Small Wars Journal

Should Cadet's NFL Status Keep Him Out of Iraq?

Wed, 04/30/2008 - 12:17pm

Call of Duty

Should Cadet's NFL Status Keep Him Out of Iraq? - Tom Weir and Reid Cherner, USA Today.

.... But [Caleb] Campbell also belongs to another fraternity -- at the U.S. military academy. His selection in the seventh round Sunday made him the first cadet taken in the NFL draft since Green Bay chose quarterback Ronnie McAda in 1997.

Ignoring players from the Army, Navy or Air Force academies is understandable, considering their commitment to serve in the military after completing college. But Campbell could break ground. He could become the first football player to take full advantage of a new rule that allows athletes with pro potential to fulfill their military commitment as an Army recruiter and with time in the reserves...

An Officer and a Linebacker for the NFL by Judy Battista, New York Times.

... The Army's hope is that talented people, like elite athletes or musicians, can help promote the service and boost recruiting. But the Army has also found itself defending the policy, which drew little attention before Sunday. Before this year, five former West Point athletes were accepted into the program. In the next few days, Campbell will join two Army teammates who signed free-agent contracts at N.F.L. minicamps. They are beneficiaries of a policy that allows them to start their playing careers sooner than they would had they played for Air Force or for Navy.

If he makes the Lions' roster, Campbell will most likely spend his off days and the off-season recruiting for the Army in the Detroit area. But his real job, he said, will be playing football. And that is enough to satisfy the Army...

Discuss at Small Wars Council

All The News That's... A Rebuttal

Tue, 04/29/2008 - 10:28pm
All The News That's... A Rebuttal

By Jill Russell

I have known Bob Bateman several years through our mutual participation in H-War, another internet forum, and from that experience I have great respect for him. However, I must disagree with his dismissive critique of David Barstow's New York Times article. To the contrary, I would argue that the muted tones of the piece belied problems far deeper than would be inferred from his recent blog post. That retired officers are acting as the puppets of DoD in their role as network and cable news military analysts is troubling when examined within the historical context of the Vietnam War's effect upon the credibility of military officers and the subsequent decades-long effort to restore their reputation for integrity. Thus, if the NYT article deserves criticism (1) , I would submit it's for missing the real significance, in big historic terms, of the military "analyst" story.

It may seem almost heretical to suggest, but the single greatest casualty of the Vietnam War for the American military was not the damage done to cohesion and morale, or training and readiness. These are actually fairly common occurrences in the aftermath of any American war, successful or not. (2) Rather, the real tragedy of that war was the American public's loss of faith in the credibility of the military leadership. And although there is constant scholarly (and other) jousting as to the outcome and ramifications of the Tet Offensive, what cannot be disputed is that it was at this point in the war that the American people began to doubt the veracity of what they heard from their nation's officers. The constant repetition that the "light at the end of the tunnel" was in sight, that the war's successful conclusion was just around the corner, could not be squared with the events of '68.

Over the course of the three decades that followed the end of the Vietnam War, the armed forces worked mightily to improve their reputation with the American public. Consider the institution most damaged by this effect of the Vietnam War, the Army. According to John Brinsfield's 1998 Parameters article, "Army Values and Ethics: A Search for Consistency and Relevance," "no other army improved itself as extensively in the eyes of the public as an organization worthy of trust and support as did the United States Army between 1968 and 1991." Later in the article, he provides a measure of the distance traveled by the Army in regaining the public's confidence:

"A 1973 Harris poll had revealed that by the end of the Vietnam War, the American public ranked the military only above sanitation workers in relative order of respect. (And some said that the sanitation workers had gotten a bum rap.) By 1989 a Harris survey found that Americans ranked the military above big business, organized labor, the medical community, banks, newspapers, Congress, television, newspapers, and even the Supreme Court in trust."

Another work, David King and Zachary Karabell's The Generation of Trust: Public Confidence in the U. S. Military Since Vietnam, chronicles this development in even greater detail across all of the services.

The success of these efforts continues to this day. A 2007 survey by Harvard's Kennedy School of Government shows that the military retains the public's highest level of confidence. Even four years into an unsuccessful war, when the administration's reputation has been ravaged by the course of events, the military's status as a trustworthy institution has not even faltered.

Given this standing, the American public is prepared to put great faith in the pronouncements of military personnel, whether they are on active duty or are retired. The uniform, the legacy of service, the short haircut and ramrod posture, etc., all combine to form a powerful image of the individual's respectability. When they speak, people listen.

We must also remember that the audience's perception of these "military analysts" is that they are speaking to the American people based upon their professional expertise. This is clearly how they are marketed in their appearances. After all, "Pentagon Puppet" does not appear under their names when they are on air. Speaking from their professional expertise, their opinions would likely have been accorded a great deal of weight with the audience. And according to the article the administration appreciated the pride of place these analysts held in their incarnations as media pundits. The following excerpts from various points in the article make this clear:

"The analysts, they noticed, often got more airtime than network reporters, and they were not merely explaining the capabilities of Apache helicopters. They were framing how viewers ought to interpret events. What is more, while the analysts were in the news media, they were not of the news media."

"Mr. Di Rita, no longer at the Defense Department, said in an interview that a 'conscious decision' was made to rely on the military analysts to counteract 'the increasingly negative view of the war' coming from journalists in Iraq. The analysts.... and the combination of their TV platforms and military cachet made them ideal for rebutting critical coverage of issues like troop morale, treatment of detainees, inadequate equipment or poorly trained Iraqi security forces. 'On those issues, they were more likely to be seen as credible spokesmen,' he said."

"An internal memorandum in 2005 helped explain why [the military analysts had such access to DoD's power center]. The memorandum, written by a Pentagon official who had accompanied analysts to Iraq, said that based on her observations during the trip, the analysts 'are having a greater impact' on network coverage of the military. 'They have now become the go-to guys not only on breaking stories, but they influence the views on issues,' she wrote."

Furthermore, the burnished reputation of retired officers has been such that they are often used to speak on any matters related to the armed forces, whether their expertise warranted it. One example of this that I recall was a segment done by CNN with one of their "analysts," a retired Army General, whose charge it was to discuss how something done by Sen. Reid was harming the morale of the families of deployed personnel. (3) I sat there watching in disbelief, the family member of a Marine deployed to Fallujah, and I just wanted to crawl through the TV screen and throttle the man. Not only was he completely wrong about what affected my morale, but who was he to speak to the issue as an expert? I hate to break it to you military folks, but the experience of the family left at home is not your bailiwick. To turn the tables and make my point, consider: My husband has been to war -- does that make me competent to speak to what it's like to be shot at? However, I have no doubt that to many folks such a comment from a general, so shiny and pretty, must have had an effect on their thinking about the issue. I can just hear the conversation between John and Jane Q. Public over morning coffee: "Honey, I think Sen. Reid is correct, but what about the military families?" "No, we can't hurt them, think of their sacrifices!" "Yes, we'll have to rethink our opinion, because we care." "Yes, we wouldn't want people to think we don't support the troops!"

My original response to the piece was personal; I was peeved at having this general misrepresent my struggle and hardships. In light of Barstow's article, however, I have had occasion to rethink this episode. Given the administration's use of the "Support the Troops" mantra to blunt any public or official contradiction of the party line, the general's comments must be reconsidered. I am now left to wonder whether he was not broadcasting a DoD talking point meant to sway public opinion against Reid. After all, possibly the worst offense to the Yellow Ribbon Policy would be to harm military personnel via the demoralization of the families left behind. I feel dirty and badly used.

And this is the crux of the real tragedy of this story. The American public was being peddled the administration's positions as if they were the opinions of independent analysts. The audience had an expectation that these officers were providing them with a professional's view of information about the war, strategy, operations, tactics, etc. And that trust was betrayed.

Don't get me wrong. I think the networks deserve a swift kick in the head for allowing themselves to be the unwitting Johns to DoD's pundit pimping. And this certainly won't help their reputation with the public. But, in the end, the media is not my primary concern.

The real threat, however, is to the reputation of the armed forces and its current and future leaders. There is no separation between these retirees and the active duty folks -- the latter are affected by the actions of the former. The reputation of all officers will be tarnished if the public feels they were deceived by these analysts. Does anyone think it would be good for the country to return to the days when the military did not hold the esteem or trust of the public?

Alternatively, and far more scary, is the prospect for a more serious criticism of the officer corps at large. To be blunt, what do these activities say about the character of senior military officers? If they were —to betray the quality of their professional opinions in favor of scripted talking points, access to the powerful, and a fatter wallet, then what can be concluded about the development of integrity and character within the officer corps? I'm not at the point of being pessimistic in my answers to these questions. But I can't help asking them.

Jill Russell holds an MA from SAIS and is a doctoral candidate in Contemporary American Military History at The George Washington University. She is currently working to complete her dissertation, a socio-cultural history of morale and food and dining traditions in the American military. She has also worked as a defense contractor in Washington, DC.

Endnotes

(1) Quite frankly, I could care less about the money issue. To borrow Bob's mock horror, ooooh, someone tried to parlay prior government service to line their pockets after retirement, I'm so shocked. (I would prefer if they'd use their power for good, but that's another rant.) Nor am I bothered -- or surprised -- that the administration pursued developed such a program.

(2) I've just been reading a 1998 article by Brian Linn about the frontier Army of the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, and he chronicles similar problems at that time as well. We all know what came of that -- victory in two world wars. I would provide a link to the article, but it is not freely available. However, those with access to JSTOR or similar databases of journals should be able to access it. "Long Twilight of the Frontier Army," Western Historical Quarterly, Summer 1996.

(3) A good indication of how utterly unimportant Reid's alleged perfidy was to my morale at the time is the fact that I can't even remember what Reid was being pilloried for in the first place. The same cannot be said for the general's comments.

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Discuss at Small Wars Council

RNC Says Unfair on DNC Attack Ad

Tue, 04/29/2008 - 5:52pm
CNN reported earlier today that the Republican National Committee takes exception to a Democratic National Committee campaign ad they say misuses Senator John McCain's remarks on US troops staying in Iraq for "100 years" in such a way to paint an incorrect portrait of McCain's position on Iraq.

The Associated Press reported that he actually went on to say:

"As long as Americans are not being injured or harmed or wounded or killed, it's fine with me, and I hope it would be fine with you, if we maintain a presence in a very volatile part of the world where al-Qaida is training, recruiting, equipping and motivating people every single day."

The ad makes no distinction between sustained combat and other operations that require a much smaller US force footprint -- a training and advisory role comes to mind here. Here is the ad - you be the judge:

I agree with the RNC on this one.

On Strategy

Tue, 04/29/2008 - 3:25am
Two timely and well written items concerning US National Security Strategy - first up is Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Freier's op-ed The Strategy Deficit that was recently published by the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute.

An honest survey of post-Cold War national security policy exhibits a dangerous strategy deficit. The word "strategy" is overused. The concept, too, is poorly applied. It is many things to contemporary policymakers except, well—strategy. In the current environment, strategic communications and strategy have become synonymous. Strategic communications is the carefully crafted but overly general and widely consumable articulation of key political messages—"assure, deter, dissuade, defeat"; "as they stand up, we'll stand down"; "clear, hold, build"; "phased strategic redeployment"; etc, etc, etc. It is strategy by faí§ade versus strategy through effective, deliberate investment of intellectual, temporal, material, and human capital in pursuit of well-defined outcomes. Real strategy is the reasoned determination of specific, minimum essential objectives, rationalized with suitable ways to achieve them and the necessary means for success. No careful observer of executive decisionmaking since the end of the Cold War believes the latter high bar to be the norm...

The second item was recently published by the Center for a New American Security - Sustainable Security: Developing a Security Strategy for the Long Haul by Jim Thomas.

The inability of many states in the developing world to govern and police themselves effectively or to work collectively with their neigh­bors to secure their regions represents a global security capacity deficit that can threaten U.S. interests. Effectively addressing this security deficit will require a new approach, one that is more preventive and indirect in its nature, that seeks to husband American power, and that reconciles America's values, interests, and commitments with its finite resources over the long haul...

Both are well worth reading.

LTG Ray Odierno and COIN

Mon, 04/28/2008 - 6:45am
Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno Embodies 'Surge' in Iraq - Peter Spiegel, Los Angeles Times, 28 April 2008.

... So Odierno made a fateful move: He challenged his boss, Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr., to change the strategy. It was an opening salvo in the behind-the-scenes battle over what became known as the "surge."

And Odierno's challenge, though initially spurned, goes a long way toward explaining why he was nominated last week to succeed Army Gen. David H. Petraeus as the overall commander in Iraq.

The tall, intimidating artilleryman with a shaved head and a grave bearing was an early believer in what is now basic U.S. policy in Iraq. And he has proved he will stand up for it under fire.

Odierno's commitment to the new approach is all the stronger because he embraces it with the fervor of a convert. During his first tour in Iraq, in 2003 and 2004, critics charged that his dedication to overwhelming force and firepower was the antithesis of counterinsurgency doctrine.

As a result, although Petraeus has become the face of the war, it is Odierno who more truly mirrors the American military's experience in Iraq...

More at the Los Angeles Times.

Lawrence and his Message

Sun, 04/27/2008 - 9:28pm
Lawrence and his Message

By Robert L. Bateman

"Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them."

~ T.E. Lawrence

Of late there are quite a few people who have taken to quoting T.E. Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia. The quote presented above is seen almost every day now, on military briefings and in State Department papers, in quotes in news articles and in public statements from people involved in all aspects of our effort. In the eyes of many Lawrence, it seems, holds the answer to our dilemmas both in our efforts to suppress an insurgency and helping develop a democracy.

Unfortunately, as seems to happen too often, almost everyone who uses this particular quote does so without understanding the context in which it was written. Many people, for example, assume that it comes from his 1922 classic, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom. Unfortunately, not so many of those who use the quote have actually read The Seven Pillars of Wisdom in all of its sometimes mind-numbing "Oh aren't these rocks and the shadows of the desert beautiful" glory. Even fewer realize that the quote is actually from a collection tidbits of advice Lawrence penned during the war in a British publication known as The Arab Bulletin. This particular quote was number fifteen (of twenty-seven) pieces of wisdom published under his byline on 20 August 1917. The salient points regarding the relevance of the citations are actually twofold. This is an issue is because, especially when quoting Lawrence, the context is important.

Today we are confronted with a unique set of problems. The regional strategic situation hangs in the balance upon the success, or lack thereof, of the mission of the Coalition and Iraqi government to gain positive control over the country against the opposition presented by several different forms of insurgencies. Yet we of the Coalition have taken to quoting Lawrence, apparently without much concern for the fact that from 1916 through 1918 Lawrence was the insurgent.

He helped channel money and weapons to an Arabic insurgency, and more specifically as he himself was very explicit in pointing out, this support went to a Bedouin Arab insurgency. During the course of operations in which he supported (and occasionally directly led) the guerilla operations nominally led by the future King of Iraq, Faisal I, Lawrence explored and romanticized the deserts of Arabia. His notes, dispatches, and personal journal formed the foundation for his culminating account. Yet it was in that first published collection of tidbits that Lawrence included the most important disclaimer. At the very top of the "27 Articles" published in The Arab Bulletin Lawrence made it explicit.

"The following notes have been expressed in commandment form for greater clarity and to save words. They are, however, only my personal conclusions, arrived at gradually while I worked in the Hejaz and now put on paper as stalking horses for beginners in the Arab armies. They are meant to apply only to Bedu [Bedouin, the tribal nomads of the deserts]; townspeople or Syrians require totally different treatment. They are of course not suitable to any other person's need, or applicable unchanged in any particular situation. Handling Hejaz Arabs is an art, not a science, with exceptions and no obvious rules."

Taking his quote out of context, of course, we have done the exact opposite of what Lawrence recommended...and are trying to apply his observations unchanged, yet in a completely different situation. It is enough to cause a historian to tear out his hair. Fortunately, there is wisdom to be extracted from Lawrence's experiences, even almost ninety years later, for he did hit upon some fundamentals which obtain, but only if we place his observations in their proper experiential context and then seek wisdom through this study. We must therefore start with the context.

For those unfamiliar with either his life or his work, T.E. Lawrence was very much a product of his era. He was born in the late 19th Century, academically he was classically trained in the British "public" school system, and was fluent in Arabic. By the time the First World War started he already had long experience (for his age) in the Middle East. He was not, significantly, a professional military officer. Originally brought into the King's Service to work with British Military Intelligence section in Cairo (his duties initially limited to cartography), in 1916 he was dispatched to the Arabian Desert to investigate the potential in a nascent Arab revolt against the Ottoman Turks. (The Ottomans were allied with the Germans.) After making contact and developing ties with their leadership, Lawrence then became the de facto primary link between the riches of the British Empire and the potential manpower of the Bedouin tribes of central Arabia. Lawrence, twenty-eight years old at the time, immersed himself in the culture of his hosts. Upon Lawrence's advice, rather than directly confronting the Ottomans, the Beduin tribes with whom he was allied sought to envelop their Turkish opponents.

Starting from their base in the Arabian city of Mecca, the Bedouin forces of the Sharif of Mecca first advanced westward to the Red Sea. In general they met with great success given their limited assets and indeed their movement resulted in the Turks calling off their plans to move southward against the Sharif directly. But Medina, to the north of Mecca, remained an Ottoman bastion. Rather than make futile assaults with his desert raiders against a numerically and militarily superior force, Lawrence instead advised moving up the coastline. The Sharif initially ignored his recommendation and instead attacked Medina. That was a failure. Lawrence, meanwhile, continued on his own with his small detachment.

It was at this point, during a bout of illness when even Lawrence's prodigious reserves of strength were utterly sapped, that he developed his epiphany regarding the route to victory in the desert. Over the course of a few days he developed the guiding principals which helped him bring his Arab forces to the apogee of success. Thus it was not in his abilities as a cultural polymorph, but in the clarity of thought which he brought to the military problem he faced, that we may derive something useful today.

At the moment of crisis Lawrence discarded the linear thought of conventional British military thinking of the period. That he did so with the inordinate glee of an outsider who by his own admission was only "playing" at soldiering, does not detract from his epiphany. On his own Lawrence developed a vision for the employment of his uniquely gifted, and limited, forces. This is what Lawrence saw (original spelling):

"The first confusion was the false antithesis between strategy, the aim in war, the synoptic regard seeing each part relative to the whole, and tactics, the means towards a strategic end, the particular steps of its staircase. They seemed only points of view from which to ponder the elements of war, the Algebraical element of things, a Biological element of lives, and the Psychological element of ideas.

The algebraical element looked to me a pure science, subject to mathematical law, inhuman. It dealt with known variables, fixed conditions, space and time, inorganic things like hills and climates and railways, with mankind in type-masses too great for individual variety, with all artificial aids and the extensions given our faculties by mechanical invention. It was essentially formulable.

Here was a pompous, professorial beginning. My wits, hostile to the abstract, took refuge in Arabia again. Translated into Arabic, the algebraic factor would first take practical account of the area we wished to deliver, and I began idly to calculate how many square miles: sixty: eighty: one hundred: perhaps one hundred and forty thousand square miles. And how would the Turks defend all that? No doubt by a trench line across the bottom, if we came like an army with banners; but suppose we were (as we might be) an influence, an idea, a thing intangible, invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas? Armies were like plants, immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head. We might be a vapour, blowing where we listed. Our kingdoms lay in each man's mind; and as we wanted nothing material to live on, so we might offer nothing material to the killing. It seemed a regular soldier might be helpless without a target, owning only what he sat on, and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at.

Then I figured out how many men they would need to sit on all this ground, to save it from our attack-in-depth, sedition putting up her head in every unoccupied one of those hundred thousand square miles. I knew the Turkish Army exactly, and even allowing for their recent extension of faculty by aeroplanes and guns and armoured trains (which made the earth a smaller battlefield) still it seemed they would have need of a fortified post every four square miles, and a post could not be less than twenty men. If so, they would need six hundred thousand men to meet the ill-wills of all the Arab peoples, combined with the active hostility of a few zealots." [i]

From this observation Lawrence proceeded on and ultimately and hit upon what we might refer to as an "Economy of Force" mission, albeit one conducted with de facto guerilla forces. The operational situation he faced however, while complex, was not apparently perceived at all by his Regular Army superiors. Lawrence recognized the disposition of the Turkish forces for what they were, not a strength, but the dilution of strength. A simple glance at any map illustrates his observations.

At the time of Lawrence's epiphany the majority of the conventional forces controlled by the British faced conventional forces fielded by the Turks in what was then called Palestine. These armies were deployed, initially, along a line running south and east from Gaza. To the right of the British lines, as their forces advanced from their base of Egypt, was the open desert. In earlier operations Lawrence had already demonstrated the vulnerability of the Turkish controlled city of Medina to interdiction of its logistical supply line via the single track railway which ran through the Hejaz desert. His new contribution was to note that, seemingly counter-intuitively, the possession of Medina by a Turkish garrison of some 20,000 was advantageous to British.

In simple terms, the more Turkish soldiers he could force into holding Medina and the Hejaz railway which supplied it, the fewer Turkish soldiers there would be to face the conventional strength of the main British forces. Lawrence's vision allowed him to stop seeing Medina as an objective to be taken, and instead see it for what it was, an inexorable drain upon the Turks which ultimately limited their options everywhere else, and most critically, in front of the British Army on the battle lines. Thus, while he realized that by cutting the extremely exposed railways at multiple points he could have forced the Turks out of Medina purely out of logistical want, he also came to see that this would be counterproductive to the larger goal. Not bad for a college-boy.

Bringing Lawrence Forward

First, remembering that Lawrence was the insurgent, not the counterinsurgent, is an important first step. It is also significant that he was dealing with nomadic tribes of Bedouin, not city dwellers. Both of these suggest that it might be useful to toss the quote which starts this article out of the window. But is there something that we can draw from his experiences? Is there perhaps some greater lesson available? How might Lawrence look at Iraq? Naturally, one would have to assume that he was a strategist for the other side.

Iraq has six neighbors, 2,281 miles of borders, and some 254 border forts. Of those neighbors four are decidedly or effectively classified as friendly to the United States, if not necessarily to Iraq, one of those neighbors was declared by the Administration to be a part of the infamous "Axis of Evil," and the other is a Baathist régime with a fairly well confirmed stockpile of weapons of mass destruction (in the form of chemical agents) and a history of both committing political assassinations beyond their own borders and supporting groups identified as terrorists by the US Department of State. In other words, to her East and West, Iraq is bordered by countries which do not harbor much goodwill for the United States. Therein lies the strategic dilemma, and the parallel to Lawrence. Transliterate "the Coalition" for "the Ottoman Turks" and "the borders" or, if you prefer, "the oil pipelines," for "the Hejaz railway" and the picture snaps into view.

Iraq itself has a total area of 167,975 square miles, which easily exceeds the land-mass calculated by Lawrence to need more than 600,000 troops. While his sophomoric equation is not really a valid tool (the idea is to control people after all, not land) when analyzed with rigor, the point remains the same. Right now two countries which most definitely do not have a friendly outlook towards the United States most of the time, have a vested interest in sustaining, and if need be fomenting, a certain level of violence within the boundaries of Iraq.

If Lawrence were still around, working as a strategist for the Iranians, for example, he would certainly be advocating this position. After all, so long as the greater part of the land combat power of the United States is consumed in attempting to squelch violence in Iraq, those forces cannot be used elsewhere. He would, as he did along the Hejaz railway, recommend calibrated support to agitated elements inside Iraq. His advice to his higher command would be that they never allow the pressure to drop so much that we withdraw after declaring a victory, nor raising the pressure so high that we actually quit the place. Iraq, through the eyes of Lawrence, is our Medina.

[i] T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, (New York, NY: Random House edition), pg. 192.

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SWJ Editors' Links

Lawrence of Iran? - Noah Shachtman, Danger Room

Channeling Lawrence - Jules Crittenden, Forward Movement

Discuss at Small Wars Council

PRT Lessons to Be Learned

Sun, 04/27/2008 - 8:25am
Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan.

US House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. April 2008.

From the Introduction:

The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations chose to investigate Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) because they are considered to be critical to our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The subcommittee used PRTs as a case study of an issue that the subcommittee has been interested in -- examining in more depth how multiple agencies work together, or for that matter, do not work together in the field and in Washington, as the third quote above suggests. As we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, the national effort involves more than just military actions, and instead requires integrated efforts and the resources of government departments and agencies beyond the Department of Defense (the Department, DOD). PRTs illustrate the need for effective, integrated action to achieve government-wide "unity of effort" in complex contingency operations. We wanted to know how the departments and agencies in Washington give comprehensive and consistent guidance to the military services and combatant commanders (COCOMs), as well as how both Washington and organizations at agency, service, and COCOM levels support interagency operations in the field. After all, mission success will only be ensured if senior leaders adequately guide and support the people who the nation has asked to do difficult jobs under dangerous and challenging conditions.

To support the committee's oversight responsibilities, the subcommittee sought to

accomplish the following:

Understand the Administration's strategy and plans for the use of PRTs, and how this strategy supports larger campaign plans and strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations more generally;

Delineate the roles of the Department of Defense, other U.S. Government (USG) agencies and departments, and coalition allies in PRTs and PRT-like entities;

Understand the brigade combat teams' (BCTs') and regimental combat teams' (RCTs') relationships to various kinds of PRTs, including command and control issues;

Understand the capabilities of various kinds of PRTs;

Review DOD and related interagency assumptions, processes, and metrics used to assess the accomplishments of PRTs;

Assess the resources invested in PRTs against the returns on those investments;

Contribute to congressional oversight of PRTs, Iraq, Afghanistan, and interagency operations;

Report findings and recommendations to the House Armed Services Committee or other committees of jurisdiction for further hearings and legislation; and

Present information for public debate, with the hope of improving the Department's approach to organizing, training, and equipping military members for PRTs, and optimizing military support to PRTs.

This report includes only a brief summary of how the subcommittee went about this oversight project (more detail can be found at Appendix B). We have focused instead on our major findings, and lay out the details of these, with related recommendations, at the tactical level (field operations), the operational level (combatant commands, services, and agencies with their policy and guidance responsibilities and their 'organize, train, and equip' missions), and at the strategic level in Washington.

The PRT tactical-level concept and the fact that there are approximately 50 such U.S. units on the ground reflect a willingness among government agencies to move outside of "stovepipes." However, the subcommittee found many significant issues during the course of our study. Although efforts have been made over the last seven years attempting to improve interagency coordination and cooperation, the government has not gone far enough or fast enough to support the people in the field or accomplish the nation's mission. The efforts that have been made must be assessed to determine whether interagency integration is improving or whether a different approach is needed. Many people are working very hard, but processes and structures in Washington still resemble what was used in the Cold War rather than what is needed to best address our nation's current and future opportunities and challenges. While agency stovepipes still exist, the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan offer lessons we can use at every level to increase our "strategic agility". What our nation needs now is a sense of urgency in capturing and applying these lessons. Our recommendations are meant to foster just that.

Read the entire report.