Exploring War Termination in the Russo-Ukraine War

During his 2024 presidential campaign, Donald Trump promised that, if elected, he would end the Russo-Ukraine War within 24 hours by meeting personally with Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky. Six months into his term, however, the war persists. This gap between political rhetoric and reality reflects not a deficiency in negotiation skills but the deeper dynamics that H.E. Goemans’ theory of war termination reveals about how battlefield outcomes reshape war aims, exacerbate commitment problems, and interact with domestic political constraints to prevent peace. Applying Goemans’ framework to the Russo-Ukraine War reveals why even sustained US pressure has failed to produce a settlement and why similar dynamics recur in protracted conflicts. Any future peace negotiations over the Russo-Ukraine War must successfully navigate the challenges highlighted within this theoretical framework.

Variance in War Aims

Goemans argues that bargaining space for war termination opens only when neither side demands more than the other can accept. Yet war aims vary based on battlefield outcomes. For Russia, the Kremlin’s illegal annexation of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia in the fall of 2022 marked a pivot from an early focus on capturing Kyiv to securing territorial control in the east and south. Putin’s rhetoric, however, continues to invoke a vision of a culturally unified Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia, suggesting that if conditions allowed, the Kremlin would once again pursue control over all of Ukraine. At the 2025 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Putin reiterated that he considers “Ukraine and Russia peoples to be one people. In this sense, all of Ukraine is ours. We have a rule. Wherever a Russian soldier sets foot is ours.”

For Ukraine, the central objective remains the preservation of genuine independence. Zelensky has declared that surrendering territory is “legally” impossible, yet he has hinted that a settlement involving concessions might be conceivable if backed by Western guarantees. This ambiguity reflects the weaker side’s adaptive strategy of balancing maximalist goals with pragmatic assessments of Western commitment, battlefield innovation (such as cost-effective drone strikes on Russian strategic assets), and the resilience of its population.

Both sides continually reassess their war aims based on questions of capability, endurance, and external support. These shifting assessments prevent convergence on mutually acceptable terms.

Commitment Problems

Goemans identifies the “commitment problem” as a major obstacle to peace as the weaker party fears that concessions today will invite further demands tomorrow. For Ukraine, any deal ceding territory risks emboldening future Russian aggression. This fear is echoed in European policy circles, where leaders such as Estonian foreign minister Kaja Kallas and Romanian President Nicușor Dan argue that only strength at the negotiating table can deter Moscow’s long-term ambitions. Indeed, Kallas has stated that “Russia is already a threat to the European Union” because it has a “long-term plan for long-term aggression.”

From the Kremlin’s perspective, the commitment problem works in reverse. Russia demands more than Ukrainian neutrality; it expects complete subordination akin to Belarus’s vassal status. The Kremlin’s insistence during the 2025 Istanbul talks that Ukraine renounce NATO aspirations was rejected as an assault on Ukrainian sovereignty, which was rejected by Ukrainian negotiators “who insist that the country has the right to “choose to be part of the Euro-Atlantic community and move towards EU membership.” In short, Russia fears that Ukraine will continue its pro-Western track after a negotiated settlement, which is unacceptable.

The respective actions needed to address these commitment problems are contrary and difficult to resolve. For the Ukrainians, Goemans’ framework suggests that only credible third-party security guarantees could resolve the impasse. Yet such guarantees, whether NATO membership or direct Western troop commitments, are unacceptable for Russia and prompts them to continue the war. For the Russians, only a complete pro-Russian regime would demonstrate a commitment to reject its pro-Western trajectory. However, regime change in Kyiv—as a demonstration of credible commitment to address Russia’s security concerns—is a non-starter for both the Zelensky government and opposition leaders in the country. These commitment problems clearly challenge the attainment of a negotiated settlement.

Domestic Political Constraints

Goemans’ most original contribution is his analysis of how regime type shapes war termination. According to his theory, leaders of “mixed autocracies” that simultaneously cater to elite and mass constituencies often double down when facing defeat, as losing power may mean imprisonment or death. Timothy Frye, a scholar specializing in Russia, describes the Russian government as a “personalist autocracy,” where Putin holds extensive powers. Russia’s personalist autocracy, while dominated by Putin, relies on three key selectorates: the siloviki (security sector elites), powerful business magnates, and the mass public. In the prosperous 2000s, oil revenues made it easy for the Putin regime to placate all these groups. Now, the strain from Western economic sanctions forces the Kremlin to make trade-offs between the groups, which raises the risk of elite coup or mass unrest. As Lawrence Freedman notes, ending the war without achieving core objectives would enrage ultra-nationalist constituencies and undermine Putin’s survival.

Indeed, evidence suggests that after battlefield setbacks in 2022, Putin chose to escalate because the perception of defeat was unacceptable. He doubled down with mobilization of 300,000 reservists, recruited prisoners, invited North Korean troops to fight on Russian soil, and issued nuclear threats. Such measures reflect a regime fighting not only for strategic objectives but for survival from banishment, imprisonment, or possibly even death. The desperate stake of the conflict makes it difficult for Kremlin negotiators to make concessions unless they are certain that such concessions are not perceived as a humiliating defeat for Russia. In a 2023 interview on Russian state media, Putin admitted that he was “primarily focused on the special military operation” and that he stays up “quite late” directing the effort. His sleepless nights are doubtless related to concerns over his selectorates: the siloviki, powerful business magnates, and the mass public. In 2023, Yevgeny Prigozhin, a powerful business elite and long-time ally of Putin, marched his Wagner Group towards Moscow over dissatisfaction with the war effort, and there have been mass protests over the decision to mobilize reserve forces. To date, Putin has been able to sidestep these challenges, but Goemans’ theory helps to increase understanding on why Putin is hesitant to engage in peace negotiations unless there is a perception that Russia was victorious. Again, this diminishes the bargaining space and increases the difficulty of reaching a negotiated settlement.

Conclusion

The persistence of the Russo-Ukraine War illustrates the enduring relevance of Goemans’ theory for explaining the dynamics of war termination. His theory offers critical insights into why costly wars continue despite their devastating consequences. The informational asymmetries that underpinned Russia’s initial decision to invade, the shifting war aims of both belligerents, the credibility deficit in postwar commitments, and the complex interplay of domestic political incentives all contribute to the current stalemate. Far from being a discrete event, war termination is a fluid process in which battlefield outcomes, political calculations, and strategic signalling continuously redefine the parameters of a possible peace.

In the case of the Russo-Ukraine War, no stable bargaining range has emerged because each side remains unwilling or unable to accept the minimum terms the other requires. Russia’s irredentist ambitions and refusal to accept a sovereign, Western-aligned Ukraine are met by Kyiv’s existential need for genuine independence and security guarantees. In addition, the restrained, inconsistent, and conditional military support to Ukraine from the international community create the conditions for what William Zartman and Matthew Krain call a “mutually hurting stalemate,” in which neither side is able to impose enough unacceptable battlefield outcomes to create bargaining space. For example, former US Army Europe commander Lieutenant General Ben Hodges has consistently argued that more robust support for Ukraine earlier in the war would have helped end the conflict with a Ukrainian victory. These positions are hardened by internal political structures that incentivize continued conflict: for Russia, a personalist regime that punishes defeat; for Ukraine, a democratic selectorate demanding freedom from foreign domination. In this environment, third-party security guarantees appear essential to resolving commitment problems, but they remain politically fraught and strategically uncertain.

Ultimately, Goemans’ theory reminds us that wars do not end simply because one side desires peace. They end when both parties perceive that peace is more valuable than continued fighting and when political and security guarantees make negotiated outcomes viable. Until those conditions emerge in the Russo-Ukraine conflict, peace in Eastern Europe will remain elusive.