Sri Lanka’s Efforts from the Viewpoint of New Approach for Counterinsurgency (COIN)
Introduction
Counterinsurgency (COIN) is defined by comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency while addressing its root causes. During the Fourth Eelam War (July 2006 – May 2009) under President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s administration (November 19, 2005 – January 9, 2015), the Sri Lankan government achieved a decisive military victory over the LTTE, quelling the rebellion. The Rajapaksa administration’s efforts to eliminate the LTTE drew attention as a successful example of crushing a rebel force through decisive military action in counterinsurgency (COIN). Because the LTTE was ultimately crushed with many civilian casualties, the thorough use of force tends to be emphasized. However, this view does not capture the full picture of the Rajapaksa administration’s COIN.
Traditionally, COIN strategies are categorized into two primary approaches: the population-centric approach and the enemy-centric approach. These approaches have influenced COIN in various countries, yet both come with inherent challenges. The population-centric approach emphasizes focusing COIN efforts on the civilian population rather than the insurgents. By safeguarding the population, providing essential services, and securing their support, this approach aims to isolate the insurgents from the populace, ultimately leading to the suppression of the rebellion. However, this approach is often based on idealistic theories and untested assumptions, making it difficult to apply effectively in real-world conflict scenarios. Conversely, the enemy-centric approach prioritizes targeting insurgents directly, often employing fear and coercive force to suppress rebellions, including exerting pressure on the population. This method tends to overlook the protection of civilians, which can fuel further rebellion and lacks a nuanced political perspective.
The Rajapaksa administration’s efforts to eliminate the LTTE in Sri Lanka are frequently viewed through the lens of the enemy-centric approach due to their reliance on military suppression. Yet, this perspective does not fully capture the comprehensive nature of their COIN strategy. To understand the Rajapaksa administration’s actions, it is essential to examine them through a new framework that transcends the limitations of the traditional COIN approaches. The following sections will introduce this new approach, analyze the administration’s efforts, and conclude with a summary of the findings.
A New Approach
A new approach that goes beyond the two traditional COIN approaches is the research of Christopher Paul and others at the RAND Corporation in the United States. They acknowledge that COIN strategies have traditionally been viewed through the dichotomy of either population-centered or enemy-centered approaches. However, after analyzing 71 insurgencies worldwide from 1944 to 2010, they argue that, contrary to popular belief, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive, but rather an oversimplification. Historically, COIN efforts have combined both philosophies—aiming to deprive insurgents of popular support while simultaneously reducing their numbers through attrition and arrests. As a result, they argue that future COIN efforts should move beyond the two traditional approaches. Specifically, the paper proposes an approach that considers the two aspects of targets that direct efforts and practical actions of COIN, and that strikes a balance between coercive policies, including the use of force, and moderate policies that reduce motivation for rebellion through moral and political initiatives.
They point out that successful COIN in the past has found a balance across four quadrants, divided by two lines of targets and actions, with the targets of the COIN being the active insurgents and insurgent support, and the practical actions of COIN being the use of physical force and moral and political efforts. The four quadrants they identify are shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1）
The four quadrants from the perspective of targets and actions as shown by Paul et al.
The lower right quadrant represents traditional enemy-centric counterinsurgency as mentioned previously. The upper right involves using force to target the insurgents’ support networks, such as implementing border control measures to disrupt the flow of supplies to insurgent forces. The upper left quadrant encompasses moral and political efforts directed at weakening insurgent support by increasing the legitimacy of the government and reducing that of the insurgents, thereby undermining the motivation for civilian backing. Finally, the lower left focuses on moral and political strategies aimed at active insurgents, including encouraging them to renounce violence, participate in the political process, and consider power-sharing or cooptation.
Presenting a framework like that shown in Figure 1 argues that future COIN will be more effective if we recognize the importance of this balance from the outset, rather than being trapped in the traditional but outdated dichotomy between enemy-centric and population-centric approaches.
Indeed, when looking at the reality of COIN, it may be difficult to clearly distinguish between the population-centric approach and the enemy-centric approach. For example, the suppression of the Huks by the Philippine government (1946-1954) is considered a successful example of the population-centric approach, but as Secretary of Defense Ramon Magsaysay (President from 1953), who led COIN overall, said, “With my left hand I will offer all rebels a path to peace, happy homes, and economic security, while with my right hand I will crush all rebel forces that resist and seek to destroy our democratic government,” in reality, the COIN approach was a mixture of moderate and coercive measures.
Given the complexities of COIN, it is difficult to clearly separate the population-centric and enemy-centric approaches. The research by Paul and others offers a new perspective that transcends these traditional frameworks. This paper will analyze the Rajapaksa administration’s efforts using this new approach.
Analysis of the Rajapaksa Administration Within the Framework of the New Approach
The Use of Physical Force to neutralize active insurgents
In suppressing the LTTE insurgency, the Sri Lankan government implemented a COIN doctrine known as the Rajapaksa model, named after then-President Mahinda Rajapaksa. This model was characterized by its exclusive advocacy for the use of force, emphasizing principles such as “no negotiations with the insurgents” and a commitment to “eliminate and annihilate.” In carrying out this doctrine, the Rajapaksa administration embarked on a military build-up.
Between 2005 and 2008, the military budget increased by 40%, and in 2008 alone, an additional 40,000 soldiers were conscripted, bringing the total strength of the army, navy, and air force to about 150,000. The defense budget was $1.74 billion, an astonishing 17% of GDP. In addition, the Rajapaksa administration succeeded in receiving significant military assistance from foreign countries such as China, India, and Pakistan for the purchase of military equipment.
In 2007, China signed an agreement to provide $42 million in military assistance, including state-of-the-art radars and large amounts of munitions to strengthen the army and navy, and in 2008 provided the air force with six F7 fighter jets, totaling approximately $1 billion in military assistance. India provided the air force with five Mi-17 helicopters in 2006, and Pakistan has also provided aircraft and other equipment as well as training support for the military.
In past civil wars (for example, the First to Third Eelam Wars), the Sri Lankan Army was at the center of the conflict, with limited naval and air force commitments. The military offensive lacked strategic and coordinated cooperation and was unable to sustain military pressure on the LTTE, which is said to have had ample opportunity to regroup and re-adapt itself in the face of the massive military offensive. However, under the Rajapaksa administration, improvements in the capabilities of the navy and air force, bolstered by support from various countries, enabled the Sri Lankan military to strengthen its operations. This enhancement facilitated a coordinated all-out war involving the army, navy, and air force, allowing for sustained military pressure on the LTTE.
Furthermore, during the Fourth Eelam War, the Sri Lankan Army deployed a small but highly trained and mobile force. Units known as Special Infantry Operation Teams (SIOT), consisting of 4, 8, or 12 soldiers each, were tasked with penetrating deep into LTTE positions to eliminate high-value targets such as commanders. They were also trained in airstrikes and artillery fire guidance, delivering precision fire strikes against LTTE defensive positions. These simultaneous attacks, both forward and deep in the rear, immobilized LTTE forces, causing them to lose their freedom of movement and slowly become decimated.
The Use of Physical Force to Target Insurgent Support
The LTTE was notable for successfully establishing a fully functioning military force. It operated similarly to a conventional military, possessing heavy weaponry such as cannons and missiles, as well as its own naval and air capabilities. This assertion is underscored by the weapons seized by the Sri Lankan military from the LTTE in 2007, including weapons like those that would be possessed by a conventional military. The seized weapons were two152mm howitzers, five 120mm mortars, eight 81mm mortars, 624 T56 assault rifles, two anti-aircraft guns, RPG anti-tank missiles, two suicide boats, 24 claymore mines, 13 machine guns, 34 high-performance communication equipment, and anti-personnel mines. Regarding the acquisition of such sophisticated weaponry, Colonel Kittu, who was the deputy commander of the LTTE in the late 1980s, stated that “LTTE’s weapons were purchased on the international market in Singapore, then transported to Tamil Nadu, India, and then transported by boat across the narrow Palk Strait between India and Sri Lanka.” The LTTE obtained its weapons and other equipment by smuggling them in from overseas. Therefore, in order for the Sri Lankan government to cut off the LTTE’s smuggling (weapons support), it was necessary for its own navy and other forces to seize or sink LTTE supply ships at sea, as Sri Lanka is an island nation surrounded by sea on all sides.
In order to prevent the LTTE’s smuggling operations, the Sri Lankan Navy introduced Dvora-class patrol boats, which are also classified as Israeli Navy fast attack boats and had been operating them since the late 1980s. However, they were vulnerable to the LTTE’s guerilla tactics using small boats and suicide bomber boats and were unable to stop the LTTE’s smuggling operations. As a result, as part of efforts to strengthen the navy, the Rajapaksa administration introduced the “Small Boat Concept” in 2006. This was a concept that effectively copied the LTTE’s guerilla tactics using small boats and developed it on a larger scale.
The Sri Lankan Navy had invested heavily in establishing a small boat force, building three types of small boats (Arrow Boats) – 16 ft (4.9 m), 18 ft (5.5 m), and 23 ft (7.0 m) – equipped with powerful engines and heavy machine guns and automatic grenade launchers. The development of Arrow boats and the creation of small boat units that could counter the LTTE’s guerilla tactics constituted a shift by the Sri Lankan Navy to guerilla tactics of unconventional warfare. This gave the Sri Lankan Navy superior capabilities to the LTTE’s naval forces, resulting in increased losses to LTTE ships and reducing the LTTE’s ability to control the seas.
With its sea control capabilities thus improved, the Sri Lankan Navy, with support from the international community, effectively carried out intelligence gathering targeting large cargo ships used by the LTTE to transport weapons. Between September 2006 and October 2007, it sank eight large cargo ships carrying more than 1,000 tons of wartime supplies. This cut the LTTE’s arms smuggling by more than 80 percent, and it is said that the LTTE was weakened by arms depletion and lack of supplies, forcing it to revert to primitive tactics such as improvised mortars and rockets instead of military-grade munitions and weaponry.
Moral and Political Efforts Aimed at Insurgent Support
The LTTE was funded by a combination of legal and illegal means, with the majority of its funding coming from Tamils living abroad. It is believed that up to 90% of its funding came from overseas. As of 2006, there were approximately 600,000 to 800,000 Tamils living abroad around the world, and donations from them reached $2 million per month at its peak. The Rajapaksa administration’s efforts to cut off foreign financial support for the LTTE included lobbying countries around the world to designate the LTTE as a terrorist organization (illegalization). When a rebel organization is designated as a terrorist organization and outlawed, providing funds to a terrorist organization becomes a criminal offense, and fundraising and transferring funds is prohibited. Rajapaksa and other high-ranking government officials requested, through the United Nations, bilateral dialogues and other fora, that the international community designate the LTTE as a terrorist organization and outlaw it.
Moral and Political Effort Targeting the Active Insurgents
One so-called moderate approach aimed at rebel forces would be to incorporate LTTE members who have surrendered or abandoned armed struggle. In the past civil wars (First Eelam War to Third Eelam War), the Sri Lankan government and military had a “take no prisoners” mentality. This meant that even if the LTTE surrendered, they would likely be killed, which instilled in them a stronger will to resist. There was also a lack of intention to gather information on the LTTE, so Tamils who offered to provide operational information to the government military were treated roughly, and as a result, these people often joined the LTTE.
In a departure from this policy, the Rajapaksa administration adopted a more tolerant attitude towards LTTE defectors and made efforts to obtain valuable information from the many high-ranking LTTE defectors. A notable example is the incorporation of Colonel Karuna Amman, who left the LTTE in March 2004 with about 6,000 members. He was a skilled field commander in the LTTE-controlled Eastern Province of Sri Lanka and had valuable information on LTTE troop dispositions, resources and hideouts. The Sri Lankan Army received support from Colonel Karuna during the Fourth Eelam War in the Eastern Province, and the Karuna faction he led fought alongside the Sri Lankan Army against the LTTE. The Sri Lankan Army took control of the entire Eastern Province under LTTE control in June 2007, but it is said that the military victory in the Eastern Province was easily achieved with the sincere support of the Karuna faction. In return for his cooperation with the Rajapaksa administration, Colonel Karuna received political status that contributed to improving the status of the Tamil people.
While LTTE leader Prabhakaran was adamant about seeking a separate and independent Tamil state, Colonel Karuna aimed for a federal system within a unified state rather than secession and ultimately sought a political solution. After leaving the LTTE, he founded the Tamil Peoples Liberation Tigers, a Tamil political party, and commenced political activities in the eastern part of Sri Lanka. This party was officially registered as a political party in January 2008 during the Rajapaksa administration, and by March 2008, it had gained the support of Rajapaksa’s ruling party, the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA). In October 2008, he was appointed a Member of Parliament by the UPFA, and in March 2009, two months before the LTTE was defeated by military force, he was appointed Minister of National Integration in the Rajapaksa administration. The establishment of a substantial Tamil party aligned with the government is believed to have diminished support for the LTTE in certain areas, provided a war-weary populace with an alternative to Prabhakaran’s authoritarian rule, and potentially offered a future voice in Sri Lankan politics.
Problems That Arose During Implementation of COIN
The problem that arose in the process of implementing COIN under the Rajapaksa regime was the increase in civilian casualties. Since the Fourth Eelam War began in 2006, the United States, the United Nations, and international human rights organizations have expressed concern over the worsening human rights situation in Sri Lanka. In particular, in June 2007, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution expressing concern over the deteriorating human rights situation in Sri Lanka and calling for the immediate resumption of peace talks, and in the same year the United States suspended its support for arms and ammunition to Sri Lanka due to human rights violations.
Traditionally, the United States, the EU, Canada and other Western have been the primary sources of military aid to the Sri Lankan government. However, as a condition for continued assistance, these nations have insisted on the respect for human rights and the minimization of civilian casualties. The Rajapaksa regime, perceiving the commitment to human rights from Western countries as a hindrance to its efforts to suppress LTTE, began to seek military support from China, India, and Pakistan instead. China, in particular, supported the Rajapaksa regime not only through military aid but also in international political arenas.
China is also said to have blocked a UN Security Council resolution that criticized the Sri Lankan government’s new military offensive, hereby granting the Rajapaksa regime the operational freedom to disregard the concerns of Western nations and continue its military suppression despite protests from human rights organizations and Western governments. As a result, many civilians were killed and injured in the Fourth Eelam War, particularly in the final stages of the conflict beginning in January 2009, when the UN estimated that approximately 6,500 civilians were killed and at least 14,000 were injured.
Conclusion
This paper introduced a new COIN approach that goes beyond the traditional population-centric and enemy-centric frameworks and analyzed the Sri Lankan government’s efforts based on this framework. The analysis reveals that the Rajapaksa administration of Sri Lanka succeeded in suppressing the LTTE by effectively balancing all four quadrants of the new COIN approach framework. Specifically, we identified the following: (1) In terms of using physical force to eliminate active insurgents (lower right quadrant), the Rajapaksa administration adopted a force-focused doctrine known as the Rajapaksa Model and increased its military power to implement this strategy, (2) for targeting insurgent support through physical force (upper right quadrant), the Sri Lankan Navy established a small boat unit to counter LTTE guerrilla tactics and enhance its maritime control capabilities to prevent weapon smuggling,(3) in moral and political efforts aimed at diminishing insurgent support (upper left quadrant), the Rajapaksa administration lobbied international communities to designate the LTTE as a terrorist organization to cut off financial assistance from overseas Tamils, and (4) regarding moral and political efforts targeting active insurgents (lower left quadrant), the administration recruited former LTTE members who had surrendered or renounced armed struggle, offering them political compensation to cooperate in suppressing the LTTE. This comprehensive approach allows us to understand the overall strategy employed by the Rajapaksa administration in its COIN efforts against the LTTE. However, further challenges have also emerged.
Although the Rajapaksa administration in Sri Lanka did succeed in suppressing the LTTE, it faced ongoing pressure from the international community to investigate human rights violations and war crimes. In May 2009, the United Nations Human Rights Council was held in Geneva, and it was argued that the current situation in Sri Lanka should be investigated, as the Sri Lankan government might have been involved in war crimes. In March 2014, the UN Human Rights Council also approved an investigation into war crimes that allegedly occurred during the conflict, stating that the Sri Lankan government had failed to conduct a proper investigation. In March 2021, the UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution to provide funds to an investigative team to collect and analyze evidence of human rights violations s during the conflict and hold perpetrators accountable. Moving forward, future COIN efforts must take into account the human rights norms upheld by the international community, alongside maintaining a balance across the four quadrants outlined in the new COIN approach. Specifically, it is necessary to balance between coercive measures, including the use of force, and moderate policies aimed at reducing the motivation for rebellion through moral and political means.
