Intelligence Support to Over-the-Horizon Targeting in Contested Environments
Executive Summary
In large-scale combat operations (LSCO)—characterized by contested air, space and electromagnetic domains—over-the-horizon (OTH) intelligence support has become increasingly necessary. Long-range fires outrange tactical organic sensors, yet GPS and communications jamming severely degrades munitions accuracy. This effect increases reliance on OTH support while exposing vulnerabilities throughout the sensor-fusion-shooter chain. Possible solutions include streamlined information sharing between allies, conditional direct links to supported units, and the rapid integration and employment of artificial intelligence. To better equip OTH support to act as decisive enablers for deep fires in contested environments, two recommendations should be applied. Firstly, resilient hybrid space architectures must be established. Secondly, the U.S. must comprehensively leverage the continued proliferation of commercial constellations alongside fusion in rear-area intelligence cells.
Introduction
Advancements in technology, communications, and munitions have enabled fires to units’ organic sensing capabilities. In zones where air and space superiority is the standard, combat enables reliance on trans-continental communications and data flow. In LSCO—as seen in the Russo-Ukrainian War—GPS, and position-navigation and timing (PNT) jamming present on the forward line of troops denies munitions accuracy and communications This makes OTH targeting essential in enabling strikes on deeply-positioned and high-value targets, which allows forces to project tactical capabilities deep into an area of operations. The speed at which analysts or their systems process information into intelligence becomes a limiting factor in munitions employment against targets of opportunity.
Background
JP 3-60 defines targeting as the process of selecting and prioritizing targets, while considering operational requirements. The end state of targeting is the integration and synchronization of fires with intelligence to generate effects conducive to the achievement of a commander’s objectives. Doctrine defines OTH as operations conducted beyond visual or radar range. Analysts typically act as intelligence support from within a sanctuary space such as the continental United States (CONUS), outside the range of even the longest-range weapon system the adversary may possess. From these sanctuary spaces, analysts can safely horizon to a conflict occurring elsewhere on the globe. Intelligence support to OTH operations must adapt to be able to operate effectively in contested environments of LSCO. While the U.S. currently maintains superiority in the air and space domain, adversaries increasingly demonstrate anti-access and aerial denial capability, including significant electronic warfare (EW) disruption of GPS, PNT, and communications—as seen in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Air and space superiority in previous conflicts enabled U.S. intelligence elements to provide support from non-contiguous locations, while maintaining near-constant connectivity to intelligence networks. This dislocation enables continuous intelligence production outside the range of fires assets at the corps level and higher, while allowing sustained access to national collection assets and processing tools to support high-volume data processing. To maintain efficacy and relevance, the joint force must therefore evaluate OTH targeting effectiveness with future operations, pattern of life analysis, and target systems analysis in mind. Reliance on sanctuary-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and medium Earth orbit networks introduces latency and fragility to the intelligence support process. Maintaining a decentralized, redundant intelligence architecture is therefore crucial.
Description of the Problem
A significant challenge in OTH targeting is the widening sensor-to-shooter gap created by geographic and echeloned separation between intelligence fusion and the tactical shooters. With this gap, the advantage goes to the party most capable of operating effectively at range. For CONUS-based intelligence support, targeting data must traverse multiple layers of processing, dissemination, and commands before reaching the shooter. The current architecture introduces latency at every stage of the targeting cycle, including higher echelon command review and approval. This is especially detrimental in contested environments where adversary EW and network disruption can delay or deny data flow.
Latency in data flow is not just a technical limitation, but an operational risk. Delays in intelligence processing and dissemination increase the probability that information becomes stale, degrading effectiveness of functions required for successful engagement. In a disrupted environment, physical and cognitive distance between analysts and the battlespace further compounds these challenges. CONUS-based intelligence support relies on consistent data streams—and the capability to process and fuse that data. The ‘tyranny of distance’ reduces immediacy and erodes situational understanding, leading to frustration and disconnect between intelligence fusion cells and the consumers of their intelligence.
Typically, OTH intelligence support excels in carrying out deliberate targeting functions, such as pattern-of-life analysis and stationary target development, but struggles with time-sensitive targeting that demands rapid sensor-to-shooter integration—especially in a disrupted environment.
Possible Solutions
Several complementary measures can shorten the sensor-to-shooter timeline and reduce delays in OTH intelligence support. First, clearly defined intelligence handover lines (IHL) and delineated responsibilities between echelons would reduce redundant production of analytical products and enhance dissemination. Although IHLs have doctrinal requirements, stricter adherence to these requirements—and additional clarity—may eliminate duplication of effort, thereby enabling analysis of the appropriate priorities to produce information required by command. Improving joint interoperability during exercises—and building relationships with the supported unit—can encourage greater buy-in and can therefore improve interoperability among U.S. services and between the U.S. and its allies. Establishing conditional direct links with supported units would allow a push of time-sensitive information when communications permit, connecting to command and control (C2) layers and the end user, delivering intelligence to the operational force.
Second, streamlining mechanisms for secure information sharing with allies would bolster coalition effectiveness in contested environments. Lessons learned demonstrate that improved interoperability directly increases quality of targets engaged. Opening the aperture for information sharing across classifications—with pre-established release procedures to allies in conflict—can significantly improve multinational targeting efforts reliant on U.S. support.
Third, pushing fires decision authority and targeting approvals to the lowest practical level would significantly tighten the intelligence support to targeting kill chain. Embracing decentralized mission command in LSCO can empower commanders with the necessary flexibility to act on OTH intelligence—without waiting on higher echelon validation. Accelerating the integration of artificial intelligence could enhance data processing, intelligence assumptions, and allow intelligence collectors to scrape for initial targets for the fusion cell, and thereafter confirm or deny targets—while maintaining human oversight. As artificial intelligence use continues to expand, automation must facilitate future efforts to shorten the targeting cycle..
Recommendations
To effectively combat latency in the targeting cycle, a multifaceted approach is necessary. Maintaining space capabilities in LSCO as often as possible, for as long as possible, is one facet. Continued application of civilian satellite networks to reduce latency and increase recuperability is another. There are currently over 10,000 active Starlink and StarShield satellites with many more in development or production. Commercial satellites may therefore become legitimate military targets for adversaries seeking to disrupt U.S. forces’ communication and observation streams. Under such a contingency, the decentralization of communication and network redundancy will become increasingly important.
Commanders and planners must accept that decreased GPS availability and information flow—particularly in LSCOs—necessitate modular, recuperable, and redundant means to communicate to shooters. Diplomatic, legal, and technical measures should emphasize decentralization, redundancy, and mesh networking to rapidly collect and transmit intelligence to the consumer. Continuous vetting and integration of architectures—combining military and commercial systems and offline-capable AI tools—will be critical.
Conclusion
Beyond technical and procedural fixes, rear-area intelligence organizations must prioritize a cultural shift. The tyranny of distance often weakens situational awareness, even with information that is only 24 to 48 hours old. This creates a constant gap between analysts and the forward battlespace. Liaison officers or embedded reach-back teams can help maintain contextual understanding for the consumer’s immediate needs.
In future LSCO—characterized by contested domains and proliferating long-range precision fires—sanctuary-based OTH intelligence support will remain prevalent in shaping the deep fight. However, the widening sensor-to-shooter gap risks forfeiting the initiative to adversaries capable of operating more effectively at range in a disrupted electro-magnetic and cyber environment. Closing the gap requires deliberate integration of doctrinal refinements, accelerated adoption of AI for data processing and initial target scrub, improved soldier training on to the use of available tools, resilient hybrid communications, and robust intelligence architecture.
