Introduction and Background

America's Frontier Wars: Lessons for Asymmetric Conflicts by Congressman Ike Skelton.

Congressman Ike Skelton suggests how to overcome the threat of asymmetrical warfare by examining yesteryear's battles to develop strategies and tactics for tomorrow's conflicts.

Revisiting CORDS: The Need for Unity of Effort to Secure Victory in Iraq by Major Ross Coffey, U.S. Army.

An innovative solution to unity of effort in Vietnam, CORDS offers a blueprint for realizing the national strategy for victory in Iraq.

The Most Important Thing: Legislative Reform of the National Security System by James R. Locher III.

Whatever its adequacy in a former era, today's national security system is an inefficient anachronism. We need sweeping reforms that create a much more agile system.

Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the Nonmilitary Instruments of American Power by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates.

The secretary of defense says the U.S. must develop a cadre of deployable civilians to strengthen the Nation's "soft" power in today's national security environment.

Learning From Our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future by Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli, U.S. Army, with Major Stephen M. Smith, U.S. Army.

Looking beyond the current wars, a former commander of the 1st Cavalry Division and Multi-National Corps-Iraq calls for significant changes to the way we train and fight.

FM 3-0 Operations: The Army's Blueprint by General William S. Wallace, U.S. Army.

TRADOC's commander introduces the newest version of FM 3-0, the Army's guide to operating in the 21st century.

FM 3-07, Stability Operations: Upshifting the Engine of Change by Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, U.S. Army, and LTC Steve Leonard, U.S. Army.

FM 3-07 is the first doctrine of any type to undergo a comprehensive joint, service, interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental review. This FM will institutionalize a whole-of-government approach to combating insurgency and sustaining success in an era of persistent conflict.

Cause for Hope: Economic Revitalization in Iraq by Paul Brinkley, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation.

An interagency initiative, the Task Force for Business and Stabilization Operations is helping to quell insurgent violence by resuscitating Iraq's old state-owned industries.

Combating a Modern Insurgency: Combined Task Force Devil in Afghanistan by Colonel (P) Patrick Donahue, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Michael Fenzel, U.S. Army.

Two principals describe how Combined Task Force Devil employed a balanced strategy of military, economic, and political actions to quiet eastern Afghanistan during OIF VI.

Preparing for Economics in Stability Operations by Lieutenant Colonel David A. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, and Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Wallen, U.S. Air Force.

During stability operations, economic actions become as important as military actions.

The Role of USAID and Development Assistance in Combating Terrorism by Colonel Thomas Baltazar, U.S. Army, Retired, and Elisabeth Kvitashvili.

The USAID, now recognized as a critical component for fighting the War on Terrorism, is transforming to take on greater responsibilities to shore up unstable countries.

Counterinsurgency Diplomacy: Political Advisors at the Operational and Tactical Levels by Dan Green.

In the age of the strategic corporal, it is high time for the tactical POLAD.

Control Roaming Dogs: Governance Operations in Future Conflict by Major Troy Thomas, U.S. Air Force.

Governance operations have been treated as tangential postconflict missions, leaving field commanders ill-prepared for governance tasks and delaying consolidation of political aims.

Monitoring and Evaluation of Department of Defense Humanitarian Assistance Programs by Colonel Eugene V. Bonventre, U.S. Air Force.

Measures of effectiveness, normally ubiquitous throughout DOD, do not exist for monitoring and evaluating military humanitarian assistance activities. Making efforts to gauge these programs can pay dividends in stability operations.

Why We Need to Reestablish the USIA by Michael J. Zwiebel.

Since 1999, when the USIA was abolished, U.S. public diplomacy efforts have been spotty. Reestablishing the old agency would be one way to fix a glaring problem.

The Sole Superpower in Decline: The Rise of a Multipolar World by Shri Dilip Hiro.

A widely-published author asserts that we are witnessing the rise of a multipolar world in which emergent powers are challenging American hegemony.

The editors would like to share the following article with the SWJ community. Published in World Politics Review on 20 May 2008, this piece examines the challenges and opportunities to arise from the Sons of Iraq phenomenon. It also seeks to debunk some of the myths to have been spun from this remarkable development. The article is also the forerunner of a longer piece on the political integration of irregular armed groups in Iraq since 2003 to the present day. Republished here with permission from the author; comments, criticism and feedback would be most appreciated.

Upcoming Iraqi Elections Must Consolidate Security Gains of 'Sons of Iraq'

By David Ucko

In the typically polarized debate on Iraq, the significance of the "Sons of Iraq" -- the predominantly Sunni militias now allied with the U.S. military against insurgents and terrorists -- can easily be lost. Depending on one's point of view, the U.S. military's new Sunni friends are either "concerned local citizens" or "opportunist insurgents" -- with pro- and anti-war camps each using the phenomenon to support pre-existing political positions. As Iraq approaches provincial elections in October, however, and the United States nears its own presidential vote, it is high time to abandon easy slogans and to examine the fresh challenges and many opportunities presented by recent events in Iraq. Among such events, the emergence of the Sons of Iraq stands out as particularly important.

Sons of Iraq (SOI) is the collective name used for the tribal elements, insurgents and civilians that turned against extremist groups active in Iraq and began working instead with the U.S. military. With the help of U.S. soldiers and Marines, the SOI have been largely responsible for the decrease in violence seen since the onset of the so-called "surge" in early 2007. The phenomenon, however, predates the surge, finding its origins in al-Anbar province in late 2006. There, the U.S. military and local Sunni tribes were able to seal security pacts with locals to work together against al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) and other Islamist armed groups. This pattern soon repeated itself in other parts of Iraq, bringing stability to former insurgent and AQI strongholds. At present, an estimated 103,000 Sons of Iraq (70 percent Sunni; 30 percent Shiite) are working with the U.S.-led coalition.

The Sunni community was for a long time excluded from the state-building project in Iraq: Their ethnic affiliation suggested close proximity to the former regime and their tribal structure clashed with the democratic foundations on which the future Iraqi state was to be built. The decision to disband Baathist security forces also alienated the many Sunnis serving in the Iraqi Army. The added alienation of Sunnis from government -- through U.S. military operations, which overwhelmingly targeted the Sunni community, and the ensuing Sunni sense of victimization, leading to their boycott of the January 2005 elections -- made this community a natural ally of the insurgents and extremists establishing themselves in Iraq's power vacuums. Such alliances were based on shared Sunni identity, opposition to the sectarian, Shiite-dominated central government, and to its protector, the American-led coalition. U.S. strategy, meanwhile, seldom differentiated between elements of the Sunni community. The few attempts by various U.S. military units to create and exploit extant rifts were on the whole unsuccessful.

In late 2006, two related factors changed this state of affairs. First, AQI rendered itself deeply unpopular among the Anbar tribes by disrupting or taking over informal business networks, seeking to marry into the higher tribal echelons and through its intimidation and violence. These efforts resulted in a backlash. It was not, as is commonly reported, primarily a matter of AQI brutality -- though this aspect certainly accelerated the breakdown in relations. More fundamentally, the backlash grew out of a wider competition over resources, financial networks, social influence and political power. Differences in these areas were what fuelled the violence, itself a crude attempt by AQI to coerce the tribes into submission.

Secondly, the U.S. military changed its strategy, assisting and even enabling the decoupling of Sunni tribes and extremist groups. In short, a number of U.S. brigades moved from a narrow focus on rooting out the insurgency to a broader effort to "end the cycle of violence," primarily by examining and engaging U.S. adversaries' various motivations for picking up arms in the first place. This effort resulted in the identification of individuals within the insurgency with whom cooperation would be possible. By pursuing a strategy of co-opting and cooperating with the middle ground, the U.S. military helped achieve the common goal of greater stability while marginalizing more extremist elements.

The U.S. Role

It bears emphasising that the change in U.S. military strategy in Iraq -- and the later surge of five additional brigades -- directly enabled these collaborative arrangements. Detractors of the new strategy commonly credit the Sunni groups' shift in allegiance rather than any U.S. action for the ensuing security gains. In most cases, however, the former could not have occurred without the latter.

When the U.S. Army 1st Armored Divison's 1st Brigade Combat Team, known as the "Ready First Combat Team" (RFCT), first deployed to al-Anbar, it conducted a review of local population and realized most residents of the predominately Sunni province did not willingly side with the extremist elements, as previously assumed. Instead, AQI was escalating its intimidation and was generally disliked, yet the tribes were unable to counter this threat for fear of retaliation. Meanwhile, American assurances of an imminent troop withdrawal, intended to placate the Sunni tribes, in fact heightened their fears of continued AQI intimidation and of an Iranian power-grab (conducted either directly or through the Iraqi government, then widely seen in al-Anbar as a "Persian" puppet government). The RFCT therefore changed the message and the mission: U.S. troops would not leave, but would stand by the sheiks and actively help their forces defend against Iranian interference and AQI violence.

A similar type of partnership was emerging in northwest Baghdad. With a mission statement "to defeat al-Qaida and affiliated movements," the 1st Infantry Division's "Dagger Brigade" initiated its tour in November 2006 by carefully studying the local population. It emerged that, in this ethnically mixed area, the Sunni population felt compelled to side with AQI as an imperfect security guarantee against the incursions of Shiite death squads conducting ethnic cleansing. This understanding of the Sunni perspective suggestive an opportunity to "turn" the area's more moderate fighters.

These pacts were to be sealed with action rather than words. Even before a shift from operating out of isolated forward operating bases became official U.S. strategy, the RFCT, Dagger Brigade and other units deployed to the most volatile sections of their areas of operations to gain the support of the sheiks and of the local population. The Dagger Brigade established combat outposts on the sectarian fault lines separating the Sunni community from Shiite extremist elements. With the first outpost, the unit immediately saw increased participation by local citizens in maintaining security, which in turn allowed for job creation and a more vibrant economy. In Ramadi, combat outposts were constructed where AQI violence was at its highest. There, U.S. troops teamed up with Sunni sheiks' forces to combat the terrorist threat. Tribal fighters also joined the security forces en masse and worked with the U.S. military to protect and secure the hospital and other civil institutions against AQI control.

The deployment of U.S. troops throughout Iraq's cities -- as opposed to their being hunkered down in isolated bases -- became a central tenet of the U.S. military's Iraq strategy in February 2007, leading to closer interaction with local communities. More and more U.S. units successfully teamed up with Sunni moderates against extremists. As various collaborative opportunities emerged, greater numbers of SOI were put on the payroll. The recruits were screened and registered using biometric technology, but were then largely free to patrol their own neighborhoods, countering the forces causing violence there and producing a notable reduction in bloodshed nationwide.

Progress or Expedience?

While the positive results of the SOI phenomenon are undeniable, questions have now turned to their significance as part of the United States' broader Iraq project. Discussion has focused on the sheiks' loyalties and the tenability of local security agreements with what are, after all, former insurgents. It is feared that, out of desperation, the U.S. military has embraced a short-term solution that will prove detrimental to the Iraqi state.

Many of the concerns underlying this critique are baseless. The U.S. military has not, for example, simply bribed another militia, bent on ethnic cleansing. The SOI are neither cohesive as a force nor independently strong: They are carefully screened, derive their strength from U.S. support and are limited to police missions. Nor has the United States armed these fighters: Most of the weapons used existed long before the shift in U.S. strategy. The tribes, meanwhile, are not sectarian but rather secular nationalists, concerned over all with their local power base and community. Indeed, their grievances against extremists were genuine rather than opportunistic and they therefore did not need to be bought off.

Finally, though the SOI have gained influence at the expense of the central government, their rise does not ultimately have to pose a challenge to the Iraqi state. The Iraqi government -- fragmented and intensely identity-driven -- has itself been responsible for some of instability and denial of services witnessed in Iraq. The emergence of alternative political structures can provide a healthy challenge to the elected government, whose inability or unwillingness to address violence in Iraq has rendered it increasingly unpopular. It is therefore promising to see a number of the tribal councils transforming their movements into political parties, able to partake in the provincial elections later this year.

If the dangers most commonly associated with the SOI are less than what they seem, however, it does not follow that their rise has or will be entirely unproblematic. The empowerment of Sunni tribes and former insurgents is a threat not only to the dominant Shiites in Baghdad, but also to the Sunnis in government who have so far posed as the champions of their ethnic constituency. This explains why the Iraqi government has done so little to consolidate and build on the gains in the security situation. Unless this changes, the pacts made with the U.S. military are likely to unravel -- along with the achievements seen since 2006.

This danger is illustrated by the difficulties faced by Sunni volunteer fighters seeking a permanent place within the government's security services. While volunteer fighters who have civilian skills can return to a more traditional profession, many SOI are untrained and uneducated or simply un—to abandon the power and prestige of protecting their community. Several SOI were also part of the former security forces, which were dismissed by the Americans in 2003, and are therefore eager to reclaim their profession. According to current plans, only 20 percent of the tribal fighters are to be integrated with central government security forces, with the rest provided civilian employment opportunities. However, even the process of approving selected SOI for national service has faced delays and rarely led to actual integration. As a result, volunteers are threatening to desert or actually deserting.

The delays stem from a combination of bureaucratic impediments and government resistance. The Shiite and Kurdish parties in power clearly want to maintain their grip on the security structure, currently based around their own sectarian militia: the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq's Badr Organization and the Kurdish Peshmurga. The government has also expressed concern that a large incorporation of volunteer fighters would bring AQI or insurgent elements into the security forces. These fears should be allayed by U.S. registration and scanning methods, but have nonetheless significantly delayed the reintegration process.

The problem is not merely one of Baghdad intransigence: While seeking the legitimacy of national service, some tribal elements have resisted foreswearing the benefits of their isolation, which range from control over local jobs, resources and business opportunities to the significant payoffs from extra-governmental deals made with the U.S. military. In addition, the Iraqi security services have a limited absorption capacity, though this technical impediment is diminishing over time. Nonetheless, the administrative process of incorporating SOI into existing forces and of forming new units may require more patience than currently exists.

Looking Toward Elections

The viability of disparate bottom-up security pacts as a means toward sustainable stability therefore remains uncertain. Given the reality facing Iraq in 2006 and the alternatives available to the coalition, the turning of Sunni insurgents and tribes is unequivocally good news. At the same time, however, as these cooperative arrangements emerged without much buy-in from the central government, this method of reintegration -- never mind reconciliation -- is far from ideal. The long-term consolidation of security gains will require the government to eschew the self-interested form of decision-making that has marked its performance since the handover of sovereignty in 2004.

On this front, the best source of hope -- and an indicator of where Iraq is heading -- will be the planned October 2008 provincial elections and December 2009 national elections. In a best-case scenario, the elections will offer Sunnis a chance to elect leaders they view as legitimate and representative, which may in turn undercut their motivation for future violence. The United States must therefore use its status as guarantor of Iraqi stability to ensure the government of Iraq holds elections fairly and on time. And, in lieu of sloganeering, these Iraqi elections must become a focal point for serious discussion and policymaking in Washington.

Dr. David Ucko is a research fellow in the Department of War Studies at King's College London. This article is based on research he conducted while serving as a visiting research associate in the Washington office of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

By Sam Liles

I have this fantasy that the warrior scholar elite can happen in my life time. Yes, I believe in the elite who are the best because in the realm of conflict failure to be elite carries the badge of vanquished. I believe that America has not only the most technologically sophisticated military, but the smartest and most creative military in history. Washing aside the driveling nauseous tripe of generational conflict between aging boomers, effete generation x'rs and dullard generation y'rs and you find honorable and efficient soldiers. Soldiers who expand beyond a passive roll into the active roll of scholar.

This is not a case of radical changes in the public education system serving society as some have received waivers and have "other" issues prior to enlisting or accepting a commission. America's soldiers succeed in spite of the mediocrity of a declining society that does not support them. In the midst of conflict the military system has a tendency to wring the vinegar out in a Darwinian evolutionary cycle. The bloated, bleeding, puss of a megalithic military industry complex collapsing before our own eyes is creating a generation of Spartan warriors. In the terror of wounded veterans, amputees, haggard eyes, and tired bodies is a systematic return to the scholarship of war. Failure to learn and implement the lessons of battle has no positive result.

Studying war is nothing less than studying the burdens of society and the relationship of the man to that society. We don't want to burden the discussion with thoughts of civilization, as on the battlefield any pretense of what we mockingly call civilization will be forgotten. There is nothing less humane but more human than the frightening realities of the battlefield. The warrior scholar does not study ways to kill his fellow human being so much as he studies the art of war. War has a beginning and an end. Only in the incestuous perversity of politics and commerce does war continue for no other reason than profit. The study of society is the scholarship of war.

Doctrine is the implemented principles of lessons learned. Where those lessons were learned may have been at Hells Gate, Saigon, or Baghdad. When those lessons were learned is immaterial other than the warrior scholar should be aware of them. This is not the job of higher education or egregious bureaucratic hand holding while paying lip service to some pedantic decree from on high. This is knowledge that only the soldier can infuse into their own soul and use beyond a classroom. Lessons learned and passed on from soldier to soldier and rapidly becoming part of the cultural framework are the best transmission mechanism.

Unfortunately the stripped down no nonsense order of a military at war has not infused the gangrene leprous putrid bureaucratic machinery of the military industrial complex. Solutions for the battlefield are still being fed into the accountant's spreadsheets and weighed on a cost benefit scale. This business like miasma with military contractors, outsourced war, paid for intelligence assets, and profit margin commands is a parasite on the high performance military. This is the current cognitive battlefield for the warrior scholar. It is a terrible drain on the resources and mental acuity to wage war.

There is something to be said about the apprenticeship of the neophyte to the journeyman trade of conflict and war. The heat and violence of battle are experiences that carry a message and lesson no classroom will ever explain. The warrior scholar though can inform the methods of education and this is a message the academic must listen to if they wish to remain relevant to the discussion. The patterns of history inform of future patterns, the engineering and technology disciplines inform of future tools and risk, and the knowledge of mathematics expresses a language that is universal.

To service the warrior scholar and the future warrior society needs to provide an educational framework of humanities and liberal arts that provide the essence of classical philosophy. Less, we create Ludites a good understanding of engineering and technology is of special importance. The officer cadre must have at least a passing understanding and awareness of the classical literature of conflict. The enlisted men should have a vocational understanding of the world prior to today and how it shaped whatever they are looking at.

These are the basic tenets of a warrior scholar and an opening treatise in the scholarship of learning conflict.

Cross-posted on the Selil Blog.

Here are several recent Bloggers Roundtables:

Afghan Police Training and Mentoring

U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Col. Richard Hall, commander of 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, talked about his battalion's deployment to Afghanistan and their mission to train and mentor Afghan police forces on the bloggers roundtable.

Colonel Describes Progress With Afghan Army, Police

U.S. Army Col. Michael J. McMahon. Coalition trainers working to build Afghanistan's national army and police force have fielded 52 infantry battalions to date.

Brigade Leaves Iraq Region Secure, Revitalized

U.S. Army Col. Wayne W. Grigsby, Jr. Nearing the end of a 15-month deployment in Iraq's Madain Qada region, the 3rd Infantry Division's 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team has helped reduce violence.

Operations in Northern Iraq

U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Mark Hertling, commander of Multinational Division North and 1st Armored Division, provided an update on operations in northern Iraq on the bloggers roundtable.

New York Guardsmen Support Task Force Phoenix in Afghanistan

U.S. Army Col. Brian K. Balfe. Members of a National Guard combat team from New York are training and mentoring Afghan national security forces.

Pilot of First Burma Relief Mission Describes Experience

U.S. Air Force Capt. Trevor Hall. The Air Force pilot who flew the first U.S. relief flight to Burma said he and his crew delivered 30,000 pounds of supplies to grateful citizens.

Business Executives for National Security (Full Transcript)

As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington, DC, Thursday, May 15, 2008.

Excerpt:

... Tonight, I'd like to discuss three elements of that support structure that I've made my top management priorities as Secretary of Defense -- areas where I've identified shortcomings and want to see fundamental institutional change before my time in office expires. Which if you're wondering, that's about 250 days, 14 hours, and 45 minutes from now.

My priorities are focused on better supporting our troops in combat and include:

- Sending more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to Iraq and Afghanistan;

- Providing troops the best possible protection on dangerous roads in Iraq and Afghanistan; and

- Improving outpatient care and support for our wounded.

These are issues I take seriously -- and very personally.

Each goes directly to our profound, even sacred, obligation to do everything we can to support the men and women currently fighting on the front lines -- people like the four we recognized tonight - to see that they are successful on the battlefield and properly cared for at home. These needs require the Department to focus on the reality that we are in the midst of two wars and that what we can provide our soldiers and commanders three or four years hence isn't nearly as important as what we can provide them today or next month. In each case, there was some sort of leadership shortcoming:

- A lack of vision or sense of urgency;

- An unwillingness or hesitancy to upend assumptions and practices that have accumulated in a largely peacetime military establishment; and

- An assumption that the war would soon be over and therefore we shouldn't impinge on programs that produce the kinds of equipment and capabilities that probably would not be needed in today's combat.

A common mantra at Defense is that the rest of the government isn't at war. Well, a lesson I learned fairly early on was that important elements of the Defense Department weren't at war. Preoccupied with future capabilities and procurement programs, wedded to lumbering peacetime process and procedures, stuck in bureaucratic low-gear. The needs of those in combat too often were not addressed urgently or creatively...

Virginia Military Institute Commencement (Full Transcript)

As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M.Gates, Lexington, VA, Friday, May 16, 2008.

Excerpt:

... The VMI community mourns the recent loss, just last month, of Marine First Sergeant Luke Mercardante in Afghanistan. VMI alum said of this honorary "Brother Rat": "His legacy lives in his cadets and others who served with him, who are now taking the field across the globe."

In a national radio address in 1940, on the anniversary of VMI's founding, its most distinguished graduate, General George Marshall spoke of the Institute and the values it instills, he said: "Our graduates seldom amass great wealth, but just as seldom do they display weakness or indifference to their duties as citizens. They are trained to be soldiers, if there be need for soldiers . . . ; but what is far more important, they are trained to be good citizens."

Taking on the full mantle of citizenship through public service is not for the timid or the faint of heart, even without the dangers of combat or rigors of military life. In fact, public service can often seem like a burden...

If, in the 21st century, America is to continue to be a force for good in the world -- for freedom, justice, the rule of law, and the inherent value of each person; if America is to be, still, a beacon for all who are oppressed; if America is to exercise global leadership consistent with our better angels, then the most able and idealistic of today's young people must step forward and agree to serve their country with the same honor, and courage, and dignity that marked the service of the long line of patriots that came before them. Your country asks nothing more than that you live up to the values you have learned and lived in this place for these past four years. You owe yourself nothing less...

When these majors talk it's best to listen, with one or more combat deployments under their belt and as serious students of our craft, they more often than not cut to the quick in identifying what works, what is broken and what needs to be done.

Hopefully we'll hear much more from the Army iron majors with the recent decision by Lieutenant General William Caldwell, IV, Commanding General of the US Army Combined Arms Center, as excerpted from a recent CAC memorandum below:

Command and General Staff College faculty and students will begin blogging as part of their curriculum and writing requirements both within the .mil and public environments. In addition CAC subordinate organizations will begin to engage in the blogosphere in an effort to communicate the myriad of activities that CAC is accomplishing and help assist telling the Army's story to a wide and diverse audience.

LTG Caldwell's memo detailed the purpose of his directive as an essential part of CAC's responsibilities to provide information to the public and usher in a culture of change within the Army's officer leadership, development and education community as well as to support military operations - leaders within the Army need to understand the power of the internet and leverage as many communications means as possible to communicate what CAC is doing. You can visit the new CAC Blog here. And of course; faculty, staff and students at our PME schoolhouses have an open invitation to blog here at SWJ, contribute to the online magazine or spar with Council members at the SWC.

"At the same time, the IDF's doctrine was completely revised: concepts that were developed in the long years of low-intensity conflict with the Palestinians were replaced by simplified, classic warfare constructs. 'For years we have developed a language that no one understands,' said a senior IDF source. 'From now on there are no longer 'spectacles' or 'effects-based warfare'. There is the objective, the method and the required achievement."

Retired general Yossi Peled, who was one of the severe critics of the IDF's previous doctrine, told Jane's "The only effect I know in warfare is to kill the enemy."

Hat tip to Bill Aldridge.