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Sum​mary:

Maurice “Duc” DuClos argues that unconventional warfare seldom reaches policymakers because knowledgeable advocates lack influence where options are framed. Drawing on four historical cases, he identifies existing capability, conventional limitations, and advocacy as recurring conditions. He recommends deeper education, credible partner capabilities, and advocates able to explain UW’s limits.

​Comment: Arguably (in my opinion, SWJ Editor-at-Large), unconventional warfare (UW) is the most misunderstood, undervalued, unappreciated, overlooked, and dismissed concept in all of military doctrine. 

Ironically, based on reports I have heard from the field, it appears that even within the SOF community there are those who do not value UW, despite it being a Title 10 (sec 167) core mission.

​Duc DuClos ​s​hows us that a capability can survive in doctrine while disappearing from strategy. If leaders hear only the options their advisers know best, the United States may strike targets without seriously considering other ways to achieve its political purpose.

The remedy requires more than a stronger voice for Special Forces. UW belongs within a national strategy, with military, intelligence, and interagency contributions aligned behind an achievable end state. ​​Two variation of the  SOF trinities ​(IW, UW and support to political warfare and influence, governance, and support to indigenous forces and populations) offer a useful discipline: SOF, intelligence, and interagency connect capabilities; resistance, resilience, ​and governance connect action to political outcomes. Neither works without indigenous agency. A resistance movement has interests of its own, and access does not establish shared purpose.

The strongest distinction is between an option rejected after assessment and one never presented. Those are different institutional failures and demand different remedies.

Four selected cases can identify recurring features, but they cannot establish that advocacy caused approval or explain how frequently UW disappears from current deliberations. ​D​uc acknowledges correlation rather than causation. His observations about promotion patterns and direct-action dominance merit examination, but the article does not systematically demonstrate them. (Those require additional stand alone articles and further research).

Nor does sound policy require conventional options to be exhausted before UW receives consideration. Different instruments may complement one another. The question is which combination serves the political objective at acceptable cost.

Iran illustrates the difference between gaining approval, removing a government, and securing lasting strategic advantage. The documentary record confirms presidential approval of the operation in July 1953; that fact alone does not establish advocacy as the decisive cause. Following Neustadt and May​ (Thinking in Time), planners should examine what changed between administrations, what remained constant, and which features cannot travel to another case. Changed threat assessments and failed diplomacy matter alongside personnel.

Better UW education could broaden policy choices and preserve capabilities neglected by a concentration on raids or large​ scale combat​ operations. Advocacy without independent challenge could instead produce another favored instrument searching for a mission. ​P​erhaps Duc’s most important contribution is to move attention upstream: from preparing to execute UW toward ensuring leaders can assess it honestly.

Part 1:Why Not UW?
The Three Half-Truths Killing Unconventional Warfare | Part 1 of 3 in the Why Unconventional Warfare? series

https://unconventionalwarfarereview.substack.com/p/why-not-uw

Part 2: The Question Is… Why UW?

Examining the conditions that make unconventional warfare a strategic policy option | Part 2 of 3 in the Why Unconventional Warfare? series

https://unconventionalwarfarereview.substack.com/p/the-question-is-why-uw

Who Speaks for UW?

Unconventional Warfare Isn’t Rejected. It Seldom Arrives. | Part 3 of 3 in the Why Unconventional Warfare? series

https://unconventionalwarfarereview.substack.com/p/who-speaks-for-uw