| Small Wars Journal

Andrew Exum is a contributor to Small Wars Journal and a fellow at the Center for a New American Security. His dispatches from Egypt will be cross-posted here and on his own blog, Abu Muqawama.

If you've been following my Twitter feed, you'll know I arrived in Cairo a few days ago and will be here for another few days doing some research. I tacked this short visit onto a trip to Europe to help train a unit preparing to deploy to Afghanistan, and I must say it's good to be back in the Arabic-speaking world during what continues to be an exciting time in the region.

This is my first trip back to Egypt since living here for seven months in 2006, and since I am no one's idea of an expert on Egypt and Egyptian politics, I am grateful to my friends here in Cairo for hosting me and providing me with plenty of people to meet with.

The research questions I'll be trying to answer here concern the position in which the Egyptian Army and other security forces now find themselves. I have two broad concerns: one is political, and one is tactical/doctrinal.

Politically, it is correct to note that the Egyptian military has more or less been one with the regime since the 1950s when the Free Officers Revolt replaced the monarchy here. But the military is at the same time in a position it has not been in for 40 years, directly involved with the day-to-day politics and decision-making in Egyptian life. Yezid Sayigh concisely and cogently explained the interests of the Egyptian Army after Mubarak in an op-ed that ran in Financial Times a week before Hosni Mubarak stood down as president. (In the interests of full disclosure, I should note that Yezid is my advisor at King's College, where he is doggedly pushing the submitted thesis of his most wayward student through the arcane bureaucracy of the University of London at the moment -- thanks, Yezid! -- but he is also one of the world's foremost experts on soldier-state relations in the Arabic-speaking world.) I agree with his analysis of the Egyptian military and have further concerns about the seemingly inevitable clash between its interests and the interests of the young revolutionaries on the streets as well as those of everyday Egyptians who have wildly inflated expectations about life after Mubarak.

First, there is a sense you get that many Egyptians honestly feel the only thing standing in between the Egyptian nation and greatness was the sclerotic Mubarak regime. Now that Muabark is gone, the military -- and whatever government that follows -- will naturally struggle to meet those expectations.

Second, the Egyptian people have now witnessed a dramatic display of people power: mass demonstrations effectively removed from power a man who seemed immovably secure in his post just one month ago. The incentives are there for every group of people in Egypt with a grievance (which is to say everyone) to now strike or demonstrate to see, in effect, what they can get. The military is growing increasingly frustrated with these demonstrations and has ordered them to cease. But the incentive structure is all wrong: even if you don't think you'll get anything, why would you not demonstrate right now? The worst case scenario is, you get nothing. But heck, you might get something!

One of the sources of the military's frustration leads to my third concern, which is the fact that even if the people have a valid grievance, there is no real authority to negotiate with at the moment. Egypt needs a transitional government of some sort, but right now, you've got people agitating for higher wages, back pay, and more reforms on the one hand, and a military on the other hand that is not prepared in the least to hear these concerns and act on them.

That all leads to my second broad concern, which is, as I said, more tactical or even doctrinal. The Egyptian military, like most militaries, is configured for major combat operations against the armies of other states -- not for what are, in some ways, stabilization operations on the streets of Egypt itself. And as an American who fought in both Iraq and Afghanistan after the conclusion of "major combat operations," it's possible to feel for the Egyptian Army at the moment.

First, the Egyptian Army is not prepared for and has no doctrine to support stabilization operations. The M1 Abrams tanks you see in downtown Cairo are as useless as the M1 Abrams tanks we had on street corners in Baghdad after the invasion. As we saw during the violence which preceded the fall of Mubarak, they're not exactly the best weapons for crowd control! (We Americans, of course, eventually made good use of those tanks in Iraq, but let's hope and pray things don't get that bad in Egypt.)

Second, we Americans paid -- and are paying -- a heavy price in Iraq and Afghanistan for the way in which the development of competent local police lags behind the development of the Army in both countries. In Cairo, at least, the police are rarely seen these days. The police officers you do see, usually directing traffic, never much respected anyway, have lost their ability to intimidate the people, who now periodically hurl abuse at them and who see themselves as having "defeated" the police during the demonstrations -- and not just in Tahrir Square but all over the countryside, where police stations burned from Upper Egypt to the Delta. But the Army trying to serve the functions of the police in preserving law and order is as awkward here as it is anywhere else. You need local police to preserve order, and though things in Cairo at the moment reflect a kind of good-natured anarchy, things might not stay that way if demonstrations continue and expectations remain unmet. (That having been said, Cairo has always been a city of neighborhoods, and locals in these neighborhoods usually do a damn fine job of preserving order on their own, thank you very much.)

Many analysts have, correctly, focused on the importance of the Army going forward. But the reconstitution and development of the police, in my mind, is probably even more important for Egypt's internal security.

So that's the kind of stuff I'm thinking about as I wander around pestering old friends and observing post-Mubarak Egypt. As anyone who follows this blog knows, I'm always more interested in what happens after a conflict or change in regime than in the conflict or regime change itself. Unfortunately for Egypt, I see more -- not less -- internal conflict and instability on the horizon. Let's all hope my initial analysis proves incorrect.

Read more about Egypt Trip Report (Part I)

19 February SWJ Roundup

Middle East / North Africa Unrest

Anti-Government Protests Spread Across Middle East, North Africa - VOA

Battle Lines Harden Across the Mideast as Rulers Dig In - New York Times

From Libya to Yemen, Unrest is the Rule - Los Angeles Times

Obama Urges Restraint in Middle East - Voice of America

Cellphones World's Eyes and Ears on Protests - New York Times

Bahrain Continues Violent Crackdown on Protesters - Voice of America

Security Forces in Bahrain Open Fire on Protesters - New York Times

Bahrain Troops Open Fire on Demonstrators - Los Angeles Times

Bahrain Military Withdraws from Capital - Washington Post

Bahrain Army Pulls Out of Manama - BBC News

Bahrain Orders Military Off Streets of Capital - Associated Press

U.S. Walks Tightrope in Policy Toward Bahrain - Los Angeles Times

U.S. Offered Rosy View Before Bahrain Crackdown - New York Times

Yemen: Government Loyalists Harden Attacks - Washington Post

Yemen Security Forces Shoot Dead Protester - Associated Press

Jordan Protesters Attacked by Government Supporters - Washington Post

Clashes in Jordan Injure 8 Protesters - Associated Press

HRW Says 24 Killed in Libyan 'Day of Rage' Protests - Voice of America

Clashes in Libya Worsen as Army Crushes Dissent - New York Times

Libya Protests: 84 Killed in Growing Unrest, Says HRW - BBC News

Libyan Forces Storm Protest Camp in Benghazi - Associated Press

Libyan Site Says National Congress Halts Session - Washington Post

Amid a Sea of Upheaval, Algeria Is Still - New York Times

Week After Mubarak's Ouster, Most Egyptians Jubilant - Voice of America

Egyptians Mark Mubarak's Fall, Call for More Reforms - Washington Post

Egyptians Celebrate but Military Starts Talking Tough - BBC News

After Long Exile, Sunni Cleric Takes Role in Egypt - New York Times

Egypt Women Stand for Equality in the Square - Washington Post

Swiss Locate Funds Linked to Mubarak - New York Times

Message to Egypt From Qaeda's No. 2 - New York Times

Egypt's Unknown Element - Washington Post opinion

Looking Dictators in the Pocketbook - Washington Post opinion

In Bahrain, the Bullets Fly - New York Times opinion

Three Days at the Pearl Roundabout - New York Times opinion

Israel / Palestinians

U.S. Vetoes U.N. Resolution Denouncing Israel - Washington Post

U.S. Blocks Security Council Censure of Israel - New York Times

Abbas Prefers Posturing to a Peace Process - Washington Post editorial

Iraq

Logisticians Share Expertise With Iraqi Forces - AFPS

Iran

Leading Iran Cleric Dilutes Calls to Execute Opposition - Voice of America

Key Cleric Wants Arrest for Opposition Leaders - Washington Post

U.S. Finds Debate in Iran on Building Nuclear Bomb - Washington Post

Afghanistan

Hillary Clinton Urges Taliban to Reject al-Qaeda Allies - BBC News

Marine Commandant Describes Progress in Afghanistan - AFPS

Attacks Across Afghanistan Leave Over a Dozen Dead - New York Times

Suicide Bomber Kills 11 in Eastern Afghanistan - Los Angeles Times

'Rogue' Afghan Soldier Kills Two German Troops in North - BBC News

Airstrike Kills More Than 35 Insurgents in Kunar Province - AFPS

U.S. Treasury Targets Afghan Money Launderers - Washington Post

Sanctions Placed on Afghan Exchange - New York Times

Elections Crippled Largely by Governing Bodies - Stars and Stripes

Pakistan

U.S. Ambassador Calls for Release of Jailed American - Voice of America

Terrorism

Military Commission Panel Sentences Guantanamo Detainee - AFPS

U.S. Department of Defense

House Approves Measure to Delay JFCOM Closure - Washington Post

House OKs Amendment to Block Joint Forces Command Closure - The Hill

Army Trains for 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Repeal - Associated Press

United States

House Approves Dramatic Cuts in Federal Spending - Washington Post

House Approves $60-billion Package of Cuts - Los Angeles Times

Africa

Ugandans Cast Votes in Presidential, Parliamentary Elections - VOA

Uganda Presidential Votes Counted - BBC News

Uganda Carries Out Elections in Peaceful Fashion - New York Times

Somali Pirates Hijack Yacht With American Couple - New York Times

Americas

U.S. Agent Under Attack in Mexico Called for Help - Washington Post

Aristide Supporters March for His Return in Haiti - Voice of America

Asia Pacific

USFK Remains Confident of American Civilians' Safety - Stars and Stripes

China Upholds Conviction of American Geologist - New York Times

Europe

Deja vu: Russia, U.S. at Odds Over Missile Defense - Associated Press

Russian Finance Minister Says Political Change Needed - New York Times

Attackers Kill 3 Tourists in Russian Resort Area - Associated Press

Turkey Jails 3 Journalists in Coup Investigation - New York Times

Kosovo Rebels Told U.N. of Organ Harvests - Associated Press

South Asia

Unrest: India Finds Comfort on the Fence - Washington Post

Sri Lanka: 5,000 Still in Camps - Associated Press

Read more about 19 February SWJ Roundup

The Wrong War

Here's the "advance praise" for Bing West's The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan:

"Bing West is many things—a battle-wise veteran, a skeptical journalist, and above all a brilliant chronicler of America's post-9/11 wars. His latest book provides a gripping account of the tactical realities in Afghanistan, but, no less important, it offers strategic counsel at a time when the Obama administration—and the country—needs it badly."—Eliot Cohen, Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

"If there is an answer for Afghanistan, it will come from only one place—the dirt. No correspondent has spent as much time on this ground as former Marine colonel Bing West, and no one has brought to it as much real-world, infantry-command experience. The Wrong War should be read (and studied) in the Pentagon and in the Oval Office. This is not think-tank theorizing, it's the real shit from a career warrior and first-rate military thinker. The Wrong War is so fresh, you can practically scrape the dirt off its pages. Read this. Read the final chapter. If there is a path to success in Afghanistan (or at least not catastrophic failure), Col. West's recommendations point the way."—Steven Pressfield, author of Gates of Fire

"A devastating critique of U.S. foreign policy regarding a seemingly endless war."—Kirkus Reviews

Our signed copy arrived in the mail yesterday, and will be devoured this weekend. Also look for an exclusive SWJ interview by our editor Mike Few with Bing West in the near future. In the meantime, Andrew Exum has reviewed The Wrong War for The Wall Street Journal. BLUF for Exum's review, In Afghanistan With Our Warrior Elite, is "Mr. West's book shows, we have an amazing cadre of young men and women who continue to serve with valor and distinction in Afghanistan, and for them as well as for Mr. West's book we should be thankful."

You can purchase The Wrong War at Amazon here.

This Week at War: A Conflict Without a Name

How should we classify Mexico's drug violence?

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) What kind of problem does Mexico have?

2) Can the United States cope with 21st century warfare?

What kind of problem does Mexico have?

On Feb. 15, gunmen on a highway in central Mexico stopped a vehicle with U.S. diplomatic license plates and shot the two men inside. Killed in the attack was Jaime Zapata, a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent. A second ICE agent was wounded. In response to the attack, U.S. Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Tex.) declared that "this tragic event is a game changer" that "should be a long overdue wake-up call for the Obama administration that there is a war on our nation's doorstep."

Should what's happening in Mexico be described as a war? On Feb. 7, U.S. Undersecretary of the Army Joseph Westphal described Mexico's troubles as a "form of insurgency," an assertion that immediately provoked a strong rebuke from Mexico's Foreign Ministry. U.S. policymakers need to fashion a strategy in response to a dire security situation across the border that does not seem to be improving. But as Clausewitz advised two centuries ago, before doing so, they would be well advised to first understand what kind of conflict they face.

In a piece for Small Wars Journal, Robert Bunker, a researcher at the University of Southern California, discussed five conflict models by which analysts might classify the troubles in Mexico. A further goal of Bunker's essay was to encourage experts on each of the models to cooperate with each other in order to achieve a deeper understanding of the situation in Mexico.

In Bunker's taxonomy, gang studies, the specialty of some criminologists and law enforcement practitioners, is one way to analyze events in Mexico. Students of gang operations analyze how gangs capture control of neighborhoods, prison populations, and local drug markets. Next is organized crime studies, also the purview of criminologists and law enforcement practitioners, but a level of criminal activity that would imply more organizational sophistication and broader territoriality than that implied by gang studies. A third classification is terrorism studies, a focus of academics and government officials at the national and international levels. Under a terrorism model, cartels in Mexico would use terror to compel compliance from rival gangs, government officials, and non-combatants. Insurgency studies are the fourth paradigm, currently an interest of academics and military planners. Under this model, cartels could ultimately form shadow governments either in parallel or inside the legitimate government. Finally, there are future warfare studies, a province of academics which hypothesizes the creation of new transnational organizational structures that could both combine and supplant governments, security forces, criminal organizations, and corporate interests.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. government struggled against two problems. First, it failed to correctly characterize the initial nature of its adversaries, how they were organized, how their networks of relationships operated, and what tactics they would employ. Second, adversaries in both conflicts rapidly adapted to changing circumstances; U.S. planners were slow at first to understand these adaptations and adjust themselves, although they improved in this regard later in each conflict.

The Mexican government currently believes it has a straightforward organized crime problem and as the Westphal incident illustrates, has little patience for alternate points of view. Should analysts and the policymakers on the U.S. side come to a different conclusion, it could make cooperation with their Mexican counterparts difficult.

Bunker argues that signs of all five models are present in Mexico. He also seems to have a lingering fear that the fifth paradigm and the worst case scenario -- some new form of sophisticated transnational criminal-military organization -- may yet predominate. It is this scenario that neither the Mexican nor U.S. governments seem prepared to contemplate. Bunker's call for cooperation among the analysts sounds like timely advice.

Can the United States cope with 21st century warfare?

It's been nearly a decade since the 9/11 attacks and most Americans sense by now that warfare in the 21st century has turned into a frustrating slog. Many are likely sick of their government spending hundreds of billions of dollars every year on defense, yet failing to deliver decisive results against its adversaries or even delivering a sense of improved security. Is there a gap between the 21st century style of warfare and what the Pentagon actually spends its money and time preparing for? It may be time for a close examination of modern warfare and what adjustments U.S. society will have to make in order to cope with a new and seemingly inscrutable battleground.

In 2010, the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute organized a conference for just this purpose, the results of which were summarized in a long essay written by two of the conference's participants. The conference yielded conclusions on what kinds of adversaries are likely to predominate in the current era, what strategies and tactics they are likely to employ, who is likely to actually participate in modern wars, and what new challenges policymakers will face in organizing for modern security challenges.

Nation-states still prepare for traditional conventional conflict, if only to deter the recurrence of 20th century, industrial-scale bloodletting and preserve the geopolitical status quo. Those preparations have not stopped alternate forms of warfare from breaking out. At least one side in every ongoing conflict in the world today is composed of non-state groups: spontaneously organized militias, part-time insurgents, full-time terrorists, amateur cyberwarriors, professional mercenaries, or some other type of irregular combatant. Uniformed soldiers of nation-states still go to war but almost never against uniformed soldiers from another nation-state.

There are several reasons for this denationalization of warfare. Most obvious is the strong incentive for combatants to avoid modern military firepower by acting as civilians and by living among the non-combatant population. Combatants also learned during the second half of the 20th century that it was possible win a war of attrition against a wealthy nation-state by avoiding decisive military engagements and implementing political and propaganda strategies in support of an open-ended but low-intensity campaign.

Irregular combatants have recently learned to further improve their odds by remaining as anonymous as possible. Anonymous cyberwarriors avoid cyberretaliation while insurgents in decentralized cells avoid intelligence officers who are experts at disrupting organizations. And with nation-states now having strong political incentives to avoid having their soldiers overtly engaged in warfare, their leaders may increasingly hire irregulars and anonymous proxies as their combatants. An odd result of these layers of deception will be confusion over when a war has begun, when it has ended, or whether some security problems are really wars at all.

In the West, warfare has become a narrow technical profession, but this may change. For the United States, war is waged by a relatively tiny group of volunteer professionals who are supplied and supported by another sliver of specialized technicians. In many places armed contractors outnumber the soldiers, which blurs the line between who is a combatant. At the same time, legal developments concerning war all trend toward restricting the military freedom of action of nation-states, a tendency that has encouraged the growth of unregulated irregular and anonymous combatants, actors to whom states may increasingly turn to do their fighting.

U.S. policymakers face steep challenges in coping with the modern era of warfare. Aircraft carriers, submarines, and stealth fighters are an insurance policy against very costly conventional combat, but the threats requiring these costly levels of insurance coverage may be too abstract for many taxpayers. Meanwhile, after a decade of frustration and indecision, there remain questions about whether the U.S. government is capable of sustaining an effective campaign against irregular and anonymous adversaries. Policymakers have to resolve these challenges if they are to convince the public they are still relevant to modern security problems.

Negoitiating with the Taliban

Conflict resolution and peace negotiations will be highlighted over the coming months as the United States begins a shift in President Obama's comprehensive counterinsurgency plan towards transition. Here is one empirical study that is of significant note.

Negotiating with the Taliban: The Timing and Consequences of Settlements in Foreign Power COIN Wars

by Andrew J. Enterline and Joseph Magagnoli

The emergence of a negotiated settlement as the goal of the American-led allied military mission in Afghanistan raises several questions: How likely is a negotiated settlement with Taliban insurgents? How long will it take to conclude negotiations with the Taliban? What is the likely long-term byproduct of negotiating with the Taliban? How close will the post-settlement facts on the ground be to American goals in Afghanistan? How will the recent strategy change in OEF influence negotiations and the resulting short- and long-term consequences? We investigate these questions by exploring patterns of negotiations between foreign powers and insurgents in COIN wars during the twentieth century. Our analysis serves as a probe of the aforementioned policy questions, such that we are merely querying the historical record to gain an understanding of how counterinsurgent armies fared in negotiations with insurgents. This probe provides a foundation from which to develop a theory of COIN negotiations that we intend to pursue subsequently.

Much more at The Culture & Conflict Review

18 February SWJ Roundup

Middle East / North Africa Unrest

Protests Grow Violent Across Middle East, N. Africa - Los Angeles Times

Populist Empowerment Grips the Middle East - Washington Post

Summary of Anti-Government Protests in Arab World - Associated Press

Saudi Prince Calls for Reform Amid Regional Unrest - Associated Press

Bahrain's Security Forces Drive Out Protesters from Downtown Square - VOA

State of Emergency in Bahrain After Deadly Crackdown - Washington Post

After Bahrain Crackdown, Mourning, More Protest - Los Angeles Times

Bahrain Locked Down After 5 Protesters Killed - Associated Press

Bahrain Urged to Show Restraint After Bloody Clampdown - BBC News

To Bahrain's Sunnis, Monarchy Is Fine - New York Times

U.S. Urges Bahrain to Show Restraint - Washington Post

Bahrain Turmoil Poses Fresh Test for White House - New York Times

Pentagon Watching Unrest in Bahrain - New York Times

Bahrain Defends Crackdown on Anti-Government Protesters - VOA

Yemen Protests Continue for 7th Day - Voice of America

Protesters Face Off for 7th Day in Yemen - New York Times

Yemen Unrest: Dozens Injured in Sanaa Clashes - BBC News

Activists Call for New Demonstration in Cairo - Washington Post

Egyptians Pack Cairo Square to Celebrate - Los Angeles Times

Egypt's Missing Stir Doubts on Military's Vows for Change - New York Times

Egypt After Mubarak: Three Ex-Ministers Arrested - BBC News

Security Remains Shaky in Egypt After Revolt - Associated Press

Egyptians Say Military Discourages an Open Economy - New York Times

Post-Mubarak, Egypt Protesters Now Pushing Army - Associated Press

Workers Strike Along Suez Canal - New York Times

Libyan Protesters Express Rage, Call for Reforms - Voice of America

Libyan Unrest Spreads to More Cities, Reports Say - New York Times

Libya Protests: Death in al-Bayda as Unrest Spreads - BBC News

Dozens Reported Killed in Libyan Crackdown - New York Times

Anti-Government Protesters Killed in Libyan Clash - Associated Press

Algeria to End State of Emergency, PM Says - Voice of America

Former Tunisian President Reported in Grave Condition - Voice of America

Bahrain: The Ticking Clock - Washington Post editorial

Blood Runs Through the Streets of Bahrain - New York Times opinion

Israel / Palestinians

Israel Kills 3 Palestinians at Gaza Border - Washington Post

Palestinians Seek Global Recognition Through S. America - Washington Post

Abbas Casts Doubt on Palestinian Elections - New York Times

Abbas: No Elections if Gaza Doesn't Take Part - Associated Press

Afghanistan

Afghan Imams Wage Political Battle Against U.S. - Washington Post

Gates: U.S. Must Consider Sustainability of Afghan Forces - AFPS

U.S.-funded Militia in Helmand Province to be Expanded - BBC News

U.S. Airstrike Kills Terrorists in Afghanistan - AFPS

Sailor Awarded Silver Star for Heroism - San Diego Union-Tribune

Get Out of Afghanistan - Washington Post opinion

Pakistan

Pakistan Worries Top Pentagon Officials - Voice of America

Raymond Davis Case: Pakistan Court Delays Decision - BBC News

Court Gives Pakistan 3 Weeks to Decide on Immunity - Washington Post

Iraq

Gates: U.S Has 'Interest' in Keeping Troops in Iraq - Associated Press

Gates Pleads for 'Critically Urgent' Funds for DoS Work - Washington Post

State Department Needs Iraq Funding, Gates Says - AFPS

Two Iraqi Protesters Killed Amid Unrest in Kurdistan - Washington Post

Protests Spread to More Iraqi Cities - New York Times

Kurdish Guards Fire on Protest in Iraq, Killing 2 - Associated Press

Baghdad Demands $1 Billion from U.S. in War Damages - Associated Press

Iran

Iran Rallies Set for Weekend - Voice of America

Iranian Opposition Leader Missing as Tensions Rise - New York Times

Iran Says Warships Will Make Suez Passage - Voice of America

Iran Warships Suez Canal Passage 'Back On' - BBC News

Iran Asks for Warships to Pass Suez Canal - Associated Press

Israel's Lieberman Says Iranian Warships a 'Provocation' - Washington Post

Terrorism

Testimony Includes Detainee's Statement, Terrorist Training - AFPS

Guantanamo Convict "Made Terrorists" - Reuters

Detainee Who Pleaded Guilty Describes Terror Training - New York Times

Suit in Terror Case Is Thrown Out - Associated Press

U.S. Department of Defense

Gates, Mullen Take Budget to Senate Committee - AFPS

United States

Government Shutdown Looms - Los Angeles Times

United Kingdom

Barack Obama Coming to U.K. on State Visit in May - BBC News

Obama in State Visit to Britain in May - Associated Press

Canada

Canada Hit by Cyberattack From China - New York Times

Africa

South Sudan Chosen as Name for New Country - BBC News

In Uganda, Unrest Gains Little Ground - New York Times

Ugandans to Vote on Museveni's 25-year Grip on Power - BBC News

Ivory Coast Government Takes Control of Foreign Banks - BBC News

Americas

Suspect Arrested in Shootings Outside Mexico City - Associated Press

Brazilian Police Arrested over 'Vigilante Death Squad' - BBC News

Brazil: Rio De Janeiro Police Chief Accused of Leaks - Associated Press

2 Haiti Presidential Candidates Start Campaigns - Associated Press

Asia Pacific

U.S. Military to Bolster its Forces in Pacific - Washington Times

North Korea Completes Second Missile Site - Reuters

Taiwan's President Seeks More U.S. Arms - Washington Post

China Blasts New U.S. Policy on Internet Freedom - New York Times

Japan: Gates Hopes Futenma Plans Set in Spring - Stars and Stripes

Europe

Belarus Dissident Vasily Parfenkov Jailed for Protest - BBC News

Read more about 18 February SWJ Roundup

Sharp as a Modern Jomini?

Sharp as a Modern Jomini?

In response to an earlier post, Barry Zellen, former research assistant to Gene Sharp and current Editor of The Culture & Conflict Review, sent us this email,

"I liked Renascent's comment in your blog, 'Gene Sharp is to non-violent strategies as Clausewitz was to Napolean: a theorist who studies the practitioners, generating and synthesizing the underlying insights.' I've come to see Sharp's writings as Jominian, in the best sense of the word - Jomini predominated for decades before Clausewitz gained a second wind - and like Jomini, Sharp has extracted/elucidated actionable methods from his studies that have been useful (not always with successful outcomes) to practitioners. It's exciting to see Sharp's work quickly find a new and global audience."

Barry recently published Muscular Nonviolence: Beyond the Terror War in the Winter/Spring 2011 Issue of The Culture and Conflict Review.

BLUF. An unexpected wave of people-powered insurgencies, waged bravely by unarmed protesters against the many mightily-armed secular and theocratic dictatorships that span the Middle East and North Africa, has shaken the very foundations of not only the region, but of the entire world order.

People-power is not a new phenomenon, but has roots that date back to ancient times, having fueled the Christian movement that internally transformed the Roman Empire, and providing ever since an alternate model of insurgency from those of presented by the heroic guerrilla campaigns of both Spartacus and the Zealots who took their own lives at Masada. The Cold War, which held the world hostage to the ominously delicate balance of terror, came to its swift end not by a fiery nuclear exchange as many had long feared, but by the massed popular resistance of democratic movements that rose up to topple the communist autocrats who enforced Moscow's will. The people, when united, seem to almost never be defeated -- with notable exceptions that include China and Burma, where competent communist or military oligarchies have successfully held onto power in the face of popular uprisings for several generations. And, so now in Arabic and Farsi we hear a new generation of nonviolent insurgents cry out for change -- with Tunisia and now Egypt forever transformed by popular revolts combined with military realignments in which the required loyalty of the armed forces shifted tectonically from state to people with decisive results.

To understand the power of the people as manifested in this wave of popular revolt, its potential for success against tyrannical regimes recognized as ruthlessly Machiavellian by even their closest friends and allies, a natural starting point is the very archetype of strategic nonviolence, Mohandas K. Gandhi -- known to many of his followers as "Mahatma" ("Saint") Gandhi.

Much more at The Culture & Conflict Review

RAND report "The War Within"

The War Within: Preventing Suicide in the U.S. Military

by Rajeev Ramchand, Joie Acosta, Rachel M. Burns, Lisa H. Jaycox, Christopher G. Pernin

BLUF. Since late 2001, U.S. military forces have been engaged in conflicts around the globe, most notably in Iraq and Afghanistan. These conflicts have exacted a substantial toll on soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen, and this toll goes beyond the well-publicized casualty figures. It extends to the stress that repetitive deployments can have on the individual servicemember and his or her family. This stress can manifest itself in different ways — increased divorce rates, spouse and child abuse, mental distress, substance abuse — but one of the most troubling manifestations is suicide, which is increasing across the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). The increase in suicides among members of the military has raised concern among policymakers, military leaders, and the population at large. While DoD and the military services have had a number of efforts under way to deal with the increase in suicides among their members, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs asked RAND to review the current evidence detailing suicide epidemiology in the military, identify "state-of-the-art" suicide-prevention programs, describe and catalog suicide-prevention activities in DoD and across each service, and recommend ways to ensure that the activities in DoD and across each service reflect state-of-the-art prevention science.

Much more at RAND

Read more about RAND report "The War Within"

Callwell, Mao, Galula, Sharp?

This article (NY Times login required) about

Gene Sharp, already included in

today's SWJ Roundup, probably warrants a special look by our

community. It provides a brief intro to his body of work on the practical

application of nonviolent revolution (basically Mao meets MLK/Gandhi) and how it

touched the wave of change in Tunisia, Egypt, et al. Well worth the

sign-in hassle if you're not already registered with the old Grey Lady. Be

sure to look at "From

Dictatorship to Democracy" (more info, languages, formats

here) and his

other works at the Albert Einstein

Institution.

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