Small Wars Journal

HTS and Newsweek

Thu, 04/17/2008 - 4:23am
In resposnse to a recent Newsweek article - A Gun in One Hand, A Pen in the Other by Dan Ephron and Silvia Spring - Dr. Montgomery McFate; the Senior Social Science Adviser to the U.S. Army's Human Terrain System Program; has this to say:

Dear Editors,

Having long been an admirer of Newsweek, I found your failure to fact check the story by Dan Ephron & Silvia Springs entitled "A gun in one hand, a pen in the other" (21 April issue) completely shocking. One naturally expects more from Newsweek than such sloppy journalism.

Below you will find a list of factual corrections and some more general points about the article.

FACTUAL ERRORS:

1) "the idea is to recruit academics whose area expertise and language skills" - Incorrect. In fact, the goal of HTS is to recruit social scientists with the appropriate research skills and methodological approaches. There are very, very few social scientists in the US who have the requisite knowledge of Iraq or Afghanistan, since these countries have been closed to research for many decades. However, if the social scientist on a team is not an Arabic speaker, other members of the team possess the requisite area expertise and language skills.

2) "only three speak Arabic" - Incorrect. Each team in Iraq and Afghanistan has members who speak the local language, although this person is not necessarily the social scientist. As of 14 April, there are 38 HTS personnel in Iraq distributed among 5 teams (slightly higher than normal, since we are in transition and executing some individual Reliefs in Place). 8 of those personnel are Social Scientists. 13 of those personnel speak Arabic,of which 2 are Social Scientists and 11 are Human Terrain Analysts or Research Managers.

3) "Johnson served in Afghanistan on a pilot Human Terrain team last year" - Incorrect. Tom Johnson was never a team member, but merely visited theater for two weeks.

4) Tom Johnson is a "Pashto speaker", and "spent much of his time there interviewing Afghans in their homes" - Incorrect. According to Tom Johnson, he has no idea where this information came from -- "surely not me."

5) "Omar Altalib was one of only two Iraqi-Americans in the program" - Incorrect. Actually the program currently has about 20 Iraqi Americans.

6) Social scientists earn "$300,000" a year - Overstated. This is true only if hazard pay, overtime, and danger pay are included. The base salary is a low six figures.

7) "Steve Fondacaro...........a retired Special Forces colonel.." - Incorrect. COL Fondacaro (ret'd) has never been in Army Special Forces. His experience as Special Operations Force (SOF) officer was exclusively with 75th Ranger Regiment and higher Headquarters.

8) "Fondacaro says overseers had to rush through the start-up phase because Pentagon planners wanted the terrain teams in Iraq quickly" - Incorrect. The requirement to put teams in country was in response to the Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) that came from the units in the war zone. Pentagon planners actually slowed the process down to carefully analyze and validate the need.

9) the contract "was handed to British Aerospace Engineering (BAE) without a bidding process" - Overstated. BAE is the omnibus contractor for TRADOC and for a start-up program, this was a normal process. Once HTS becomes a program of record, the contract will be bid out.

10) "The rest are social scientists or former GIs" - Incorrect. Actually, much of the manpower is made up of US Army reserves.

11) "the anthropologists sent to Iraq..." - Incorrect. Not all of the social scientists on teams are anthropologists.

12) "the relationship between civilian academics and military or ex-military team members was sometimes strained" - Incorrect. The environment in the training program is very different than a year ago, which is the period the quoted sources were familiar with.

13) "40-year-old expert on trash" - Incorrect. Actually, Dr. Griffin is an anthropologist with an interest in food security and economics.

GENERAL ISSUES

1) The main input to the article came from two individuals who were terminated, and whose knowledge is outdated.

2) The article's main premise is that the majority of HTS social scientists are not Middle East specialists with fluency in Arabic. Fair enough, but Human Terrain Teams include personnel with language, regional, and local area knowledge in addition to social scientists. The teams are not just the lone social science advisor that the media has tended to focus upon. As teams, they include a variety of individuals uniquely suited to understanding the social, political, economic and cultural aspects of the population in question -- both military and civilian.

3) In the article, the significance of research methods was downplayed in favor of language and culture area skills. Certain subfields require formal area studies training, but as whole, social scientists are trained to apply their knowledge of analytical frameworks and research methodologies across different locales, based on the premise that the dynamics of human behavior exhibit certain universal features. This does not mean that social scientists cannot be area experts: many are, given their past research. However, what social scientists bring to the table is a way of looking at the social world, studying it, and analyzing it in a way that is distinct from the way the military approaches these issues.

4) That soldiers on their second- or third- tours possess inestimable knowledge about the area in which they are operating is undeniable. Yet, as currently organized, combat brigades do not possess the organic staff capability or assets to organize this knowledge and look at the broad questions that HTTs are concerned with. While civil affairs soldiers are the closest to such an organic asset, along with information operations, these assets are mission-focused and often lack the manpower to engage in the sort of question-formulation and asking that HTTs can. Nor do these assets always include personnel trained in social scientific analysis. Therefore, it is the job of HTTs to take the knowledge these soldiers have gleaned, to examine the information already being gathered on the ground on a daily basis, engage in original research, and consider this information in terms of broader issues from a different perspective in order to add to the brigade commander's situational awareness of the social, economic, political, cultural and psychological factors at work in the environment.

5) All this was explained to both Dan Ephron & Silvia Spring, but none of it is reflected in the article.

GEN Wallace, the commander of TRADOC, has written a letter to the editors of Newsweek regarding this article, which I hope you will consider publishing. You may also consider this email as a 'letter to the editor' and publish any or all of it.

I hope in the future that Newsweek will hold itself to a higher standard of journalism.

Warm regards,

Montgomery McFate, JD PhD

RCT-5 COIN Update

Tue, 04/15/2008 - 6:07pm
Marine Corps Colonel Patrick Malay, commander of Regimental Combat Team 5 of Multi-National Force - West, briefed Pentagon reporters and the bloggers roundtable this week on success against insurgents in the western portion of Iraq's Anbar province.

U.S., Iraqi Forces Winning in Western Anbar Province by Gerry J. Gilmore, American Forces Press Service

Increased security brought about by military success against insurgents in the western portion of Iraq's Anbar province is enabling a drawdown of U.S. forces there as well as enhanced regional reconstruction efforts, a senior Marine commander told Pentagon reporters today.

"The insurgents, by and large, have been marginalized in western Anbar," Marine Corps Col. Pat Malay, commander of Regimental Combat Team 5, told Pentagon reporters during a satellite-carried news conference from Camp Ripper, Iraq. Malay's area of operations comprises about 30,000 square miles, an area about the size of South Carolina.

During a previous Iraq tour in Fallujah two years ago, Malay recalled, multitudes of foreign fighters were entering western Iraq from Syria. Today, there are very few foreign fighters in his area of operations, he observed.

"Quite frankly, I think we've killed a lot of them, and I think that the enemy is having a more difficult time recruiting to the numbers that they have in the past," Malay said. In addition, foreign fighters no longer are transiting across the Syrian border into Anbar province, the colonel said.

With insurgents "on the run" in western Anbar province, the resultant reduced violence has enabled a drawdown of U.S. forces in his sector, Malay said. Three of his command's five battalions have rotated home over the past three months, he noted...

Related Sites:

Multinational Force Iraq

Multinational Corps Iraq

Multinational Division West

Briefing Transcript

Defense Department Bloggers Roundtable

Secretary Rice's Remarks on US COIN Doctrine / Strategy

Mon, 04/14/2008 - 9:33pm
Remarks At Air University, Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base

Secretary Condoleezza Rice

Montgomery, Alabama

April 14, 2008

Secretary Rice receives the first honorary degree at Air University, Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base, Alabama.

SECRETARY RICE: Thank you very much. Thank you, General Lorenz, for that really wonderful introduction. I want to thank very much the members of the Board of Governors who are here. It's my great privilege to accept the first ever honorary degree from Air University. I want to thank you too, General, for your leadership of this great institution, for adapting the education of the U.S. Air Force to the challenges of the 21st century. From the Wright brothers to the creation of the Air Corps Tactical School, the River Region of Alabama has been at the forefront of aeronautical innovation and training for nearly one century. Today, Air University is the intellectual and leadership center of the Air Force. And as an educator myself, I want you to know that I really value the mission of this institution.

I also know what good work the men and women of Air University do for this broader community. You make Montgomery proud, as Mayor Bright would be the first to acknowledge and thank you, Mayor, for being here. And then when a tornado left hundreds of people homeless in Prattville this February, Air University was there to help, and I know Mayor Byard can attest to that and thank you, Mayor, for being here. And when Hurricane Katrina devastated our Gulf Coast, Air University was critical to the relief effort. So, as a daughter of Alabama, I want to thank you.

It is a real pleasure to be back in Alabama. I grew up, as you know, about 90 miles down I-65 in Birmingham. Now, I know that there are a lot of people who may be a little new to Alabama, so I thought I would bring along a few helpful hints for you. Now, when you address people here in Alabama, you say "y'all," but the plural of "y'all" is not "y'alls." (Laughter.) If there are a lot of people, you say, "all y'all." (Laughter.) There's also nothing called unsweetened tea in Alabama. (Laughter.) It just doesn't exist. But if you really want to understand Alabama and become a part of us, you really need only three words -- "Roll Tide, Roll!" (Laughter, applause.) Now, I know there are a few misguided souls who say, "War Eagle, fight."

General Lorenz, General Trey Obering, Secretary Beth Chapman, Dr. Bruce Murphy, distinguished guests, faculty, again, members of the Board of Visitors, ladies and gentlemen, I'd like to speak with you today about one of our most important missions and, indeed, one of our strategic opportunities, and that's Afghanistan. But I want to thank all of you by helping to make possible what we are doing there. Much attention is paid to what is happening on the ground in Afghanistan and, of course, in Iraq. But we can never forget that our gains on the ground are possible because of our superiority in the sky. With our soldiers, sailors, and Marines, many of you, both active duty and reservists, have deployed to the Afghanistan theater, often for multiple tours. And we are winning in Afghanistan because of you.

Our Air Force is essential to that difficult form of warfare that we have had to learn, or perhaps I should say relearn, in recent years. We tend to think of counterinsurgency warfare as a ground-based activity. But again, our entire effort on the ground depends on the lift, precision strike, and reconnaissance that our Air Force provides. Furthermore, our Air Force is doing things to support our mission today that few people would have imagined in 2001. In Afghanistan, for example, six American airmen are leading Provincial Reconstruction Teams. And many more are on the ground helping to do things like build roads and guard facilities and support local agriculture.

You have been called to adapt to the demands of counterinsurgency. And I must say, the State Department has been called to adapt too. And it's been hard. We've had to work not only to engage with states, but to help post-conflict societies build states. Our diplomats and development workers have had to use -- have had to get used to new and dangerous operating environments far beyond our embassy walls. American civilians are learning how to be effective partners to our men and women in uniform, and you to us.

In recent years, America has developed a counterinsurgency doctrine that fuses the tools of war with the instruments of peace to help countries in conflict shape a future of freedom and opportunity for themselves. Our armed forces can defeat any adversary, but our civilian agencies must shape the political and economic context in which our gains will endure. We're gaining the field experience to work with you to do this right.

There has been much talk, of late, about how we are doing in Afghanistan. Some of it has been positive, some of it has not. Today, I'd like to offer you my assessment. We now have a new strategic opportunity in Afghanistan, one that is a product of lessons learned from both successes and setbacks. So here is why we will win in Afghanistan.

Since 2001, there has been much that has been good and successful. First, and most importantly, we have seen that whenever the Afghan people have an opportunity to choose a course for their nation, they have voted overwhelmingly, and often at great personal risk and sacrifice, for a future of democracy and modernity and liberty under law, not for the medieval despotism of the Taliban. And we continue to have a strong partner in the elected government of President Karzai.

To support our Afghan partners, NATO is leading an International Assistance Force of 40 nations. The Afghan National Army, which we are training and equipping, is now at the forefront of many combat operations alongside international forces. Twenty-six Provincial Reconstruction Teams, including 14 led by allies, are helping our Afghan partners to turn improving security into better governance and development. The legitimate Afghan economy is now growing faster than any other in Central and South Asia, and it is benefiting more and more of Afghanistan's citizens.

America's commitment to Afghanistan is also bipartisan. Congress has played a leadership role in funding U.S. policy there. And thanks to the generosity of the American people, the United States has provided nearly $23 billion in assistance to Afghanistan, with our allies providing another 18 billion. This assistance has helped over 15 -- over 5 million Afghan refugees to return to their homes. It is supporting the construction of critical infrastructure, like the national ring road, which is nearly 75 percent complete. And it is enabling 5 million Afghan children to get an education, including, for the first time ever, 1.5 million girls.

Our mission in Afghanistan has led to substantial progress. But at times, our many good programs have amounted to less than the sum of their parts. We have grappled with a lack of coherence among a broad coalition of international partners with disparate capabilities. This partly reflects a learning curve, as we have re-engaged a nation that America and our allies had neglected for too long: a country of inhospitable terrain, many ungoverned spaces, and a long history of poverty, misrule, and weak civilian institutions and civil war. Indeed, much of the work in Afghanistan could be more properly described not as reconstruction, but as construction.

This challenge has been made more difficult too by a determined enemy, the Taliban that has regrouped after its initial defeat, and has now turned to the tactics of pure terror to further its intolerant goals. The Taliban has benefited from regional turmoil on Afghanistan's borders. And this has led many in Afghanistan and the region, some even in our alliance, maybe even some here at home in America, to question whether our coalition has what it takes to support Afghanistan's long-term success.

In recent months, our Administration has looked closely at our policy in Afghanistan, both what we're doing well, and what we can and should be doing better. We have studied the independent reports that have been issued. I went to Afghanistan myself in February, both to Kabul and out to Kandahar, to see the situation on the ground. And the President and I have recently conferred with our allies, at the NATO summit in Bucharest.

I am confident that we are now laying the foundation for a long-term commitment to the success of Afghanistan and this region. This commitment must be built on a bipartisan consensus that unites our Administration and the Congress today, but also future administrations and future congresses. This commitment must also be built on an international consensus among our allies and our Afghan partners. We must all understand and explain to our people that Afghanistan is not a peacekeeping operation. It is a hard counterinsurgency fight and the stakes could not be higher.

The United States and the entire free world have a vital interest in the victory of our Afghan partners over the Taliban, and the consolidation and empowerment of an effective democratic state. Successes in Afghanistan will roll back the drug trade in a country that produces 93 percent of the world's opium and a great deal of its heroin. Successes in Afghanistan will advance our broader regional interests in combating violent extremism, resisting the destabilizing behavior of Iran, and anchoring political and economic liberty in South and Central Asia. And success in Afghanistan is an important test for the credibility of NATO.

Let no one forget, Afghanistan is a mission of necessity, not a mission of choice. That country must never again become a haven for the kind of terrorists who attacked America on September 11th, who have attacked our friends and our allies repeatedly, and who seek to do us all even greater harm. We cannot afford, either, to think whether we will choose to succeed in Afghanistan or succeed in Iraq. That is a false choice.

In both countries, the stakes are too high, the potential benefits of success too great, and the real costs of failure too catastrophic for us to think that these missions are zero terms. The real choice, and it is a choice befitting a great people, a great power, and a great democracy, is how to forge long-term commitment to succeed both in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

This goal is not only essential, it is attainable. As in Iraq, our challenges in Afghanistan do not stem from a traditionally strong enemy. The Taliban does not offer a political vision that most Afghans embrace when free to choose. The Taliban's theory of victory is not to prevail on the battlefield, or to win hearts and minds. It is simply to undermine the elected Afghan government, fracture the international coalition, and outlast us.

Our theory of victory, and the counterinsurgency strategy that we are pursuing to achieve it, is far superior to the designs of our enemy. We can defeat the Taliban on the battlefield. But we will render the Taliban obsolete by supporting an effective, democratic Afghan state that can meet the needs of its people. Where we have been able to do this, for instance, in the east of Afghanistan, the Taliban is in retreat.

Earlier this month in Bucharest, we and our NATO allies renewed our commitment to Afghanistan. President Karzai announced that the Afghan National Army will assume responsibility for security in Kabul by August, and we are supporting our Afghan partners. The United States is deploying roughly 300 -- 3,500 additional Marines. France is sending a battalion. This has enabled Canada, whose service in Afghanistan is an inspiration for NATO, to extend its deployment through 2011. Our allies pledged to deploy additional forces, with some deciding to enter conflict zones in the south, where we are especially grateful to Canada, Britain, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Australia for shouldering most of the hardest fighting. We will continue to press our allies to lift the caveats on their military forces.

The international community is also taking new steps to increase the coherence of our assistance effort in Afghanistan, including appointing Kai Eide as the United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative. Our strategy directs resources toward the central pillars of counterinsurgency: protecting the people from the enemy by strengthening Afghan security institutions, connecting people to their government by improving governance and rule of law, and fueling economic and social opportunity through reconstruction and development.

On the security front, Afghans are eager to provide more of their own security, and our plan supports that. We and our allies must step up our efforts to train and equip the national army of Afghanistan. But we must also increase our efforts to help the Afghan National Police become a more professional force that can enforce the law and police the nation's now porous borders.

At the same time, we and our allies are helping the Afghan Government to marry these security gains with good governance and economic development. Success depends on expanding the good work of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams. These teams lead our growing effort to help Afghan leaders, both national and local, to promote the rule of law, to strengthen their ministries, to deliver essential services like health and education to the people, and to lay a foundation for long-term private investment. Just last week, I had the pleasure of meeting with eight Afghan governors who play an important role in these efforts. These are local leaders who are beginning to give Afghan -- Afghanistan's government the means to deliver goods and services more directly to the people.

Within our counterinsurgency strategy, we and our Afghan partners must also expand our counternarcotics efforts. This has been one of the most difficult and vexing problems and, frankly, we've not found all the right answers. Yet, it is just as urgent as the fight against the insurgency, because the two are inextricably linked. There is an erroneous view that poppy in Afghanistan is mostly grown by poor farmers struggling to earn a living. In fact, over 70 percent of Afghanistan's poppy will likely be grown this year in the Taliban's stronghold, on vast narco-farms that benefit our enemies. These drug kingpins do not need alternative livelihoods; they need to be brought to justice.

We must step up our interdiction, eradication, and law enforcement campaign while helping those Afghan farmers who truly do need adjusting. In places where security and political will exist, this strategy has shown some promise. Two years ago, only six of Afghanistan's 34 provinces were nearly or completely poppy-free. This year, it will likely be 26.

In everything we do, we must encourage the Afghan people, empower the Afghan Government, bolster our allies, and demoralize our enemies. But success is only possible if Afghan ownership grows over time and with greater integrity. Afghanistan's democracy is already under attack from external enemies. It cannot allow corruption to undermine democracy from within. Institutions like the Independent Directorate for Local Governance are a good start and we are increasing our support for Afghan efforts to create a fair and functional system of justice.

Addressing Afghanistan's regional context is also crucial to success. A new strategic opportunity comes from the transition to democracy that is underway in Pakistan, a nation that, like Afghanistan, America had too long neglected. Pakistan has been an ally in the war on terror since September 11th and yes, this has necessitated a strong program of military assistance and cooperation. After 2001, we supported President Musharraf's efforts to chart a moderate, modern path for that nation.

Our engagement, however, has always been multidimensional. Since 2005, America has invested $300 million each year to help the Pakistani people by supporting health programs, educational reform, as well as the building of civil society. And when this progress was put at risk last November, we pushed hard, publicly and privately, for a return to civilian rule, an end to the state of emergency, and free and fair elections in February that were open to all of Pakistan's leaders.

To be sure, terrorists exacted a high toll in innocent life trying to stop this election, including the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. But not only did their violent efforts fail to disrupt the voting and plunge the country into chaos; the Pakistani people dealt the forces of political extremism a crushing defeat at the polls, including in the frontier province. Indeed, the election dispelled the myth of rising extremism in Pakistani politics, proving that a moderate, democratic center is the country's dominant political force. We salute the Pakistani people for courageously restoring their democracy.

Successful American engagement with a democratic Pakistan is vital to our national security and to the lasting success of South and Central Asia. In Pakistan, as in Afghanistan, we must help a democratic partner to meet the needs of its people and eliminate the conditions that feed continuing extremism. We will greatly expand our support for the efforts of Pakistani civilians to strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law and to reinforce the foundation of every free society: good governance, judicial independence, a free media, health and education, good jobs and social justice. We will support Pakistan's efforts to secure all of its people, and to wage a counterinsurgency fight against the violent people who still threaten Pakistan's future.

Finally, the United States will support Pakistan's efforts to develop fruitful links with its neighbors and with the community of responsible nations. This includes intensified Pakistani-Afghan dialogue on regional security, continued efforts to reduce tensions and reconcile with India, and closer economic integration with the nations of South and Central Asia.

We have a unique opportunity to foster the lasting security of a troubled region, a region that is of vital interest to our nation. From our partnerships with the newly democratic Pakistan and a free Afghanistan that is fighting the Taliban, not governed by it, to our growing strategic partnership with India and our improved relationships all the way across South and Central Asia, the United States is in a dramatically different and better position in this region than we were in 2001.

Though we and our friends face savage and determined enemies, I am confident that we will prevail, not by force of arms alone, but by the power and the promise of the values we share: the conviction that parents everywhere want their children to grow up in dignity, in liberty, and with limitless horizons. Success in Afghanistan and Pakistan will demonstrate that these values are more compelling than the spiritual poverty of suicide bombing.

The journey ahead will be difficult and often winding. Most certainly, the path toward democracy is never a straight line. We have hard work to do. But I am confident that we will succeed because we have done hard work before. I was fortunate to be the White House Soviet Specialist from 1989 to 1991 at the end of the Cold War. It doesn't get much better than that. In fact, those were very heady days. But as we went through those extraordinary days, it was important to stop and to pay homage and to think about those who had set up the possibilities and laid the foundation for the victory of our values at the end of the Cold War.

In fact, when I would go to the White House, and now, when I go to the State Department, I think about the people in 1945, in 1946, and 1947 who built a firm foundation for democracy on the ruins of Europe and Asia at the end of World War II. I think about people who faced a situation in 1946 in which the Italian Communists won 46 percent of the vote, French Communists 45 percent of the vote. I think about those people who faced a 1947 in which Europe was still starving, 2 million Europeans still starving; that in 1947, saw civil war in Greece and civil conflict in Turkey; that in 1948, saw what we all thought would be the permanent division of Germany with the Berlin crisis; the Czechoslovak coup in which the Soviet Union snuffed out the last of liberty in Eastern Europe; in 1949, a Soviet Union that exploded a nuclear device five years ahead of schedule; and when the Chinese Communists won, only to have war break out on the Korean Peninsula in 1950.

Those were not small tactical setbacks. Those were huge strategic defeats for the victory of democracy and Western values in Europe and Asia. But somehow, someway, the people who led that fight, Marshall and Truman and Kennan and Acheson -- somehow, everyday, they got up and they stayed true to their values and they believed in the power of our principles. And that is what permitted us to see, in 1989, in 1990 and '91 the overcoming of a country 5 million men strong, 30,000 nuclear warheads, and spanning 12 different time zones without firing a shot.

That is the spirit with which we must meet this new historic transition and transformation because challenges like the ones that we faced at the end of World War II and the ones that we face now can only be overcome with optimism about the power of our principles and our values. And so, as I sat at NATO next to permanent representatives from Poland and the Czech Republic and Hungary and the Baltic states in Latvia in 2006, I thought, had someone said there will be a NATO summit in Latvia in 2006, in 1946, people would have thought that they had lost their minds.

And so, I know that some Secretary of State will stand here in 10 years or 20 or 30, but most certainly, will stand here to say, of course the people of Iraq have triumphed in democracy; of course, the people of Afghanistan have triumphed in democracy. What else would you expect? Because the power of our principles is that it makes those things that one day seemed impossible seem, after, to have been inevitable.

Thank you very much and God bless you.

(Applause.)

Air University Part 2 (Q&A)

(Applause.)

GENERAL LORENZ: Thank you, Madame Secretary, for those inspiring and thought-provoking remarks. I believe our students and faculty have some questions, so if you'd go ahead and sit down, I'll tell you how the rules will be played, all y'all. (Laughter.)

Air University students and faculty, if you have a question for Secretary Rice, please make your way to one of the microphones -- there are three on each side -- and to begin with, I will recognize you in turn. Prior to asking a question, please identify yourself and your college, your school. And with that, we'll take advantage of this time. Please make your way to the microphones and let's begin. Thank you.

Over here to the left.

QUESTION: Good morning, Ms. Rice. We have the honor to have you with us today. I'm Lieutenant Colonel Alenazi from Saudi Arabia. My question is you've been traveling a lot to the Middle East all this time. Could you give us an idea of to what level has the peace process reaches, and what is the King Abdullah -- have the influence in that process?

SECRETARY RICE: Yes, thank you very much. You'd like a trip report, is that right, on my trips to the Middle East? (Laughter.) All right.

Yes, we launched -- the President launched in November of this past year what has been called the Annapolis process. And the Annapolis process is an effort to help the Palestinians and the Israelis end their conflict by getting the vision of the Palestinian state, the details, the outline of the Palestinian state, finally agreed between Israelis and Palestinians. And there's a very important reason to do that. Of course, of course, it would bring peace, and that's a very important thing. But also, the moderate, tolerant, peace-loving people of the Palestinian territories and indeed of the Middle East in general need to know that there is an alternative to extremism. And the state, the Palestinian state, provides that alternative.

Now, the Annapolis process has three tracks. On the one hand, we are trying to help the Palestinian people simply have a better life through the ability to improve movement and access so that Palestinian businesses can start and the economic life of the people can grow.

Secondly, we are trying to make progress -- the Palestinians and the Israelis several years ago undertook certain obligations on something called the Roadmap, which are a set of parallel obligations to move them toward peace. And you might want to know that one of the Air Force's own, General -- Lieutenant General Will Fraser, is the monitor for that effort and doing a very fine job.

And the third is the peace negotiations themselves. And I can tell you the following: They are talking very, very seriously about the hardest issues, about borders, about refugees, about how they're going to bring into being two states living side by side in peace and security.

Now, one reason that you hear very little about what they're actually talking about in the negotiations is they've made a very wise decision that they're not going to go to the press every day to say whether they're making progress. That says to me they're really serious. I sat with them for two and a half hours. It's going to be hard. If anyone had had an easy answer to this, they would have solved it a long time ago. But they are serious about it, and it is the President's hope and the intention that there would be a state in being, or a state in outline, by the end of this coming year. We think it is time. It's been too long. The Palestinian people need a state.

Now, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has been a very strong supporter of the Annapolis process. Prince Saud, the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia attended. It was the first time that Saudi Arabia had actually attended under its own flag at a peace conference, so that was very exciting. And I believe that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, along with President Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah of Jordan, are perhaps the most influential Arabs in helping to give the kind of support to both Abu Mazen, the President of the Palestinian Authority, and to the Israelis to go ahead and make peace. And so we've been in very close contact. The President visited Saudi Arabia very recently, talked to the King a great deal about the peace process. And we, this time, are going to make certain that we've worked with the Arab states so that they can be supportive if the Palestinians and the Israelis are able to come to an agreement.

GENERAL LORENZ: Let's go to the second mike on this side.

QUESTION: Good morning, Secretary Rice. This morning, I just want to comment that the cooperation and friendship between yourself and --

GENERAL LORENZ: Hang on a second. Remember the rules: Identify yourself and your school, please.

QUESTION: Major Courier from Air Command and Staff College. The cooperation and friendship between yourself and Secretary Gates is refreshing and important to the unity of effort between the Department of State and the Department of Defense in addressing regional conflicts. I was wondering if you could please discuss specifically the new Office of Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization and our nation-building effort.

SECRETARY RICE: Thank you very much. Yes, first of all, let me say that Bob Gates and I have a very close friendship that goes back a lot of years. We served together. He was the Deputy National Security Advisor when I was special assistant on that NSC staff of Brent Scowcroft and George H.W. Bush that was fortunate enough to be around at the end of the Cold War. So we had a great friendship and we have a lot of good stories and we enjoy being together.

And we recognize that we have a very strong obligation to have the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the uniformed military, be able to perform well on really what is a continuum between war and peace. We tend to think in our theory of war and then peace, so you win the war and then you go and build the institutions of peace. But of course, that's not how we are fighting and winning any longer. We're fighting on a continuum. Counterinsurgency really means that you have go to into an area, you have to clear it of the enemy, then you have to hold the area with police forces, most appropriately police forces of the home country, which means you have to build adequate police forces, and then you go in and you do reconstruction and development right there where you've cleared so that people don't turn back to the terrorists.

Because the best -- by far, the best weapon that the terrorists have is when they can imbed in a village or in a community and have the local people refuse to turn them over. Very often, the local people don't really support them, but they're terrified of them. And if you can give people security, then they will turn over the terrorists and they will be on your side. And that's what we're seeing in places like Al Anbar province in Iraq, where the Sons of Anbar turned on al-Qaida and have essentially thrown them out. And we've been able then to stabilize Al Anbar.

Now, if you're going to do that, you have to have not just the ability to fight, but also the ability to bring that reconstruction effort. We call it the post -- the stabilization phase. And we have never had in the United States an institution that was really capable and dedicated to doing that, and it needs to be a civilian institution. We've done it in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Frankly, we tried to do it with the UN structures and that didn't work terribly-- all so well. And then in Afghanistan we tried to do it with the Bonn process, which brought every country in the kind of adopt-a-ministry approach, so the Germans took one ministry, the Italians another ministry. And frankly, while the efforts were sincere and I think many of them good, it left us with some of the incoherence that we have today. In Iraq, we tried to do it by handing it to the Defense Department to do reconstruction and development. Of course, that worked not all that well either. I mean, we were able to do some things, but not as much as we should have done.

So finally, Americans -- if there's one thing we do, we keep going until we get it right. And I think we've now got the right structure, which is a civilian structure that would be akin to the Reserve and the National Guard, where you have different kinds of expertise on call to go out and do reconstruction and development. There's no way in the State Department that I can have city planners and engineers and specialists on building judiciaries and specialists on police. You really, however, might be able to call up Americans -- perhaps, that prosecutor who's in Arizona and wants to spend a year helping the Afghan people to learn how to build a good justice system, or perhaps that city planner who's in Montgomery and would like to go and help the people of Haiti or Liberia know how to do city planning. And so the idea is to have a civilian response corps, probably initially of close to 2,000 or so Americans, who would train the way the Guard and Reserve train, and then be ready when we need to do one of these stabilization efforts.

And not only do I think it would be a wonderful call for Americans who want to contribute in that way; but frankly, this isn't what the military, the Reserve and the Guard should be doing, and we've had to rely heavily on the uniformed military in order to do civilian stabilization and reconstruction because we've just not had the right institution. I think this is the right institution. It's had no stronger supporter than Bob Gates and the uniformed military. And if Congress fully funds it, which we hope that it will, it should be really ready for its initiation phases very shortly.

But thank you for asking.

GENERAL LORENZ: Let's go to the second mike on this side, please.

QUESTION: Good morning, Dr. Rice. I am Group Captain, or Colonel, Iqbal, from Terminal 13 Air War College and Pakistan. Thank you very much for sharing your views about the region, especially Afghanistan and its neighbor, Pakistan. I just want to call your attention towards the recent developments which has happened in Pakistan; that means the country is getting back to the path of democracy. But traditionally, what we have seen, that U.S. is more -- feels comfortable to engage with autocracy there. Because you know, about 30 years, in my country, the country has been ruled by the army. Now, you have a different stage. There is a broad-based government in Pakistan.

So I want to -- I'd like to hear your views about it, because many of the intellectuals here has given their opinion that now the U.S. policy should be engaging both the political as well as the other half, that is, the army. So what are your shares? Thank you very much.

SECRETARY RICE: Thank you. And again, on Pakistan, you are absolutely right that the Pakistani people have made a transition. There is a broad-based Pakistani Government which we intend to engage, as the Government of Pakistan, as we would engage any other democratic government. In fact, Deputy Secretary Negroponte has already been to Pakistan to meet the new civilian leaders. I have spoken to a couple of them on the phone prior to the formation of the government. And we think this is a really terrific step for the people of Pakistan. They're to be congratulated for doing it, despite a lot of threats from extremists and efforts to disrupt the elections, starting, of course, first, with the assassination of Mrs. Benazir Bhutto.

Now, we will engage the armed forces in military training and in military cooperation in the way that we do militaries around the world, many of them from democratic countries. It is terrific that you are here. I think one of the most important things that we can do is to have military officers from countries like Pakistan here for international military education. We cut that off for a period of seven -- let's see, four years, which really, I think, was a very, very bad thing to have done, frankly, because we need to engage with all of the institutions of Pakistan. And Pakistan now will need to find a way to have very solid civilian control of the armed forces. I believe that our tradition of that is a good one, in which Pakistani officers can come and be a part of a democratic state in which civilian control is really now taken for granted, but wasn't always taken for granted, so we've built the institutions of it.

So we will engage across a broad front. As I mentioned in my remarks, I believe that the coming of a democratic government in Pakistan is a new strategic opportunity. It is an opportunity for an ally in the war on terror. But remember that our answer to terrorism is not just to fight and defeat the terrorists; it is to deal with the conditions that produce terrorism, and the absence of freedom is one of the conditions that produces terrorism. Perhaps the most important condition is the absence of freedom.

And so when we see an ally in the war on terror makes a transition to democracy, it could not be more affirming of everything that President Bush believes about the power of democracy, the power of those principles, and their power to defeat terrorism long term.

GENERAL LORENZ: Let's go to the last mike on this side.

QUESTION: Good morning, Madame Secretary. My name is Lieutenant Colonel Edwards. I'm from Syndicate 17 at the Air War College. Could you please share with us the foreign assistance framework and how the combatant commanders can inject their theater and regional security concerns in that process, and how might that process be enhanced?

SECRETARY RICE: Thank you. We have gone a long way to reform foreign assistance over the last several years, since I've been Secretary. And one of the reasons that we did it is that we believe that we were not able to bring all elements of our programs together to see whether we had the right elements to move countries along from total dependence on foreign assistance to the place that they were beginning to build the infrastructure and the environment in which perhaps they could begin to get foreign investment. Trade is a part of building that environment.

And so we have changed our foreign assistance process. What we now do is we start by asking the question -- let's take a country like Mozambique. Where is Mozambique on the economic continuum? What two or three things are standing in the way of Mozambique making a transition from totally dependent to eventually perhaps even able to be self-sustaining? Is it the problem with infrastructure? Is it a problem with subsistence farming? How can we make sure that the people of a country are seeing Americans out with them in the field, giving them the opportunity for healthcare, giving them the opportunity for education? Because, in many ways, one of our strongest foreign policy tools is the assistance that we give.

Now, that's where the combatant commanders and the Defense Department have come in. And indeed, when we do now our foreign assistance strategic look at what the budget is going to look like for that year, in my conference room I sit not just with the Assistant Secretary for, say, Africa and the Assistant Administrator for USAID, we also invite the Department of Defense to come and join that meeting, the Department of the Treasury to come and join that meeting, and so we get a full picture of what we're doing for any one country.

The combatant commanders have also been enormously helpful because they are able to use their assets and their resources -- I saw a great example of this in Guatemala, where there is a health clinic that's being run by naval personnel on a kind of rotating basis. They come back every several months and they do healthcare at this clinic. I asked the question: Now, is USAID here alongside you so that when you leave three or four months, before you come back, perhaps we've trained some local healthcare workers to help make sure that eventually Guatemala is going to be able to sustain those clinics on their own?

But I'm a big fan of many of the programs that the combatant commanders run to help people with healthcare, with education. They're fine programs, and we're trying to unite them, link them up with the programs that we have at USAID and State Department programs so that the entire U.S. Government is going -- putting its programs forward for a specific country as a unit -- the entire U.S. Government. And I think we're making some progress.

But I just have to say that one of the real contributions that President Bush has made is to take foreign assistance, which was flat for almost 20 years in the United States, and we have now quadrupled foreign assistance for Africa, tripled foreign direct assistance worldwide, and in Latin America doubled it. We have -- we had the opportunity to see some of these programs in Africa, where the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS is literally saving lives, where children are being saved from malaria, where girls are going to school in places that they've never gone to school, and the compassion of the American people in what we do around the world is coming through, through those programs.

Because America is, and always will be, a powerful country. But what makes America different in the annals of the history of powerful countries is it is also a deeply compassionate country. And compassion, married with principle, married with power, is an extremely effective way to change, literally, the face of the globe. As I said, we've done it before and we're doing it again. And I want to thank each and every you-- every one of you for the role that you're playing in that great historic transformation.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

GENERAL LORENZ: Madame Secretary, on behalf of the entire Air University community, let me thank you again for sharing with us today your incredible wealth of knowledge in international relations and national security. This has truly been a memorable day for all of us.

Ladies and gentlemen, please remain standing for the singing of the Air Force song and the departure of the official party.

2008/T12-1

Released on April 14, 2008.

Remembering our Heroes

Mon, 04/14/2008 - 6:29pm
Frontier Six, LTG William B. Caldwell, IV, Sends

Remembering our Heroes

Corporal Jason Dunham, United States Marine Corps

Four years ago Corporal Jason Dunham did the unimaginable when an insurgent tossed a grenade into the middle of his unit. In a split second, he placed the welfare of his comrades above his own. Covering the grenade with his Kevlar helmet and his body, he saved the lives of the Marines around him. Tragically, he died of his wounds eight days later. Jason's actions may come as a shock to us, but not to the people who knew him because they reflect the character of the man he was.

Jason was always concerned for others. He had extended his term of enlistment because he wanted to stay with his squad for their entire tour in combat. His good friend, Lance Corporal Mark Dean said "you're crazy, why would you do that?" Jason's response was "I want to make sure everyone makes it home alive. I want to be sure you go home to your wife alive." Shortly before deploying to Iraq, Lance Corporal Dean was a little short on cash and Jason bought him a phone card so he could call his wife.

From his first day in the Marines, Corporal Dunham stood out for his outstanding leadership abilities. One of his leaders, Staff Sergeant John Ferguson, said he showed "the kind of leadership where you're confident in your abilities and don't have to yell about it." A fervent patriot, his father, Dan Dunham said "Jason believed that all men on this earth should be free."

No, Corporal Jason Dunham's actions were no surprise to the people who knew him because Jason was a man of character and integrity, a selfless servant and leader. He embodied all the qualities we want in the men and women serving in our military. Jason also had something extra; the dedication to go above and beyond the call of duty, to care just a little more.

I am always amazed to hear stories like Jason's; amazed, but also thankful. Thankful that people like Deb and Dan Dunham raised a young man with Jason's character, compassion, and concern for others. Thankful that our nation always seems to produce another generation of heroes who are —to step up and serve when their nation calls.

For his actions that day, Corporal Jason Dunham was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. At that time, it was only the second Medal of Honor awarded for actions during the Global War on Terrorism. The first was to SFC Paul Smith of the US Army and the other two were awarded to Lieutenant Michael Murphy and Petty Officer Michael Monsoor both of the US Navy. They each made the ultimate sacrifice. Now it is our job to ensure their sacrifice and the lives they lived will never be forgotten.

On April 14th 2008, let's honor the incredible sacrifice of Corporal Jason Dunham and those who loved him so dearly.

Interagency Online Training

Mon, 04/14/2008 - 5:33pm
From US Joint Forces Command - USJFCOM Signs Letter of Intent to Support Interagency Online Training by MC2 (AW) Nikki Carter of JFCOM's Public Affairs Office.

The State Department's Foreign Services Institute (FSI) and U.S. Joint Forces Command's (USJFCOM) Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) signed a letter of intent to commence the development of online courseware in support of integrated reconstruction and stabilization training and education.

The State Department hosted the ceremonial signing Thursday to recognize the significant collaboration achieved between FSI and the JWFC.

The JWFC's Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution (JKDDC) initiative will work closely with FSI to make the courseware a reality.

Dr. Jerry West, JKDDC strategic plans and implementation division chief, said the letter of intent is a formal agreement on how the two organizations will share information and collaborate in the development of online courses, mostly in support of a Presidential national security directive (NSPD 44).

"[NSPD44] requires interagency to coordinate and support reconstruction and stabilization in synch with U.S. military plans and operations," West said. "The State Department is the lead agency for structuring the coordination across all agencies."

Marty Vozzo, JKDDC deputy program manager, said the letter of intent outlines how the agencies will identify training requirements and collaboratively build Web based courses and then enhance learning portals.

"[The agreement will] close gaps and help us understand the cultural differences between interagency partners," West said.

Vozzo said each agency will provide introductory course information to better understand the needs of the training audience.

"The result is to better train participants in joint operations worldwide," he said.

"As we bring together different agencies representing diverse organizations, these Web-based training products will be available to help us work better together and be more proficient in the tasks we are tackling together." Vozzo added.

Iraq and the Human Terrain Teams

Mon, 04/14/2008 - 5:29pm
Newsweek has posted a Human Terrain System profile piece by Dan Efron and Silvia Spring - A Gun in One Hand, A Pen in the Other.

Marcus Griffin had never been to the Middle East before he arrived in Iraq last fall, as part of a project to help the U.S. military decipher the country's intricate social nuances. An anthropologist from Christopher Newport University in Virginia, Griffin knew much more about the Philippines, having accompanied his social-scientist father on a two-year research project there as a teen. In Virginia he'd been studying Freegans, those superenvironmentalists who forage for food in restaurant and supermarket Dumpsters. And so, during a recent outing with the unit he's attached to in Baghdad, Griffin rummaged through the trash of an Iraqi sheep rancher, looking for patterns that would tell him something worthwhile about the neighborhood—and by extension, about Iraqi society. "Well, they're drinking a great deal of Pepsi," he said dryly to a Newsweek correspondent. When a man in a checked kaffiyeh emerged from one of the homes, Griffin peppered him with questions. Where did he get his electricity? (A generator.) Did his children attend school? (No, they're too young.) How did he make a living? (From his sheep.)

Though he wears Army fatigues and carries a gun, Griffin is a civilian, part of a controversial program known as the Human Terrain System. According to a Pentagon blueprint from 2006, the idea is to recruit academics whose area expertise and language skills can help the military wage a smarter counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. These specialists, among other things, are meant to map the population of towns and villages, identify the clans that matter and the fault lines within them, then advise U.S. commanders on the right approach for leveraging local support...

Continue reading A Gun in One Hand, A Pen in the Other.

General David Petraeus / Ambassador Ryan Crocker Testimony (Updated 14 April)

Mon, 04/14/2008 - 4:34am
Background

Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I) - Official Web Site

General David Petraeus - Official Biography

US Embassy, Baghdad - Official Web Site

Ambassador Ryan Crocker - Official Biography

Transcripts / Briefing Slides

Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq - General David Petraeus

Testimony to Senate Foreign Relations Committee - Ambassador Ryan Crocker

Testimony to Senate Armed Services Committee - Ambassador Ryan Crocker

Testimony of General David H. Petraeus - Briefing Charts

Skelton Delivers Opening Remarks - Washington Post transcript

Petraeus Testifies at House Hearing - Washington Post transcript

Crocker's Opening Remarks at House Hearing - Washington Post transcript

Videos

General Petraeus gives his opening statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

General David Petraeus calls it battlefield geometry - determining the strength and positioning of U.S. forces across Iraq.

Charlie Rose Show - Senator Jack Reed, Jack Keane, Senator Jeff Sessions - A discussion about General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker's testimony on Iraq.

Charlie Rose Show - A discussion about day two of General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker's testimony on Iraq with John Burns and Dexter Filkins, both of The New York Times.

In 9 April 2008 testimony, General David Petraeus discusses the reasons for war, al Qaeda, and the definition of success in Iraq.

News Reports / Analysis

No Further Reduction of Troops in Iraq - Meyers and Shanker, New York Times

Bush Supports Pause in Iraq Drawdown - Baker and DeYoung, Washington Post

Gates and Petraeus Differ over Troop Levels - Spiegel and Barnes, Los Angeles Times

No Sign of Large Iraq Troop Withdrawals - David Stout, New York Times

Stresses Still High on US Military - Peter Grier, Christian Science Monitor

Bush Announces Shorter Deployments - James Gerstenzang, Los Angeles Times

Bush to Cut Army Tours to 12 Months - Baker and Weisman, Washington Post

Bleak Assessment of Iraq Military - Meyers and Shanker, New York Times

Petraeus Resists More Troop Pullouts - Farah Stockman, Boston Globe

More Skepticism Voiced at House Hearing - Brian Knowlton, New York Times

General Gets Unfriendly GOP Fire - Dana Milbank, Washington Post

Eyes on '08 Field - Gail Russell Chaddock, Christian Science Monitor

Next President and US Footprint - Abramowitz and DeYoung, Washington Post

A Plea From Petraeus - Baker and Weisman, Washington Post

Bush Ready to Back General Petraeus - Tim Reid, London Times

Testimony Off the Radar of Most in Baghdad - Amit Paley, Washington Post

Petraeus Urges 45-Day Halt - Meyers and Shanker, New York Times

Petraeus Warns of Iraq Backslide - Carter and Miller, Washington Times

Reassess Iraq Before Further Cuts - Peter Grier, Christian Science Monitor

Frustrated Senators See No Exit Signs - DeYoung and Ricks, Washington Post

Candidates Hear What They Want to Hear - Donald Lambro, Washington Times

Candidates Stay on Message - Elizabeth Holmes, Wall Street Journal

Antiwar Lawmakers Waiting on November - Noam Levey, Los Angeles Times

Testimony Before Impatient Lawmakers - Karen DeYoung, Washington Post

Testimony Met with Praise, Skepticism - Michaels and Jackson, USA Today

Surging General Petraeus - Andy Solis, New York Post

Petraeus Takes Fight to Next US President - Reid and Hider, London Times

Hearing Intrudes in Sadr City, if Power Lasts - Michael Gordon, New York Times

A Chance to Explain Iraq Views - Elisabeth Bumiller, New York Times

Bush Listens Closely To His Man in Iraq - Michael Abramowitz, Washington Post

Congress To Hear Of Gains In Iraq - Karen DeYoung, Washington Post

With War in Senate Spotlight - Elisabeth Bumiller, New York Times

Soldiers on Ground Offer Mixed Assessment - Richard Tomkins, Washington Times

Sustaining Troop Mumbers in Iraq - Tim Reid, London Times

Petraeus' Return Promises Political Drama - Spiegel and Barnes, Los Angeles Times

Petraeus Likely to Push for Flexibility - Jim Michaels, USA Today

Petraeus, Crocker to Face Scrutiny on War - Miller and Carter, Washington Times

Why Drawdown Likely to Stop in July - Howard Lafranchi, Christian Science Monitor

Opinion-Editorials

Ambassador Crocker's Warnings - Washington Times editorial

National Security is the Issue - David Limbaugh, Washington Times

Exposing a Blind Spot - Donald Lambro, Washington Times

Heroes and Horoscopes - Oliver North, Washington Times

A Century or Worse? - Clifford May, Washington Times

Surrender Syndrome - James Lyons, Washington Times

War at the Pentagon - Jim Hoagland, Washington Post

Iraq: All the Time He Needs - New York Times editorial

The Question Petraeus Can't Answer - David Broder, Washington Post

Let's 'Surge' Some More - Michael Yon, Wall Street Journal

Petraeus's Policy Quandary - Jed Babbin, Human Events

Perseverance Pays Off in Baghdad - Melik Kaylan, Wall Street Journal

Progress, Actually - Frederick Kagan, Weekly Standard

The Sound Bite War - William Murchison, Washington Times

They Really Do Plan to Surrender - Matthew Continetti, Weekly Standard

Vultures of the Left - Dean Barnett, Weekly Standard

Pause vs. Drawdown? - USA Today editorial

The Petraeus-Crocker Report - Washington Times editorial

Iraq's Realities - Christian Science Monitor editorial

Reality Check - Pittsburgh Post-Gazette editorial

The Wartime Economy - Los Angeles Times editorial

Executing the Mission Statement - David French, National Review

Resolve and Commitment - Cal Thomas, Washington Times

Turning No Corners - E. J. Dionne Jr., Washington Post

Petraeus' 'Anaconda' - Austin Bay, Washington Times

A Hundred Years of War? - Clifford May, National Review

Assessing the Surge - Ralph Peters, Armed Forces Journal

UK Not Wanted by Iraqis, Time to Go - Con Coughlin, London Daily Telegraph

No Answers, No Goals, No Exit - Boston Globe editorial

What Next for Iraq? - Harlan Ullman, Washington Times

What I Heard at the Hearings - John Cornyn, National Review

Are We Closer to "Victory"? - Joe Conason, Real Clear Politics

Stonewall Petraeus - Fred Kaplan, Slate

Iraq's National Identity Alive and Growing - Samir Sumaida'ie, Wall Street Journal

Sacrificed to the Surge - Spring and Kaplow, Newsweek

Cost of Not Liberating Iraq - James Pethokoukis, US News and World Report

Obama's Iraq Weakness - Michael Gerson, Washington Post

Iraq Report Redux - Washington Post editorial

'See No Progress' - Wall Street Journal editorial

Petraeus Patience - National Review editorial

Modest Progress, Absence of Accountability - USA Today editorial

Staying in Iraq for Proxy War - Los Angeles Times editorial

Never-ending War - Baltimore Sun editorial

Petraeus' Assessment - Philadelphia Inquirer editorial

Fate of Iraq Under General Petraeus - London Daily Telegraph editorial

Iran At the Heart of Iraq - David Ignatius, Real Clear Politics

No Clear Way Forward or Out - Michael Goodwin, New York Daily News

Iraq's Real Gains - Barham Salih, Washington Post

Iraq Policy Needs Clarifying - Trudy Rubin, Philadelphia Inquirer

The Price of the Surge - Steven Simon, Real Clear Politics

A Sense of Exhaustion - Michael Hirsh, Newsweek

Nobody Puts Petraeus in a Corner - Mark Hemingway, National Review

More Troops or Fewer Troops? - Bronwen Maddox, London Times

Iraq Proposal Likely to Roil Campaign - Yochi Drezean, Wall Street Journal

Messages For and From the Media - Tony Blankley, Washington Times

Assessing the War - Gartenstein-Ross and Roggio, Weekly Standard

Petraeus' Anaconda Strategy - Austin Bay, Real Clear Poltics

The Hallmark of the Iraq Debate - Gerard Baker, London Times

Toil and Trouble - Maureen Dowd, New York Times

More Time for More of the Same? - New York Times editorial

The Petraeus Effect - Wall Street Journal editorial

Fruits of the Surge - Washington Times editorial

The Sergeant Solution - Robert Scales, Wall Street Journal

Why Iraq Matters - Frederick Kagan, National Review

Beyond 'Benchmarks' - Rich Lowry, National Review

Back From Iraq, Again Facing Fire - New York Times op-ed series

Focus on Iraq and the Future - Tulin Daloglu, Washington Times

Resist the Urge to Leave Iraq - Max Boot, Los Angeles Times

Buying Time in Iraq - H.D.S. Greenway, Boston Globe

Iraq Testimony: Required Reading - Frank Gaffney, Jr., Washington Times

Shifting War Rhetoric - Hegseth and Bellavia, Washington Times

Iraq and Its Costs - Lieberman and Graham, Wall Street Journal

Blog Reports / Opinions

Liveblogging the Iraqi Hearings - Tom Ricks, Washington Post

Equally Dangerous - Abu Muqawama, Abu Muqawama

The Morning After - Abu Muqawama, Abu Muqawama

After Petraeus, a Growing Divide - Ben Pershing, Washington Post

The Anaconda Chart - Austin Bay, Austin Bay

Bush's Stubborn Strategy - Phillip Carter, Intel Dump

Missed Historical Analogy - Abu Muqawama, Abu Muqawama

Stupid Question - Jules Crittenden, Forward Movement

Petraeus Overplays His Hand - Phillip Carter, Intel Dump

Of Swine, Hyenas and Generals - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal

What, No Bruce Willis Ending? - Ed Morrissey, Hot Air

Petraeus, Crocker, and God in the Dock - Abu Muqawama, Abu Muqawama

Previewing Petraeus and Crocker - Phillip Carter, Intel Dump

How to Testify Before Congress - Westhawk, Westhawk

"Failure of Leadership" - Jules Crittenden, Forward Movement

MEP Thinking Strategically About Iraq - Marc Lynch, Abu Aardvark

Knowledge Before Spin - Steve Schippert, Threats Watch

General Petraeus Supplement Post - Blackfive, Blackfive

What do You Want to Know? - Soldier's Mom, Mudville Gazette

Snakes on the Plane - Richard Fernandez, The Belmont Club

"People Hearing without Listening" - Richard Fernandez, The Belmont Club

If You Missed Today's Testimony... - Noah Shachtman, Danger Zone

Iraq by the Numbers: April 2008 - Bill Roggio, Long War Journal

Petraeus Advisor Colonel Derek Harvey - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal

The Supplemental Information - Ed Morrissey, Hot Air

A Debate On The Surge - Max Boot, Commentary

After the Fire - James Taranto, Wall Street Journal

Yea, Right

Sun, 04/13/2008 - 12:14pm
Associated Press news item - Iran Dismisses Sabotage in Mosque Blast by Nasser Karimi.

Iranian officials on Sunday ruled out an attack as the cause of an explosion that killed 11 people inside a mosque in the southern city of Shiraz.

The explosion ripped through the mosque packed with hundreds of worshippers late Saturday as a cleric delivered his weekly speech against extremist Wahabi beliefs and the outlawed Baha'i faith, the semiofficial Fars news agency said.

Authorities said besides the 11 killed, 191 people were wounded, some of them critically, the state IRNA news agency reported...

The police chief of the southern Fars Province, Gen. Ali Moayyedi, said he "rejects" the possibility of an intentional bombing and "any sort of insurgency" in the blast.

Moayyedi, in comments carried by state IRNA news agency, said the initial investigation found remnants of ammunition from a military exhibition that was held recently at the mosque....

Sure, that's the ticket.

April's Armed Forces Journal

Sun, 04/13/2008 - 9:36am
Several items from the latest edition of Armed Forces Journal:

New Answers to Hard Questions: Properly structured adviser teams are key to winning the Long War by 1st Lieutenant Brian Drohan and Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl.

Today's strategic realities outline a world in which many states face internal and transnational threats from terrorist organizations and other violent groups. The past five years in Iraq and Afghanistan present a number of stark lessons, but perhaps chief among them is the need to help our friends and partners provide for their own security. In the words of Defense Secretary Robert Gates, success in the Long War "will be less a matter of imposing one's will and more a function of shaping behavior — of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between." The Defense Department must create specifically designed force structure optimized for adviser and assistance missions to successfully engage partner nations at all levels, from the institutional to the tactical, and help them build the capacity to win the Long War...

Assessing the Surge by Ralph Peters.

U.S. commanders with whom I spoke in Anbar province in August were worried — worried that their Marines would get bored in the absence of combat action. Enlisted Marines on return tours of duty expressed surprise verging on bewilderment that cities such as Fallujah, long wracked by insurgent violence, were calm and open for business. Foreign terrorists who once ruled the streets still launched minor attacks, but had been marginalized across the province. And last year's Sunni-Arab enemies were busily scheming how to profit from the American presence...

The Fight for Friends by Chet Richards.

Polls show that most non-Kurdish Iraqis blame the U.S. for the condition of their country and believe that their situations will improve after we leave. If, some five years after the invasion, this describes the mood of those we came to help, it suggests that we and the Iraqi people will obtain — at best — an Iraq that is worse off than it was before our occupation and one that could provide a breeding ground of resentment against American interests for as long into the future as we can imagine.

At worst, our withdrawal from Iraq could result in hundreds and possibly thousands of additional American casualties, the abandoning of billions of dollars of equipment, and the emergence of powerful and determined entities allied with Iran in the case of the Shiites, or with the most regressive political and social forces in the Middle East in the case of Arab Sunnis...

Hope and Skepticism: Iraqis at home and displaced weigh changes in Baghdad by Christopher Griffen.

Last April, this column described initial responses by Iraqi bloggers to the "surge" of American troops in their country. Writing from shattered Baghdad and exile in Damascus, they recorded hopeful auguries as families returned to reclaim their lives in such one-time combat zones as Baghdad's Haifa Street. But such hope was tempered by long-sewn despair: One blogger noted in February 2007 that he didn't know whether to feel happy because the violence was dissipating, afraid that it may return or "sad because deep inside I think I know it will."

One year later, Iraq's growing community of milbloggers reports continued improvement, citing both the success of the surge and the growth of "awakening councils" that comprise former Sunni insurgents who have worked with coalition forces to expel tyrannical al-Qaida terrorists...

The Long Haul: Leaving Iraq will be a logistical nightmare by Captain Timothy Hsia.

The recent push by the White House to negotiate a pact with the government of Iraq concerning the long-term presence of U.S. service members in the country surprised many Americans but served as coda for Army logisticians. The fact is, the military continues to build and stockpile thousands of containers full of equipment in Iraq, despite the unresolved political infighting in Washington concerning whether U.S. troops will leave...

Hedging Strategies: UCAVs, budgets and improbable threats by Group Captain Peter Layton.

Unmanned air vehicle development has sharply accelerated in recent years principally because UAVs can overcome a major shortcoming of manned aircraft — limited persistence — while offering better range, payload and stealth performance.

Improved capabilities, though, are important only if they are strategically relevant and affordable. For the foreseeable future, the major strategic drivers appear to be winning the long struggle against global terrorism and hedging against the re-emergence of a major state-based threat. Although unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs) are relevant to both circumstances, this article discusses the strategic, budgetary and technological case when considering hedging against a future peer competitor...

Hoisted by its Own PR: Israel's gamble on high-risk ops hastened self-defeat in Lebanon by Barbara Opell-Rome.

Obscured amid the failures of Israel's 2006 Lebanon War was the extent to which Tel Aviv's wartime leaders were —to wager on speculative, strategically dubious, image-boosting operations.

Part of the Israeli military's quest for "narrative superiority," these so-called "consciousness operations" ranged from relatively simple public relations efforts to boost homeland morale to complex psychological, special forces missions designed to trigger strategic change in the Lebanese theater...

Sunday Blog Snapshot

Sun, 04/13/2008 - 8:55am
Phil Carter of Intel Dump has two posts up concerning combat tour length - Combat Tours Still Too Long and More on Combat Tours.

Most soldiers I know greeted yesterday's news about the reduction in combat-tour lengths with a great deal of cynicism. It's not that they don't appreciate the reduction -- they do, and their families most certainly do. It's just that even a 12-month tour is such a hardship, such a departure from the deployment models used before the Iraq war strained the Army to its breaking point...

Counterinsurgency requires detailed knowledge of the human, geographic, political and social terrain, and it takes time to acquire that knowledge. I'd say it became effective around the fifth or sixth month of my tour as a police adviser in Iraq. Arguably, advisers, commanders and troops operating outside the wire should serve longer tours in order to develop and cement their relationships, and capitalize on them.

But they can't -- there's a finite limit to the amount of combat that men and women can endure. So we must balance combat effectiveness, and the needs of an all-volunteer force (and its families), against the steep learning curve of counterinsurgency, which demands longer deployments...

Grim of Blackfive has recently returned from Iraq and shares his thoughts.

Iraq has essentially three problems to "solve" to become a stable country. These are the Sunni problem, the Shia problem, and the Kurdish problem. By "problem" I mean not that the people are a problem, but that each of the main subsets of the population has a particular challenge that has to be resolved before it can integrate into a successful state. (This is, of course, at a high degree of abstraction -- at the ground level, Shiites and Sunnis may be intermarried, etc.)

The Sunni problem was rejectionism. The Surge has solved the Sunni problem.

That's a fundamental shift in the situation on the ground from a year ago. The gains are -- as Petraeus said -- reversable...

Richard Fernandez of The Belmont Club provides insights on the Shia problem.

Now whatever one may think of Moqtada al-Sadr's participation in politics, the essential question is whether his participation will take place within the framework of an Iraqi Shi'te subpolity or within an Iranian dominated framework. The difference is essential. Sistani's declaration that the "law is the only authority" goes to this very point: whose law and whose authority. In this case Sistani seems to suggest that the Shi'ites can settle their "problem", but settle it within the framework of Iraq...

Bill Roggio of The Long War Journal discusses combat preparations for operations in Sadr City.

Three weeks after the Iraqi government initiated Operation Knights Assault in Basrah, US and Iraqi forces have squared off against the Mahdi Army daily in the Shia slums of Sadr City. Additional US and Iraqi forces have moved into northeastern Baghdad to prepare for a possible major engagement against the Mahdi Army...

Herschel Smith of The Captain's Journal shares his thoughts on the fighting in Basra.

There are tens of thousands of Iranian fighters inside Iraq. Five days of fighting in Basra and a few more in Sadr City are not enough to rid Iraq of Iranian influence. We are only at the very beginning stages of the fight in the South. Since Britain implemented the "we may as well go ahead and give all of the terrain to the enemy" approach to counterinsurgency, the developments in the South lag far behind the West and North...

Will Hartley of Insurgency Research Group discusses the Taliban, General Giáp and guerrilla strategy.

While the Taliban's desire to explicitly adopt classic insurgency doctrine is interesting, it is questionable whether they are in a position to successfully emulate Giáp in Afghanistan. One of the main differences is that Giáp was able to benefit from a regular supply of heavy weaponry and munitions from Mao across the border in China, including the artillery and anti-aircraft guns that proved key to isolating and destroying the French at íiện Biíªn Phủ.

Although able to overrun isolated outposts manned by poorly equipped Afghan National Police (ANP) - in the same way as Baitullah Mehsud's Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are able to temporarily seize isolated forts in the FATA in Pakistan - the Taliban are a long way away from achieving the kind of coordinated assault, backed by heavy weaponry, that would be required to seize a coalition Forward Operating Base. It is also questionable whether the Taliban have the extremely tight command and control structure required to conduct the coordinated multi-pronged offensives key to Giáp's success...