The Katanga Secession, the Five Factors Model, and Counterinsurgency (COIN) Theory

Introduction

In 1960, only days after being granted independence from Belgium, the Republic of the Congo, now known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, collapsed into civil war. The ensuing series of insurgencies is known as the Congo Crisis and ravaged the country until 1965. The first and largest rebel movement was a secessionist attempt by the rich southern province, Katanga.

The US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute began the Study of Internal Conflict (SOIC) project as an investigation into why governments are defeated in internal conflicts. According to “COIN Doctrine is Wrong,” 40 military, geographic, economic, and political factors were identified in 53 different conflicts (including the Katanga Secession) that occurred post-1945. The project revealed that five factors were present in at least 90% of all cases where government forces were defeated by insurgencies. The study’s findings are a remarkable pivot in counterinsurgency theory, as they turn away from the commonly held beliefs that tactics like “clear, hold, build” and “nation building” are key to counterinsurgency. The SOIC model argues that the result of an internal conflict is effectively predetermined by the presence of five factors at the onset of the conflict. The Five Factors are:

1. 85% of the country must share a national identity.
2. 85% of the population must perceive the government as legitimate.
3. The government must achieve or maintain security control over roughly 85% of the country’s overall population.
4. The rebel movement must have persistent access to external sanctuary in a neighboring country to a militarily significant degree.
5. There was a government army or armed constabulary force in existence at the start of the conflict.

The purpose of this paper is to determine why the SOIC’s Five Factors Model failed to predict the outcome of the Katanga Secessionist conflict of 1960-1963. The research shows that although the Katangese forces achieved the first four factors, which should predict government defeat to a probability of 100%, the Congolese government was victorious, defying the model. I believe that the Five Factors Model failed to predict government defeat due to its narrow scope which prevents deeper investigation into the role of foreign support and the strength of Katangan national identity.

Background

Roots of the Conflict

Although strains of the conflict can be traced hundreds of years back to the tribal history of the region, the primary catalysts were colonial. Belgian colonization began with the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885.  Unlike other African colonies, however, the new Congo Free State was not administered by the Belgian government, but rather it was personally managed by King Leopold II, who was enticed by the region’s rich natural resources. Following international backlash against the Belgian treatment of workers in the rubber industry, the control of the Congo Free State was turned over to the Belgian government in 1908. Shortly before the Belgian government replaced King Leopold II, a group of international investors formed the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) in 1906. UMHK represented Belgian and British mining interests and maintained significant political and commercial influence over the region through the colonial and secessionist periods.

The push for decolonization began in the mid-1950s when newly legalized regional ethnic movements began gaining momentum. The largest Katangan group was the Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT). It was formed in 1958 to attract members across different tribes by unification through a common Katangese identity. Another rival Katangese association also emerged at this time, the Association Générale des Baluba du Katanga (BALUBAKAT). Conversely, BALUBAKAT membership was chiefly tribal, leading to pre-independence skirmishes.

In the early summer of 1960, a new government was elected, including a president and a prime minister, Patrice Lumumba. On June 30, 1960, the Republic of the Congo officially gained independence. Due to the lack of preparation for separation from Belgium, internal conflict began immediately, with a mutiny by the Congolese National Army (ANC). On July 5th, enlisted black soldiers revolted against their white officers. Reports soon surfaced of atrocities being perpetrated against white colonists.

Without consulting the Congolese government, Belgian troops invaded to restore order. Outraged, Leopoldville appealed to the United Nations to force the Belgian troops to withdraw and for a peacekeeping force to replace the Belgians. The UN agreed and authorized the creation of an intervention force, the Opération des Nations Unies au Congo, while simultaneously demanding the withdrawal of Belgian troops. However, two days prior, the country began to fracture, and on July 11th the providence of Katanga announced they would secede. Less than a month later, the neighboring South Kasai province followed.

The Katangese Secessionist Movement and the Gendarmes

The Katanga Secessionist Movement was led by Moïse Tshombe. A businessman turned politician in the 1950s, he was elected president of CONAKAT in 1959, gaining control of Katanga’s parliament. CONAKAT controlled southern Katanga, while its rival, BALUBAKAT, controlled the north. Ethnic and social differences between these two groups showed through internal conflicts over federal versus regional governance and industrial versus agrarian identities. CONAKAT was supported by Tshombe’s tribe, and, more importantly, UHMK.

As soon as Tshombe announced his intention for an independent Katangese government based in Elizabethville, he gained the support of several foreign governments and corporations. At the start  of the conflict, the UN banned direct support of the insurgent forces in the Congo. Despite this, the British, French, US, and Belgian governments covertly supported Tshombe . However, no nation would ever officially recognize Katanga, not even Costa Rica, which was bribed $1 million by members of Katanga’s strong foreign delegation network to do so.

Alongside UMHK, many other European and American companies were active in Katanga, and several maintained large holdings in the mining industry. Corporate fears revolved around nationalization, especially after the Suez Crisis of 1956. Support from business was more than just financial, however. For example, British businessmen supplied Tshombe with arms and worked to prevent British munitions from being used by UN peacekeeping forces. Covert European support aligned with the anxieties of both European settlers and expatriates, as well as commercial interests. But as overt support was illegal, a tendency to use tribal dynamics to shield European aims emerged.

Despite these subtleties, in the years following the conflict, analysis has heavily focused on European influence and actors as drivers of secessionist attitudes. Work has recently been conducted, however, to illuminate the agency of black political leaders and the role of Katangese national identity in the conflict. Native Katangan leaders, for example, were able to mobilize local European interests and military assets to create the secessionist state’s administration and military institutions. Later, as Belgian support waned, a network of Katangese diplomats was able to recoup the support via France, the UK, and the US, albeit only commercially.

Katanga’s military forces, called the Katangese Gendarmerie, were officially christened in November of 1960. Despite initial plans for 1,500 men, they were able to raise around 7,000. Early members came from the ANC, who were loyal to Katanga. In the first year of the war, the Gendarmes were led by a Belgian officer corps, and during this time, the force heavily resembled a colonial army due to the racial makeup and experience of commanders. After the UN had recalled the Belgian officer corps by August 1961, they were replaced by white mercenaries. The new mercenary ranks included pro-colonial soldiers from South Africa and Rhodesia, French veterans from the Algerian War and First Indochina War, former Italian fascists, and German SS soldiers. Although ideology did serve as a motivator in some cases, the main attraction was financial. Mercenary fees were reportedly paid by UMHK. At its strongest, the Gendarmerie was estimated to be composed of up to 17,000 soldiers. In addition to this surprising mix of soldiers, the Gendarmerie remains notable as one of the only insurgencies with an air force.

Open War in Katanga

The UN sent 8,400 troops to the Congo in July 1960 in what would be the organization’s second peacekeeping deployment. Expecting minimal resistance, they found instead an adversary unlike any other in the institution’s short history. Troops from India, Sweden, and Ireland faced a force of indigenous soldiers, some in warpaint, led by European mercenaries and supported by fighter jets.

The United States supported UN intervention from the beginning, primarily due to fears of a communist takeover in the fledgling country. Initially, the Eisenhower Administration was hopeful that the new government would be pro-Western. But as the weeks following the UN declaration unfolded, it appeared that Prime Minister Lumumba was becoming increasingly friendly with the Soviet Union, stoking fears that a communist overthrow was imminent. Chaos ensued, and in September 1960, a military coup, orchestrated by General Joseph Mobutu, and supported by the US, toppled the new government and pushed the Soviets out of the country. Shortly thereafter, Mobutu had Lumumba assassinated.

By the autumn of 1960, the BALUBAKAT organization had built up its own militia and seized land in response to the growing militarism of CONAKAT. Tshombe understood that BALUAKAT represented a significant obstacle to Katangese independence and as such, retaking that territory became the first military objective. These are considered the first shots of the Katanga Secession and by early 1961, southern forces were able to retake nearly all territory lost to BALUAKAT.

American fears of further Soviet interference arose when the eastern province of Congo-Stanleyville announced secession in early 1961. Led by President Antoine Gizenga, the new state intended to maintain Lumumba’s pro-Soviet leanings. Strategically, the Kennedy Administration saw a united Congo as the best defense against communism despite the enormous challenge of defeating the various insurgencies. In response, the US sought to build up UN forces.

Once all of Katanga was under the control of Tshombe, the conflict evolved into a conventional civil war as pro-Congolese forces tried to reclaim the breakaway province. Negotiations between leaders of the two sides were common but often ineffective. In February of 1961, the stakes rose when the UN Security Council allowed the use of force to subdue the secessionists and expel the remaining Belgian soldiers. Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General of the UN, led these early attempts to pacify Katanga. Hammarskjold wanted to limit the UN’s involvement in the conflict, as many saw the Katanga Secession as an internal matter.

UN forces were able to push deep into Katanga and entered the capital, Elizabethville, in 1961. Believing capturing the city meant the war was over, the UN announced a cease-fire. However, Tshombe had fled to Rhodesia without agreeing to UN demands, and Western backers were angered at the UN for taking such drastic steps outside of their specified mission. A second UN setback occurred in September 1961 when Hammarskjold died in a plane crash – a claim that many attributed to his plane being shot down.. Ultimately, his untimely demise opened the door to a larger UN presence, spearheaded by his replacement, U Thant.

Thant’s revised UN force would contain 20,000 peacekeepers that he believed necessary to effectively destroy the independence movement. From this point on, the UN campaign became increasingly aggressive, seeking to destroy all military forces not under UN or Congolese control. By December, the Katangese Air Force had been neutralized and Tshombe had signed an agreement stating Katanga would accept the rule of the Congolese government. Tshombe delayed reintegration, however, and as a result, the conflict continued for another year.

Despite losing Belgian military advisors throughout 1961, the Katangese Gendarmes did not collapse as many analysts believed. Instead, they maintained discipline and effectiveness in countering UN attacks. Many claimed this was due to the immediate hire of white mercenaries, but contrary to this common belief, these mercenaries had little day-to-day command over indigenous forces, and many groups of mercenaries operated autonomously. Thus, the continued success of the Gendarmes was largely due to the skill of their new black officer corps.

As 1961 flowed into 1962, UN forces maintained control of Elizabethville, turning northern Katanga into the final stronghold of the insurgents. Negotiations for reintegration continued as UN peacekeepers steadily chipped away at Gendarme territory. By May, CIA concerns over the fate of the Gendarmes after a seemingly inevitable Katangese defeat became the US’ top foreign policy priority. Fears that the group would resort to a guerilla campaign pushed the US to call for retraining and reorganization of the force once the conflict ended, as a non-hostile Gendarmerie was considered paramount for future stability.

Katangan Defeat and Post-Conflict Upheaval

By mid-1962, CONAKAT’s days were numbered: the Gizenga government had surrendered, South Kasai had been defeated, and Belgium had completely abandoned them. Now siding with the US, both countries pushed forcefully for a quick, negotiated end to the conflict. UN military pressure intensified through the Autumn, and by late December, nearly all Katangese forces had surrendered or fled. The remaining political and military leaders officially surrendered on January 14, 1963, ending the Katanga Secessionist Movement.

Immediately following the surrender, Tshombe fled to Europe, and thousands of Gendarmes escaped to Rhodesia and Angola. The UN mission formally ended in June 1964, just as new rebellions were springing up around the country. Faced with continued insurrection, the Congolese government turned to Moïse Tshombe to stabilize the country. In July 1964, he became prime minster of the Republic of the Congo. His return also brought previously exiled Gendarmes and mercenaries back from abroad who fought alongside ANC forces, Belgian paratroopers, and the US Air Force to pacify the country by November 1964.

The Congo Crisis ended with General Mobutu organizing a second coup in November 1965, ousting Tshombe again with US backing. Mobutu would hold power until 1997. Tshombe fled and would spend the next four years plotting to retake Katanga before his death in 1969.

Assessing the Five Factors

The SOIC Five Factors Model, as explained in “COIN Doctrine is Wrong”, represents a sharp shift in COIN discussion. The theory rejects previous fundamental beliefs like “nation building” and “winning hearts and minds” that were developed and reinforced based on American experiences in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Instead, the model depicts a highly simplified formula that looks at five factors present at the beginning of a conflict. While these factors may evolve over the course of the struggle, only their state at the onset is considered by the model. The first three factors are numerical, revolving around a limit of 85%, and the second two binary variables are commonly examined by COIN analysts. The Five Factors are:

1. 85% of the country must share a national identity. (F1)
2. 85% of the population must perceive the government as legitimate. (F2)
3. The government must achieve or maintain security control over roughly 85% of the country’s overall population. (F3)
4. The rebel movement must have persistent access to external sanctuary in a neighboring country to a militarily significant degree. (F4)
5. There was a government army or armed constabulary force in existence at the start of the conflict. (F5)

According to the study, the loss of each factor to rebel control indicates a significant reduction to the likelihood of government victory. If F1 is lost, then government defeat is 96% likely. If F2 is lost, then defeat is 94%. F3 is 94%, as well and F4 and F5 are both 100%. Since the Katanga Secession case pushes the first four factors to the benefit of the rebels, government defeat is guaranteed – per the Five Factors Model.

F1: Does at least 85% of the country share a national identity?

“No.” The Republic of the Congo, as an entity, was completely artificial. King Leopold II drew the boundaries of the region irrespective of tribal, ethnic, and geographic lines. There was no real sense of Congolese nationalism as it would be interpreted by European eyes. Answering F1 is possible by looking at population figures and the total of the Congolese population that was Katangese equated to about 13%. However, since national identity was not shared across the rest of the country, the population living under the concurrent South Kasai rebellion movement must also be considered, due to Congolese and UN forces engaging both simultaneously. With a population of around 1.2 million, it constituted about 9% of the country’s population. Based on this evidence, in the summer of 1960 the two rebellions indicated that approximately 22% of the country’s population was living under two separatist governments. Therefore, 85% of the Republic of the Congo did not share a national identity, making F1 a rebel advantage

F2: Was the government perceived as legitimate by at least 85% of the population?

“No.” Due to the quantitative nature of F2 and the fact that it cannot increase, per the Five Factors Model, the best way to investigate this question is through population statistics. Like F1, the combination of the parallel Katangan and South Kasai, show that during this time, approximately 22% of the country’s population was living under the two different rebellious governments, indicating maximum perceived government legitimacy of only 78% of Congolese citizens. Therefore, 85% of the Congolese people did not view the government as legitimate during the Katanga Secession. The advantage goes to the rebels.

F3: Did the government achieve or maintain security control over roughly 85% of the country’s overall population?

“No.” The Katangese Gendarmes operated entirely inside of Katanga, and there was little to no popular support for the secessionist movement outside of the province. Inside of Katanga, the insurgent forces moved freely. Just like F1 and F2, the combination of the Katangan and South Kasai secessions shows that the Congolese government did not maintain security control over the minimum 85% of the Congolese people at the onset of the conflict. After the crisis began, both the Katangan and South Kasai movements maintained strong security control over their respective populations after declaring independence in near unison. Thus, the central government would have had control over only 78% of Congolese citizens indicating that the advantage was held by the insurgents.

F4: Did the rebel movement have persistent access to external sanctuary in a neighboring country to a militarily significant degree?

“Yes.” Throughout the conflict, the borders of Katanga were especially porous. Cross-border flight was most notably used by successionist leaders when they needed to flee into Rhodesia, as Tshombe did in 1961. Two years later, he escaped to Europe, and the ex-Gendarmes fled to Angola. Based on this historical evidence, we can conclude that the Katangese Gendarmes and top leadership did have access to external sanctuary throughout the conflict. However, even though an external sanctuary was available to rebel forces, it was not used to a military significant degree. Therefore, even though F4 is answered “Yes” as a benefit to the rebels, the fact that it was not used, negates any advantage that may have been ascertained. In the nomenclature of the SOIC model, the mere possibility of external sanctuary makes F4 a rebel benefit. However, even if this factor was answered “No”, it would not change the model’s prediction. Three pro-rebel factors still indicate overwhelming odds of a rebel victory.

F5: Was there a government army or armed constabulary force in existence at the start of the conflict?

“Yes.” The first domestic Congolese force was the Force Publique, established in 1885 as a military and police force. The Force Publique remained under control of King Leopold II until the Belgian government took over the colony in 1908. During the colonial period, their ranks were made up of both local and foreign Africans, but the officer corps was entirely white. After the Republic of the Congo gained independence in 1960, they were renamed the Armée Nationale Congolaise. While mutiny is a clear indicator of incompetence in any military, command was quickly restored, and the ANC was deployed against the various insurgent factions. The advantage of F5 goes to the government, due to the clear establishment of the force many years prior to the start of the war.

Why the Model Failed: Foreign Intervention

The Five Factors Model failed to predict the outcome of the Katanga Secessionist Movement due to the limited scope of the factors, which, most crucially, does not include examination of foreign support. Foreign involvement in an internal conflict is not unique to Katanga. Since WWII, nearly 66% of all rebel groups have enjoyed some form of foreign support. But the difference in this conflict is the extent that both the rebel and the national governments were supported, manipulated and handpicked. Looking back to the colonial era, the history of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is closely intertwined with that of two foreign nations.

The first was Belgium: King Leopold II brutally abused the Congolese people for financial gain. And while conditions improved under Belgian government control, it was hardly a free and fair society. Great Britian also had a hand in the suppression, as British individuals were heavily involved in UHMK. Even though the Belgians did grant increasing freedoms to the Congolese as the decades wore on, I believe it is fair to say that, had European colonial empires not collapsed after WWII, Belgium would have worked hard to keep its gold mine of a colony much longer than 1960. But that’s not what happened; the Republic of the Congo gained independence and collapsed into chaos due to the lack of preparation by the Belgians and Congolese leaders, which allowed Belgium to invade only days later.

Once the Congo Crisis exploded, the UN and the US both supported the central government, but the latter also lent covert assistance to Katanga. The Soviet Union supported Lumumba, and later Congo-Stanleyville. South Kasai was supported by the Belgians, Rhodesians, French and South Africans. White mercenaries, fighting on behalf of Katanga, came from all over Europe and the white-ruled countries of Rhodesia and South Africa. Support rose and fell throughout the course of the conflict, and after, defeated fighters found haven in Angola, Rhodesia and Rwanda. At no point was this conflict-free from foreign involvement. Shifting loyalties meant these actors propped up a failing Congolese government, sent troops to destroy breakaway movements, and gave financial and material support that was unobtainable otherwise. In a sense, foreign support of both sides completely shaped each’s warfighting ability. Without it, both the government and rebel forces would be unrecognizable. Thus, any analysis of this conflict must focus heavily on the role of foreign support.

Why the Model Failed: A Weak National Identity

Foreign involvement was the single largest, although not only, determinate factor of the Katanga Secession. The lesser, secondary factor was the hollowness of Katangese nationalism which was undermined by three factors. In the years following independence from colonial rule, many African national identities were largely created by white settlers to serve colonial agendas, and the Republic of the Congo was one of the most extreme examples. Just as the concept of a “nation-state” was alien, so too was “national identity.” This presented both a challenge and an opportunity to the forces in the Congo. Some sought to unite the country as it had never been before, and others saw the opportunity to divide it for opportunistic reasons. Nonetheless, national identity was frail across the country and Katanga was no exception. It was pushed in a top-down manner, rather than swelling up from the population. This distinction meant there was no stable base from which to build an insurgency. To be clear, CONAKAT did lay the groundwork for a Katangese identity, as did others, like the American Methodist Episcopal Church. But the CONAKAT-turned-Katangan secessionist identity was not adopted by the majority, and significant parts of the province pushed back against it. This is evidenced by early fighting with BALUBAKAT and the Tshombe’s narrow win in the 1959 elections. After independence was declared, this new national identity, with strong independence and anti-communist strains, was forced on the people, chiefly through propaganda. Local newspapers and international outlets pushed lines that promoted Katanga’s “special character” and “uniqueness”. Furthermore, while critics decried the close relationship between secessionist leaders and foreign companies, a significant portion of Katangese mythic history had evolved to deal with this. Historical accounts of tribal international trade were used to show that the presence of foreign companies was no different than in the golden days of the old tribal empires. Ultimately, Tshombe’s branding did not take hold. This is perfectly illustrated when ex-Gendarmes were turned away from their homes post secession. If these fighters were truly nationalist heroes, would they not have been embraced as martyrs and champions of a lost cause?

While the conflict was much shorter than many other insurgencies, it owes what endurance it had to the tactical effectiveness of the Gendarmes and to Tshombe, who drew out peace negotiations significantly. The first talks began early on and continued throughout the war. At the time, many thought these early negotiations would lead to some sort of power sharing agreement, where Katangan leaders would have a larger role in the Leopoldville government. The fact that Tshombe and other secessionists were willing to come to the table early in the conflict shows their own perceptions of the fragility of a unifying identity and futility of the cause. I believe that these men knew their position was hopeless in the face of mounting international pressure and decreasing Belgian support. They likely believed that drawing out the conflict would give them a better position from which to bargain for a soft landing, a tactic seen today in the Russo-Ukrainian War.

The third factor that perfectly illuminated the lack of Katangan belief in an independence based national identity was the lack of popular mobilization for the cause after Tshombe was elected Prime Minister in 1964. During Tshombe’s short tenure, the Leopoldville government was weak. UN forces had left the country, and several new rebellions had sprung up. The trained and loyal ex-Gendarmes had reentered the country. Many former secessionist leaders still held political office, and the choice of the Leopoldville government to appoint a former rebel leader to prime minister only projected weakness. Conditions seemed perfect- yet nothing happened. Tshombe appeared to have turned his back on the Katangan cause and instead successfully preserved the territorial integrity of the country, even if he did rely on foreign support. While Katangan identity had been championed by elites during the conflict, defeat in 1963 erased it from nearly all but those who went into exile abroad. Even though Tshombe supported ex-Gendarmes prior to returning to the country, his appointment to a legitimate position snuffed out the last real essence of any Katangan independence based on national identity. Following his ousting in 1965, he planned to reignite the rebellion, but never got the chance.

A Free Katanga?

I believe that had no Europeans, Americans, or international government organizations intervened, the Republic of the Congo may have split into three separate states. The central Congolese government did not have the strength, cohesion, nor popular support to defeat the rebels of Katanga, let alone the three concurrent movements in Katanga, South Kasai and Congo-Stanleyville. Based on Congolese military success against South Kasai, and its geographical position between the area under Leopoldville control and Katanga, I believe South Kasai could have been retaken by the ANC, as happened. However, as in reality, the conquest would have been very costly to the Congo and would have delayed and perhaps prevented further incursions into Katanga. Katanga was always able to field high numbers of Gendarmes and even without a Belgian officer corps, success would have been possible. After all, they only needed to fight a defensive war and there was always the possibility that South Kasai would have become a buffer zone, again like the factual conflict. I do not believe this hypothetical version of the Katanga Secession war would have lasted long and would have ended in late 1961. This was when UN forces sharply increased their offensive operations and pushed the Gendarmes onto their heels. Without UN support however, the Congolese campaign would have collapsed, and Katanga would have achieved independence.

That being said, I do agree with the opinion given by the US Under Secretary of State, George W. Ball in 1961 about the possible future of an independent Katanga. Ball describes a future where Katanga becomes a petrostate, exporting its natural resources under some sort of quasi-colonial commercial system. The combination of a white commercial elite class with their ties to Tshombe and CONAKAT and the enormous influence of foreign companies would have fortified the natural resource-based economy. Tshombe could have remained in power and preserved the country’s parliamentary democracy, albeit with commercial interests at its heart. It is also possible that Katanga could have become a part of the Central African Federation, as was discussed in 1960. Some experts believe this should have been a more attractive option for Tshombe, as Katanga was more closely linked to regions in southern Africa through industry and rail networks than it was to Leopoldville. As the years wore on, I find it likely that any quasi-colonial system would have faded with the inevitable withdrawal of European nations from Africa and this hypothetical Katanga would become similar to a typical modern petrostate, like an African United Arab Emirates or Bahrain. This would be in an economic sense, not a political sense; however, it is almost certain that a majority of political power and revenue would have remained in the hands of elites.

A counter-factual future for an independent Congo-Stanleyville is not as clear. Based on the way in which the province was defeated, I believe the government was weak, and control was vested entirely with Antoine Gizenga himself. However, if Congo-Stanleyville had succeeded in achieving independence, I believe it would have become a Soviet client state. During the Cold War, states like Cuba, Nicaragua and Syria were dependent on the USSR for goods and services, and in return these countries prevented the USSR from having to get involved in affairs of the Global South and supported them on the world stage. Due to the feebleness of Congo-Stanleyville, they would have taken all that the Soviets could offer, including military aid, doctors, technicians and teachers. And in return, they would have shielded the USSR from having to be involved in central Africa.

Conclusion

The Five Factors Model failed to predict Katangan defeat during the Congo Crisis of 1960 due to lack of examination of certain characteristics. The Model did not explore the extent of foreign involvement nor the weakness of Katangese national identity. These two factors directly caused Katangan insurgent defeat despite the Model guaranteeing a rebel victory. However, the argument presented here is not suggesting the Five Factors Model is deeply flawed. Rather, this case proves that the theory is not as reliable as the Model’s figures suggest, lending credibility to the old saying about exceptions to every rule. The Katangan Secession represents a strong outlier in the 53 cases examined by the Study of Internal Conflict, but it should not be omitted from future study. I believe this case shows a unique path to government victory that straddles the line between conventional COIN ideas and the simplified predeterminate nature of the Five Factors Model. The rare circumstances of this insurgency are important lessons that need to be better understood by all COIN analysts.