The Five Vehicles of Irregular Warfare

Innovations in five areas are transforming the character and nature of irregular warfare (IW). Described herein as “vehicles,” these enablers are influencing outcomes from Ukraine to Taiwan and the Middle East. The vehicles are space, drones, artificial intelligence (AI), unconventional maritime operations, and global supply chains.

IW is about people, cognition, incentives, coercion, assurance, and legitimacy. The five vehicles don’t change any of that. Instead, these vehicles should be thought of as the most important tools used to promote or “deliver” Irregular Warfare. They are deeply interconnected, with their interdependencies amplifying their collective impact, necessitating new approaches for strategists and policymakers. Each section of this article outlines how one vehicle relies on one or more of the others.

The Space Vehicle

Space has become a critical vehicle for Irregular Warfare primarily because of the democratization of technologies associated with it. Commercial satellite imagery, with resolutions as fine as 30 centimeters from providers like Planet Labs, enables non-state actors and smaller powers to access advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Low-earth-orbit satellite constellations, such as SpaceX’s Starlink with over 6,000 satellites, facilitate coordination in contested environments like eastern Ukraine, where reliable connectivity enables real-time tactical adjustments.

Space-based navigation systems, including GPS and Galileo, supercharge the precision of drone and maritime operations, enabling strikes within meters of intended targets, like was recently seen in Operation Spider’s Web. However, while space assets enable hybrid conflict, they are also vulnerable to it themselves.  Portable jammers costing less than $1,000 can disrupt satellite communications, while ground-based lasers can temporarily blind optical sensors, as seen in reported incidents targeting U.S. satellites. Cyberattacks on ground stations, such as the 2022 attack on Viasat’s KA-SAT network, can disable entire satellite networks. These actions, often difficult to attribute, degrade capabilities without triggering overt conflict. Non-state actors leverage dual-use technologies, such as 3U CubeSats weighing under 4 kilograms, for ISR or electronic warfare, integrating space-based systems with terrestrial operations to create asymmetric advantages. The interdependence of drones, AI, and unconventional maritime operations underscores the strategic importance of space in irregular competition.

The Drones Vehicle

Drones have changed the nature of airpower, establishing a pivotal vehicle by providing irregular actors with affordable access to aerial capabilities. Commercially available unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as DJI’s Mavic series costing $500–$2,000, enable non-state actors, insurgents, and criminal organizations to conduct ISR, targeted strikes, and logistical support. In Ukraine, First-Person View (FPV) drones, equipped with 1080p cameras and live video feeds, have neutralized T-72 tanks using retrofitted RPG warheads, achieving a cost asymmetry of 1,000:1. Drone swarms, coordinated via open-source algorithms like ArduPilot, challenge air defenses by saturating systems like Russia’s S-400, which struggles against low-flying, small-signature targets.

Advancements in payloads, such as 3D-printed plastic explosives and anti-jamming technologies, including frequency-hopping radios, enhance effectiveness. The rapid innovation cycle, driven by open-source software and global markets, allows irregular actors to adapt tactics within weeks, outpacing conventional counter-drone measures like C-UAS jammers or laser systems, which require months to deploy. Drones rely on satellite navigation, linking them to the space vehicle, and their components depend on the global supply chains vehicle, with 90% of the global commercial drone market coming from China.

The Artificial Intelligence Vehicle

Artificial intelligence is reshaping Irregular Warfare, forming a vehicle in information operations and decision-making. AI processes large datasets—terabytes of social media posts or drone footage—to identify vulnerabilities and engineer targeted disinformation campaigns. Generative AI models, such as those based on transformer architectures, produce realistic deepfakes – like fabricated videos of political leaders – deployable within hours to influence public opinion. In tactical applications, AI enhances ISR by analyzing imagery to detect patterns, such as vehicle convoys in Ukraine, with convolutional neural networks achieving 95% accuracy in object recognition.

AI supports autonomous drone operations, reducing operator exposure, as seen in experimental swarms navigating without GPS. Algorithmic bias, trained on skewed datasets, risks misidentification, while unintended escalation—such as misinterpreting a civilian vehicle as a threat—poses strategic risks. AI development depends on graphics processing units (GPUs) from companies like NVIDIA, with 80% of high-end GPUs produced in Taiwan, tying it to the global supply chains vehicle. Integration with drones, space-based data, and maritime sensors creates networked capabilities but introduces vulnerabilities to cyber disruptions.

The Unconventional Maritime Operations Vehicle

There are four key elements that make up the unconventional maritime operations vehicle.

1. Coercive, aggressive, and deceptive tactics using maritime vessels: Examples in the Indo-Pacific include the CCP’s fishing boat militia – officially called the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) – intimidating other countries, or “Coast Guard” ships ramming and water-cannoning Philippine vessels. Pirates hijacking ships in the Malacca Strait, the Abu Sayyaf taking hostages in the waters between Indonesia and the Philippines, and Iran taking hostages, arming Houthis, and illegally seizing vessels in the Middle East provide other real-world examples.
2. Manipulating and/or damaging surface and sub-surface infrastructure: There are over 400 undersea cables, carrying 95% of global data, and pipelines are exposed on the seabed, susceptible to sabotage by commercial submersibles or underwater drones costing $10,000–$50,000. The 2022 Nord Stream sabotage disrupted European energy supplies, demonstrating economic impacts without clear attribution.
3. Dual-use “research” – above and below the surface: The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) spends vast resources deploying spy vessels around the world under the guise of “research” surveys, with the actual, dual-use objective of conducting Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to prepare for conflict. Around Taiwan, for example, the CCP executes bathymetric surveys to map the sea floor and determine the best places to hide submarines and interdict sub-surface data cables.
4. Use of unmanned vehicles: Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs) and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs), like Ukraine’s Magura V5 USV, enable irregular actors to conduct ISR, deliver explosives, or disrupt shipping. In 2024, Ukraine used USVs to damage Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, sinking the Tarantul II class guided-missile corvette Ivanovets with a drone swarm that cost thousands of dollars versus a $50 million ship. These systems rely on satellite navigation, linking them to the space vehicle.

Countering these threats requires enhanced maritime domain awareness, including synthetic aperture sonar and satellite monitoring, but rapid advancements challenge naval strategies. Supply chains for USV components, such as lithium-ion batteries from China, are global and susceptible to disruption, with the majority of maritime drone components sourced from Asia, connecting to the global supply chains vehicle.

The Global Supply Chains Vehicle

The defense industrial base (DIB) and global supply chains form an important yet vulnerable vehicle in Irregular Warfare, serving as a backbone for rapid deployment of technologies and tactics across the other vehicles. The DIB, traditionally designed for conventional systems costing millions and optimized for large-scale, long-term production cycles, struggles to meet the demands of irregular conflict, which prioritizes flexible, rapid, low-cost solutions. This mismatch has led to a growing reliance on commercial technologies—such as drones, AI frameworks, and maritime unmanned systems—to fill the gap, enabling adversaries to exploit dual-use systems with considerable efficiency. Global supply chains, heavily dependent on just-in-time logistics, are increasingly susceptible to a range of threats, including cyberattacks, component tampering, counterfeit parts, and physical disruptions, with ransomware attacks on U.S. supply chains and DIB partners rising sharply, exposing critical vulnerabilities.

The concentration of production hubs, such as the 90% of advanced semiconductors manufactured in Taiwan, creates chokepoints that adversaries can exploit through “weaponized interdependence.” For instance, China’s rare earth export restrictions have delayed materials essential for drone and AI production, demonstrating how supply chain leverage can be weaponized to disrupt military capabilities. These vulnerabilities are compounded by the DIB’s acquisition processes, which average 5–7 years, lagging behind the innovation cycles of irregular actors measured in weeks or months. Securing these supply chains requires a creative approach, including diversified sourcing to reduce reliance on single points of failure, cybersecurity to protect against digital threats, and streamlined procurement.

The importance of partners and allies in the global supply chain vehicle cannot be overstated. These partnerships enhance resilience by pooling resources, sharing intelligence on threats, and co-developing technologies tailored to irregular warfare needs.  This vehicle underpins the drones, AI, maritime, and space vehicles. For example, lithium-ion batteries powering maritime drones and the GPUs driving AI systems are sourced globally, with Asia dominating production. Disruptions in these chains can cascade across all vehicles, amplifying the impact of irregular tactics. To counter this, the contributions of partners, allies, and non-traditional entities are essential to establish resilient, multi-sourced supply networks that can withstand geopolitical pressures and disruptions.

Trends Across the Vehicles

Emerging technologies enable irregular actors to exploit vulnerabilities in novel ways across these vehicles. In the space vehicle, non-state groups could deploy nanosatellites for signals intelligence, as seen in experimental launches by universities repurposed for military use. The drone vehicle is evolving with modular designs, allowing field upgrades with new sensors or weapons, reducing reliance on centralized supply chains. In the AI vehicle, predictive analytics forecast adversary movements based on historical data, enhancing operational planning for smaller groups. The maritime vehicle sees drones incorporating AI-driven navigation, enabling autonomous patrols in contested waters like the Strait of Hormuz. The global supply chains vehicle faces increasingly sophisticated attacks, with state-sponsored actors targeting software updates, as in the 2020 SolarWinds hack, to infiltrate DIB networks. These advancements, driven by commercial innovation, lower costs, and accelerate deployment, enabling irregular actors to challenge state militaries. The integration of these vehicles creates feedback loops: AI optimizes drone swarms, which rely on satellite data, while maritime drones use AI to exploit supply chain weaknesses, amplifying asymmetric impacts.

Conclusion

The five vehicles are not replacements for the objectives, nature, or principles of irregular warfare.  The vehicles are the tools that deliver irregular warfare.  The convergence of the vehicles of space, drones, AI, unconventional maritime operations, and global supply chains reshapes how irregular warfare is implemented. Vehicle interdependence creates a dynamic environment where technological and operational advancements manifest quickly. IW strategists and policymakers must therefore adopt approaches that develop both timely responses as well as aggressive, proactive measures that take into consideration all five vehicles. Failure to adapt to the reality of the five vehicles risks ceding advantages to state and non-state actors that exploit agility and asymmetry while America and its allies lag in innovation. As conflicts evolve, these vehicles will remain key drivers of irregular warfare for the foreseeable future.