by Jeff Raleigh
My friend Lt General Daud Daud was killed two weeks ago in his home province of Takar, Afghanistan. The General was in a meeting with members of ISAF and the District Governor when a suicide bomber, dressed as a policeman, detonated his explosive vest and killed six people, including two German NATO soldiers. He wounded the Governor and a German Army Major General in addition to murdering NATO soldiers and General Daud. Daud's death, as was his life, was a microcosm of life in Afghanistan.
Daud had served closely with the Ahmed Shah Massod, the famous and revered, among certain Afghan ethnic groups, mujahedeen leader who was assassinated by the Taliban on September 10, 2001. While serving with Massod, Daud was, by all accounts, a fearless and ruthless warrior against the Russians.
He was also charming, intelligent and hard working, qualities that were not all that common among Afghan officialdom. He was able and —to work across ethnic and tribal lines to build a nation in a society riven by ancient conflicts.
When Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun, was named president he appointed Daud a Tajik, as the head of Counternarcotics for the Ministry of Interior where he was responsible for the MOI's CN efforts, not to be confused, or in most instances, coordinated with the efforts of the Afghan Ministry of Counternarcotics (MCN) a separate entity that was responsible for... well none of us who worked with MCN were ever sure for what it was responsible
I worked with and got to know and like Daud when he was CN Chief at the MOI, a job many thought was the perfect position to protect his reputed family drug cartel. The UK, which had the lead on CN in Afghanistan, was especially adamant about Daud's ties to the flourishing Afghan drug trade. The US, especially those of us who were involved in the counter narcotics efforts on a day-to-day basis, suspected that he was at least peripherally involved but we also respected his dedication to his nation, his courage in waging the Afghan version of the War on Drugs and his relative incorruptibility.
While CN chief Daud could be counted upon to take action against drug dealers in certain provinces of Afghanistan, though as with much with went on, we westerners were sometimes unsure exactly what criteria were used in determining what drug lords and what areas were to be acted against.
A colleague of mine once told me that to understand Afghanistan one had to understand Daud. He was intelligent, though he was relatively uneducated. He was generally incorruptible, in the Afghan milieu, yet was able to support in style his Afghan wife and children as well as his other wife and family in the United States. (Apparently he had the uncanny ability, as did many Afghan officials, to make his government salary of about $3,000 per month stretch more than most people could.) He was an activist police official who did do much to stop certain elements of the drug trade while at the same time exhibiting a blind eye to certain other elements. He was among the warmest, most hospital officials I ever met. He once hosted a rather large dinner party to thank me and some colleagues for putting on a large CN conference. There were forty guests, a large dinner, speeches and gifts. As usual, we were told of the event at 4:00 PM one Saturday afternoon. The dinner started at 6:00 PM.
The one quality that no one who ever met him doubted was his courage. From standing next to Massod as the Northern Alliance fought first the Russians and then the Taliban, Daud never backed down. I saw his courage on a number of trips I took with him to Helmand, Patika and other volatile provinces when most Afghan officials who were supposed to come with us became conveniently "ill" and missed our flights.
His most recent job was as police commander for northern Afghanistan a region that has been, until recently, a relatively quiet section of Afghanistan with a much smaller Taliban influence than in the Pashtun dominated south and east. That he was killed in his home province despite heavy security is an indicator of increased Taliban activity in the north.
The last time I saw Daud was about 18 months ago on a trip back to Kabul. He had learned that I was back in town for a short visit and had his aide call me and ask if the General could come by to say hello. Since I was a private citizen in town just to say hello to some of my former colleagues I was honored that Daud took the time to call. I was even more honored when he showed up at the guesthouse where I was staying and spent an hour with me. When I had first met him in 2004 he spoke virtually no English. This day he was almost fluent, having dedicated himself to learning English and pursuing a university degree. I believe that his goal was to run for and be elected President of Afghanistan, a nation he truly loved. We discussed what he saw as Afghan's future and his role in it. He told me that he was confident that the country could survive and prosper if the men who believed in it and were dedicated to building its institutions stayed in the country and survived the violence.
Unfortunately for my friend and for Afghanistan, the same forces that killed Massod and many other Afghans killed him. With each loss, the odds of Afghanistan ever becoming a stable member of the family of nations become greater. Daud Daud was a good Afghan. His nation will miss him.
Jeff Raleigh was a senior US Diplomat in Kabul for a number of years. He is presently writing a book about a murder in Kabul.
Afghanistan
World Bank Withholding $70 m., Afghans Try to Resolve Scandal - NYT
Afghan Cash Crunch Looms, Millions Withheld Over Bank - Reuters
Obama Talks Drawdown with Top Afghan Commander - AP
UN Separates Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions - AP
UN Splits Taliban and al-Qaeda on Sanctions Blacklist - BBC
UN Separates al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions - AP
Project Advances Coalition Information Sharing - AFPS
ISAF Operations Roundup - AFPS
Images From Afghanistan: June 2011 - WP
Pakistan
Pakistan Army Denies Colluding With Insurgents - AP
11 Militants Killed in Clashes with Pakistani Forces - VOA
Pakistan 'Concerned' by NATO Incursion Near Border - Reuters
Karachi Soldiers Appear in Court over Video Killing - BBC
Syria
Casualties Mount as Syrian Protests, Crackdown Intensify - VOA
Defying Crackdown, Protesters Surge Across Syria - NYT
24 Reported Slain in Syrian Protests - LAT
Deadly Fresh Protests Erupt - BBC
Syrian Forces Open Fire on Protesters; 16 Killed - AP
Syria Forces Kill 19 in Biggest Protests - Reuters
Pressure Mounts on Assad to Resign - WP
Syrian Town Is Strained by Flood of Refugees - NYT
US Mulls War Crimes Charges Against Syrian President - VOA
Libya
Gaddafi Defiant, as Bombs Rain on Tripoli - WP
Pro-Gadhafi Forces Hit Misrata, NATO Targets Tripoli - VOA
Ten Killed in Misrata, Medics Say - BBC
Libyan Rebels Live by 'V' Sign: 'We Win or We Die' - AP
Fighting as Libyan Rebels Try to Close on Gaddafi - Reuters
2 Top Lawyers Lost to Obama in Libya War Policy Debate - NYT
US Paying European Teams to Hunt Stray Munitions - NYT
Libya and the Potemkin Alliance - WP opinion
Yemen
Yemen's Vice President in the Hot Seat - WP
Allies Say Yemeni President to Return Home in Days - AP
Government Says Saleh to Return Despite Protests - Reuters
Iraq
Al-Qaida Claims Killing of Anti-Saddam Purger - AP
Middle East / North Africa
Turkish Charity Says its Ship Won't be Part of Gaza Flotilla - WP
Three Dead in Sectarian Clash in North Lebanon - Reuters
Saudi Women Tap Road Rage Against Driving Ban - AP
Bail Set for Billionaire Accused of Corruption With Mubarak - WP
Morocco's King Proposes Limited Steps to Democracy - NYT
Morocco's King Mohammed Unveils Constitutional Reforms - BBC
King Declares Morocco a Constitutional Monarchy - AP
Lawyer: Tunisia's Ex-President Denies Charges - AP
Latest Developments in Arab World's Unrest - AP
Al Qaeda
Bin Laden Court Case Dismissed - WP
Osama Bin Laden: US Drops Embassy Bomb Terror Charges - BBC
Where will Zawahiri Take al-Qaeda? - WP opinion
US Department of Defense
Navy Spike in Commanding-officer Firings - WP
Marine Reservist in Custody after Pentagon Scare - AP
Man Found With Suspicious Materials in Virginia - NYT
Army Suicides in May are Most in Nearly a Year - S&S
After Fighting a War Comes the Fight for a Civilian Job - UST
Lawmakers Want Obama to Halt DADT Repeal - S&S
Crew: Amphib San Antonio Finally Fixed - DN
Army Announces Site for National Museum - AFPS
United States
Mayors See End to Wars as Fix for Struggling Cities - NYT
Military Spending on the Sgenda as US Mayors Meet - AP
US Pledges to Raise Deportation Threshold - NYT
Obama Extends National Guard Border Deployment - AP
United Nations
UN Security Council Backs Second Term for Ban Ki-moon - BBC
Africa
Ivory Coast Deadline for ICC Testimony - BBC
Sudan Fear for Missing UN Worker Hawa Abdullah Mohammed - BBC
In Sudan, Genocide Anew? - WP opinion
Americas
Gunfight Kills Several in Mexico Border City - AP
Mexican Teenage Girls Train as Drug Cartel Killers - Reuters
Mexico Arrests Ex-Soldier Accused in Massacre - AP
Mexico Finds $2.4 m. in Phone Cable Headed for Venezuela - AP
2 Killed, 18 Hurt as Troops Storm Venezuela Prison -AP
Venezuelan Forces Storm Prison 'to Protect Lives' - BBC
Guatemala Arrests Ex-General in 1980s Killings - AP
Asia Pacific
China: Maritime Patrols on the Rise - NYT
Naval Drills Seen as Warning to Vietnam - LAT
Philippines to China: Don't Intrude Into Our Water - AP
China Celebrates Anniversary of Group With a Long Blacklist - NYT
Another Japan Reactor Tests Nation's Will - NYT
US Helps Vietnam to Eradicate Deadly Agent Orange - BBC
Thai Yellow Shirts Protest Against Leaders, UNESCO Temple Listing - VOA
Europe
Medvedev Tells Investors Russia will Reform - WP
Germany Says Creditors Can Be Shielded in Greek Bailout - NYT
Greece: Merkel and Sarkozy Urge Bail-out - BBC
Belarus Leader Rejects Reforms to End Crisis - Reuters
Why Europe No Longer Matters - WP opinion
South Asia
--US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice on the Security Council's unanimous vote to treat al-Qaida and the Taliban separately when it comes to UN sanctions.
Dr. Gorka and Dr. David Kilcullen recently co-authored an article for Joint Force Quarterly entitled An Actor-centric Theory of War: Understanding the Difference Between COIN and Counterinsurgency. In that piece they wrote that "COIN, in the American mode, is but one small reflection of the much older, even ancient, practice of countering insurgents, or irregular enemies." They propose a theory of war based on who is using violence against us; an "Actor-Centric" theory of war.
Dr.Gorka's brief is Wednesday, 29 June 2011 at 10:00 CDT (1100 EST, 15:00 ZULU). Those interested in attending may view the meeting online at https://connect.dco.dod.mil/coinweb and participate via Defense Connect Online (DCO) as a guest. Remote attendees will be able to ask questions and view the slides through the software.
Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:
Topics include:
1) In blasting NATO, Gates explains what moral hazard feels like
2) The U.S. government sends its civilians to fight in Yemen
In blasting NATO, Gates explains what moral hazard feels like
In what he termed his "last policy speech as U.S. defense secretary," Robert Gates ripped into his policymaking peers at NATO headquarters in Brussels last week for allowing "significant shortcomings in NATO in military capabilities, and in political will" to occur. Gates noted that although the non-U.S. alliance members have more than 2 million troops in uniform, these countries struggle to deploy 40,000 soldiers into an effective military campaign. Gates also pointed to NATO's embarrassing performance in Libya, noting that European members, despite having a multitude of officers collecting paychecks at frivolous staff billets, have failed to generate the intelligence support and command capabilities needed to wage an effective air campaign. Gates warned of a "dismal future for the transatlantic alliance."
Gates's frustration was no doubt sparked by the realization that his department has become the victim of moral hazard. The United States provides a free security guarantee to Europe. Europeans, meanwhile, have responded in an economically rational way by taking greater risk with their external defense. With the collapse of the Soviet Union removing the last plausible military threat, it was logical for European policymakers to avoid spending on expensive space, communications, and intelligence systems that the United States was largely providing for free. Gates and many other U.S. policymakers see an alliance with too many free riders; Gates noted that only five of the 28 allies spend more than the agreed target of 2 percent of GDP on defense.
In the short term, Gates fears that the United States will have to bail out the Libya operation. This week, Adm. Mark Stanhope, Britain's top naval officer, warned that budget limits and unit rotation requirements could force NATO combatants over Libya to soon have to choose between Libya and Afghanistan. Should a shortfall of European forces in either campaign result, Gates undoubtedly fears that the United States will have to make up the gap.
Over the longer term, the moral hazard issue extends beyond NATO into the Western Pacific, the South China Sea, and soon the Persian Gulf. For example, the United States has a great interest in signaling to China that it has strong security commitments to its partners in the region. Washington likewise wants those partners to share the defense burden and to also avoid provocative behavior. The stronger the signal it sends to China, the less incentive the partners have to do their part. In the Middle East, the United States will likely respond to the emerging Iranian nuclear threat with a security guarantee for its Sunni Arab allies on the west side of the Persian Gulf. It is just as likely that a future exasperated U.S. defense secretary will someday tour that region, reprising Gates's final speech to NATO and pleading with the Arab allies to do more for themselves. Of course, the United States could opt not to issue the Persian Gulf security guarantee and risk either a regional nuclear arms race or watch another major power move into the region with its own guarantee. No U.S. administration would tolerate these outcomes.
Gates concluded his speech by warning Europe's leaders that the next generation of U.S. leaders lacks nostalgia for the Cold War struggle and could walk away from the NATO alliance. In the future, Europe will undoubtedly have to do more for its external defense. That doesn't seem like a problem now since there is no apparent external threat. But should they have to more fully insure themselves, European defense planners should consider how they would rebuild their defenses. They should consider how much time it would take to mobilize political and budgetary authority to prepare for these threats and how long it would take to rebuild the required military forces. Most notable in this regard is the risk of losing both a defense industrial base and functioning military institutions, which once gone might never be restored, at least within a relevant time frame.
Gates's speech displayed his frustrations with the decision to intervene in Libya, which quite possibly will see the United States having to pay up on an insurance policy that Gates never wanted to write in the first place. More broadly, the military security guarantees the United States has issued to Europe and elsewhere are risk-management tools that come with benefits and annoying costs. Gates has warned Europe that its insurance policy may be cancelled. If that happens, the continent's leaders will have to think about their security risks in old and unfamiliar ways.
The U.S. government sends its civilians to fight in Yemen
In last week's column, I discussed how the U.S. government is inexorably "civilianizing" its military operations in response to irregular adversaries who have adopted a civilian appearance to gain an advantage. The U.S. government will increasingly find itself assembling its own civilianized army comprised of covert intelligence operatives, paramilitary groups, and local militias to battle modern irregular opponents. This week U.S. officials revealed that the next test of this game-plan will occur in Yemen, where it will now have to track down al Qaeda without the help of the Yemeni government.
According to the Washington Post, there will be a large buildup of CIA assets for the Yemen mission. This buildup will include CIA-operated Predator drones, which will fly from a new airbase now under construction somewhere in the region. This expanded CIA effort in Yemen will supplement and perhaps supersede a small counterterrorism operation that has thus far been run by the Pentagon's Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).
The recent collapse of government authority in Yemen accounts for the reshuffled U.S. counterterrorism command structure. JSOC operated in Yemen with the permission of the Yemeni government and in support of its counterterrorism units. But with the departure of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was wounded in a rocket attack, government authority seems to have collapsed. Yemeni counterterrorism teams have also apparently abandoned the hunt for al Qaeda. With local government support to the JSOC operation either withdrawn or effectively suspended, it has become necessary to start a covert operation under CIA authority to continue the hunt for al Qaeda.
This is the future of irregular warfare, at least in the world's most difficult, ungoverned spaces. The first preference of the U.S. government is to deal with other legitimate governments and their institutions. Over the past decade, when there was no such government, it was U.S. policy to "nation-build" a suitable sovereign counterpart that could control its territory and work with U.S. government officials. But after the costs of such efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is little chance the United States is going to attempt similar efforts in ungoverned al Qaeda hangouts like Yemen or Somalia.
Instead, the United States will have to fall back to a long-term strategy of cultivating useful relationships with tribal leaders, warlords, and other local powers. If the U.S. government wants to find targets for drones and chase al Qaeda in other ways, it will have to give up on nation-building and go straight to local sources instead.
The arc of the U.S.-Pakistani relationship over the past decade is another illustration of a transformation from military to civilian warfare. At the beginning of this period, the United States hoped to assist the Pakistani military to fight al Qaeda and other radicals inside Pakistan. But as the relationship has collapsed, the U.S. has had to civilianize its military effort inside Pakistan. Gone are U.S. military trainers for the Frontier Corps. Instead, the United States will have to rely more on its unilateral covert intelligence effort to support the CIA's drones, bypassing the Pakistani government -- as it also did to track down Osama bin Laden.
The forthcoming CIA operation against al Qaeda in Yemen will thus utilize techniques the agency has already had to adopt in Pakistan. Legally, it will be a deniable covert action which will put the CIA in the lead. The CIA's drone air force looks set to expand. And the agency's clandestine service and paramilitary officers will likely be in the lead on the ground, developing targets for the drones and others. The Pentagon's JSOC will play a supporting role, as it did in the raid on bin Laden. But it seems like the war in Yemen will be run and fought -- on both sides -- by civilians.
by Marno de Boer
Immediately after the successful conclusion of the raid on Osama Bin Laden's compound the United States government and its agencies fed the press and public alike with information about the event. Two trends stand out in this information flow; the rapidity with which it was delivered, and the fact that much of it later turned out to be incorrect. While it is not yet possible to determine whether this was the result of a deliberate policy, it was highly successful in getting a favorable story across during the first few days after the action, the period crucial for forming people's perceptions. In this way, the American media policy, while in some ways an evolution of prior engagements with the media, also began to show a likening to the ones successfully adopted by regular and irregular opponents alike in the last decade. This article argues that this new policy was fairly successful and might be a worthwhile model for dealing with the press during future events.
In various conflicts in which Western militaries have been involved recently, the opponent has been fairly skilled in using tactical events to shape people's ideas. One aspect of this is the propaganda of the deed, often used by Al Qaeda and associated movements to inspire potential followers and attract recruits. While the deed is often a terrorist attack, it can in principle be any event, and the own-goals of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay have probably done much to fuel hatred of the US. This use of enemy actions can also be observed in more territorially defined conflicts. An early example is the Serbian response to the accidental NATO bombing of a convoy of refugees near Djakovica in Kosovo during the 1999 crisis. Western journalists were immediately offered transportation from Belgrade to cover the event, while NATO took several days to respond. The ensuing headlines and public criticism they created pressured the alliance into ending nighttime strikes.
The present day Taliban uses a similar approach. An example is the American bombardment on the Baghni Valley in Helmand on 2 August 2007. Both the Pentagon and the Afghan Ministry of Defense claimed that only Taliban fighters died in the attack, but were reluctant to give more details on the incident. Meanwhile, the Taliban guided reporters of the Afghan press agency Pajhwok Afghan News to the area. When they arrived locals, acting on Taliban instructions, told how a village picnic had been targeted. This message was subsequently published by the BBC, Associated Press, Agence France Press, and various newspapers. As the Baghni Valley case illustrates, the great advantage irregular or conventional but dictatorial opponents have, something already recognized by David Galula, is that they are not bound by the truth in the same ways as militaries from liberal democracies are.
Western militaries, with the US Armed Forces in the lead, have responded to their opponents' asymmetric advantage with a more open media policy. During the invasion of Iraq a full-fledged program of embedding was implemented, in which journalists joined up with frontline units. The rationale behind this was that journalists would be able to get the story out quickly, much quicker than if they had to wait for the Pentagon or White House to compose and release press statements. The fact that journalists reported what they saw themselves would also give the news item more credibility than a government's press release, while the reporters' time spent among soldiers should contribute to their understanding and sympathy for the military. All this was designed to rapidly counter the enemy's propaganda, which it might spread right after a tactical event. The embedding program has been transferred to Afghanistan, where most Allies have adopted it. Dutch reporters for example have even been allowed to accompany Task Force 55, probably to proactively dispel the image that this special operations unit was some sort of rogue killer unit.
Despite this development, Western militaries still struggle to formulate an adequate media response to many incidents, air strikes in particular. If one takes the strike of 28 May 2011 in Helmand, in which 9 civilians died, as an example, one sees that it are others that set the tone of the story to a significant degree. Afghan officials first released news of the event, making the claim that 14 civilians died. Subsequently ISAF published a statement on its website to express its regret over the casualties. The coalition also explained that the death toll consisted of 9 civilians and 5 Taliban who fired upon Marines from the compound in which the civilians lived. Subsequently headline coverage passed to Afghan president Karzai though, who once again used strong language to condemn ISAF operations that cause civilian casualties. Of course, ISAF is faced with several difficulties; one cannot embed a reporter in an F-16, and Karzai has made it a habit to defame ISAF('s airstrikes and nightraids) in an attempt to boost his own domestic popularity. Nevertheless, ISAF ends up being in a situation in which it responds to the tone of news, rather than setting it. The only option left then is damage control.
The engagement with the media in the immediate aftermath of the Bin Laden raid was of an entirely different kind. During the first 48 hours after the raid, US officials did not yet have a complete picture of what had happened inside the Abbottabat complex. They (and in particular Obama's top terrorism advisor John Brennan) nevertheless decided to present a story to the media, which suggested that a serious shoot-out had taken place, and contained the remarkable detail that Bin Laden used one of his wives as a human shield. This narrative was subsequently widely published by the media. US officials also referred to the terrorist leader's hideout as a 'million dollar mansion', while in fact it was not worth more than a quarter of that price. All of this projected the image that Bin Laden had behaved rather cowardly in what was a serious engagement, and lived a life of relative luxury.
During the following days the story was changed in some aspects and reinforced in other ways, but the perception through which events were received had been created. The firefight was not all that intense after all and Bin Laden's wife received her injury when she rushed toward the SEAL operators. Nevertheless, this did not change the created perception of a not very heroic Bin Laden. Other news releases only reinforced this perception and fitted into the mold that had been created by the statements of the first hours after the attack. The video of Osama watching himself on TV suggests he was a rather vain man, while the way he is dressed and seated looks more like that of a senile grandfather than a strong and capable military leader. The discovery of a large porn collection in the compound even suggest a degree of hypocrisy by the Al Qaeda leader, who previously criticized the US for selling its women like products by displaying them in sensual ways in advertisements.
Given its success, the handling of media affairs in the immediate aftermath of the Bin Laden raid might be a model for future events. It seems that by getting the story out fast the US government managed to set the tone for the narrative and 'conquered' the headlines in the first days after the raid, when it received most media attention. In that way, it (perhaps unintentionally) successfully copied what has often given its opponents an advantage in the battle of perceptions. That it had to make changes later was not held against it too much, since it could use the fact that over time new details surfaced as a plausible excuse. The fact that Bin Laden's wife sustained her wound while rushing toward the Navy SEALs rather than as a human shield used by her husband, then fitted into the mold of perception of a cowardly Bin Laden. In other circumstances it might just as well have created the perception that even women are —to die heroically for the cause. Perhaps ISAF should follow the successful example of the Bin Laden raid aftermath, and also try to get a story out fast after events such as the 28 May air strike, rather than solely issue a declaration of regret and the promise of a future investigation after Afghan officials have already aired the news. In that case other aspects of the event might receive a more prominent part in the story, such as the fact that it were Taliban fighters who exposed women and children to grave danger by firing on enemy soldiers from inside an inhabited house. It would in any case give ISAF more opportunity to set the tone of the narrative regarding the event and mold perceptions through which subsequent information is viewed.
Marno de Boer is a student at King's College London enrolled in the MA History of Warfare.
by Jimmy Carter
The New York Times
BLUF. The report describes the total failure of the present global antidrug effort, and in particular America's "war on drugs," which was declared 40 years ago today. It notes that the global consumption of opiates has increased 34.5 percent, cocaine 27 percent and cannabis 8.5 percent from 1998 to 2008. Its primary recommendations are to substitute treatment for imprisonment for people who use drugs but do no harm to others, and to concentrate more coordinated international effort on combating violent criminal organizations rather than nonviolent, low-level offenders.
Much more at The New York Times
