Defense Secretary Robert Gates has directed the U.S. military services to adopt a set of counterinsurgency tools modeled after ones instituted in Afghanistan by Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, said a senior Pentagon official. Gates on May 24 signed a directive ordering the services to "take McChrystal's COIN training and proficiency standards ... and adapt those for the whole force," Garry Reid, deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combat terrorism, told Defense News May 25.

The idea is to take the kinds of COIN training and "proficiency" standards that McChrystal, the top American general in Afghanistan, implemented there with his "AfPak Hands" program...

More at Defense News.

WASHINGTON (NNS) -- Similar to the collaborative signing of the Maritime Strategy, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandants of the Marine Corps and Coast Guard released the Naval Operations Concept 2010 (NOC 10) http://www.navy.mil/maritime/noc/NOC2010.pdf, which guides implementation of the strategy and describes how, when and where U.S. naval forces will contribute to enhancing security, preventing conflict and prevailing in war.

NOC 10 describes the ways with which the sea services will achieve the ends articulated in the Maritime Strategy, signed in October 2007.

"The Naval Operations Concept charts more precisely how our naval forces can and do put into motion our Maritime Strategy," said Adm. Gary Roughead, chief of naval operations. "Free from territorial boundaries, naval forces can responsively maneuver to meet global needs and challenges when and where they happen."

NOC 10 states who the naval forces are, what they believe, where they operate, what they provide the nation, and what capabilities they employ to meet the demands of a complex, evolving security environment. NOC also describes how naval forces use the sea as maneuver space and are employed across the range of military operations.

NOC 10 recognizes that naval forces continuously operate forward-and surge additional forces when necessary-to influence adversaries and project power.

For more information on the Maritime Strategy go to: www.navy.mil/maritime. For more information on NOC 10 go to: www.navy.mil/maritime/noc.

The top American commander in the Middle East has ordered a broad expansion of clandestine military activity in an effort to disrupt militant groups or counter threats in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and other countries in the region, according to defense officials and military documents. The secret directive, signed in September by Gen. David H. Petraeus, authorizes the sending of American Special Operations troops to both friendly and hostile nations in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa to gather intelligence and build ties with local forces. Officials said the order also permits reconnaissance that could pave the way for possible military strikes in Iran if tensions over its nuclear ambitions escalate.

While the Bush administration had approved some clandestine military activities far from designated war zones, the new order is intended to make such efforts more systematic and long term, officials said. Its goals are to build networks that could "penetrate, disrupt, defeat or destroy" Al Qaeda and other militant groups, as well as to "prepare the environment" for future attacks by American or local military forces, the document said. The order, however, does not appear to authorize offensive strikes in any specific countries...

More at The New York Times.

The future of the standard issue infantry rifle used by American troops in Afghanistan is under review amid concerns that it is the wrong weapon for the job. With its light bullets the M4 rifle lacks sufficient velocity and killing power in long-range firefights, leaving U.S. troops outgunned by the Taleban and their AK47 Kalashnikovs and the old Russian SVD sniper rifle.

British Forces face the same dilemma but the Ministry of Defence said yesterday that there was no plan to review the SA80A2 rifle, which fires the same NATO 5.56mm calibre rounds as its U.S. counterpart. "We constantly review all of our capabilities," a spokesman said. However, Britain has followed the U.S. in investing in 400 new larger-calibre Sharpshooter rifles, which use a heavier 7.62mm round, and are effective at longer ranges. The weapon is expected to be deployed in Afghanistan, alongside the standard rifle, by the end of the month...

More at The Times.

Last year, a group of people were asked to join in offering an opinion to the court. Those were: Special Forces Association, U.S. Army Ranger Association, Senator Lindsey Graham, Col. (ret) Abraham German, Wade Ishimoto, Prof. Andrew Nichols Pratt, Dr. Dennis Walters, Rear Admiral (ret) George Worthington, Michael Yon and Senator Ryan Zinke.

The good attorneys who are trying to keep us from getting blown up by repeat offenders emailed today. The above parties received the following message from Attorneys David Rivkin and Carlos Ramos Mrosovsky:

Dear Gentlemen,

We are very happy to report a tremendous success in the Maqaleh litigation before the D.C. Circuit. Last Friday, the panel of three judges handed down their decision, as well as an opinion by Chief Judge Sentelle, which reversed the district court and ordered that the Bagram detainees' habeas petitions be dismissed. We have attached Judge Sentelle's opinion for your review.

It appears that our amicus brief was right on target. While both the government and counsel for the detainees made "bright line" arguments -- that is, they argued that habeas rights should always or should never apply on U.S. military bases overseas -- the court refused to accept either extreme position. Instead, it focused on the "practical factors" which were emphasized in our brief. In this regard, the most important language appears on page 22 of the decision: " . . . we hold that the third factor, that is 'the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ . . . weighs overwhelmingly in favor of the position of the United States." The court then concluded that the fact that Bagram is located within an active theater of war weighed strongly against extending habeas rights to detainees held there. Given the court's emphasis on the "practical difficulties" side of the analysis, we feel confident that the involvement of amici who could speak with ultimate credibility as to those difficulties cannot but have made an immense impact.

At this stage, it is too early to know whether counsel for the detainees will seek a final appeal to the Supreme Court. Even if she does so, however, we believe that, given the unanimous nature of the D.C. Circuit panel's decision and its well-reasoned character, the Supreme Court is most unlikely to grant this request. Overall, the D.C. Circuit's Maqaleh decision represents a significant victory.

Thank you again for your participation in this amicus briefing project. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any questions.

Best regards,

David & Carlos

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced today that President Barack Obama has nominated U. S. Army Gen. Raymond T. Odierno for re-appointment to the rank of general with assignment as commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM).

Located in Norfolk, Va., USJFCOM oversees a force of more than 1.16 million dedicated men and women, spanning USJFCOM's service component commands and subordinate activities. The command includes active and reserve personnel from each branch of the armed forces and civilian and contract employees.

Pending confirmation by the U.S. Senate, Odierno will oversee UFJFCOM's roles in joint concept development and experimentation, joint capability development, joint training, and force provision and management as outlined in the Department of Defense's Unified Command Plan.

If confirmed, Odierno will replace Marine Corps Gen. James N. Mattis later this year; currently, Odierno commands U.S. Forces - Iraq, a post he has held since September 2008.

He returned to Iraq and assumed command of USF-I less than seven months after completing a 15-month deployment with III Corps and commanding general of Multi-National Corps-Iraq from December 2006 to February 2008. As the day-to-day commander of coalition forces in Iraq, Odierno was the operational architect of the surge and implemented the counterinsurgency strategy that led to the dramatic decrease in violence in Iraq in 2007 and 2008.

A native of New Jersey, Odierno graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1976 with a commission in field artillery. During more than 33 years of service, he commanded units at every echelon, from platoon to theater, with duty in Germany, Albania, Kuwait, Iraq, and the United States. After his first assignment with U.S. Army Europe, Odierno was assigned to the XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery at Fort Bragg, N.C., where he commanded two batteries and served as a battalion operations officer.

Following advanced civilian and military schooling, Odierno returned to U.S. Army Europe and the 7th Army, serving as a battalion executive officer, division artillery executive officer, and brigade executive officer, deploying in that capacity for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. He later commanded 2nd Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, 7th Infantry Division, and the division artillery of the 1st Cavalry Division. From October 2001 to June 2004, he commanded the 4th Infantry Division, leading the division throughout the first year of Operation Iraqi Freedom from April 2003 to March 2004. The unit was headquartered in the Sunni triangle north of Baghdad, and soldiers from the 4th Infantry Division captured former President Saddam Hussein near Tikrit in December 2003.

His other significant assignments include arms control officer, Office of the Secretary of Defense; chief of staff, V Corps; assistant division commander (support), 1st Armored Division; deputy commanding general, Task Force Hawk, Albania; director of force management, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; and assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C., where he was the primary military advisor to Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice. During this time, he accompanied the Secretary of State on all diplomatic journeys and state visits, traveling over 335,000 miles and visiting over 65 countries, while attending international events ranging from NATO and APEC Summits to Pakistan earthquake relief efforts.

He has a bachelor of science degree in engineering from West Point and master's degrees in nuclear effects engineering and national security and strategy from North Carolina State University and the Naval War College, respectively. He also is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College.

Odierno's awards and decorations include two Defense Distinguished Service Medals, two Army Distinguished Service Medals, the Defense Superior Service Medal, six Legions of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, four Meritorious Service Medals, the Army Commendation Medal, the Army Achievement Medal, and the Combat Action Badge.

He has also received the highest award in the State Department, the Secretary of State Distinguished Service Medal, and recently the Romanian president awarded Odierno the Romanian Order of Military Merit.

He is the 2009 recipient of the Naval War College Distinguished Graduate Leadership Award for his strategic leadership and insight.

Q. What are the real lessons of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars?

A. War is a human endeavor, a social problem, and we have modest expectations that technology is going to solve a problem as complex as warfare.

Second, no war is over until the enemy says it's over. We may think it over, we may declare it over, but in fact, the enemy gets a vote, as we're often saying in the military.

A third point is that what we cannot do is look towards war today as something that we are going to fight on our own. We are going to be fighting alongside allies of some stripe, and we are going to have to create a military that can easily adapt to other allies fighting alongside it as part of our formations, and perhaps us fighting as part of their formations.

But you can't simply transport the lessons from one theater, even one as recent as Iraq, directly to Afghanistan. It's its own country, the enemy is its own enemy, the terrain is different. Most importantly, the human terrain - the complexity of the human connections, the tribal relationships - is different.

Q. You're changing JFCom's name?

A. I've asked for that change: to Joint and Coalition Forces Command. That decision is not yet made.

Read the entire Q&A at Defense News.

Instead of better officers, the academies produce burned-out midshipmen and cadets. They come to us thinking they've entered a military Camelot, and find a maze of petty rules with no visible future application. These rules are applied inconsistently by the administration, and tend to change when a new superintendent is appointed every few years. The students quickly see through assurances that "people die if you do X" (like, "leave mold on your shower curtain," a favorite claim of one recent administrator). We're a military Disneyland, beloved by tourists but disillusioning to the young people who came hoping to make a difference.

In my experience, the students who find this most demoralizing are those who have already served as Marines and sailors (usually more than 5 percent of each incoming class), who know how the fleet works and realize that what we do on the military-training side of things is largely make-work. Academics, too, are compromised by the huge time commitment these exercises require. Yes, we still produce some Rhodes, Marshall and Truman Scholars. But mediocrity is the norm.

Meanwhile, the academy's former pursuit of excellence seems to have been pushed aside by the all-consuming desire to beat Notre Dame at football (as Navy did last year). To keep our teams in the top divisions of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, we fill officer-candidate slots with students who have been recruited primarily for their skills at big-time sports. That means we reject candidates with much higher predictors of military success (and, yes, athletic skills that are more pertinent to military service) in favor of players who, according to many midshipmen who speak candidly to me, often have little commitment to the military itself.

Dr. Shaun Baker, a professor of philosophy, provides an excellent counterpoint to Dr. Fleming in an entry on his blog at Themistocles' Shade. Dr. Baker received his PhD from Wayne State University, and is the Assistant Director of the James B. Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership at the US Naval Academy. He teaches philosophy, coaches the Academy's Ethics Bowl team, and is the Stockdale Center's webmaster.

In the Naval Academy, there is a very strong tradition of exhortation to moral excellence, honesty, integrity, ideals taken very seriously, and as more than one mid on more than one occasion has put it, "pounded" into their heads from day one Plebe Summer. Yes, this exhortation may heighten the sort of sensitivity to inconsistency that gives rise to cynicism, but I believe it also has a pronounced effect on the day-to-day thinking of a majority of the mids.

They do take these values seriously, even as they recognize their own shortcomings, those of other midshipmen and the faculty and staff. In general, I would say that this does not diminish the fact that they do take these values seriously, and think about them, have them in the forefront of their minds much more so than would people that did not go through four years of such rigorous exhortation to ethical thinking and exemplary character.

Not only do all midshipmen go through a rigorous 4 year cycle of classes intended to drive home the importance of ethical thought, and ethical leadership, classes that explicitly take up and rationally discuss cynicism, among other germane topics (just war theory, international law, military justice, principles of servant leadership, followership, constitutional principles, and etc..) but the very nature of the institution they live in for four years puts them in a good position to understand the position of the enlisted people they will eventually work with. In many ways the academy does two things at the same time. It prepares for leadership at various ranks, in various ways intellectual, moral and emotional, but it also drives home how it is to be a lower level "cog" in a big quite hierarchical command-structured institution, and teaches one how to deal with that reality, and the cynicism that naturally results.

Discuss the articles further at the Small Wars Council...

President Obama on Saturday offered a glimpse of a new national security doctrine that distances his administration from George W. Bush's policy of preemptive war, emphasizing global institutions and America's role in promoting democratic values. In a commencement speech to the graduating class at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the president outlined his departure from what Bush had called a "distinctly American internationalism." Instead, Obama pledged to shape a new "international order" based on diplomacy and engagement.

Obama has spoken frequently about creating new alliances, and of attempts to repair the U.S. image abroad after nearly a decade in which Bush's approach was viewed with suspicion in many quarters. Unlike Bush, who traveled to West Point in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks to announce his American-centered approach to security, Obama on Saturday emphasized his beliefs in the power of those alliances...

More at The Washington Post.

Obama Offers Strategy Based in Diplomacy - Peter Baker, New York Times.

President Obama previewed a new national security strategy rooted in diplomatic engagement and international alliances on Saturday as he essentially repudiated his predecessor's emphasis on unilateral American power and the right to wage pre-emptive war. Eight years after President George W. Bush came to the United States Military Academy to set a new security doctrine after the Sept. 11 attacks, Mr. Obama used the same setting to offer a revised vision vowing no retreat against enemies while seeking "national renewal and global leadership."

"Yes, we are clear-eyed about the shortfalls of our international system," the president told graduating cadets. "But America has not succeeded by stepping out of the currents of cooperation. We have succeeded by steering those currents in the direction of liberty and justice, so nations thrive by meeting their responsibilities and face consequences when they don't." Mr. Obama said the United States would "be steadfast in strengthening those old alliances that have served us so well," while also trying to "build new partnerships and shape stronger international standards and institutions." He added: "This engagement is not an end in itself. The international order we seek is one that can resolve the challenges of our times." ...

More at The New York Tmes.

As the intelligence community was rebuilt after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, two additions were seen as crucial to addressing systemic breakdowns: a new director to force often-squabbling agencies to work together, and a counterterrorism center to connect threat data dots. But developments this week underscored the extent to which those two institutions have struggled to carry out their missions, and are increasingly seen as hobbled by their own structural flaws.

The resignation of Dennis C. Blair as director of national intelligence Friday means the position will soon be turned over to a fourth occupant in little more than five years. Current and former U.S. intelligence officials said the job has come to be viewed as a thankless assignment - lacking in authority, yet held to account for each undetected terrorist plot...

More at The Washington Post.

Dispute Over France a Factor in Intelligence Rift - New York Times.

An already strained relationship between the White House and the departing spymaster Dennis C. Blair erupted earlier this year over Mr. Blair's efforts to cement close intelligence ties to France and broker a pledge between the nations not to spy on each other, American government officials said Friday. The White House scuttled the plan, officials said, but not before President Nicolas Sarkozy of France had come to believe that a deal was in place. Officials said that Mr. Sarkozy was angered about the miscommunication, and that the episode had hurt ties between the United States and France at a time when the two nations are trying to present a united front to dismantle Iran's nuclear program.

Officials said the dust-up was not the proximate cause of President Obama's decision to remove Mr. Blair, who announced his resignation on Thursday, from the job as director of national intelligence, but was a contributing factor in the mutual distrust between the White House and members of Mr. Blair's staff. The episode also illuminates the extent to which communications between the president's aides and Mr. Blair had deteriorated during a period of particular alarm about terrorist threats to the United States...

More at The New York Times.

Ousted U.S. Spy Chief 'Faced Rebellion' - Daniel Dombey, Financial Times.

High-profile intelligence reforms since September 11 2001 have not done enough to protect the U.S. against future attacks, analysts and experts said on Friday, following President Barack Obama's decision to remove the country's spy chief. Mr Obama obtained the resignation on Thursday of Dennis Blair, director of national intelligence, the most high-level departure from his administration yet. Mr Obama's move threw the spotlight on often warring U.S. intelligence agencies, which have a $50bn (€40bn, £35bn) budget and are at the forefront of the battle against al-Qaeda - not least through CIA drone strikes in Pakistan.

The effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence effort has been under public scrutiny after two recent failed bombing attempts, in an aircraft above Detroit last Christmas day and in Times Square this month. While many White House officials faulted Mr Blair on alleged personal failings, the administration also ack­nowledges that his role was still not adequately defined...

More at The Financial Times.

Clapper Leading Candidate for National Intelligence Post - Ellen Nakashima and Greg Jaffe, Washington Post.

... Clapper, who has spent more than 45 years in intelligence work, is the leading candidate to become the next DNI. The extent of the authorities the next occupant of the post will wield is a significant issue for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which will hold the confirmation hearing. "The committee has generally taken the position that the DNI needs to be a strong position, filled with a strong person," a congressional aide said.

Some question whether Clapper would want a job that is widely regarded as lacking sufficient authority to coordinate 16 intelligence agencies, ranging from the CIA and NSA to the FBI and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Clapper's former agency. DNI Dennis C. Blair, who announced Thursday that he was resigning, struggled to fully assume the role of the president's chief intelligence adviser. Hayden said that if Clapper, 69, were the nominee, he would urge him to secure President Obama's commitment that he is the go-to guy on intelligence. "He has got to believe that the president believes he is senior intelligence adviser," Hayden said...

More at The Washington Post.

Former DIA Analysts Rip Clapper's Leadership - Jeff Stein, Washington Post.

Two former top Defense Intelligence Agency officials say retired Air Force Gen. James R. Clapper, Jr., a leading candidate to be the next Director of National Intelligence, nearly wrecked the agency's analysis wing when he ran the organization in the mid-1990s. Clapper, currently Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, ran the DIA for three years before retiring in 1995 after 32 years in the Air Force.

According to the two former top DIA officials, Clapper's major initiative - to reorganize intelligence analysis by specialists in enemy weapons, rather than specialists in countries and regions - wreaked havoc at the agency and significantly downgraded its understanding of foreign events. One of the analysts, Jeffrey White, who was chief of Middle East/Africa military assessments, among other top jobs during a 34-year career at the DIA, said Clapper eventually realized the mistake he made and reversed course...

More at The Washington Post.

Mr. Blair's Departure - New York Times editorial.

It is unsettling to watch yet another shake-up in the intelligence community. As the aborted Times Square and Christmas Day bombings proved, militant groups are determined to strike here again. A well-functioning spy network is truly a matter of life and death. Dennis Blair, who was forced out on Thursday by President Obama, is the third man to have served as director of national intelligence since the job was created in 2004 in the flurry of post-9/11 reforms.

The brainy, retired four-star admiral (and former chief of the United States Pacific Command) seemed well suited to ride herd over 16 competing spy agencies. He quickly clashed with Leon Panetta, the C.I.A. director (and true Washington insider), bristled at what he saw as White House micromanagement, struggled to figure out how to work the nonmilitary bureaucracy and never developed a relationship with Mr. Obama...

More at The New York Times.

Blair's Replacement Has Problems to Solve - Washington Post editorial.

The resignation of Dennis C. Blair as director of national intelligence was the product of personal as well as institutional failings. A retired admiral with a distinguished record of service, Mr. Blair's political judgment looked questionable from the beginning of his DNI tenure, when he nominated a former ambassador with close ties to China and Saudi Arabia - and crackpot views about the Israel "lobby" - to chair the National Intelligence Council. After the failed Christmas Day airplane bombing, Mr. Blair told Congress that the Nigerian suspect should have been questioned by the interagency interrogation group created by the administration for terrorism cases - only to acknowledge later that the team had not yet been launched.

But Mr. Blair's biggest problem was his poor management of the problem he inherited from his three, also short-lived, predecessors: the lack of clear authorities and responsibilities for his office, which was created by Congress in 2004 in an ill-considered attempt to respond to the intelligence failures before Sept. 11, 2001. Though it has mushroomed into a quasi-agency with 1,500 employees, the office of the DNI has never exercised authority over the nation's other intelligence agencies or solved the problem of their failure to share and synthesize information about key threats...

More at The Washington Post.

Dennis Blair Departs - Wall Street Journal editorial.

Intelligence disputes are usually murky, though the sacking of Dennis Blair isn't among them. Explanations for the Director of National Intelligence's exit this week range from Mr. Blair's turf wars with the CIA and at the White House to the failure to pre-empt three domestic terror attacks, two of which failed out of blind luck. But Mr. Blair is really a casualty of the failed "intelligence reform" of the last decade.

Mr. Blair's successor will be the fourth DNI in the five years since the office was stood up in 2005, and this unfortunate man or woman will also supposedly integrate and manage the 16 intelligence satraps. As we and other critics predicted at the time, however, the DNI has merely become another bureaucracy layered on top of the other bureaucracies, with some 1,500 employees often doing what others elsewhere also do. In a bureaucratic classic, Mr. Blair and CIA chief Leon Panetta clashed last year over naming intelligence chiefs abroad. Mr. Panetta won...

More at The Wall Street Journal.