The War of The Pen: What America’s State Department is Ignoring
Introduction
The United States is the world’s foremost superpower, with a global reach militarily, economically, scientifically, and most of all, diplomatically across all regions of the earth. American soft power has enabled Washington to project force and influence to stabilize or remedy any conflict around the globe at any given moment. However, over the past several years, US soft power has gradually waned while a near-peer rival of China has increased its global outreach.
The lack of American-appointed ambassadors worldwide, alongside diplomatic conflicts stemming from hasty decisions by Washington, has led to the US losing its influence in key regions. Simultaneously, China has ramped up its diplomatic efforts around the globe, and several middle powers such as Turkey and Pakistan have also grown in influence in affairs that the United States government used to be able to mend or resolve.
Soft power not only includes diplomatic relations but also force projection capabilities. If Washington continues to have less influence on global affairs, the US Armed Forces and their overseas status will be directly hindered. Unless the US returns to its diplomatic roots of WWI and WWII, where the international community looked for America to lead, Washington risks losing the shadow war of global influence.
Lack of U.S. Ambassadors Under Trump II
During the second Trump administration, a policy was implemented for ‘cost-cutting’ in all federal branches, including the US State Department. Over 1,300 personnel, such as Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) and civil service contractors, experienced termination or release under the administration. Due to the downsizing and restructuring, 109 out of 195 ambassador positions remained vacant as of June 2026.
US ambassadors are currently absent in countries that are either embroiled in conflict, on the front lines, in regional hotspots, or major US allies. For example, the world’s largest conventional war today, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, is absent American ambassadors in Kyiv and Moscow, which has made negotiations difficult, as the Trump administration indefinitely halted peace-mending efforts due to waning US influence over the war.
Despite having close ties to the Gulf states, the Trump administration has vacant ambassadorships in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Kuwait. All of these countries are on the front line of blowback from the 2026 Iran war, as Tehran’s wartime strategy is striking Gulf state energy infrastructure as a form of economic warfare to apply pressure on the White House.
In the pivotal Indo-Pacific, where the US seeks to curb growing Chinese influence, Washington is missing ambassadors in key countries within the region. America needs to counter Beijing’s soft power. As of early June 2026, there are no US ambassadors in Australia, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, or South Korea.
The lack of American ambassadors in the region at a time when US priorities have shifted towards a Monroe Doctrine could be detrimental to Indo-Pacific security, as Canberra and Seoul are mutual treaty allies (ANZUS and ROK-US, respectively). Furthermore, China’s economic influence and coercion affect Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, with whom the United States also actively works diplomatically.
Lack of American Soft Power
According to the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), Trump’s current administration heavily trails prior US presidents with career diplomatic appointments, including Trump’s first term. During his second administration, Trump has appointed only 9% of career diplomats compared to 57% from his first term.
Concurrently, US ambassador vacancies are facing critical shortfalls elsewhere in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Americas, international organizations, and the Middle East. Africa currently has 37 US ambassador vacancies, with Asia-Pacific 20, Europe 18, the Americas 17, the Middle East 6, and international organizations 11 in diplomatic shortfalls.
The absence of US ambassadors has not only signaled budget cuts but also a lack of American soft power and influence—particularly as key regional areas continue to heat up. For example, after a year of attempted negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, the war continues with heightened casualties and conventional battles. Without ambassadors in Kyiv and Moscow, the US government would confirm its temporary disengagement from the negotiations to end the war.
Instead of assigning ambassadorships to Ukraine and Russia, President Trump sent two of his close envoys, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, into negotiations. Both failed to reach Kyiv to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, whereas Kushner and Witkoff made numerous trips to Moscow. Without ambassadors sending outreach messages, Russia perceived itself as having an advantage, and Ukraine saw a bias as territorial concessions without concrete security guarantees were unfeasible.
Outside of Russia and Ukraine, waning American influence and soft power are currently evident in Europe as a rift in relations emerged between the second Trump administration and the continent. Tensions over the handling of the Greenland crisis, sacrifices made by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries in Afghanistan, and the 2026 Iran war have led to a decline of American influence in Europe and the wider Indo-Pacific.
For example, despite threats, the Trump administration has done little to convince both European countries, along with South Korea, Japan, and Australia, to directly intervene in the Strait of Hormuz, as not only are those regions dealing with their own existential threats, but also feeling the effects of tariffs and a trade war from a turbulent US foreign and economic policy.
Rise of Middle and Regional Powers
Simultaneously, middle powers such as Turkey, Pakistan, and Qatar have stepped up to mend conflicts the US government failed to resolve due to indecisiveness or domestic politics. In Syria, Libya, and the South Caucasus, Turkey played key roles in ending large-scale fighting. In Syria, the Turkish government’s frozen lines in Idlib, along with training and sharing intelligence with Syrian opposition forces, led to the lightning 2024 offensive that overthrew the Assad regime. Ankara also vouched for Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government in Damascus, which opened up Syria back into the international fold.
The Turkish intervention in the Second Libyan Civil War helped freeze the contact lines in favor of the internationally recognized government in Tripoli (GNA) as the US failed to be diplomatically engaged to halt fighting. Turkey played a major role in the South Caucasus by not only militarily backing Azerbaijan and limiting Russian influence but also pushing for a peace deal with Armenia that could open up Ankara and Yerevan to European Union (EU) funding and investments.
During the 2026 Iran war, the US lost its position of strength by failing to calculate a Strait of Hormuz closure. Already tricking Iran twice during negotiations to have the element of surprise against Tehran, Washington, under pressure after failing to reopen the Strait, needed regional countries to help mend the war, as the Iranian regime now led from a maximalist position and didn’t trust the American government.
Instead, Pakistan emerged as a key mediator for simmering tensions between America and Iran. Pakistan has served as an intermediary in diplomatic talks between Tehran and Washington, as Islamabad maintains good relations with each respective head of state. Months of mediation by Pakistan with Iran ultimately led to common ground suitable with the United States, which led to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that could end the hot war.
Qatar has built its reputation as not only a major non-NATO ally but a key regional mediator in areas where the US had fizzled out. Qatar’s diplomatic mediation has stretched into Lebanon, Yemen, Iran, Gaza, and Afghanistan, in which the latter’s Doha Accords ended America’s longest war. Controversially, Qatar’s diplomatic outreach and soft power have come under criticism, as Doha has pursued its own interests that often conflict with those of either fellow Gulf state neighbors, Israel, or the US.
Qatar’s soft power includes maintaining close ties with regimes and organizations designated as extremists, such as the Iranian government, Taliban, and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, amongst others. Doha came into conflict with its Gulf neighbors, who enacted a several-year blockade over its lukewarm reaction to extremist groups, in which Washington remained particularly absent in mending.
Furthermore, Qatar has hosted Hamas’ political leadership in Doha, which gives the Qatari government major influence in the Israel-Palestine conflict. An airstrike by the Israeli government on a Hamas safehouse in Qatar not only led to more hostage releases in the Israel-Hamas war but also to a broader Qatari influence with the Trump administration, which looks to Doha for Middle Eastern regional diplomatic back-channels.
Beijing’s Diplomatic Outreach is Outpacing Washington’s
Outside of regional countries with growing soft power and diplomatic outreach, China, a superpower itself, is gaining an edge over the United States in diplomacy. Whereas the US has engaged in budget cuts to its diplomatic corps, China has taken the opposite approach—expanding foreign service institutions along with embassies and consular services. According to a March 2024 analysis by the Lowy Institute, China had 274 global diplomatic posts by the end of 2023 compared to America’s 271.
Beijing’s focus on expanding its diplomatic outreach over Washington’s is calculated. China retains a larger diplomatic footprint in Africa, the Indo-Pacific, and Central Asia—all regions where Chinese soft power through trade, economic development, and global sympathies lies due to the lack of Western soft power.
America’s disengagement from Africa and lack of force projection on the continent are a vacuum that China has filled with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), where Beijing has eclipsed Washington as a top trading partner on the continent. In Central Asia, a region historically under Russia’s hegemony, China’s influence and diplomatic reach continue to grow due to declining Russian power. With the Kremlin increasingly losing its soft power due to insurmountable losses in invading Ukraine, Beijing has filled the gap with countries Moscow used to have oversight over, such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
China’s true power base is the Indo-Pacific region, where two frozen conflicts intertwine with Beijing’s soft power. China is currently applying diplomatic pressure, along with hybrid warfare and economic coercion, against any country that supports Taiwan to end the cross-strait crisis in its favor permanently. Simultaneously in the South China Sea, Beijing’s naval force projection has come into conflict with America’s mutual treaty ally in the Philippines, with yearly provocations such as ship ramming, negating civilian fishing, and creating military bases on top of reefs and man-made islands.
Utilizing production advantage for trade against the US, China’s soft power influence is taking a foothold in Southeast Asia, with Myanmar, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Mauritius, along with attempts to establish a foothold in Oceania. Furthermore, China’s soft power advantage over the US in Africa now directly affects the Indo-Pacific.
During the planned visit of Taiwan’s President, Lai Ching-te, to Eswatini, China applied economic coercive diplomacy against Seychelles, Madagascar, and Mauritius to block the Taiwanese Presidential plane from flying over their airspace. Ultimately, President Lai had to use the Royal plane of Eswatini to covertly visit and bypass Beijing’s coercive diplomacy, as Washington’s waning influence in Africa had little effect in backing Taipei.
Policy Recommendations
To keep China from pulling up the ladder, the United States needs a reconstituted strategy for its diplomatic corps outreach. America’s soft power decline is primarily self-inflicted and can be reversed through sustained actions.
The US needs to allocate an indefinite focus on Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia, where China’s soft power has outpaced America’s. With Myanmar’s brutal civil war in Southeast Asia with no end in sight, American diplomatic influence in ending the conflict could allow Washington to have more rare earth minerals that Beijing has amassed from the war-torn nation.
In Central Asia, the US made strides under the Biden administration to grow ties with Central Asia with the C5+1 summit and critical minerals dialogue. Likewise, the Trump administration, which wants to focus on countering Beijing’s control over critical minerals, can continue enhancing relations with Central Asian states—especially as Russian influence wanes.
Africa will be the hardest to mend relations with and expand diplomatic outreach with. As seen with the post-French withdrawal from West Africa and the lack of American diplomatic engagement in wars in Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic, amongst others, other countries outside of China, such as Russia and Turkey, have exerted major influence on the continent either through arms sales or mercenary contracting to stabilize rogue regimes. The cuts towards the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and United States Africa Command (US AFRICOM) have cost America critical influence, and a refocus on those policies will be needed in the next fiscal year.
Lastly, trust will need to be reestablished in all countries with which the US engages in a critical diplomatic outreach. Ultimately, many countries see the US as an increasingly unreliable partner due to erratic policies such as the Greenland Crisis, failed negotiations with Ukraine and Russia, leveraging Taiwan’s arms sales, and the recent failure in the 2026 Iran war.
Conclusion
Ultimately, America’s diplomatic decline and lack of soft power projection are more self-inflicted, and the resources are available. It will be up to US lawmakers and their constituents whether to increase the diplomatic corps’ footprint in regions where American soft power has seen a decline.
