Fake News for the Resistance: The Office of Strategic Services and the Nexus of Psychological and Unconventional Warfare During World War II

Abstract

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), America’s intelligence and special operations organization in World War II, is best known for the work of its Special Operations (SO) Branch to collect intelligence on the Axis Powers and to arm and train resistance groups behind enemy lines. It has received negligible attention for its efforts to disrupt enemy morale and decision-making through the use of “black propaganda.” In contrast to “white propaganda,” black propaganda designed to deceive the enemy and undermine his cohesion and will to fight by presenting demoralizing messages that appeared to originate from within the enemy’s own side, whether from dissident troops or from actual military leaders. As of this writing, there exist no published histories that provide a comprehensive overview of how OSS’s Morale Operations (MO) Branch conducted these activities in the field, or how these efforts integrated with the service’s operations to support resistance groups in Axis- occupied areas. Furthermore, there are no published works that compare these activities between theaters. This thesis will fill this gap in the literature by answering the following research question: How did OSS psychological warfare operations contribute to the service’s broader efforts to disrupt enemy forces?

Beginning with a critical review of the extant secondary literature, this thesis presents a detailed study of the wartime activities of OSS’ Morale Operations Branch based on archival research in the OSS records as well as the personal papers of OSS Director William Donovan and of the OSS’s counterpart services in Britain. It focuses especially on the integrated role of propaganda and special operations that Donovan envisioned for his service, how the employment of these activities differed across theaters, and how organizational structures established by conventional theater commanders could help or hinder efforts to integrate psychological warfare with other forms of subversive activity. This thesis will ultimately show that OSS operations hewed closely to Donovan’s vision in the areas where they fell under British command. American commanders, who lacked any familiarity with irregular warfare and adhered to a culture that valorized direct action against the enemy, generally separated propaganda and special operations functions, significantly reducing their effectiveness.