a logistical chokepoint, halting ground-based operations for days.

War correspondent Michael Yon sought the answer to an uncomfortable question: who was responsible for the security of that bridge?

Yon is no ordinary reporter. A former Green Beret with U.S. Army Special Forces, he has spent more time embedded in Iraq and Afghanistan than any other journalist. His dispatches have produced some of the most memorable combat narratives of the war, and a large share of its most iconic images. Make no mistake; Michael Yon is not a dispassionate observer of the Columbia J-School variety. When writing about U.S. forces, he says "we." When writing about insurgents, he calls them terrorists or Taliban. And when reporting failures in the war effort, he names names. This has earned him both the respect and ire of senior military staff. In the case of the Tarnak River Bridge, the name most repeatedly mentioned as responsible for its security was Daniel Menard, the Canadian brigadier general in charge of Task Force Kandahar. Yon went public with this information...

More at The Atlantic.

Add others we missed to comments below.

... This is the bizarre world of Afghan war, where both sides know the rules and fight according to them. For one side, the rules can resemble constraints. For the other, they can mean opportunity.

NATO's rules of engagement govern when, where and how force can be used, and in what forms, from a pistol shot to an airstrike. They also guide decisions on when and how Afghan homes can be entered. Rules of eligibility help shape when an Afghan can be given access to the military's medical system. Other rules determine when an Afghan can be detained, and by whom, and for how long, and where, and under what conditions. Over the years, the rules have shifted repeatedly. No doubt they will continue to change. And whenever a change is made, soldiers and Marines often joke that it seems that the Afghans they fight know the new rules as surely as American troops do, and adjust to them immediately.

This seemed to be the case on May 29 - when, if the soldiers had it right, two Afghans fighting the Americans took a break when they got shot, tossed aside their rifles or machine guns, and chose the wounded civilian option to hitch a ride from their enemy to their enemy's top-shelf gunshot-trauma care...

More at The New York Times.

The U.S. still possesses unprecedented power projection capabilities, and just as important, it is armed with the goodwill of countless countries that know the U.S. offers protection from bullies.

Much nonsense has been written in recent years about the prospects of American decline and the inevitable rise of China. But it was not a declining power that I saw in recent weeks as I jetted from the Middle East to the Far East through two of America's pivotal geographic commands - Central Command and Pacific Command.

The very fact that the entire world is divided up into American military commands is significant. There is no French, Indian or Brazilian equivalent - not yet even a Chinese counterpart. It is simply assumed without much comment that American soldiers will be central players in the affairs of the entire world. It is also taken for granted that a vast network of American bases will stretch from Germany to Japan - more than 700 in all, depending on how you count...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

It's Memorial Day -- time to look back and reflect on what so many have given

to get us to where we are.  In practice, it's also the unofficial start of

summer and the time to look forward to all that brings. With no disrespect intended

to this solemn day, it is also time for us to kick off our first fundraising campaign. 

During June 2010, or more precisely through the 4^th of July, we have

a goal of raising $50,000 for Small Wars Foundation, the 501(c)(3) that operates

Small Wars Journal.

When we reflect back on where we are now, damn, we're thankful. We are

where we are now, first and foremost, because of the quality of thought and writing

by our content contributors (all volunteers), the substantive participation of commenters

on the Journal and SWJ Blog, and the richness of discussion in

the Small Wars Council.  We have benefitted immensely from the early endorsement

and continued participation of some of the greats in the field.  We have received

some individual contributions and we have efforts underway enabled by some generous

grants. We are humbled by the way the community has embraced Small Wars Journal.

Even more humbling is the amount of work we need to do to keep up with your interest

and continue to be worthy of the value you seem to place in us.  We have a

criminal backlog of good content submissions that we need to be able to work through

faster, since timeliness in so important to our dialog. We have a lot to do to update

and expand the site's other content, particularly to exploit the potential of an

upcoming platform and usability upgrade made possible by a grant. We are doing a

lot, we can do a lot more, and we need some resources help to close the gap. Call

it capacity building.

So to better serve you, the small wars community of interest, we are in the unpleasant

but necessary position of coming to you, hat in hand, in an NPR-like scenario. We

are counting on your contributions, coupled with support from grants and foundations,

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Where I grew up in the Midwest during the 1950s and early '60s, Memorial Day was no more about remembering the nation's war dead than Labor Day was about honoring working stiffs. It was a "free day." Falling on a Monday, Memorial Day made possible that great innovation, "the long weekend." As a family, we gathered in backyards for barbecues and to celebrate the informal beginning of summer. We did not gather in cemeteries to pay homage.

During my years as a serving soldier, Memorial Day connoted something quite different: It meant no scheduled training. It no longer implied a "free day," however. In the outfits where I served, holidays were the days we officers wore civvies to work, trying to catch up on everything left undone (usually paperwork) during the duty week. In retrospect it seems odd and more than a little embarrassing: Girding ourselves to fight the Red hordes, we Cold Warriors could spare no time to contemplate the sacrifices made by the real warriors who had preceded us.

Three years ago this month, my son was killed while serving in Iraq. His death changed many things, among them my own hitherto casual attitude toward Memorial Day.

Here in New England, where we now make our home, deejays and local news anchors still proclaim Memorial Day weekend the unofficial start of summer, as if unearthing some fresh discovery. Folks with cottages to open up take to the highways, pushing through traffic toward seashore or mountains. Our trek will be considerably shorter and simpler: We will make the five-minute drive to our son's gravesite...

More at The Los Angeles Times.