Sudan’s War Beyond the Battlefield: Governance Collapse and the Struggle for Civil Authority
Since April 2023, Sudan has been consumed by a brutal war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). While the international coverage has focused on battlefield maneuvers, mass displacement, and atrocities, a quieter but equally devastating process is unfolding: the systematic collapse of governance and the violent contest for civil authority. This article argues that the war has fragmented Sudan into several vacuums of governance, where no single actor provides security or basic services, and where local civilian authorities are being actively suppressed, co-opted, or replaced by military actors. This article suggests practical responses for international and local actors to support and restore civil governance. Without a deliberate strategy to rebuild civil authority from the ground up, any future peace agreement will rest on an empty shell of a state.
The Unravelling of Sudan’s Administrative State
Even before the war, Sudan’s transitional government was fragile. The 2021 coup by General Burhan and General Hemedti shattered hopes for a civilian‑led transition, but left bureaucratic ministries, state governments, and local councils somewhat intact. The current war has destroyed even those vestiges of authority.
In Khartoum, the capital’s civil registry, tax collection, and municipal services have ceased almost entirely. Senior ministry officials have fled or are operating remotely from Port Sudan, while RSF-controlled neighborhoods indicate no government presence. According to Freedom House, violence and localized conflicts have increased across Sudan, especially in Darfur and Kordofan. In those regions, localized conflict had weakened government authority even before the onset of civil war in April 2023. Both SAF and RSF have targeted civilian administrative hubs, local government offices, courtrooms, and land registries, either looting them or converting them into military barracks. This is a deliberate strategy to erase any competing center of authority. The result is that, in vast swathes of Sudan, no entity remains capable of issuing identity papers, resolving land disputes, or arresting criminals. Communities are left with militia rule, rough justice, or destruction.
Parallel Authorities and the Shadow State
Into the gap have stepped multiple armed groups, each asserting itself as capable of governance. The RSF has established “civil administration” offices in Darfur and parts of Khartoum, appointing allied tribal leaders and former regime figures to manage local affairs. These structures collect “revenues” (extortion at checkpoints), issue movement permits, and even run makeshift courts. For example, in September 2023, RSF fighters in Nyala set up roadblocks demanding up to 10,000 SDG from traders and civilians to allow passage, while seizing goods from those who refused. Similarly, local civil society groups have documented incidents in which RSF-appointed officials issued “fines” to business owners and detained those unable to pay. This is not governance, but rent-seeking predation. RSF’s justice is arbitrary: its services are reserved for those who pay or collaborate.
In SAF‑held areas, the military has reimposed a hollowed‑out version of the old state. Port Sudan now functions as a parallel capital, but its reach is nominal. Local resistance committees, the grassroots civilian networks that led the 2019 revolution, have been systematically sidelined or arrested by SAF officers who view any independent authority as a threat. Meanwhile, remnants of the former Bashir regime’s civilian bureaucracy have reemerged, offering loyalty to SAF in exchange for local power. This is not a restoration of civil authority but its seizure by militarized clients. In South Kordofan, the SPLM-N is unable to maintain effective services, with Radio Tamazuj reporting worsening malaria outbreaks and the spread of tuberculosis.
The Struggle for Civil Authority: Resistance Committees and Emergency Response Rooms
During this collapse, the most hopeful and most endangered actors are the grassroots tandheem al‑moqawama (resistance committees) and the emergency response rooms (ERRs). Originally formed during the revolution to coordinate protests, these networks have become the last providers of basic services in many neighborhoods.
Reporting from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Long War Journal indicates that fighting in El Fasher has led to shifts in territorial control between the RSF and SAF. However, these changes have not produced effective or legitimate governance. Armed groups’ control does not ensure the delivery of public goods or accountable administration. The Yale School of Public Health notes that, in the absence of functioning state institutions, community groups such as resistance committees and ERRs have become the primary sources of civil authority, coordinating necessary services and community support in El Fasher. The United Nations Office at Geneva reports that the humanitarian situation for civilians is worsening as the conflict escalates, placing volunteer groups working on water system repairs and communication with humanitarian agencies at continuous risk. Both parties to the conflict often view these independent organizations as threats to their authority.
According to a report from Human Rights Watch, Sudanese security forces have mistreated civilians, including children. Still, the report indicates the RSF has not yet stormed ERR facilities, nor has the SAF arrested resistance committee leaders for “unauthorized organization.” A report from the Associated Press highlights how the current conflict in Sudan has left Khartoum strewn with unexploded weapons. In this environment, both the RSF and SAF see functioning civil authorities as a challenge to their respective authority.
To ensure the survival of a post-war civilian state, it is vital that these civil networks are protected, supported with resources, and granted legal authority. These networks should not be considered spoilers, but rather essential foundations for a future system of decentralized governance. Concrete protection measures are urgently needed. International and local actors should pursue several parallel approaches. Firstly, establish discreet legal monitoring and rapid response networks to document threats and provide emergency legal aid. Secondly, press for diplomatic assurances and explicit terms in ceasefire negotiations prohibiting attacks or arbitrary detentions of grassroots leaders. Thirdly, provide financial support for secure communications, safe houses, and evacuation options for targeted network members. Finally, create operational cooperation with international agencies to ensure any retaliatory measures against committees or ERRs trigger public global condemnation and leverage with Sudanese power brokers.
International Implications: Why Governance Collapse Matters Beyond Sudan
For outside actors, the instinct has been to focus on ceasefire negotiations and humanitarian access. These are necessary but insufficient. A ceasefire without a parallel plan for local civil authorities will freeze the current fragmented, predatory governance arrangements. Humanitarian aid, if channeled solely through SAF or RSF, will be looted or weaponized.
There are three immediate steps for international partners. First, recognize resistance committees and ERRs as legitimate civilian authorities for delivering services, and fund them through trusted intermediaries. Second, condition any security sector reform discussions on the demilitarization of local government, requiring SAF and RSF to vacate all civil administration buildings as a precondition for talks. Third, support the creation of neutral “local protection zones” where community-led justice mechanisms can operate without interference from armed actors, modelled on the Aman initiative in parts of Darfur.
Carrying out these measures will not be straightforward. Vetting and monitoring trusted intermediaries can be challenging in an environment where local actors may be threatened or manipulated by rival factions. There is also a risk that funding or support could be diverted or captured by armed groups, undermining the legitimacy of civil initiatives. To reduce these challenges, international partners should adopt strict vetting procedures in collaboration with independent Sudanese community society networks, employ third-party monitoring for aid flows, and require open reporting from intermediaries. Where possible, partnerships with established diaspora organizations and scheduled audits can further safeguard processes. For protection zones, clear criteria for designation, local buy-in, and global observers should be built in from the outset to deter violations. Anticipating these impediments and integrating risk-reduction strategies will improve the practicality and impact of international assistance to Sudan’s fragile civil authority.
Conclusion: From Battlefield to Bureaucracy
Wars end on a battlefield, but peace lives or dies in a tax office, a courtroom, and a school registration desk. The tragedy of the Sudanese civil war is that even as the bullets fly, the more lasting destruction is of the everyday infrastructure of civil authority. If the international community and Sudanese civilian forces cannot reverse this collapse mid‑war, the end of active combat will not bring stability; it will bring a Hobbesian scramble among armed mafias disguised as governments. The struggle for Sudan is not only for the presidential palace, but also for the local council’s water pump. That struggle is already underway, and civilians are losing. Now is the time for decision-makers, international actors, and Sudanese leaders to act. Do not wait for the guns to fall silent before investing in the systems and people who can restore civil life. Prioritize and protect local civilian networks, ensure aid arrives in communities through legitimate channels, and demand the demilitarization of local governance as part of any peace initiative. The fate of peace in Sudan and the region depends on urgent, coordinated action to rebuild civil authority from the ground up.
