Is American Critical Infrastructure Ready for Assymetric Warfare?

As we know now well, a few thousand dollars of commercial hardware can now destroy tens of millions of dollars in strategic assets. Just consider Operation Spiderweb, which cost $7 billion in Russian damages. The refinery campaign has been slower but no less corrosive, idling roughly a tenth of Russian refining capacity through repeated, cheap strikes.

Michael Wallace of HomelandSecurity Today points out how this capability could just as easily be turned inward. With 17 million containers moving through global trade at any time, and inland waterway cargo screened far more loosely than goods entering ports, a saboteur could sail a weaponized container up the Mississippi with real hope of a delayed attribution.

Wallace outlines three gaps in our defenses:

1. Inland waterways lack the screening authority applied at ports of entry;
2. Chemical facilities regulated under CFATS mostly lack counter-drone defenses despite the risk of mass-casualty strikes; and
3. The chain of command for responding to a swarm attack (divided among the FAA, DHS, DoD and FBI) remains unresolved.

Congress has begun granting new counter-drone authorities, and CISA has issued guidance to infrastructure operators. But neither substitutes for hardened sites, faster detection, or clear rules of engagement. Are we ready?

Here’s the original piece in HomelandSecurity Today: “Asymmetric Warfare in the Drone Age: Lessons from Ukraine and an Urgent Warning for U.S. Critical Infrastructure.”