NORTHCOM Expands Counter-UAS Operations Against Cartel Drones at the Southern Border

In September, U.S. Northern Command reported that Joint Task Force-Southern Border had defeated more than 300 unmanned aircraft systems during 2026, including more than 100 in August alone. Among those incidents, soldiers used the Army Multipurpose High-Energy Laser, or AMP-HEL, to defeat 11 UAS associated with cartel activity along the U.S.-Mexico border.

NORTHCOM has since added another counter-UAS capability to the mission.

A New Counter-UAS Capability Reaches the Border

On October 8, NORTHCOM announced that 22 JTF-SB soldiers had been trained and certified to operate a counter-small UAS fly-away kit at Yuma Proving Ground. Joint Task Force-Southern Border is the first NORTHCOM subordinate unit to receive and certify personnel on the capability.

The system incorporates sensors, software, and the Anvil counter-UAS system to detect, track, identify, and defeat small unmanned aircraft. Its introduction adds another component to the kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities being employed along the border, including directed-energy systems such as AMP-HEL.

From Directed Energy to Layered Counter-UAS Operations

The sequence provides a timeline of how the counter-UAS mission is developing along the southern border.

On August 25 and 26, JTF-SB soldiers used AMP-HEL to defeat three UAS associated with cartel activity. By September 4, NORTHCOM reported 11 UAS defeated by the laser and more than 300 UAS defeated through kinetic and non-kinetic means during 2026.

Soldiers subsequently trained on the counter-small UAS fly-away kit in September, with NORTHCOM announcing their certification in October.

The progression shows growth toward a layered counter-UAS architecture. Sensors provide detection and tracking. Command-and-control systems support identification and threat assessment. Electronic and other non-kinetic capabilities provide defeat options, while kinetic interceptors and directed-energy systems provide additional methods of engagement.

The Department of War’s 2026 Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Quick Reference Guide places these capabilities within a broader layered approach to counter-UAS operations.

The Cartel Drone Problem

NORTHCOM has associated UAS operating along the border with smuggling activity and surveillance of U.S. military and law-enforcement personnel.

Small UAS can provide criminal organizations with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities while allowing operators to observe personnel, positions, patrol patterns, and border activity from geographically separated locations. Their accessibility also places capabilities once concentrated within military and state security organizations into the hands of criminal networks.

The resulting problem extends from detecting an aircraft to determining who operates it, what activity it supports, whether it presents a threat, and which authority or capability should respond.

A Homeland Defense and Irregular Warfare Problem

The southern border provides an active case study in the diffusion of unmanned systems to non-state actors. U.S. forces are encountering UAS operated by criminal organizations during a domestic defense mission while developing the personnel, technology, tactics, and interagency coordination required to counter them.

The environment also brings military and law-enforcement missions into close proximity. The U.S. Department of War, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and other federal entities operate under different authorities and responsibilities, making counter-UAS coordination an operational and institutional issue alongside the technical challenge.

Questions for the SWJ Community

The developments raise several questions:

• How should DoD distinguish routine cartel drone activity from UAS presenting an immediate force-protection threat?
• What lessons from counter-UAS operations overseas apply to homeland defense?
• How should military capabilities integrate with DHS, CBP, and law-enforcement counter-UAS authorities?
• What does sustained cartel use of UAS indicate about the diffusion of military technologies and tactics to criminal organizations?
• What can operations along the southern border teach the Joint Force about protecting installations, critical infrastructure, and personnel against inexpensive unmanned systems?