Why Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces Must Regroup

Since the 2022 Russian invasion, Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SOF) have been used in a variety of ways, including direct action, information warfare, and unconventional warfare capacities. SOF has enjoyed various high-profile successes, however there are systemic shortcomings that reduce their effectiveness. In practice, Ukrainian SOF forces are often placed under conventional commanders, who in turn tend to use SOF as expendable front-line shock troops, which creates an issue of efficiency and economy of force for Ukraine’s key force multiplier. This approach should be reformed to properly utilize SOF within its independent command structure (UKRSOCOM), and any continuing use of SOF in this capacity should draw on the historic successful use of shock troops to reduce casualties and increase effectiveness. Ukrainian SOF are also deployed to distant theaters where they achieve minimal gains, and potentially harm the nation’s international reputation. In the face of severe manpower shortages within conventional forces, Ukraine must take every measure to preserve this highly trained force in order to retain its capability as a force-multiplier and avoid any disruption in operational capacity due to the prolonged nature of the SOF selection, training, and replacement process.
Background
Since Russia’s invasion in 2022, Ukraine has been fighting an uphill battle to preserve its sovereignty. Ukraine is a much smaller country than Russia, with less than a third of its population, and as such, manpower disparities have been a significant issue. Ukraine has managed to build up a significant fleet of Western fighting vehicles more advanced and survivable than their Russian counterparts, but reductions in Western aid, especially with recent German promises to reduce their military contributions and the victory of U.S. President Donald Trump, may hamstring further Ukrainian efforts. Given these circumstances, Special Operations Forces are of the utmost importance for Ukrainian military capabilities. While lengthy and expensive to train, these forces are powerful force multipliers, translating their skills into an outsized impact on the battlefield while requiring less material support.
Current Use
Ukrainian Special Operation Forces, on paper, have been organized more in line with Western models since 2015. Ukrainian Special Operations Forces Command (UKRSOCOM) is its own command within the Ukrainian military. Previously, Special Operations were divided between the pre-existing military commands, much like the Russian system that exists today. Additionally, Ukraine has various similar groups within the Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR). These groups participate in direct action as well as other SOF activities. At present, Ukrainian SOF engage in at least three of the core activities that Western Special Operations Forces execute.
Direct Action – The most visible role of UKRSOCOM, Special Operations Forces have partaken in a wide variety of direct action operations against Russia. The most effective of these attacks appears to be infiltration shaping operations, in which operators will penetrate deep behind enemy lines and destroy key enemy infrastructure. A notable example of this includes a naval infiltration to destroy Russian air defense radar units in Crimea, facilitating missile strikes against the Sevastopol port in August of 2023. More recently, Special Operations Forces infiltrated Russia’s Kursk region, destroying key infrastructure and capturing larger Russian units ahead of the conventional Ukraine invasion in August 2024.
According to a Dr. Jeff Gardner article for the Irregular Warfare Center, UKRSOCOM forces have frequently participated in more conventional attacks against Russia, fighting on the frontlines rather than beyond the front lines. Special Operations Forces are used as frontline shock troops, reducing their contributions to close-range marksmanship and grenade-throwing rather than their wider skill sets. Unlike the aforementioned examples, these front-line actions tend to have less firepower support and are conducted during the day. Direct action operations have also been taken by Ukrainian HUR forces in Syria and Sudan. Notably, in September of 2024, a large magazine on a Russian military installation near Aleppo was destroyed.
Unconventional Warfare – UKRSOCOM has the ability to train, embed, and materially support the wide array of civilian resistance cells remaining in Russian-occupied territory. SOF units exploit the intelligence potential of Ukrainians living behind Russian lines to more effectively target critical Russian infrastructure, including military personnel, political figures, and materiel depots. In addition, Ukrainian SOF assets embedded with civilian resistance carry out assassinations of Russian troops and officials, as well as information warfare operations to intimidate occupying forces and their collaborators.
A wide array of resistance cells exist in Ukrainian land occupied by Russia. Russian occupation is often harsh and degrading to civilians, making the environment ripe for recruitment. Many resistance cells were created in the lead-up to the invasion, which have since remained in occupied territory to conduct surveillance and assassinations. SOF’s ability to rapidly exploit actionable intelligence through DA is directly linked to the continued existence and well-being of the resistance, underscoring the strategic nature of such combat enablers. UKRSOCOM’s ability to conduct these operations was significantly improved by a 2021 bill that allowed for the training, arming, and paying of Ukrainians for resistance actions against occupiers during wartime.
Outside the Ukraine-Russian theatre, Ukrainian SOF continue to work alongside Malian and Syrian rebel forces to disrupt Russian efforts in the region. In Syria, for example, Ukrainian HUR forces have worked alongside rebel groups to target Russian installations and personnel. Ukraine has also contributed to medical efforts with Syrian rebel groups. In Mali, for example, an ambush that led to the deaths of 84 Wagner soldiers was enabled by Ukrainian intelligence and drone training, drawing backlash from the Malian government. These actions have not been without their drawbacks, most notably in the case of Mali, where the nation severed diplomatic ties with Ukraine in response to their cooperation with rebel groups.
Military Information Support Operations – While the full extent of UKRSOCOM efforts in this domain are unknown, a key contribution along this axis is the release of successful frontline footage. Helmet-cam footage provides visceral and visual examples of Ukrainian successes against Russian forces, and this, in turn, boosts the morale and perception of success among Ukraine and its allies. The publication of Ukrainian action in Syria and Africa also creates an impression that threats to Russian forces are everywhere and that Ukraine has the means to deploy valuable forces across the world.
Shortcomings
While there are many successes in the deployment of Ukrainian Special Operations Forces, there are key shortcomings as well. In practice, UKRSOCOM is deployed in a similar manner to how it was before Westernization efforts in 2015. Special Operations Forces are often subservient to conventional commanders, and these commanders are often ignorant of how to best deploy these forces due largely to a lack of cross-command training and exercises. Ukrainian military training is quite siloed, and joint exercises, including those with UKRSOCOM, are rarely conducted.
Consequently, these forces are often deployed as frontline shock troops, using aggressive, high-tempo tactics coupled with close-quarters combat training, much like German Stormtroopers in World War I. While these historical forces were very effective, especially in conventional war against entrenched enemies similar to modern Russian positions, Stormtroopers also suffered extremely high casualties. Casualty rates for Ukrainian SOF in these capacities are hard to come by; they are likely quite high and have been reported as such by publications such as War on the Rocks. Estimates of Ukrainian front-line unit strengths are often around thirty five percent for conventional units, and many have even higher attrition rates. This offers an explanation as to why conventional commanders may be desperate to use SOF in these capacities due to manpower shortage, as well as illustrating that SOF are likely also experiencing high casualties in these roles. Since SOF are already a much smaller force that require much more time and resources to train than the average infantryman, their use in this role is a deeply inefficient use of manpower. Given the serious manpower shortage that Ukraine is experiencing, the use of Special Operations Forces in this manner is hampering its economy of force at a serious cost. In addition to this general guidance, increased cross-training between the siloed military commands, not only for students of the training centers but for the trainers themselves, could help develop a more effective deployment of UKRSOCOM.
Another misuse of Ukrainian Special Operations Forces may be their use in Syria and Africa. While a significant informational warfare win, SOF would more effectively disrupt Russia combat capabilities if redeployed to the Ukrainian theatre. The goal of SOF deployment outside of the Russia-Ukraine theater is to draw more Russian forces into these theaters and away from Ukraine, reducing Russian material and manpower resources for their Ukrainian operations. The effectiveness of these forces can be difficult to quantify, but Russian troop deployments in the region appear to be unaffected by Ukrainian efforts. Notably, in May of 2024, part of Russia’s Africa Corps was redeployed away from Africa and back to Ukraine in preparation for their Kharkiv Offensive. Recent reports have indicated that Russia may deploy more forces to Syria, but this is due to the recent victory of rebel groups rather than to Ukrainian actions. The highlight of Ukrainian success in the region is in Mali, where Ukrainian intelligence and training contributed to a deadly rebel ambush of a Wagner and Mali government force convoy, the most destructive blow to Russian forces in Africa to date.
Further, this highly visible and direct collaboration with regional forces can negatively affect Ukraine’s reputation. While Wagner’s allies are rarely sympathetic, usually oppressive military juntas, the same issue applies to their adversaries, who often resort to terror tactics. Ukraine’s support for the Mali attack has already drawn serious diplomatic backlash in Africa, causing Mali and Niger to break off diplomatic relations in protest. Given a resurgence of anti-colonial governments in Africa, Ukraine’s actions were poorly timed diplomatically, as extra-African score-settling in the continent is often viewed as European disregard for African sovereignty. Malian rebels are problematic bedfellows, especially when the most Ukraine has to show for it is perhaps a couple of hundred Russian casualties, a fraction of what happens daily on the Ukrainian front lines. Given the modest payoffs of operations in the region and the sharp political backlash, operations of this style should be curtailed and conducted far more subtly, if not eliminated entirely.
Recommendations
UKRSOCOM and the HUR have already had many successes, and the foundations already exist to facilitate more effective utilization of Special Operations Forces. Unlike Russia, which has not updated its special operations forces doctrine significantly, Ukraine is in a position to rapidly and effectively optimize its forces and operational methodology against Russia.
Improve Conventional Commanders’ Competence of SOF Deployment – Trench-clearing operations are dangerous and have a high attrition rate. SOF are too valuable assets to be thrown into this form of combat, but conventional commanders continue to do so. Further cross-command training and education should be done at the higher command levels to help educate conventional commanders on the best uses of SOF, as recommended by Dr. Gardner and his co-contributors in their Irregular Warfare Center piece. It is likely that even with these measures, SOF will continue to be used on the front lines, even if to a lesser extent, due to manpower shortages, but every effort should be made to address these shortages within the conventional force structures. Potential exceptions could be made in extremely vital circumstances, but even then, SOF should be heavily supported with firepower and play to their strengths, such as night raids or infiltration attacks.
Ensure UKRSOCOM Retains Command of SOF – Having SOF under independent command from conventional forces would improve their effectiveness. Special Operations Task Force commanders should be deployed in theater and work alongside conventional commanders rather than relinquish command of SOF to them. Task Force commanders should liaison with conventional commanders to deconflict, as well as develop a better sense of the battlefield on the tactical and operational levels. Doing this would more fully implement the military reforms set in motion almost a decade ago and improve the interoperability of UKRSOCOM with Western Forces.
Reduce or Entirely Eliminate SOF presence in Syria and Africa – The effectiveness of Ukrainian efforts in these regions is questionable and HUR resources would be better spent behind enemy lines or Russia proper, as evidenced by at least one assassination of a high-ranking official. The political and diplomatic effects of some of these problematic alliances in these regions are not insignificant. If this line of effort is to continue at all, it should be done discreetly and be relegated to intelligence sharing. Further arrangements with regional partners could be enacted that demand discretion, a consequential yet avoidable failure of the Mali ambush. Diplomatic credibility is more important than a photo op.
Take credit for Syria – While a small informational win, efforts could be made to better articulate the degree to which Ukrainian SOF helped contribute to the fall of the Assad regime. A few videos of Ukrainians alongside rebels in key cities and at former Russian installations could be effective information operations. This effort would be quick and would allow for the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces in short order in line with the above recommendation. Given the U.S. president’s recent remarks, this recommendation would be received well among allies. This recommendation also has some risk and could backfire if the rebels begin to act inhumanely after their victories.
Conclusion
Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces are a critical force multiplier in the Russo-Ukraine War. Ukraine’s misuse of these forces significantly undermines the strategic effect they can achieve against Russia within the Ukrainian theatre of operations, and it is imperative Ukrainian SOF work to refine the command relationships and mission parameters under which they are deployed. In Ukraine, greater emphasis must be placed on joint exercises and the education of commanders to ensure that the various parties invested in SOF operations understand how to best utilize and support them, and UKRSOCOM must maintain command of SOF units. Ukrainian SOF operations in the Middle East and Africa must be reduced, if not eliminated entirely, unless the operational effects can be empirically shown to degrade Russian combat capabilities in Ukraine. Russia’s brazen and relentless attempt to overwhelm and annex Ukraine is the primary national security threat facing Kyiv. Accordingly, SOF assets, limited in size yet disproportionately destructive when applied strategically, must be refocused where they are most effective against the encroaching Russian military in order to achieve the greatest battlefield effect.