PRT Lessons to Be Learned

US House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. April 2008.

From the Introduction:

The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations chose to investigate Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) because they are considered to be critical to our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The subcommittee used PRTs as a case study of an issue that the subcommittee has been interested in -- examining in more depth how multiple agencies work together, or for that matter, do not work together in the field and in Washington, as the third quote above suggests. As we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, the national effort involves more than just military actions, and instead requires integrated efforts and the resources of government departments and agencies beyond the Department of Defense (the Department, DOD). PRTs illustrate the need for effective, integrated action to achieve government-wide "unity of effort" in complex contingency operations. We wanted to know how the departments and agencies in Washington give comprehensive and consistent guidance to the military services and combatant commanders (COCOMs), as well as how both Washington and organizations at agency, service, and COCOM levels support interagency operations in the field. After all, mission success will only be ensured if senior leaders adequately guide and support the people who the nation has asked to do difficult jobs under dangerous and challenging conditions.

To support the committee's oversight responsibilities, the subcommittee sought to

accomplish the following:

Understand the Administration's strategy and plans for the use of PRTs, and how this strategy supports larger campaign plans and strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations more generally;

Delineate the roles of the Department of Defense, other U.S. Government (USG) agencies and departments, and coalition allies in PRTs and PRT-like entities;

Understand the brigade combat teams' (BCTs') and regimental combat teams' (RCTs') relationships to various kinds of PRTs, including command and control issues;

Understand the capabilities of various kinds of PRTs;

Review DOD and related interagency assumptions, processes, and metrics used to assess the accomplishments of PRTs;

Assess the resources invested in PRTs against the returns on those investments;

Contribute to congressional oversight of PRTs, Iraq, Afghanistan, and interagency operations;

Report findings and recommendations to the House Armed Services Committee or other committees of jurisdiction for further hearings and legislation; and

Present information for public debate, with the hope of improving the Department's approach to organizing, training, and equipping military members for PRTs, and optimizing military support to PRTs.

This report includes only a brief summary of how the subcommittee went about this oversight project (more detail can be found at Appendix B). We have focused instead on our major findings, and lay out the details of these, with related recommendations, at the tactical level (field operations), the operational level (combatant commands, services, and agencies with their policy and guidance responsibilities and their 'organize, train, and equip' missions), and at the strategic level in Washington.

The PRT tactical-level concept and the fact that there are approximately 50 such U.S. units on the ground reflect a willingness among government agencies to move outside of "stovepipes." However, the subcommittee found many significant issues during the course of our study. Although efforts have been made over the last seven years attempting to improve interagency coordination and cooperation, the government has not gone far enough or fast enough to support the people in the field or accomplish the nation's mission. The efforts that have been made must be assessed to determine whether interagency integration is improving or whether a different approach is needed. Many people are working very hard, but processes and structures in Washington still resemble what was used in the Cold War rather than what is needed to best address our nation's current and future opportunities and challenges. While agency stovepipes still exist, the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan offer lessons we can use at every level to increase our "strategic agility". What our nation needs now is a sense of urgency in capturing and applying these lessons. Our recommendations are meant to foster just that.

Read the entire report.