Russia’s long-range air attacks—one of its last remaining advantages over Ukraine—are increasingly becoming neutralized and ineffective, leaving the Kremlin few remaining cards to play as it continues to lose its war against Ukraine
Journal
Journal Articles are typically longer works with more more analysis than the news and short commentary in the SWJ Blog.
We accept contributed content from serious voices across the small wars community, then publish it here as quickly as we can, per our Editorial Policy, to help fuel timely, thoughtful, and unvarnished discussion of the diverse and complex issues inherent in small wars.
by Ian Edgerly | Mon, 01/09/2023 - 8:44pm | 2 comments
As all facets of the United States national security apparatus slowly come to terms with the implications and meaning of a policy shift towards strategic competition, albeit one that began during the Obama administration, several larger questions have become glaringly apparent. Of those larger policy level inquiries, such as a deeper identification of what “integrated deterrence” really consists of, and whether or not the geostrategic context actually resembles a Cold War environment, the one that concerns this article’s inquiry is what exactly comprises United States foreign policy as it relates to military affairs. Although this is an extremely deep question that has been pondered upon by some of the great minds in history, this article will specifically make the case that within the United States Army special operations community, education can in fact take the form of and directly impact foreign policy aims and goals. Arguably a “blip” on the radar of most organizations within the Department of Defense, regional expertise and culture education that is provided within operational and deployable Army special operations forces has the capability to directly impact the enactment of foreign policy goals for several factors that are discussed within this article. Indeed, making this type of education more robust can help to ensure the overall success within a strategic competition environment.
by Bol Ring | Sun, 01/08/2023 - 8:08pm | 0 comments
The Army has recognized the need to adapt to environmental changes, prompting senior leaders to develop a comprehensive strategy to implement an Army-wide organizational change focusing on taking care of the Soldiers. "We win through our people, and people will drive success in our Readiness, Modernization, and Reform priorities. We must take care of our people" (Gen. McConville, Army People Strategy, 2019. p. 2). With Army People Strategy directives, the Army senior leaders direct the force to execute a total organizational change focusing on prioritizing taking care of the People. However, operationalizing the commander's intent will require examining the current work environment. The most important element in the work environment is the People.
by Daniel H. McCauley | Sun, 01/08/2023 - 7:59pm | 0 comments
Over the past few decades, the conduct of war has changed significantly. Non-military means are now far more effective than traditional military means in achieving enduring national security objectives. The increased use of information, social, humanitarian, political, economic and other non-military means have dramatically accelerated the real and potential change resident in today’s security environment. As a result, most strategic civilian and military leaders have not yet adjusted their thinking to enable their nation or organization to adjust to this rapidly evolving global security reality. In short, they are failing to think and act strategically in pursuit of their preferred future.
by Peter Roberto , by Erik Kacprzyk | Sun, 01/08/2023 - 7:49pm | 0 comments
The wake of Russia’s once unimaginable invasion of Ukraine has put Europe at war for the first time in nearly a century. All signs point towards a resurgence of Cold War tensions as Finland and Sweden finalize discussions to join NATO, NATO bolsters its rapid reaction force to include 300,000 soldiers from its previous 40,000, and the U.S. plans to add a new headquarters in Poland. However, this movement to secure NATO members on the border with Russia may be futile if NATO and the U.S. do not address Russia’s exploitation of private military companies and the legal cover they provide. As a result, Europe and NATO now find themselves once unimaginable times and must anticipate unimaginable threats to their sovereignty. However, the ever-expanding sanctions imposed from a wide range of states, such as the U.S., the European Union, and even the traditionally neutral Switzerland, can be further enhanced by utilizing tools often used for counterterrorism.
by William Tynan | Sun, 01/08/2023 - 5:40pm | 0 comments
In early October of 2022, the U.S. Army published its newest doctrine on multidomain operations. This timing, while likely unintentional, coincided with the release of the National Defense Strategy and leaders across the U.S. government will need to align their efforts based on new requirements. As shown in Ukraine, leadership must continue to address asymmetric warfare to enact policy and protect our interests.
by Zachariah Lee Parcels | Sun, 01/08/2023 - 5:03pm | 0 comments
This paper analyses cooperation between the Nihon Sekigun (Japanese Red Army; JRA), or Araba Sekigun (Arab Red Army), and The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s (PFLP) Special Operations Group (SOG) that was autonomous under the PFLP until being expelled in 1972. Using Moghadam’s (2017) terrorist cooperation typology as a theoretical framework, this paper examines PFLP-SOG-JRA cooperative activities between a terrorist entrepreneur, informal networks, and a terrorist organisation. PFLP-SOG-JRA activity denotes networked cooperation, or collaborations between a terrorist organisation and informal terrorist actors (i.e., informal networks or terrorist entrepreneurs; Moghadam, 2017, p. 97). This networked cooperation manifested mainly into variations of Moghadam’s (2017) second, third, and fourth variants (p. 103; see APPENDIX II). Terrorism cooperation hereafter describes “formal or informal collaborative arrangements between two or more actors who employ terrorist tactics in the pursuit of joint interests” (Moghadam, 2017, p. 8). Terrorism, albeit no definitional consensus existing, might be defined as “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change” by a “subnational group or nonstate entity” (Hoffman, 2006, p. 40; see also Ganor, 2002). This paper posits that pre-1974 JRA is a merger of informal networks while PFLP-SOG is its patron and a “network of networks” characteristically akin to post-9/11 al Qaeda.
by Tom Ordeman, Jr. | Fri, 01/06/2023 - 9:16pm | 10 comments
In recent weeks, the topic of the DoD's mastery of Irregular Warfare (IW) - one flavor of this being counterinsurgency (COIN) - has received some long overdue discussion, initially in an article in The Hill penned by a team of authors including LTG Charles T. Cleveland (Ret.), former commander of U.S. Army Special Operations Command; and COL David Maxwell (Ret.), a distinguished former Army Special Forces officer and Editor-in-Chief of the Small Wars Journal. Discussion continues in several contributions to the latter publication.
by Sean W Dummitt | Thu, 01/05/2023 - 6:47pm | 1 comment
A principal-agent problem occurs “when the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is doing.”U.S. policymakers and members of the Special Operations community often present this problem when evaluating the relationship between the U.S. and its Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) partners in Syria. The principal–U.S. Special Operations Forces–and the agent–Syrian Democratic Forces– were once aligned in their objectives during large-scale combat operations to defeat the Da'esh physical caliphate until the group's collapse in 2019. Today, however, the landscape of the battlefield is starkly different, necessitating renewed deliberation. This article argues that a principal-agent problem still does not exist between the U.S. and the SDF in Syria. It will demonstrate that the SDF remain a dependable partner in ensuring the enduring defeat of Da'esh, countering the Iranian Threat Network, and avoiding escalation with Turkey. This assertion will be examined through three fundamental transformations in the military environment since the introduction of Special Operations advisors in 2015: the transition from combat operations to regional security, facing the Iranian Threat Network, and restraining from escalating with a NATO ally.
by Ernest Bosompem Darkwah | Thu, 01/05/2023 - 6:25pm | 1 comment
Contemporary unconventional wars require interventions by the international community to prevent genocides and also protect civilians from the scourge of war. The characteristics of Special Operations Forces make them suitable for such wars. Even though the United Nations have deployed Special Operations Forces in some mission areas, they are not being utilized to its full capacity. Additionally, not all United Nations missions deploy with Special Operation Forces. Limitations of regular forces deployed in United Nations missions restrict them in the conduct of their duties. Traditional peacekeepers deploy in cities and towns where they can have access to air or sea ports for resupply. Resources available to force headquarters in peace operations do not also allow wide deployment of units.
by Jason L. Glenn | Wed, 01/04/2023 - 8:39pm | 0 comments
According to the Department of the Army (2019), Army design methodology (ADM) is a system of creative thinking and critical reasoning that assists the commander and staff in visualizing and understanding problems within an operational environment (OE). Additionally, ADM is a tool used in the conceptual planning process that fuels the military decision-making process (MDMP) with a problem set for further analysis and development of a course of action. The activities associated with ADM include framing the OE, framing problems, framing solutions, and reframing as necessary while utilizing specific tools, techniques, and key concepts (Department of the Army, 2015). The synthesis of framing activities, key concepts, tools, techniques, the role of the senior enlisted leader, and the Ia Drang battle in Vietnam will highlight the importance of the ADM framing activity within a genuine OE.
by Charlie Black | Tue, 01/03/2023 - 9:31pm | 1 comment
Let’s begin with stating that this forum is great for candid debate. I applaud James Armstrong who came out swinging in his recent rebuttal to an article authored by LTG Cleveland et al. Unfortunately, his article mischaracterizes the many causal factors of a two-decade long war and misplaces blame for associated military failures that are shared by many, elected and appointed.
The Oblique Approach to Irregular Warfare: Civil Affairs as the main effort in Strategic Competition
by Juan Quiroz | Tue, 01/03/2023 - 7:41pm | 0 commentsRussia’s invasion of Ukraine is a wakeup call to U.S policymakers and defense leaders that our approach to Irregular Warfare (IW) requires reevaluation because the conflict has also impacted the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) strategic calculus for annexing Taiwan. If like Russia the PRC resorts to military action to satisfy its territorial ambitions the world would be plunged into economic chaos, and millions of civilians would be caught in the crossfire, to say nothing of the cost to our armed forces. To head off this disastrous scenario, our leaders need a new IW approach that multiplies all aspects of national power (diplomacy, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement – DIME-FIL). Instead of focusing hardening partners’ defensive posture to survive large scale conflict, our new approach should proactively disrupt and degrade Chinese influence, depriving the PRC of the diplomatic, informational, and economic tools that set conditions for military action. Because of their training and institutional experience dealing with these non-military domains, U.S. Army Civil Affairs (CA) forces need to transition from their current role as a supporting effort to maneuver and special operations forces to become the main DoD action arm for future IW campaigns focused on strategic competition.
by Gustavo A. Arguello | Tue, 01/03/2023 - 5:39pm | 2 comments
On 3 October 1993, during operation codename Gothic-Serpent, United States special operators in Mogadishu, Somalia, had the task of capturing high-ranking members of Aidid’s militia. The operators executed Gothic-Serpent as part of Task Force Ranger, under the overall command-and-control of General Garrison, the commanding officer who directed the capture of the high-ranking militia lieutenants. Participants expected the mission to last 30 minutes, but the battle extended overnight and eventually became the bloodiest battle since the Vietnam war. According to the case study “The successes and failures of the battle of Mogadishu and its effects on U.S. foreign policy”, the Gothic-Serpent met its operational goal despite the number of casualties in the 15-hour battle (Dotson, 2016).
by James Armstrong | Tue, 01/03/2023 - 8:39am | 6 comments
This opinion piece is written directly in response to the words of LTG(R) Cleveland, himself a former commander of US Army Special Operations Command, Special Operations Command Central, Special Operations Command South, and 10th Special Forces Group.
I will point out the first great big elephant in the room, “Irregular Warfare” is largely the responsibility of the US Army as the primary land force for the DOD. The US Air Force, US Navy, and US Marine Corps do have a role to play, but by large the personnel and resources for waging any warfare where “the human dimension” is the critical factor reside within the US Army’s “campaign quality.” People mostly live in the land domain, and that’s why the US Army must master irregular warfare. Any push at professionalizing the Department of Defense on irregular warfare, we must first professionalize the entire US Army on irregular warfare.
by Chris Telley | Mon, 01/02/2023 - 12:11pm | 2 comments
When discussing the potential for a war over Taiwan, it is difficult for many pundits to escape the metaphorical traps of Graham Allison’s book Destined for War. However, Allison’s 1914 case study of the escalation toward the First World War, and most of anyone else’s discussion of the outbreak of that conflict, misses a fairly large risk that should move Beijing’s contemporary partners to push for calm. The economic crisis of July 1914 offers a parable, even for those far removed from the familiar flashpoints, through which to examine various market consequences that might be expected after a People’s Republic of China (PRC) escalation in the Straits of Taiwan. Those risks should be on the mind of every corporate or government leader as they decide on what to say, or not say, to Beijing about its so-called “internal matter.”
by Ella Busch | Mon, 01/02/2023 - 11:59am | 0 comments
“The bird is freed.” With these words, @elonmusk announced his official takeover of the Twitter platform on October 27, 2022 at 11:49pm.[1] Elon Musk, the CEO of Tesla -and now Twitter- bought the company for $44 billion this fall. His implementation of a “Twitter 2.0” has been nothing short of problematic, with his self-proclaimed “extremely hard-core” workplace strategy[2] resulting in the resignations of half of the company’s previous 7,500 employees. As the company’s sole board member, Musk has used this authority to apply his personal ideology of unmoderated speech, or “free speech absolutism” to Twitter. The company has already stopped enforcing its previous Covid-19 misinformation policy, reinstated formerly-banned accounts (including that of former President Donald Trump), and has scaled back its moderation efforts.[3] This lack of moderation risks more than the circulation of false or hurtful communications: it is likely to cause extremists to flock to the platform in order to take advantage of unregulated speech, disseminate propaganda, and radicalize potential recruits to terrorist groups. Twitter’s new ownership and content moderation standards will worsen far right extremism in the US because they allow for the creation and spread of far-right extremist (FRE) propaganda as well as the reemergence of figures that inspire and unify the far-right. To mitigate this risk across all social media platforms, the United States must amend its current legislation relating to corporate responsibility in moderating hate speech online.
by Andrew Loftesnes | Sun, 01/01/2023 - 11:47pm | 0 comments
The unprovoked Russian war of aggression against the sovereign state of Ukraine is the most stark case of good and evil since the Second World War. The Russian state is waging a genocidal campaign in order to manifest the imperial ambitions of a single evil man. Vladimir Putin undoubtedly has been emboldened after years of indiscriminate and consequence-free slaughter of the Syrian people, and by the unopposed annexation of Crimea in 2014. Any policy which aims to achieve anything short of an unquestionably defeated Russia is against the national security interests of the United States, and a moral calamity. But there are other times and places to talk about policy. I want to talk to you about the Ukrainian people.
by Julio Garzon | Sun, 01/01/2023 - 11:34pm | 1 comment
One of the most spirited and lasting discussions among historians pits practitioners against their methods over the utility of the discipline in explaining human behavior. Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May make a compelling contribution to the above the debate. This review evaluates Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers by concentrating on the following areas: a primer on the authors’ background and their intended audience; the book’s general content; a brief overview of two previous reviews of the work that comment on its contributions and limitations; the main strengths of their arguments; and a set of concluding observations on the book’s general quality.
by Brian E. Frydenborg | Sun, 01/01/2023 - 11:08pm | 0 comments
There is much Conventional Wisdom out there that the coming winter will mean major combat operations will halt in Ukraine and a general pause in the war, that winter means windows and opportunities will close for Ukraine or that Ukraine is somehow at a disadvantage once winter sets in. Before Ukraine retook Kherson City, you could easily find commentary that Ukraine needed to rack up victories before the winter sets it, that, somehow, winter would force Ukraine or both sides to dig in and regroup and await a thaw for a return to bigger battles.
by Otto C. Fiala | Sat, 12/31/2022 - 10:12pm | 0 comments
In 2014, immediately prior to the Russian invasion of Crimean, US Special Operations Command – Europe (SOCEUR) began an effort to examine the concept of resistance, based on the vulnerable exposure of the three Baltic NATO allies of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This vulnerability centered on the lack of NATO conventional forces in that northeast corner of NATO to offer ground-based deterrence to a possible Russian incursion. The question became; what was available, besides the unlikely use of nuclear weapons, to deter and if necessary to defend those nations in case of Russian invasion? The short answer, soon to be further developed, was resistance. Then, within several months, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea. The resistance effort quickly moved from an academic thought exercise to resurrecting a form of irregular warfare, resulting in a written Resistance Operating Concept (ROC). Though with northern European roots, it has geographically broader application as a form of irregular warfare. This article will examine resilience and resistance in Ukraine primarily from a ROC based perspective and also identify new developments based on events in Ukraine and how they fit into the concept of resistance.
by Douglas A. Borer , by Shannon C. Houck | Sat, 12/31/2022 - 9:55pm | 0 comments
Since the mid-1970s, defending the Asia-Pacific Area of Responsibility has fallen primarily to the US Navy. Having no war to fight in theater since Korea and Vietnam, the conventional US Army and Marine Corp assumed a supporting role for intermittent troop surges in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, during the last twenty years, the U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) have been highly active in the counter-terrorism fight throughout Asia while simultaneously building foreign partnership capacity across the region. Today, in late 2022, with the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a Naval power, the conventional US Army, Marine Corps, and SOF must all show their relevance to the Navy-lead Joint Force as it prepares for a peer-to-peer fight with a PRC that now has more ships than the U.S. Distributed and networked land-based forces, mostly consisting of very small units, should be seen as platforms of integrated deterrence in the same manner that surface ships, submarines, and aircraft are viewed today.
by Yurij Holowinsky | Sat, 11/26/2022 - 8:18pm | 0 comments
The world is witnessing the horrors of full-scale war in Ukraine, and some are beginning to offer the advice that Ukraine should seek peace with Russia. Those who do so do not understand Ukraine and Ukrainians; the unstoppable passion of a people awoken and pursuing the goal of real freedom.
by Rafael Velázquez Flores | Tue, 11/22/2022 - 11:24am | 2 comments
This memorial essay by Rafael Velazquez Flores celebrates the life and work of Mexican scholar Jorge Chabat (1956−2022).
| Sun, 11/20/2022 - 11:39pm | 0 comments
(Editor’s Note: Flavius Belisarius reads the SWJ National Security and Korea News and Commentary daily. Below he comments on three articles from last week and provides a unique perspective worth pondering to help us answer the question of “How Can We Do What We Do Better?”)
by Bill Edwards | Fri, 11/11/2022 - 11:13am | 1 comment
The war in Ukraine has proven one explicable truth, the convergence of commercial off-the-shelf drone technology with the military-industrial complex (MIC) drone platform is here to stay and possibly the first military revolution we’ve seen since the advent of the nuclear age.
by Amos C. Fox | Thu, 11/10/2022 - 10:05pm | 0 comments
The Russo-Ukrainian War provides an exorbitant amount of information for the security and defense studies communities, much of which is too immature, or insufficiently detailed to stake out ‘lessons learned.’ Nonetheless, examining urban operations from the macro-level, that is, above the movement of troops and individual formations, provides several noticeable trends. Most notably, urban operations in Ukraine demonstrate that attrition is how wars between industrialized nations are fought, won, and lost. Next, dislocation, or the effect of rendering an adversary’s strength irrelevant through position, function, time, or will, is germane to fighting and winning wars of attrition. As a result of these two features of urban warfare, sharply brought into focus by the Russo-Ukrainian War, Western militaries must make doctrine, organization, and training adjustments to how they think about and prepare for future war. This paper provides a set of principles for urban operations, based on these findings, to help orient the community of interest toward that end.
by Robert C. Jones | Mon, 11/07/2022 - 9:59am | 0 comments
Blaming people like Donald Trump for instability is easy – but it is wrong as well. Trump is far more symptom than causation. He is a symptom of a deep and growing sense of outrage and abandonment felt across a vast and diverse segment of our nation. To ignore that grievance and fixate on symptoms places the stability of our nation at risk. It places our democracy at risk. As a retired Green Beret Colonel, and as a special operations strategist I have spent a lifetime studying and participating in the drivers of political instability. If I could offer one insight it is simply this: the old playbook is obsolete.
by Daniel Rice | Thu, 11/03/2022 - 8:17pm | 8 comments
The war in Ukraine will end at some point. When, and under what terms, is unknown and still to be determined. But when it does end, there needs to be an international security force in Ukraine to ensure Russia never invades again. In hindsight, after Russia invaded and illegally annexed the Donbas and Crimea in 2014, an international security force should have been installed in Ukraine. Had the international community done so, we would not likely be in this massive war.
by Jonathan D. Rosen | Tue, 11/01/2022 - 11:01pm | 1 comment
This paper reviews recent gang crackdowns by Salvadoran President Nayib Buckle. El Salvador is home to some of the most powerful gangs in the Western Hemisphere: Mara Salvatrucha or MS-13, the 18th Street Southerners, and the 18th Street Revolutionaries. These gangs compete for control of territory and are present in more than 90 percent of the municipalities in El Salvador.
by Daniel Rice | Fri, 10/28/2022 - 8:56pm | 0 comments
It occurred to me that Ukraine is the closest we have to a modern-day Sparta. This war has affected every single member of Ukrainian society, for years, starting with the Russian invasion of 2014 and the illegal annexation of Crimea and Donbas.
by Isaac Poritzky, by Nathan P. Jones, by John P. Sullivan | Mon, 10/24/2022 - 6:28pm | 7 comments
This article is a mixed methods research study, using social network analysis (SNA), on the Mexican Mafia (La Eme) and La Familia Michoacana (La Familia or LFM), with a focus on their alliance, dubbed “The Project.” Using two indictments of the Mexican Mafia that included an attempt to establish a permanent relationship with the Mexican La Familia drug cartel.
by Daniel Weisz | Mon, 10/17/2022 - 8:46pm | 1 comment
Book review of Janice K. Gallagher's "Bootstrap Justice" by SWJ−El Centro Associate Daniel Weisz Argomedo. "Bootstrap Justice" examines criminal violence and impunity in Mexico.
by Hy Rothstein | Mon, 10/17/2022 - 11:00am | 1 comment
“What is past is prologue" is a quotation by William Shakespeare from his play The Tempest. In contemporary use the phrase means that history sets the context for the present. This phrase does not apply to the decision to rename U.S. military bases. While Congressional and military leaders may have good reasons to take these actions today, we are very fortunate that the leaders of the post-Civil War period did not think like today’s leaders. If they did, it is very likely that the country would have been racked by insurgency and the Union would have not survived after winning the war.
by James Steels | Sat, 10/15/2022 - 2:16pm | 0 comments
On 24th February 2022 Russia launched an invasion of Ukraine that Putin described as a ‘special military operation’. It has been promoted that one of the reasons behind the wider Ukraine conflict and this particular invasion is due to Putin wanting to absorb old Soviet Bloc countries back into Russia because he has a dream of recreating and bringing back the Soviet Union. This is not entirely true. Putin himself has said: ‘Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart. Whoever wants it back has no brain’. So what is the root cause behind the Ukraine war and what has been Russia’s approach to this international security issue?
by Brent Stricker | Sat, 10/15/2022 - 2:02pm | 0 comments
After withdrawing from much of the territory it occupied in Kharkov Oblast, the Russian military has turned to a new strategy of attacking civilian infrastructure, such as the power grid and dams. On September 14, 2022, Russian Aerospace Forces attacked the Karachunivske dam at Kyvyi Rih, the hometown of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Evidence from various Telegram Channels show that water flow to the city has ceased, forcing civilians to purchase bottled water. Anton Gerashchenko, adviser to the Ukrainian Interior Minister tweeted, “Rockets were directed at hydraulic structures. This caused water level of Inhulets river to increase, threatening the city.” Russia conducted a second attack with ballistic missiles on the Pechenihy dam on the Siverskiy Donets river on September 24. These attacks on civilian objects are controversial because they may violate the law of armed conflict.
by Christopher Williams | Fri, 10/14/2022 - 9:41am | 0 comments
This story, and others like it, linger as vivid in my memory as visceral in my soul. It is her story, not mine, but I trust history's annals to deem it worthy of record. I’m not sure how else these stories will be told — from who’s perspective — or how long it will take me to dig more out of the caverns of my skull, as occult as the human mind ever remains.
by Brian E. Frydenborg | Wed, 10/12/2022 - 7:24pm | 0 comments
This Is the Beginning of the End of the War. The current Ukrainian advances will be the ones to push Russian ground forces completely out of Ukraine, leaving any remaining combat to take place on or just over the border with Russia or with longer-range systems, ending major ground combat operations on Ukrainian soil
by Daniel Rice | Mon, 10/10/2022 - 3:06pm | 1 comment
In most modern wars, bridges are fought over, defended, and attacked. They can be decisive to both battles and wars. In military terms, bridges are " key terrain.” Capturing a bridge can allow an attacker the means to quickly cross with large numbers of troops, depending on the capacity of the bridge. Bridges are also key terrain along lines of communication in support of logistics. The loss of a key bridge, on the other hand, can trap forces in a dangerous situation. Many of the most pivotable battles in history have had bridges as the key terrain, leading to either victory or defeat. The bridges of Ukraine, and a superior Ukrainian strategy with regards to the bridges, will likely prove to be one of the keys to defeating Russia.
by Thomas Macias | Sun, 10/09/2022 - 1:03pm | 12 comments
Students of military strategy are familiar with Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, but what about Homer? The works of the ancient Greek poet credited with composing The Iliad and The Odyssey are most often remembered for legendary battles, meddlesome gods, and mortal heroes who fight like caffeinated hornets. Entertainment value aside, these epics serve a higher purpose. On the surface, these stories are allegories or fables occurring in mythical settings. In reality, these works are classical seminars on leadership and crisis management. Instead of TED Talks or slide presentations, Homer’s enduring principles are brought to life through unforgettable characters and scenarios. Given the enduring nature of war as a human activity, Homer’s insights remain pertinent to conflicts of all eras. This includes the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Boiled down to Twitter-size, Homer’s three-thousand-year-old message is that "It's all been done before."
(Editor's Note: The classics remain very relevant. Note the author's bio).
by Marco Leofrigio | Sun, 10/09/2022 - 1:16am | 1 comment
This essay by Italian security analyst Marco Leofrigio looks at the current controversy surrounding the evolution of Mexico's Guardia Nacional (National Guard).
by Nicholas Krohley | Wed, 10/05/2022 - 7:06am | 0 comments
The new great game is under way. The rules-based global order is unraveling, and America’s rivals are making moves. Russia has staggered wildly into Ukraine, undeterred by the West. China is flexing its economic muscles across the Global South, currying high-level influence among dictators and democrats alike—while steadily massing resources for a potential move on Taiwan.
by John Farinelli | Sun, 10/02/2022 - 7:42pm | 0 comments
Russia views cyber espionage and information warfare as a vital element of their continued military strategy, hence the continued and persistent effort to exert their cyber influence around the world. Between 2018 and 2020, Russia’s cyber espionage and information warfare actions were found in eighty-five countries, totaling six continents and sixteen world regions. Under President Vladimir Putin, Russia has become one of the most prolific actors in cyberspace in the world as his approach is not only to undermine the target, but to influence the target population’s perceptions in ways that favor Russian interests.
This paper presents the history of Russian cyber espionage and information warfare by highlighting examples of cyber-attacks and the rationality that led up to them. Following the historical analysis are the types of Russian cyber-attacks, the specific groups behind these attacks, and the motives behind them. The paper concludes by analyzing the state of Russian cyber espionage and information warfare, including an assessment of future attacks and targets in Russia’s future.
by Brian E. Frydenborg | Sun, 10/02/2022 - 6:06pm | 0 comments
Putin’s mobilization is myopically feared by some but does more damage to him at home than anything to help the war effort, the dynamics of which have been set and cannot be altered by this mobilization or “referenda,” gimmicks that reek of desperation and prove Russia is losing even to Russians
by John P. Sullivan, by José de Arimatéia da Cruz, by Robert Bunker | Tue, 09/27/2022 - 9:03pm | 1 comment
Areas controlled by criminal armed groups (CAGs) in Rio de Janeiro grew by 131% over the past 16 years according to a new study released jointly by the Instituto Fogo Cruzado (Cross-Fire Institute), Grupo de Estudos dos Novos Ilegalismos (Study Group for New Illegalisms) at Universidade Federal Fluminense (Fluminense Federal University) (GENI/UFF) on 13 September 2022. Militias were the fastest growing group, expanding rapidly in suburbs while narcotrafficking gangs retained control of favelas.
by Daniel Rice | Tue, 09/27/2022 - 12:16am | 1 comment
Russia indiscriminately targeted civilians with air-dropped cluster bombs in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Georgia, Donbas, Crimea, Syria and again in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Targeting civilians is a blatant and clear war crime. Russia has never been charged for these intentional war crimes which represent a pattern of behavior that should not only be charged as war crimes, but should cause it to be designated a State Sponsor of Terror.
by Tom Johansmeyer | Mon, 09/26/2022 - 10:14pm | 0 comments
We’ve heard about wars fought for oil for the past century, even if the concept has been exaggerated a bit. In the future, the contested commodity could shift from fossil fuels to water. More than 15% of the world’s water conflicts over the past 4,000 years have arisen since 2020. The notion that wars are fought for resources is almost beyond dispute, and there could be more drivers of conflict coming. Often seen as an alternative to fossil fuels, for which wars clearly have been fought, renewable energy could lead to its own resource conflicts.
by Hannah Wallace | Sat, 09/24/2022 - 2:30am | 0 comments
Along the Iranian border in Syria’s Deir Ezzor province, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) recently purchased two homes and tracts of adjacent land for 700 million Syrian pounds (US$150,000) with the funds provided by Iran’s Hajj organization. A massive new hotel will soon be built on the spot, according to Abdulaziz Al-Sawadi, head of the Political Bureau of the Liberation and Construction Movement, to accommodate Iranian and Iraqi pilgrims.
by James Steels | Sat, 09/24/2022 - 2:22am | 0 comments
In September 2022 Taiwan intercepted and shot down a Chinese surveillance drone that Taiwan said had violated the airspace over one of the islands that they control located off the coast of China. China responded by stating that this was an attempt by Taiwan to ‘hype up tensions’. Was the shooting down of this drone a reckless response from Taiwan, or is China creating a provocation in an attempt to deliberately construct a security issue with Taiwan
by R. McCreight | Fri, 09/16/2022 - 5:26pm | 8 comments
What is the strategic value of a covert technology that has consistently displayed a capability to disable and permanently impair basic thought, perception and inflict degrading effects on human neuro-cognitive motor skills? Is it significant but far less than strategic? Non-kinetic yet still strategic in impact? What if an adversary intent on harming US military and civilian leadership could unleash and deploy this technology without fear of detection? What if that adversary knew the US targets had no way to protect themselves from the insidious effects of this covert technology? This is neuro-cognitive warfare which has been taking place during the last decade and which allows an aggressor to attain a degree of strategic leverage and influence literally without firing a shot.