Why the Army’s Messaging About COIN Is Dangerous

Abstract

The Army has made large-scale combat operations (LSCO) its highest training standard. LSCO stresses the force in ways counterinsurgency does not. Yet Army messaging suggests the institution is moving away from COIN entirely. This signal is wrong. LSCO should be the training priority. Counterinsurgency (COIN) should remain part of the operational toolkit. Senior leaders need messaging that separates these two truths.

Introduction

The Army spent two decades fighting counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. After 2015, the institution made a correct decision: to rebuild large-scale combat capabilities. Two decades of COIN focus had weakened the force in peer-conflict skills. Russia and China have modern militaries. The Army needed to be ready for large-scale conventional combat.

LSCO are genuinely the most demanding training standard. They require contested sustainment, division and corps synchronization, protection against long-range fires, and mission command against peer threats. An Army capable of executing LSCO can execute almost anything else.

The institutional messaging about this shift, however, created an unintended problem. Army white papers, senior leader statements, and professional publications describe the move as a transition from counterinsurgency to large-scale combat operations. The language communicates a pivot away from one thing and toward another. This framing unintentionally signals to officers that COIN is the past and LSCO is the future.

Two different statements are being conflated. The first statement—”LSCO is our highest training standard”—is correct. The second statement—”We are transitioning away from COIN”—is dangerous. Army messaging treats them as a single message. This creates a cognitive problem for an officer corps that understands its profession based on institutional signals.

Institutional Signals Shape Officer Understanding

Officers are pragmatists. They watch where the institution invests resources. They pay attention to what senior leaders emphasize in speeches and white papers. They make career choices based on what the Army appears to value. If the Army’s message is “we are moving away from COIN,” officers reach reasonable conclusions about their future. They assume COIN expertise is becoming less valuable. They conclude the Army does not expect future COIN operations. They prioritize LSCO specialization.

Over time, this creates an officer corps shaped by the signal. Younger officers entering the force now have not fought COIN wars. They have only heard senior leaders describe the shift away from COIN. These officers will fill battalion and brigade command positions within ten years. In twenty years, they will occupy division and corps command. If the institutional message has been “COIN is over,” these future commanders will have limited COIN expertise and limited access to COIN institutional knowledge.

Professional development reflects the same bias. Army University changed branch captains’ career courses and revamped the Command and General Staff College curriculum to include LSCO principles. Army University Press also built a large-scale combat operations historical case study series to support the Army’s updated doctrine. COIN no longer occupies the central institutional position it held during Iraq and Afghanistan. Officers moving through the professional education system now receive repeated exposure to peer-conflict scenarios, LSCO doctrine, and conventional readiness. Senior-leader emphasis reinforces the message. Army journals, doctrine, training guidance, and public force-structure changes all point officers toward LSCO as the Army’s main preparation problem. The result is clear: Officers absorb the repeated signal and conclude the Army has moved on from COIN.

The cumulative consequence is that the Army is systematically pushing its officer corps away from COIN expertise at the exact moment it needs to preserve it.

What Happens When Campaigns Demand COIN

The Army risks messaging that COIN is irrelevant. When a campaign suddenly demands COIN, the Army will find an officer corps that specializes in LSCO but lacks COIN muscle memory.

Consider what happens mid-campaign. Commanders will not have practiced counterinsurgency at professional development. Staff sections will not have rehearsed population security operations. Headquarters will not have doctrine internalized from repeated focus on COIN. Division and corps staffs will struggle to recognize when campaigns are transitioning from conventional to irregular warfare. They will be slow to reorganize headquarters, reorient priorities, and reallocate resources toward COIN operations.

Iraq 2003 demonstrates this pattern. The U.S. military defeated the Iraqi conventional army through rapid maneuver. Although victory seemed clean, the war did not end. Instead, it transformed. Remnants of the Iraqi military reconstituted as an insurgency. Terrorist networks exploited the power vacuum. The Army transitioned from conventional operations to counterinsurgency, population security, governance support, and training local forces. This transition was sudden and costly. Some of that cost could have been reduced if the force had maintained COIN capability and expected transitions.

The same transition could occur in a future peer conflict. The opening phase might be large-scale conventional combat. What follows depends on political objectives and enemy choice, not Army preference. If the adversary’s military is defeated but refuses to surrender, the war becomes counterinsurgency. If the adversary conducts sabotage, population control campaigns, or irregular tactics, the Army must counter COIN threats while maintaining conventional readiness. The point is not that COIN and LSCO are equally likely. LSCO is the higher-stress training standard and should be the priority. The point is that COIN remains plausible. Officers who have internalized “COIN is over” will be unprepared when campaigns demand it.

How Institutional Knowledge Decays

COIN expertise is embedded in doctrine, training systems, professional networks, and institutional culture. When Army messaging suggests COIN is obsolete, several cascading effects occur.

Fewer officers volunteer for COIN-focused positions. COIN assignments used to mark senior experience and professional prestige. If the message is “COIN is the past,” these assignments become less desirable. Fewer officers seek them. The pool of COIN-experienced officers shrinks over time.

Professional development shifts emphasis away from COIN. The Army’s war colleges and intermediate schools begin emphasizing LSCO scenarios. COIN case studies receive less classroom time. A generation of officers moves through the system hearing more about large-scale combat than about counterinsurgency. They internalize the institutional priority.

Doctrine becomes inert when not practiced. The Army has solid doctrine on counterinsurgency. If the doctrine is not practiced in exercises, if it is not emphasized in professional education, if it is not the focus of command emphasis, the doctrine sits unused. Officers do not internalize it. When a campaign demands it, execution is slow and ineffective.

Professional networks decay as experienced officers retire. Officers who fought COIN wars in Iraq and Afghanistan developed relationships, shared understanding, and mentorship networks around COIN expertise. As these officers leave the institution, younger officers without COIN experience lose their mentors. The informal transfer of institutional knowledge breaks down. Tribal knowledge about what works in COIN—lessons learned through blood and sacrifice—is lost. Over ten to fifteen years, the cumulative effect is significant. The Army retains LSCO expertise and loses COIN expertise. Then a campaign demands COIN. The Army must relearn lessons already learned.

The Core Problem: Two Truths Conflated into One Message

The fundamental issue is that Army messaging conflates two separate institutional decisions. Decision one is correct: LSCO is the highest training priority. Decision two is wrong: COIN is obsolete. Army messaging treats them as a single package. Senior leaders say, “We are transitioning from COIN to LSCO,” as if these are opposite choices. They are not.

A better framework would separate these truths. The Army should state clearly that LSCO is the most demanding training standard and therefore receives priority resources and training emphasis. At the same time, COIN remains part of the institutional toolkit and doctrine. Officers should understand both. The Army will train harder for LSCO because that is the most demanding standard. This messaging explains the resource priority without implying COIN is irrelevant.

Senior leaders should emphasize this distinction in speeches, white papers, and command messaging. Professional development should include COIN scenarios alongside LSCO scenarios. Promotion boards should value officers who understand both, even if the training emphasis is on LSCO. Career assignments should not treat COIN experience as a liability. When the institution sends these signals consistently, officers understand the training priority without discarding COIN knowledge.

What Success Looks Like

If the messaging is corrected, officers understand LSCO is the highest training standard without assuming COIN is obsolete. They develop LSCO expertise because that is the priority. They also maintain COIN knowledge because the institution still values it. Institutional knowledge about COIN is preserved. Officers who have COIN experience remain valued. Professional networks around COIN expertise persist. Doctrine on population security and counterinsurgency remains internalized.

When a campaign transitions from LSCO to COIN, the Army executes the transition effectively. Commanders understand what is happening. Staff has rehearsed it. Doctrine is fresh in their minds. The transition is smoother than it was in Iraq. The Army is ready for what is most likely (LSCO) and prepared for what is still possible (COIN). Institutional credibility strengthens. The Army can credibly claim readiness for future campaigns because it has built competence in both conventional and irregular warfare.

Conclusion

The Army is right to make LSCO the highest training standard. LSCO is genuinely the most demanding standard. It stresses the force in ways that build broad competence. Resources devoted to LSCO readiness are well spent.

The Army’s messaging has created an unintended signal: COIN is the past. This signal is wrong. COIN is not the past. COIN is less likely than LSCO but still plausible. Future campaigns may demand it. Officers who have internalized “COIN is over” will be unprepared when campaigns require it.

The fix is to change how senior leaders talk about it. Stop saying “transition from COIN to LSCO.” Start saying “LSCO is the highest training standard. COIN remains in our toolkit.” These are not the same statement, but Army messaging treats them as one. When senior leaders separate these truths, officers will understand the training priority without assuming COIN is obsolete. The institution will preserve COIN expertise while investing in LSCO capability. When campaigns demand either LSCO or COIN, the Army will be ready.