Hybrid Violence in Mexico: Cartel Attacks, Tactical Evolution, and the Impact of 2025 Terrorist Designations

By 2025, cartel violence in Mexico no longer resembled the sporadic criminal brutality seen in previous decades. As government capacity and enforcement efforts grew, major criminal groups shifted towards being hybrid violent actors rather than just profit-driven organizations. They adopted tactics often used by foreign terrorist groups—such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), drone warfare, political assassinations, disinformation campaigns, and coordinated urban disruption—adapting them to Mexico’s terrain, institutions, and social fabric.[1][2][3]

Violence is no longer just a tool for trafficking; it is now used coercively to control territory, influence governance, and reshape local order.[4][5] These developments occurred alongside a significant shift in US policy. In February 2025, the US Department of State officially designated several Mexican criminal organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) following Executive Order 14157.[6][7] This designation marked a symbolic and operational escalation in how cartel violence was framed—from organized crime to a national and transnational security threat.

The definition of terrorism remains highly debated in both academic and policy circles. Generally, most definitions highlight the use of violence or intimidation to evoke fear beyond the immediate victim, who is often a means rather than the ultimate target, to achieve ideological, political, psychological, or social goals and thus pressure governments or civilian populations.[8][9][10] However, this conceptual debate is especially relevant in Mexico: cartels are not ideologically driven organizations in the traditional sense, nor are they fully equivalent to terrorist groups; their main objectives focus on profit, market protection, territorial control, and organizational survival.[11][12]

Correa-Cabrera provides several analytical insights that clarify this issue. First, she emphasizes the distinction between terror as a tactic and terrorism as an organizational category.[13] However, the increasing use of tactics commonly linked with terrorism or insurgency should be seen as evidence of a hybridization process rather than as proof that these groups are entirely equivalent to terrorist organizations.

Second, this distinction provides a conceptual foundation for understanding why cartels can systematically use fear without being categorized as terrorist organizations in a meaningful legal or analytical way. Correa-Cabrera points out that these groups operate based on the internal logic of transnational corporations, viewing organized crime as “a transnational and corporate phenomenon,” where violence stems from a business mindset rather than a revolutionary one.[14][15] As Jorge Ramírez explains, the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG)  should not be seen merely as a drug cartel but as an organization that “produces” organized violence and turns it into a profitable commodity, emphasizing how violence has become central to cartel power, competition, and survival.[16] In this context, violence functions as a tool for control, leverage, and deterrence.

Among the designated groups, the Sinaloa Cartel and the CJNG stood out as the most influential actors in 2025 due to their operational scope, tactical flexibility, and territorial influence.[17][18][19] The article first discusses the conceptual debate and then reviews major cartel attacks in 2025 to assess adaptive responses amid increased enforcement, leadership disruptions, and the changing legal and political landscape following the FTO designations. It contends that the primary effect of these designations was not restriction but adaptive restructuring: fragmentation, dependence on proxies, and the growth of insurgent-style tactics, further blurring the line between organized crime and internal security threats.[20][21]

As Cengiz argues, one of the most important current security trends is the merging of organized crime and terrorist networks, where criminal groups use coercive tactics linked to terrorism, and terrorist organizations increasingly depend on criminal funding.[22] This merging does not erase the differences between the two, but it creates hybrid forms of violence that challenge traditional ways of analyzing them.

For this article, hybrid violent actors are criminal organizations that pursue profit while systematically using coercive, territorial, and politically impactful violence similar to that linked with insurgents or terrorists.

Across different regions, this hybridization is seen in the ability of such organizations to function both as market-driven enterprises and as coercive territorial actors that exercise de facto governance, deploy scalable violence, and influence local political and social order.

Garay-Salamanca and Salcedo-Albarán contend that these organizations consist of nodes that perform specific functions and may not be aware of—or directly rely on—other nodes within the same network.[23] This cellular and decentralized structure offers important operational benefits, including resilience, adaptability, deniability, and the capacity to maintain interdependent networks rather than depend solely on a strict hierarchy. Under pressure, such structures can enable fragmentation, proxy warfare, and tactical innovation without necessarily transforming into fully ideologically driven terrorist organizations.

Taken together, these dynamics point to a new paradigm for understanding hybrid criminal non-state actors and the expanding forms of hybrid criminal violence observed across diverse contexts.[24][25] Modern drug-trafficking organizations are not merely traditional criminal enterprises; they are decentralized and multidimensional entities that pursue economic goals through illegal operations while simultaneously exercising political coercion, territorial control, and systematic, scalable violence as tools for profit and influence.[26][27] Embedded within larger ecosystems of illicit governance, these hybrid actors operate at the intersection of organized crime, paramilitary force, proxy governance, and state capture, challenging national sovereignty, undermining public institutions, and threatening regional stability across borders.[28][29][30]

While debates over the definition of terrorism in academics and policy circles are likely to continue, both Mexican and US legal systems already have sufficiently broad laws to allow authorities to classify cartel-related actors, associates, and affiliates as terrorists under certain conditions. In both countries, the legal standard does not strictly require ideological motivation but instead focuses on the functional use of violence, intimidation, and coercion against civilians, authorities, or national security. Consequently, when criminal acts meet these criteria—especially when they have effects consistent with terrorist patterns—existing legal tools can be used to support a counterterrorism-focused policy response.[31][32]

These tensions should not be seen as analytical inconsistencies, but rather as evidence of the hybrid nature of cartel violence: profit-driven organizations are increasingly using coercive tactics that blur the lines between criminality, insurgency, and terrorism without fully fitting into any one category.

Cartels, Corruption, and Their Environment

In Mexico, ongoing corruption, institutional weaknesses, and uneven government capacity have created conditions where criminal organizations can grow, establish themselves, and, in some areas, implement forms of criminal governance.[33][34] This pattern cannot be explained by a single administration or political cycle; instead, it reflects deeper continuities across various political periods, reinforced by high-profile cases of collusion and institutional infiltration, including the conviction of former Secretary of Public Security Genaro García Luna in the United States.[35][36]

Public discourse often swings between two problematic extremes: on one side, the claim that the Mexican state is entirely captured by cartels and that large parts of the country are effectively under criminal control; on the other, the equally unconvincing tendency to dismiss such claims altogether.[37] Both positions are analytically insufficient. The first risks repeating the failed-state stereotype, obscuring important differences in state presence, institutional effectiveness, and coercive authority across regions; the second ignores how criminal actors infiltrate institutions, shape local orders, and limit state action.[38][39]

Criminal governance creates structural obstacles that hinder peace efforts: criminal organizations cause instability, violence undermines the legitimacy of state actors, and institutional, political, and social vacuums are exploited, increasing the gap between citizens and the state.[40][41]

Under these conditions, communities often adopt survival strategies in response to violence, forced displacement, self-censorship, and the threat of death, sometimes even accepting criminal control as a form of protection.[42][43] This is when hybrid non-state actors expand their influence across multiple layers of social life—not only in politics, security, and justice, but also in health, education, and public administration—occupying spaces where the state has failed to govern effectively.[44][45]

As Benjamin Lessing argues, organized crime does not dominate solely through violence; it governs out of necessity by imposing norms, resolving disputes, and replacing core state functions, thereby creating a form of practical legitimacy among populations mainly focused on survival.[46] Louise Shelley’s framework on the connection between crime, corruption, and terrorism further clarifies the structural environment in which such criminal governance exists. In this view, corruption is not just a consequence of organized crime but a key enabling mechanism that allows criminal actors to operate, grow, and embed themselves within state institutions.[47][48]

Applied to the Mexican case, this framework helps explain why the 2025 FTO designations, while symbolically and operationally important, do not completely solve the underlying analytical problem. Although violence is the most visible sign of cartel power, corruption remains a deeper threat to public trust, institutional legitimacy, and the capacity of the state. It is public corruption—including bribery, collusion, abuse of office, and the infiltration of police, judicial, and political structures—that enables criminal organizations to evade detection, weaken enforcement, and strengthen their influence within formal institutions.[49][50] From this perspective, framing cartels mainly as terrorist threats risks misdiagnosing the issue: the real problem is not just the violence they use against the state but also how deeply state institutions have been infiltrated, reshaped, and, in some regions, subordinated to forms of criminal governance.[51]

This distinction is vital for understanding how cartel behavior develops in 2025. If corruption forms the structural environment where these organizations operate and grow, violence should be seen as a flexible and strategic tool used within that context. It is no longer confined to inter-cartel rivalry but acts as a means of territorial control, political messaging, coercing authorities, regulating local economies, and deterring both state and non-state actors.[52][53] In this way, modern cartel violence signifies not only escalation but also adaptation—an increasingly nuanced use of force influenced by enforcement pressure, organizational fragmentation, and broader political and legal factors.

The following section explores how these dynamics played out in practice through a series of notable attacks and operational patterns linked to designated cartels in 2025. By examining specific incidents involving the Sinaloa Cartel, Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), and related groups, it becomes possible to see how hybrid non-state actors turn structural issues—such as corruption, institutional weakness, and contested governance—into tangible forms of violence that blur the lines between organized crime, insurgency, and internal security threats.[54][55]

At its core, this dynamic reflects a mutual dependence between political authority and criminal power. Instead of functioning separately, both operate within overlapping institutional and territorial areas, where corruption, coercion, and selective cooperation allow criminal actors to infiltrate state structures while public officials maintain formal authority.[56][57] In this setting, criminal and political sovereignties do not entirely replace each other but coexist in parallel, resulting in governance that is fragmented, contested, and sometimes partially controlled. The result is not a lack of authority but a contested, hybrid system where the lines between state and criminal power remain consistently blurred.

Notable Attacks by Designated Cartels in 2025

In February 2025, the US Department of State officially designated several Mexican criminal organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, including the Sinaloa Cartel, Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), Cárteles Unidos, Cártel del Noreste, the Gulf Cartel, and La Nueva Familia Michoacana.[58][59] In November 2025, the Cártel de los Soles was separately designated.[60] Among the groups designated in February, the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG remained the most operationally significant players throughout the year.

In 2025, cartel violence in Mexico evolved beyond previously understood patterns as the state increased its efforts to fight organized crime. Criminal groups increasingly acted as hybrid actors, improving their methods and using tactics similar to those of foreign terrorist organizations—such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), drone warfare, political assassinations, disinformation campaigns, and coordinated urban disruption—while tailoring them to Mexico’s terrain, institutions, and social fabric.[61][62][63] This development allowed sustained coercive violence aimed at gaining strategic control rather than just making criminal profit.

The designation process was conducted under Executive Order 14157.[59] In this context, the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG became the most prominent actors in 2025, in terms of tactical adaptation, operational reach, and territorial influence.[64][65]

The Sinaloa Cartel faced intensified internal conflict marked by factional disputes and alleged cooperation with US authorities. The split between Los Chapitos and the El Mayo faction led to unprecedented violence, with thousands killed and missing across Sinaloa and nearby states.[66] In April 2025, a cell linked to Los Chapitos attacked a drug rehab center in Culiacán, killing nine people and injuring others.[67] Later clashes in the year resulted in at least twenty more deaths, with bodies intentionally displayed to scare rivals and locals, showing a pattern of signaling behavior common in cartel warfare.[68]

The Strategic Logic and Limits of Criminal Violence

Contrary to the common belief that violence diminishes criminal profitability, CJNG has demonstrated that large-scale violence can serve as a strategy for territorial expansion and market control. In 2025, the cartel improved its operational tactics, including coordinated narcobloqueos (narco-blockades), vehicle arson, and highway shutdowns across multiple municipalities in Michoacán, with spillover into Jalisco and Guanajuato.[69] In May, the group escalated its actions by deploying an improvised explosive device against Mexican security forces, destroying an armored vehicle and killing all eight personnel onboard.[70] This event marked a clear shift toward insurgent-style IED warfare along the Michoacán-Jalisco corridor.

Beyond tactical innovation, CJNG has also invested in improving its operational skills through training and professional development. Reports indicate the inclusion of external expertise, including people with paramilitary backgrounds, to boost combat effectiveness, tactical coordination, and the use of advanced weapons systems.[71] This trend shows a broader pattern where criminal groups adopt structured professional models to support more complex violence while training new members to operate within more disciplined and deadly structures.

However, the long-term viability of this model depends not only on firepower or tactical innovation but also on the ability to continuously replenish its ranks. As Curiel, Campedelli, and Hope (2023) demonstrate, criminal organizations in Mexico rely on sustained recruitment to maintain operational capacity. Estimates suggest that by 2022, between 160,000 and 185,000 people were involved in organized crime, with approximately 350 new members recruited each week.[72] Their analysis highlights a key vulnerability: if recruitment is not reduced, enforcement efforts alone are insufficient, as violence is displaced rather than diminished. The study further identifies a “critical recruitment threshold”: if criminal groups can replace at least 10 percent of their losses—whether through arrests or combat—they become structurally resilient to state pressure. Under current trends, cartel membership could surpass 200,000 by 2027, accompanied by a rise in violence. Conversely, halving recruitment could reduce violence by up to 25 percent and decrease the size of these organizations by roughly 11 percent.

In this sense, CJNG’s operational strength depends not only on its tactical evolution but also on its ability to maintain a steady pipeline of personnel, connecting recruitment, training, and violence into a self-sustaining cycle.

On the other hand, the Sinaloa Cartel has shown how internal fragmentation can lead to prolonged and large-scale violence. After the capture of Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada—reportedly aided by Joaquín Guzmán López, son of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, also known as “El Güero”—the organization entered a period of intense internal conflict between factions known as “La Mayiza” and “La Chapiza.”

This rupture has developed into a sustained and highly violent clash between networks aligned with Ismael “El Mayo Flaco” Zambada and those connected to the sons of Joaquín Guzmán, especially the faction formerly led by Ovidio Guzmán López (“El Ratón”), who is now in US custody following his extradition and guilty plea in federal court.[75][76] Instead of stabilizing the organization, the leadership disruption has increased intra-cartel rivalry, causing cycles of retaliation, territorial disputes, and coercive signals across Sinaloa.[77]

The resulting conflict has caused a continuous wave of killings and forced disappearances. Reports show that since late 2024, the clash between “La Mayiza” and “La Chapiza” has resulted in thousands of victims, demonstrating how fragmentation can weaken internal cohesion and disrupt established systems of criminal governance.[78]

From an operational perspective, the internal conflict has imposed substantial costs on the organization. Increased government pressure, combined with intra-cartel violence, has disrupted trafficking routes, fractured command structures, and raised the risks and expenses related to production, transportation, and enforcement. Instead of facilitating growth, violence in this setting has diminished efficiency, overburdened organizational capacity, and complicated territorial control.

In this sense, the Sinaloa Cartel case suggests that, under conditions of fragmentation and sustained enforcement pressure, blood can indeed be bad for business.

Drone Warfare, Political Violence, and Expansion of Hybrid Tactics

In mid-October, the Baja California State Attorney General’s Office anti-kidnapping unit in Playas de Tijuana was targeted in a drone-delivered explosive attack, representing one of the clearest 2025 examples of unmanned aerial systems being employed against a government facility in a major urban border area. Reports indicate that multiple small drones were used to deliver improvised explosive payloads, damaging several vehicles while causing no reported casualties.[79] Unmanned aerial vehicles are evolving from peripheral tools for surveillance or contraband transport into instruments of routine coercive capability—an airborne intimidation layer that can be scaled by proxies and replicated across operational theaters.[80][81] This trajectory aligns with post-Ukraine diffusion concerns, wherein criminal actors assimilate battlefield lessons and progressively upgrade from consumer drones to first-person-view (FPV) platforms and counter-jamming adaptations, thereby increasing the likelihood of broader technological spillover.[82]

The assault reportedly involved three drones carrying homemade explosives containing nails, BBs, and shrapnel fragments, though no injuries were reported. Mexican officials confirmed that the devices landed on the compound.[83] The incident prompted a rare warning from the US Consulate General in Tijuana, advising American residents to remain cautious and avoid the area.[84] While no cartel officially claimed responsibility, analysts and local reporting indicate that the attack aligns with CJNG’s evolving tactics, including the use of drones for offensive operations intended to intimidate authorities and demonstrate operational strength along major trafficking routes. Baja California authorities also noted that this was not an isolated threat, as similar targets had been attacked previously, and investigators considered classifying the incident as terrorism in order to expand investigative authority.[85]

Another defining trend in 2025 was the normalization of drone warfare. In Michoacán—particularly in Apatzingán, Cotija, Tepalcatepec, and areas bordering Jalisco—CJNG and allied groups employed drones to deliver explosive payloads into populated areas, often at night. These systems were also used for surveillance and targeting, enabling coordinated ground attacks. What began as experimentation matured into routine operational use, including kamikaze-style drones.[86][87][88]

This trend did not emerge overnight. According to Mexico’s Secretariat of National Defense, 605 explosive drone attacks were recorded between 2020 and mid-2023, rising from five in 2020 to approximately 260 in the first half of 2023 alone.[89] By 2025, drones were fully integrated into cartel doctrine. Specialized units adapted inexpensive commercial drones for bombing and battlefield reconnaissance, and some groups developed rudimentary counter-drone measures. Even with incomplete official data, at least 32 offensive drone incidents had been documented by May 2025, confirming a sustained upward trajectory and suggesting the emergence of a technological arms race between cartels and security forces.[90]

CSIS underscored the urgency of this challenge during its 2025 event, Countering the Criminal Drone Threat in the Americas. In 2024, 77 drone incidents were recorded in the region, including 16 involving armed groups, 6 involving military forces, 14 involving police, and 14 involving civilians. In the first half of 2025, 32 incidents had already been documented, 15 of which involved armed groups, indicating a sustained and accelerating pattern of criminal drone use rather than isolated experimentation.[91]

Criminal Fragmentation and Hybrid Conflict: Cartel del Noeste and Carteles Unidos

In Tamaulipas, Cartel del Noreste (CDN), the successor to Los Zetas, demonstrated its capacity to rapidly destabilize urban areas. Following the February 2025 arrest of senior leader Ricardo González Sauceda, alias “El Ricky,” Nuevo Laredo experienced sustained gunfights and highway blockades.[92] The intensity of the violence was sufficient to disrupt the city’s international airport and prompt emergency alerts from the US Consulate.[93][94] This episode illustrates how the removal of senior cartel figures can precipitate immediate citywide security crises in strategic border zones, as criminal organizations move to reassert control, restore deterrence, and signal continued operational capacity.

One of the most consequential manifestations of coercive violence in 2025 was the assassination of Uruapan’s mayor, Carlos Manzo, who was shot during a public event in November, underscoring the increasing willingness of criminal organizations to target political authority directly.[95] Subsequent arrests revealed deep infiltration within the mayor’s security detail, demonstrating how cartel violence has become increasingly intertwined with the capture of local governance structures.[96] This pattern aligns with broader findings in the literature showing that criminal organizations employ selective political assassinations and institutional penetration to weaken state authority and secure territorial control, rather than merely to settle criminal disputes.[97][98]

Other criminal organizations adapted their violence in response to enforcement pressure by targeting civilians and local economic life. The Gulf Cartel, for example, relied on coercive violence to maintain territorial control and dominate local economies. A notable case occurred in May 2025, when members of the regional music band Grupo Fugitivo were kidnapped and later found murdered in Reynosa following a performance.[99] The attack was widely interpreted as an intimidation strategy aimed at reinforcing cartel authority over civilian and commercial activity. This pattern is consistent with research showing that criminal organizations increasingly use selective violence against non-combatants to regulate local economies and signal dominance in contested areas.[100]

Carteles Unidos (CU), now formally included within the broader US terrorism designation framework, operates primarily as an anti-CJNG coalition within the highly contested Apatzingán-Tierra Caliente corridor. Open-source reporting indicates that CU has repeatedly engaged in town-by-town firefights, ambushes, blockades, and intimidation campaigns intended to contain CJNG expansion in Michoacán.[101] Many of these violent acts are not clearly attributable to identifiable CU commanders, reflecting the coalition’s fragmented, semi-autonomous structure and its reliance on localized cells rather than centralized command and control.[102] A similar problem of attribution characterizes Nueva Familia Michoacana, which operates in a complex, multi-actor battlespace where overlapping territorial disputes often blur responsibility for specific acts of violence. In such environments, what local reporting frequently describes simply as cartel violence reflects the diffuse, layered, and overlapping character of contemporary organized criminal conflict.

Recent public statements have elevated the cross-border drone issue into a bilateral security flashpoint. Then US Attorney General Pam Bondi stated that US authorities were actively intercepting or neutralizing cartel-linked drones near Texas airspace, framing the issue as an urgent national security concern rather than a matter of political interpretation.[103] By contrast, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum rejected claims of confirmed malicious drone incursions and emphasized that no official Mexican report substantiated the scale of the threat described in US media.[104] Mexican press reporting further highlighted warnings regarding numerous drone sightings along the border and noted that both criminal organizations and Mexican security forces possess comparable counter-drone capabilities, underscoring an increasingly symmetrical technological environment.[105]

Cartel Responses to the 2025 Terrorist Designations

Provisional data from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention indicate that drug overdose deaths in the United States declined by approximately 24 percent during the 12-month period ending in September 2024, representing the steepest year-over-year decrease in decades.[106] This reduction coincided with record-level interdiction efforts in fiscal year 2025, during which the US Coast Guard reported seizing nearly 510,000 pounds of cocaine—approximately three times its historical annual average and the largest maritime cocaine seizure in the service’s history.[107] Separately, the Drug Enforcement Administration documented the seizure of roughly 44 million fentanyl pills, 4,500 pounds of fentanyl powder, and more than 65,000 pounds of methamphetamine nationwide, highlighting the unprecedented scale of enforcement pressure on trafficking networks.[108]

Since the administrations of Felipe Calderón, Enrique Peña Nieto, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, and now Claudia Sheinbaum, Mexico has steadily expanded the armed forces’ role in confronting organized crime.[109][110] However, this expansion has largely remained within a public security framework, even as the scale, capabilities, and territorial reach of criminal organizations have evolved in ways that increasingly resemble national security challenges.[111][112]

By contrast, the United States has undergone a clearer doctrinal shift. The 2025 and 2026 Annual Threat Assessments of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence explicitly identify transnational criminal organizations, illicit drug trafficking, and border security as core threats to the Homeland.[113][114] Mexico-based cartels—particularly the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG—are assessed as the dominant producers and suppliers of fentanyl, heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine for the US market, while fentanyl and other synthetic opioids remained linked to more than 52,000 US deaths in the 12 months ending in October 2024 and more than 38,000 deaths in the 12 months from September 2024 to September 2025.[115][116] Within this framework, the escalation from a law-enforcement problem to a national-security priority appears to have generated tangible effects, including increased bilateral pressure, more efficient transfer of detainees, and measurable disruptions in trafficking flows.[117][118]

These shifts are also reflected on the Mexican side, albeit in a more indirect and uneven manner. While Mexico has not formally adopted a national-security designation framework comparable to that of the United States, recent policy adjustments suggest a gradual convergence.[119] The growing deployment of the Guardia Nacional along key migration and trafficking corridors has effectively repositioned it as a hybrid internal and border security force.[120][121] This reconfiguration points to an implicit recognition that expanding traditional public-security mechanisms is insufficient to contain criminal organizations whose growth, adaptability, and territorial entrenchment have evolved in parallel with the state itself.[122][123]

This asymmetry suggests that Mexico is not confronting a conventional criminal threat, but a form of hybrid conflict in which state forces face adaptive non-state actors capable of combining criminal, paramilitary, and coercive governance strategies.[124][125] In this sense, the evolving dynamics are consistent with asymmetric forms of conflict and bear resemblance to what some scholars have described as fourth-generation warfare, where the boundaries between crime, insurgency, and governance become increasingly blurred.[126][127] While such classifications remain analytically contested, they underscore a central reality: the challenge posed by cartels is no longer adequately captured by traditional public-security paradigms alone.[128]

Throughout early and mid-2025, Mexican federal authorities deployed thousands of National Guard personnel to reinforce both the northern and southern borders and to expand joint operations nationwide.[129] Official security briefings, as reported in the press, indicated the seizure of hundreds of metric tons of illicit drugs—including millions of fentanyl pills—the dismantling of more than 1,700 clandestine laboratories, and major maritime interceptions off the coast of Guerrero. Collectively, these figures suggest that 2025 constituted one of the most intensive drug-seizure periods in Mexico’s recent history, reflecting unprecedented operational tempo rather than a contraction in illicit production.

At first glance, rising interdiction rates and parallel enforcement trends in the United States and Mexico could suggest that cartels have significantly reduced their operations in response to heightened protection, security, and deterrence. However, such an interpretation is misleading. Substantial evidence indicates that sustained or record-level seizures generally correlate with continued high production and trafficking throughput, rather than organizational retreat, as criminal groups absorb losses as a cost of doing business under pressure.[130] The destruction of shipments or laboratories does not necessarily signal contraction; instead, it reflects high-volume production intersecting with intensified enforcement.[131]

Under these conditions, cartels have adapted by diversifying their criminal portfolios, expanding into fuel theft (huachicol), migrant smuggling, prostitution, and other illicit economies to stabilize cash flow.[132] As organizations fragment into semi-autonomous cells and proxy actors, groups have hardened logistics, intensified counter-surveillance, expanded corruption and infiltration into public administration, and increasingly adopted asymmetric tactics—including drones, improvised explosive devices, and targeted killings—to deter enforcement and raise the costs of state intervention.[133] Internal fragmentation has emerged as a decisive driver of instability, with criminal organizations operating as complex, decentralized networks composed of semi-autonomous nodes rather than strictly hierarchical structures.[134]

This dynamic is evident in the Sinaloa Cartel’s internal conflict. US court proceedings and official announcements confirm that Ovidio Guzmán López moved toward—and subsequently entered—a guilty plea in the Northern District of Illinois, a development widely interpreted as increasing pressure on and potentially exposing Sinaloa-linked networks.[135][136] Concurrently, Mexican and international reporting have documented an intensifying succession struggle between Los Chapitos and the “El Mayo” faction. These reports also circulated allegations of tactical realignments, including a purported understanding between CJNG and Los Chapitos, which would likely deepen volatility rather than restore cohesion.[137] Such developments illustrate that institutional pressure can accelerate fragmentation and realignment within cartel structures; the principal risk is less a “collapse” of the cartel than the emergence of a more volatile and violent operational ecosystem.

Deterrence and deception have increasingly shaped cartel behavior in response to these designations, and the public escalation ladder they imply. In early May 2025, President Claudia Sheinbaum publicly stated that she rejected President Donald Trump’s offer to send US troops to Mexico to confront cartels, explicitly framing sovereignty as non-negotiable. Days later, Trump confirmed the offer.[138] Even in the absence of execution, such public signaling functions as coercive pressure on Mexico’s decision space and conveys strategic messaging that criminal organizations can perceive, thereby influencing risk assessments, incentivizing adaptation, and reinforcing the value of deniability and proxy-based violence.

The Mexican government has taken a significant step by transferring its nationals to the United States under a national security rationale, specifically grounded in Article 5 of the National Security Law, as noted by the former Attorney General of the Republic, Alejandro Gertz Manero.[139] This does not amount to a full doctrinal reframing of organized crime as a national security issue; rather, it reflects the selective use of national security tools within what remains, primarily, a public security framework. More consequentially, it is creating a mechanism of transfer that bypasses the traditional extradition process, reducing procedural constraints and accelerating the handover of cartel-linked actors under a security-based justification.[140]

This development converges with evolving US prosecutorial practice. As Estefanía Medina Ruvalcaba argues, the significance lies not only in the transfer itself, but in the legal authorities activated once these individuals enter the US system.[140] Recent Department of Justice cases have explicitly charged cartel-linked actors with narco-terrorism under 21 U.S.C. § 960a, alongside providing material support to terrorism under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.[141][142] These are distinct offenses, but together they expand the prosecutorial reach of counterterrorism tools into domains traditionally associated with organized crime. This leads to a broader conclusion: whether we accept it or not, narcoterrorism—whether as a criminal offense or as a legal category—has already become an exportable construct. The legal boundary between organized crime and terrorism, once considered unthinkable, has effectively been crossed.

Cartels appear to have internalized that actions capable of triggering such responses could inadvertently advance Washington’s publicly stated objectives. While intent cannot be empirically proven, the strategic logic of deterrence and coercion suggests that when a credible escalation ladder is publicly articulated, adversaries—including non-state armed actors or criminal armed groups—tend to adjust behavior to avoid low-probability, high-impact consequences.[143][144] In this sense, the mere possibility of escalation functions as a deterrent signal: it does not eliminate criminal activity but can reshape operational calculus by increasing the perceived downside risk of visible, spectacular attacks that could justify external intervention.

The Mexican government’s response to cartel activity in 2025 reflects a carefully calibrated balance between asserting sovereignty and maintaining bilateral cooperation. Mexico has publicly signaled that it will not permit foreign military presence on its territory—emphasizing that “sovereignty is not for sale”—while simultaneously prioritizing coordination and information-sharing with the United States.[145] Following the US designation of major cartels as terrorist organizations, President Claudia Sheinbaum emphasized that Mexico had not been consulted and announced plans to pursue constitutional measures to reinforce sovereignty, illustrating a dual-track posture: cooperate with international partners but retain control over domestic decision-making.[146] This approach seeks to reduce the risk of strategic surprise or uncontrolled escalation while maintaining bilateral engagement within a Mexican command framework.

Cartels in Mexico remain resilient, adapting behavior, posture, and strategy in response to enforcement and designation pressures. The Sinaloa Cartel, for instance, absorbed internal shocks from US judicial action against senior figures, including Ovidio Guzmán López’s guilty plea in Chicago, which added institutional pressure and intensified factional competition.[147] Reporting on alleged realignments, including potential CJNG-Los Chapitos cooperation, suggests that external pressure can accelerate fragmentation and reconfiguration rather than produce immediate collapse.[148] The central risk is not the disappearance of cartels but the emergence of a more volatile and violent operational ecosystem under sustained pressure.

CJNG has responded by maintaining operational tempo while hardening logistics, expanding proxy alliances, and accelerating asymmetric capabilities, including drones and improvised explosive devices. Open-source reporting and security analysis indicate that CJNG has deliberately avoided actions likely to directly trigger US escalation, focusing instead on protecting international supply routes into Europe, Africa, Asia, and Oceania while consolidating its territorial presence in Mexico.[149]

Domestically, CJNG has expanded by forcibly seizing disputed territories and franchising its brand to smaller criminal groups seeking leverage, protection, or reputational benefit. These affiliated organizations operate as proxies across multiple illicit economies, including cigarette trafficking, real estate manipulation, hospitality businesses, vehicle theft, and bribery networks, thereby maximizing operational scalability, deniability, and insulation from enforcement pressure.[150]

The Cártel del Noreste (CDN), a remnant of the Zetas, continued to exert influence in strategic border zones in 2025. The February arrest of Ricardo González Sauceda, alias “El Ricky” or “Mando R,” in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, triggered sustained gunfights, highway blockades, and heightened security alerts that disrupted urban life and mobility.[151][152] Subsequent US Treasury sanctions on senior CDN members underscored the cartel’s ongoing involvement in drug trafficking, extortion, arms trafficking, and cross-border criminality.[153] While CDN and other regional groups generally focus on territorial control and local criminal economies rather than large-scale escalation outside their zones, these events illustrate their continued capacity to influence security dynamics along the border.

In Michoacán, several organizations have coalesced into loose anti-CJNG coalitions to contain the cartel’s expansion. These arrangements increasingly resemble insurgency-style warfare, conducted by semi-autonomous, fragmented cells that prioritize local control and survivability over transnational operations.[154] These groups exploit terrain knowledge, territorial extortion, coercion, and bribery—particularly within licit agricultural sectors such as lemon and avocado production—to sustain authority while minimizing exposure to higher-level enforcement or external escalation.[155]

Available data indicates the FTO designation has not meaningfully or durably reduced cartel activity. Rather, it has altered behavior by increasing costs, uncertainty, and the need for adaptation under pressure. While record-level drug seizures and declining overdose deaths could superficially suggest contraction, empirical analysis demonstrates that the primary effect has been behavioral adjustment rather than structural dismantlement. Targeted enforcement and arrests of key actors tend to reshape criminal organizations—often fragmenting or decentralizing them—without eliminating operational capacity.[156]

Cartels have responded by diversifying their criminal portfolios into fuel theft, migrant smuggling, prostitution, and other illicit economies to stabilize revenue streams.[157] Fragmentation has led to hardened logistics, intensified counter-surveillance, increased corruption and institutional penetration, and the adoption of asymmetric tactics, including drones, IEDs, and selective killings, all of which raise enforcement costs and deter intervention.[158][159] Comparative studies indicate that under counterdrug pressure, trafficking networks routinely reallocate resources, shift routes, and adjust spatial patterns to avoid interdiction rather than cease operations.[160]

Across different regions, this hybridization is reflected in the ability of such organizations to operate simultaneously as market-oriented enterprises and coercive territorial actors that exercise de facto governance, deploy scalable violence, and shape local political and social order.[161] These differences should not be read as inconsistencies but as evidence of oscillatory behavior within resilient criminal networks. As Víctor Hugo Guerra argues, these organizations are composed of nodes that perform specific functions and may not know—or directly depend on—other nodes within the same network.[162] This cellular and decentralized structure provides important operational advantages, including resilience, adaptability, deniability, and the capacity to sustain interdependent networks rather than rely exclusively on rigid hierarchy. Under conditions of pressure, such structures can facilitate fragmentation, proxy warfare, tactical innovation, and shifts in operational behavior without implying a full transformation into ideologically driven terrorist organizations.[163]

Taken together, these dynamics point to a new paradigm for understanding hybrid criminal non-state actors and the expanding forms of hybrid criminal violence observed across diverse contexts.[164] Modern drug-trafficking organizations are not merely conventional criminal enterprises; they are decentralized and multidimensional entities that pursue economic objectives through criminal operations while simultaneously exercising political coercion, territorial control, and systematic, scalable violence as instruments of profit and influence.[165] Embedded within broader ecosystems of illicit governance, these hybrid actors operate at the intersection of organized crime, paramilitary force, proxy governance, and state capture, challenging national sovereignty, undermining public institutions, and threatening regional stability across borders.[166]

These adaptive shifts are reflected in a series of emerging risk trends, including proxy violence, deniable coercion, technological innovation, and deeper forms of criminal penetration into local governance.[167][168]

Emerging Risks and Strategic Trends Across Designated Cartels

 By 2025, one of the most consequential risk trends among Mexican cartels is the growing shift from direct inter-cartel confrontation to forms of proxy violence. This does not simply multiply armed actors; it creates a grey zone in which attribution becomes harder, frontlines blur, and violence is dispersed among splinter factions, local gangs, affiliated armed cells, and temporary alliances that serve as expendable enforcement layers.[169] Proxy violence is not only an indirect method of combat but also a mechanism for reshaping the conflict environment itself, producing opaque and contested spaces between organized crime, armed conflict, and coercive governance.[170]

As Moghadam, Rauta, and Wyss suggest, proxy conflicts are best understood not only as relationships between principals and agents, but also as processes shaped by multiple actors, audiences, and local populations, often under conditions of plausible deniability and fragmented control.[171] In Latin America, as Mantilla notes, these dynamics frequently unfold in opaque grey zones between organized crime, armed conflict, and coercive governance.[172] In the Mexican case, this helps explain why cartel violence increasingly operates through delegated coercion, blurred frontlines, and contested local order rather than through clearly attributable forms of direct confrontation.[173]

A second notable trend is the growing integration of drones and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) into cartel operations, particularly by CJNG and its affiliated networks, although the Sinaloa Cartel and Cártel del Noreste (CDN) are also moving in this direction. Drones are no longer merely experimental or symbolic tools; they are increasingly embedded in cartel operations for surveillance, targeting, intimidation, and offensive action.[174] In Michoacán, the use of explosive-carrying drones and improvised landmines reflects more than tactical adaptation: it signals a shift toward indirect, deniable, and insurgent-style methods intended to offset state advantages and impose higher costs on security forces. In that sense, drones do not simply extend cartel firepower; they expand the repertoire of coercion that criminal organizations project, complicate attribution, and reshape the conflict environment itself.[175][176]

Cartels have also demonstrated a growing ability to modify low-cost commercial unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) into operational weapons systems. Open-source reporting suggests efforts to acquire expertise in first-person-view (FPV) attack drones, coordinated strike operations, and counter-drone measures, while broader trends in contemporary conflict indicate that inexpensive aerial platforms can challenge traditional ground defenses, intensify uncertainty, and accelerate tactical diffusion across theaters of violence.[177] Reports further indicate that individuals with combat-drone experience from Russia and Ukraine may have traveled to Mexico to train specialized CJNG drone units.[178] While these claims remain unproven in court, they are consistent with observable operational trends: cartel drones are increasingly capable of conducting night operations, delivering explosives, maintaining persistent surveillance, and coordinating with ground attacks. Taken together, these developments suggest a significant escalation in both technological sophistication and tactical adaptation.[179]

This evolution should be understood as part of a broader process of hybrid criminal adaptation. As scholarship on grey-zone coercion and hybrid threats suggests, indirect and deniable methods are attractive precisely because they operate below the threshold of overt war, allowing actors to test adversaries, broaden the battlespace, and raise operational costs without assuming full visibility or responsibility.[180] In the Mexican case, the resulting technological arms race indicates that criminal actors are adapting more quickly than governmental countermeasures, increasing the likelihood that knowledge, tactics, and capabilities will diffuse across other criminal networks.[181] Drone warfare, in this sense, is not simply a technological innovation, but an enabler of hybrid criminal violence: scalable, deniable, psychologically coercive, and increasingly adaptable across fragmented networks.[182]

Targeted killings constitute another increasingly significant dimension, particularly in the political sphere. The murders of mayors, candidates, police commanders, and other local officials—often carried out in public—demonstrate that cartels are not merely reacting to governance conditions but actively reshaping them through violence.[183] These killings are deliberate instruments of coercion, intended to compel compliance, neutralize opposition, and signal territorial control. The risk becomes even more acute when insider involvement is evident, including participation by members of the victims’ security or administrative teams.[184][185]

A final and perhaps more consequential trend is the increasing penetration of cartels into public administration. Beyond bribery, criminal organizations are reportedly placing personnel in key bureaucratic positions, pressuring officials and their families, and exerting influence over municipal logistics, procurement, and security arrangements.[186] This erosion of institutional integrity enables cartels not only to obstruct enforcement but to operationalize administrative structures as instruments of coercion and protection.[187] Taken together, proxy violence, drone warfare, political assassination, and bureaucratic penetration create a feedback loop through which criminal organizations increasingly penetrate, distort, and in some localities partially displace state authority. The result is not the wholesale replacement of the state, but the consolidation of contested forms of parallel governance in which criminal power operates alongside, through, and at times against formal institutions. Under such conditions, cartels become a persistent threat, particularly when they can grow, adapt, and sustain themselves through the very mechanisms that underpin their survival: diversified illicit economies, coercive capacity, corruption, and institutional penetration.[188][189][190]

Policy Recommendations and Conclusion

The US designation of certain Mexican cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) created a new operational and legal environment that increases pressure on Mexico while expanding the practical range of tools available under a counterterrorism-inflected framework.[191] As Magda Long argues, the designation does not by itself authorize automatic military action in Mexico, but it does widen the effective scope for intelligence fusion, persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), signal intelligence (SIGINT), financial disruption, leadership targeting, surveillance, and other targeted measures now increasingly applied to counternarcotics.[192] In that sense, the FTO label is not merely symbolic. It expands operational latitude, sharpens coercive diplomacy, and raises the deterrent value of possible secondary actions. Yet analytically, cartels still do not fit neatly within the classical terrorist model represented by ISIS or al-Qaeda: they are not primarily ideological, nor are they uniformly centralized organizations.[193] Their evolution into hybrid actors does not automatically transform them into terrorists. Rather, it shows that they have perfected a form of criminal power whose principal functional market product is violence itself.[194]

Violence is no longer simply an instrument used to protect trafficking routes or eliminate rivals; it has become the core mechanism through which cartels regulate territory, intimidate communities, discipline authorities, penetrate institutions, and secure the reproduction of their illicit economies.[194] That reality makes them more coercive, more politically consequential, and more dangerous, but it still does not resolve the conceptual question of whether they should be treated as terrorist organizations in the strict analytical sense. This distinction is critical because the FTO designation shifts the cartel problem into a narrative of potential intervention without guaranteeing that it will actually reduce criminal power. The label is partly legal, partly strategic, and partly theatrical: it does not settle the nature of the phenomenon so much as it leverages cartel violence to politically justify a more permissive coercive framework.[195]

For Mexico, the implications are significant. Although the country lacks a standalone counterterrorism statute comparable to those of the United States or Canada, its legal framework remains operationally robust enough to address conduct functionally consistent with terrorism.[196] At the same time, recent legal and institutional changes have expanded the state’s ability to convert intelligence into actionable evidence, target leadership structures, and disrupt criminal networks.[197] Cartels, however, have continued to evolve under pressure through proxy warfare, targeted political violence, bureaucratic penetration, and technological innovation, particularly through drones and surveillance capabilities.[198] One policy implication should therefore be made explicit: cartels now operate as multinational enterprises that project logistical, financial, coercive, and corruptive capacities across every territory in which they establish themselves.[199] For that reason, international cooperation cannot remain episodic or politically contingent. What is needed is a common doctrinal and juridical framework with clear floors and ceilings: a more equitable and interoperable architecture capable of establishing reciprocal obligations, operational boundaries, and safeguards for sovereignty in confronting narcotrafficking and the organized violence that sustains it.

Ultimately, the decisive issue is not whether the FTO label fully resolves the cartels’ conceptual status, but whether Mexico and the United States can turn exceptional pressure into a permanent and disciplined strategy. The February 2026 operation that ended with the death of Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes demonstrated that bilateral coordination had reached a level capable of facilitating high-value action against the uppermost tier of cartel leadership.[200] On the public record, however, this was not a covert action preserved by plausible deniability, but a publicly acknowledged Mexican military operation supported by US intelligence cooperation.[201] Its significance lies precisely there: it shows that the post-designation environment expanded the practical use of counterterrorism-adjacent tools against cartels without resolving the analytical question of whether they fit the classical terrorist model. Yet the strategic lesson is harsher than the tactical success. As past campaigns such as Plan Colombia suggest, sustained pressure can seriously weaken entrenched criminal structures.[202] But without continuity, criminal power adapts, fragments, and regenerates.[203]

Endnotes

[1] Paulina Villegas and Adriana Zehbrauskas, “With Drones and IEDs, Mexico’s Cartels Adopt Arms of Modern War.” New York Times. 3 September 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/01/world/americas/mexico-cartel-weapons.html.

[2] John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, “Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #53: Recent Improvised Landmine Attacks in Michoacán and Jalisco.” Small Wars Journal. 31 May 2025, https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/31/mexican-cartel-tactical-note-53-recent-improvised-landmine-attacks-in-michoacan-and-jalisco/.

[3] Heather Ziemer, “Illicit Innovation: Latin America Is Not Prepared to Fight Criminal Drones.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. 11 June 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/illicit-innovation-latin-america-not-prepared-fight-criminal-drones.

[4] Guillermo Trejo and Sandra Ley, “High-Profile Criminal Violence: Why Drug Cartels Murder Government Officials and Party Candidates in Mexico.” British Journal of Political Science. Vol. 51, no. 1. 2021: pp. 203–229, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123418000637.

[5] Benjamin Lessing, Making Peace in Drug Wars: Crackdowns and Cartels in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

[6] “Foreign Terrorist Organization Designations of Tren de Aragua, Mara Salvatrucha, Cártel de Sinaloa, Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación, Cárteles Unidos, Cártel del Noreste, Cártel del Golfo, and La Nueva Familia Michoacana.” Federal Register. 20 February 2025, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/02/20/2025-02873/foreign-terrorist-organization-designations-of-tren-de-aragua-mara-salvatrucha-cartel-de-sinaloa.

[7] “Executive Order 14157: Blocking Property and Designating Certain Transnational Criminal Organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” Executive Office of the President. 20 January 2025, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/29/2025-02004/designating-cartels-and-other-organizations-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations-and-specially.

[8] Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature, Second Edition. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2005.

[9] “Terrorism.” Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2023, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism.

[10] “Counter-Terrorism Module 4: Defining Terrorism.” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. July 2018, https://www.unodc.org/e4j/fr/terrorism/module-4/key-issues/defining-terrorism.html.

[11] Op. cit., Lessing at Note 5.

[12] Francisco Rojas Aravena, Víctor Hugo Guerra, Juan Carlos Buitrago, Maurício Vieira, Juan Carlos Sainz-Borgo, and Claudette Vernot, Economías Criminales: Enfoques Multidimensionales. Bogotá: Editorial Diké, 2024.

[13] Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, Los Zetas Inc.: La Corporación Delictiva Que Funciona Como Empresa Transnacional. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2017.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Jorge Ramírez, “El Mencho, Empresario de la Violencia.” Spoiler Político. 2026, https://spoilerpolitico.com/el-mencho-empresario-de-la-violencia.

[17] Andrés Rodríguez and Marcos Vizcarra, “The Relentless Struggle Between Factions Deepens the Sinaloa War: Bodies in Coolers and a Surge in Homicides.” El País. 23 December 2025, https://english.elpais.com/international/2025-12-23/the-relentless-struggle-between-factions-deepens-the-sinaloa-war-bodies-in-coolers-and-a-surge-in-homicides.html.

[18] Mahmut Cengiz, “Hezbollah’s Global Networks and Latin American Cocaine Trade.” Small Wars Journal. 26 April 2023, https://smallwarsjournal.com/2023/04/26/hezbollahs-global-networks-and-latin-american-cocaine-trade/.

[19] Pablo Ferri, “Sinaloa Cartel Alliances Add Fuel to Internal War.” El País. 20 May 2025, https://english.elpais.com/international/2025-05-20/sinaloa-cartel-alliances-add-fuel-to-internal-war.html.

[20] Richard Snyder and Angélica Durán-Martínez, “Does Illegality Breed Violence? Drug Trafficking and State-Sponsored Protection Rackets.” Crime, Law and Social Change. Vol. 52, no. 3. 2009: pp. 253–273, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-009-9195-z.

[21] Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

[22] Edgardo Buscaglia and Jan van Dijk, “Controlling Organized Crime and Corruption in the Public Sector.” Vienna: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 2003, https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/forum/forum3_Art1.pdf.

[23] Luis Garay-Salamanca and Ernesto Salcedo-Albarán, Narcotráfico, Corrupción y Estados Capturados. México: Debate, 2012.

[24] Eduardo Moncada, Resisting Extortion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021.

[25] Código Penal Federal (México), Artículo 139, Última Reforma DOF 13 March 2026, https://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/CPF.pdf.

[26] 18 US Code § 2331, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2331; 8 US Code § 1189, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1189.

[27] Op. cit., Moncada at Note 24.

[28] Op. cit., Buscaglia et al. at Note 22.

[29] Op. cit., Garay-Salamanca and Salcedo-Albarán at Note 23.

[30] Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Currency, 2012.

[31] Op. cit., Código Penal Federal at Note 25.

[32] Op. cit., United States Codes at Note 26.

[33] Piotr A. Chomczyński and Roger S. Guy, “‘Los Carteles son la ley’: Organized Crime, Criminal Governance, and Illicit Opportunities in Mexico.” Criminology & Criminal Justice. 2025, https://doi.org/10.1177/17488958251349531.

[34] Op. cit., Moncada at Note 24.

[35] “Genaro García Luna Sentenced.” US Department of Justice. 16 October 2024, https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/ex-mexican-secretary-public-security-genaro-garcia-luna-sentenced-over-38-years.

[36] “Genaro García Luna Convicted.” US Department of Justice. 21 February 2023, https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/ex-mexican-secretary-public-security-genaro-garcia-luna-convicted-engaging-continuing.

[37] Op. cit., Rojas Aravena et al. at Note 12.

[38] Benjamin Lessing, “Conceptualizing Criminal Governance.” Perspectives on Politics. Vol. 19, no. 3. 2021: pp. 854–873, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720001243.

[39] Op. cit., Chomczyński and Guy at Note 33.

[40] Op. cit., Lessing at Note 38.

[41] Op. cit., Moncada at Note 24.

[42] Op. cit., Lessing at Note 38.

[43] Op. cit., Moncada at Note 24.

[44] Op. cit., Chomczyński and Guy at Note 33.

[45] Roxana Gutiérrez-Romero and Nayely Iturbe, “Causes and Electoral Consequences of Political Assassinations: The Role of Organized Crime in Mexico.” Political Geography. Vol. 115. no. 103206. 2024: pp. 1–16, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2024.103206.

[46] Op. cit., Lessing at Note 38.

[47] Louise I. Shelley, Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime, and Terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

[48] Louise I. Shelley, “The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism.” Brown Journal of World Affairs. Vol. 11, no. 2. 2005: pp. 101–111, https://access.heinonline.com/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/brownjwa11&div=38&id=&page=.

[49] Op. cit., Chomczyński and Guy at Note 33.

[50] Op. cit., Gutiérrez-Romero and Iturbe at Note 45.

[51] Op. cit., Rojas Aravena et al. at Note 12.

[52] Op. cit., Trejo and Ley at Note 4.

[53] Op. cit., Lessing at Note 38.

[54] Op. cit., Cengiz at Note 18.

[55] Op. cit., Ziemer at Note 3.

[56] Op. cit., Chomczyński and Guy at Note 33.

[57] Op. cit., Moncada at Note 24.

[58] Op. cit., “Foreign Terrorist Organization Designations” at Note 6.

[59] Op. cit., “Executive Order 14157” at Note 7.

[60] “Terrorist Designations of Cartel de los Soles.” US Department of State. 16 November 2025, https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/11/terrorist-designations-of-cartel-de-los-soles.

[61] Op. cit., Villegas and Zehbrauskas at Note 1.

[62] Op. cit., Sullivan and Bunker at Note 2.

[63] Op. cit., Ziemer at Note 3.

[64] Op. cit., Rodríguez and Vizcarra at Note 17.

[65] Op. cit., Ferri at Note 19.

[66] Ibid.

[67] “Ataque a centro de rehabilitación en Culiacán deja nueve muertos y cinco heridos.” Animal Político. 7 April 2025, https://animalpolitico.com/estados/ataque-centro-rehabilitacion-culiacan-sinaloa.

[68] Pablo Ferri, “La última masacre en Culiacán: ‘No nos mataron a todos porque se les entrampó el rifle’.” El País. 8 April 2025, https://elpais.com/mexico/2025-04-08/la-ultima-masacre-en-culiacan-no-nos-mataron-a-todos-porque-se-le-entrampo-el-rifle.html.

[69] Ernesto Martínez, “Narcobloqueos tras operativo contra CJNG.” La Jornada.18 November 2025, https://www.jornada.com.mx/noticia/2025/11/18/politica/narcobloqueos-tras-operativo-contra-cjng.

[70] Op. cit., Sullivan and Bunker at Note 2.

[71] David Gagne, “Are FARC Rebels Training Mexican Drug Cartels?” InSight Crime. 18 May 2015, https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/is-the-farc-training-mexican-drug-cartels/.

[72] Rafael Prieto-Curiel, Gian Maria Campedelli, and Alejandro Hope, “Reducing Cartel Recruitment Is the Only Way to Lower Violence in Mexico.” Science. Vol. 381, no. 6664. 2023: pp. 1312–1316, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.adh2888.

[73] María Verza, “Mexican Drug Lord ‘El Mayo’ Zambada Says He Was Ambushed and Kidnapped Before Being Taken to the US.” AP News. 10 August 2024, https://apnews.com/article/mexico-el-mayo-zambada-letter-sinaloa-cartel-fa47408be4329708f429fab200f8f0f0.

[74] Pablo Ferri, “A Year of Terror in Sinaloa: Inside the War Between Los Chapitos and Los Mayos.” El País. 13 September 2025, https://english.elpais.com/international/2025-09-13/a-year-of-terror-in-sinaloa-inside-the-war-between-los-chapitos-and-los-mayos-in-mexicos-drug-heartland.html.

[75] “Ovidio Guzmán López Pleads Guilty to Federal Drug Charges.” US Department of Justice. 11 July 2025, https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/ovidio-guzman-lopez-son-el-chapo-and-head-sinaloa-cartel-pleads-guilty-federal-drug.

[76] “Ismael Zambada García Appears in Federal Court in New York.” US Department of Justice. 25 August 2025, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ismael-zambada-garcia-appears-federal-court-new-york.

[77] Op. cit., Rodríguez and Vizcarra at Note 17.

[78] Op. cit., Ferri at Note 74.

[79] Rodrigo Hernández López, “A diez años de la caída del ‘Chapo’ Guzmán, el agonizante cisma y la guerra en el cártel de Sinaloa.” Proceso. 10 January 2026, https://www.proceso.com.mx/nacional/2026/1/10/diez-anos-de-la-caida-del-chapo-guzman-el-agonizante-cisma-la-guerra-en-el-cartel-de-sinaloa-366214.html.

[80] Op. cit., Villegas and Zehbrauskas at Note 1.

[81] Dominika Kunertova, “Learning from the Ukrainian Battlefield: Tomorrow’s Drone Warfare.” ETH Zürich. 2024, https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000690448.

[82] Crisstian Villicaña, “Tercer ataque contra la Fiscalía de Baja California en apenas un año.” El Financiero. 16 October 2025, https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/estados/2025/10/16/tercer-ataque-contra-la-fiscalia-de-baja-california-en-apenas-un-ano/.

[83] “Security Alert – U.S. Consulate General Tijuana.”  US Mission to Mexico, 16 October 2025, https://mx.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-consulate-general-tijuana-october-15-2025/.

[84] Op. cit., Villicaña at Note 82.

[85] Andrés Rodríguez, “Cartels in Mexico Take a Leap Forward with Narco-Drones.” El País. 14 December 2025, https://english.elpais.com/international/2025-12-14/cartels-in-mexico-take-a-leap-forward-with-narco-drones-it-is-criminal-groups-that-are-leading-the-innovation-race.html.

[86] Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, “Mexican Cartels Are Embracing Aerial Drones, and They’re Spreading.” War on the Rocks. 11 November 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/mexican-cartels-are-embracing-aerial-drones-and-theyre-spreading/.

[87] Israel Zamarrón, “Aumentan en México los Ataques con Drones Equipados con Explosivos.” Forbes México. 25 September 2023, https://forbes.com.mx/aumentan-en-mexico-los-ataques-con-drones-equipados-con-explosivos/.

[88] “Informe anual de actividades 2023.” Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional. https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/1046232/INFORME_ANUAL_DE_ACTIVIDADES_2023.pdf.

[89] Op. cit., Ziemer at Note 3.

[90] Henry Ziemer, Robert J. Bunker, Alfonso Camacho-Martinez participation in “Countering the Criminal Drone Threat in the Americas,” CSIS webinar, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 20 November 2025, https://www.csis.org/events/countering-criminal-drone-threat-americas.

[91] Perla Reséndez, “Captura de ‘Ricky’ del Cártel del Noreste desata bloqueos y balaceras.” El Financiero. 3February 2025, https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/estados/2025/02/03/captura-de-el-ricky-jefe-regional-del-cartel-del-noreste-desata-balacera-y-bloqueos-en-nuevo-laredo/

[92] “Security Alert: Level 4 – Do Not Travel Due to Crime and Kidnapping.” US Mission to Mexico. 27 January 2025, https://mx.usembassy.gov/security-alert-level-4-do-not-travel-due-to-crime-and-kidnapping/.

[93] Rubi Martinez, “Cártel del Noreste descarta toque de queda.” Infobae. 5 February 2025, https://www.infobae.com/mexico/2025/02/05/cartel-del-noreste-descarta-toque-de-queda-en-nuevo-laredo-tras-la-captura-de-el-ricky/.

[94] “Gunmen Kill Mexican Mayor Who Urged Government to Tackle Violent Crime.” CBS News. 2 November 2025, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/gunmen-kill-mexican-mayor-who-urged-government-tackle-violent-crime-michoacan/.

[95] Benito Jiménez, “Tenía crimen un infiltrado con Manzo.” El Diario. 23 November 2025, https://diario.mx/nacional/2025/nov/23/tenia-crimen-un-infiltrado-con-manzo-1094930.html.

[96] Op. cit., Trejo and Ley at Note 4.

[97] Op. cit., Snyder and Durán-Martínez at Note 20.

[98] Iván Evair Saldaña y César Arellano, “Detienen al presunto autor intelectual del asesinato de músicos.” La Jornada. 2 June 2025, https://www.jornada.com.mx/noticia/2025/06/02/politica/detienen-al-presunto-autor-intelectual-del-asesinato-de-musicos-del-grupo-fugitivo.

[99] Op. cit., Trejo and Ley at Note 4.

[100] “Cárteles Unidos.” InSight Crime.  25 May 2021, https://insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/carteles-unidos.

[101] Ibid.

[102] “Fiscal de EU confirma derribo de drones ligados a cárteles.” Forbes México. 11 February 2026, https://forbes.com.mx/fiscal-de-eu-confirma-derribo-de-drones-presuntamente-ligados-a-carteles/.

[103] Fernando Dávila, “Sheinbaum rechaza incursión de EU con drones.” Excélsior. 8 April 2025, https://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/sheinbaum-responde-reportes-de-que-eu-usara-drones-para-atacar-carteles/1709502.

[104] “Ejército y CJNG cuentan con el mismo armamento antidrones.” Más Información. 12 February 2026, https://massinformacion.com.mx/ejercito-y-cjng-cuentan-con-el-mismo-armamento-anti-drones/.

[105] “CDC Reports Decline in U.S. Drug Overdose Deaths.” Center for Disease Control and Prevention. 25 February 2025, https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2025/2025-cdc-reports-decline-in-us-drug-overdose-deaths.html.

[106] “Historic Record Cocaine Seizures FY25.” US Coast Guard. 2025, https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCG/bulletins/3fa5039.

[107] “DEA Drug Seizures, 2025.” US Department of Justice. 15 July 2025, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-highlights-dea-drug-seizures-first-half-2025-successful-operations-over.

[108] Gerardo Rodríguez Sánchez Lara and María Paula Montserrat Aguilar Romero, “Las Fuerzas Armadas mexicanas en la Seguridad Pública: trayectorias dependientes y conflictos de poder.” Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad. Vol. 15, no. 1. 2020: pp. 61–78, http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1909-30632020000100061.

[109] “Generals’ Labyrinth: Crime and the Military in Mexico.” Brussels: International Crisis Group. Latin America Report No. 106. 24 May 2024, https://www.crisisgroup.org/es/latin-america-caribbean/mexico/106-generals-labyrinth-crime-and-military-mexico.

[110] Op. cit., Lessing at Note 38.

[111] Op. cit., Rojas Aravena et al. at Note 12.

[112] “Annual Threat Assessment.” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, March 2025,https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified-Report.pdf.

[113] “Annual Threat Assessment.” Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 2026,https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2026-Unclassified-Report.pdf.

[114] “2025 National Drug Threat Assessment.” Drug Enforcement Administration. May 2025, https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025NationalDrugThreatAssessment.pdf.

[115] Op. cit., “Annual Threat Assessment” at Note 113.

[116] Ibid.

[117] Estefanía Medina Ruvalcaba, “Traslado de 37 personas por vínculos con narcotráfico: impacto para sectores financiero y comercial.” Expansión Política. 22 January 2026, https://politica.expansion.mx/voces/2026/01/22/traslado-de-37-personas-por-vinculos-con-narcotrafico-impacto-para-sectores-financiero-y-comercial.

[118] Daniela Wachauf, Gabriela Martínez, “Despliegan 10 mil efectivos de la Guardia Nacional.” El Universal, 4 February 2025, https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/despliegan-10-mil-efectivos-de-la-gn-a-la-frontera-norte-se-distribuyen-en-18-municipios/.

[119] Ibid.

[120] Op. cit., Moncada at Note 24.

[121] Op. cit., Chomczyński and Guy at Note 33.

[122] Op. cit., Lessing at Note 38.

[123] Op. cit., Rojas Aravena et al. at Note 12.

[124] Yuliia Kurnyshova, “Deterrence, Coercion, Desecuritization: Three Lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian War.” Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe. Vol. 34, no. 1. 2025: pp. 163–176, https://doi.org/10.1080/25739638.2025.2599339.

[125] James Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine.” RUSI. 19 May 2023, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/meatgrinder-russian-tactics-second-year-its-invasion-ukraine.

[126] Op. cit., Lessing at Note 38.

[127] Op. cit., “Despliegan 10 mil” at Note 118.

[128] Andrés Rodríguez, “Más de 1.000 arrestos y 47 millones de pastillas de fentanilo incautadas: la DEA saca pecho contra el narco sin aludir a México.” El País. 4 February 2026, https://elpais.com/mexico/2026-02-04/mas-de-1000-arrestos-y-47-millones-de-pastillas-de-fentanilo-incautadas-la-dea-saca-pecho-contra-el-narco-sin-aludir-a-mexico.html.

[129] “Navy Seizes Cocaine off Guerrero Coast.” Mexico News Daily. 11 September 2025,https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/navy-seizes-1600-kilos-cocaine-guerrero/.

[130] “Keeping the Oil on Fire: Tackling Mexico’s Fuel Theft Racket.” Brussels: International Crisis Group. Crisis Group Latin America Briefing N°46. 25 March 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/mexico/b046-keeping-oil-fire-tackling-mexicos-fuel-theft-racket.

[131] John P. Sullivan, “Crime Wars: Operational Perspectives on Criminal Armed Groups in Mexico and Brazil.” International Review of the Red Cross. Vol. 105, no. 923. 2023: pp. 849–875, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383122000558.

[132] Op. cit., Rojas Aravena et al. at Note 12.

[133] Op. cit., “Ovidio Guzmán López Pleads” at Note 75.

[134] Ibid.

[135] Op. cit., Ferri at Note 19.

[136] “Sheinbaum Says She Rejected Trump’s Offer to Send Troops to Mexico.” AP News. 3 May 2025. https://apnews.com/article/mexico-trump-sheinbaum-us-migration-5223b4afa52a7da1011cff86aaa41e86.

[137] Ley de Seguridad Nacional (México), Artículo 5, Última Reforma DOF 14 November 2025, https://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LSN.pdf.

[138] Op. cit., Medina Ruvalcaba at Note 117.

[139] “Sinaloa Cartel Leader Charged with Narcoterrorism.” US Department of Justice. 26 February 2026, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/sinaloa-cartel-leader-charged-narcoterrorism-material-support-terrorism-and-drug-trafficking.

[140] “Sinaloa Cartel Leaders Charged with Narco-Terrorism.” US Department of Justice, 13 May 2025. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/sinaloa-cartel-leaders-charged-narco-terrorism-material-support-terrorism-and-drug.

[141] Op. cit., Kurnyshova at Note 124.

[142] Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan. New York: Random House, 2007.

[143] Op. cit., “Sheinbaum Says She Rejected” at Note 136.

[144] “Mexico’s President Rejects U.S. Military Intervention to Combat Drug Cartels.” AP News. 3 May 2025, https://apnews.com/article/mexico-us-sheinbaum-trump-cartels-ae2fe54f63d72b887cbd8f2ae565a081.

[145] Op. cit., “Ovidio Guzmán López Pleads” at Note 75.

[146] Op. cit., Ferri at Note 19.

[147] Op. cit., Sullivan and Bunker at Note 2.

[148] “Global Organized Crime Index 2025.” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 10 November 2025, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/the-global-organized-crime-index-2025/.

[149] Op. cit., “Captura de ‘Ricky’”at Note 91.

[150] Op. cit., “Cártel del Noreste Descarta” at Note 93.

[151] “Sanctions on Cartel del Noreste.” US Department of the Treasury. 6 August 2025, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0219.

[152] Op. cit., Sullivan at Note 131.

[153] Luis H. Atuesta and Ana F. Ponce, “Meet the Narco: Increased Competition among Criminal Organizations and the Explosion of Violence in Mexico.” Global Crime. Vol. 18, no. 4. 2017: pp. 375–402, https://doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2017.1354520.

[154] Deborah Manzi and Francesco Calderoni, “The Resilience of Drug Trafficking Organizations: Simulating the Impact of Police Arresting Key Roles.” Journal of Criminal Justice. Vol. 92, no. 102190. 2024: pp. 1–10, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S004723522400014X.

[155] Op. cit., “Keeping the Oil on Fire” at Note 130.

[156] Op. cit., Sullivan at Note 131.

[157] Op. cit., Rojas Aravena et al. at Note 12.

[158] Nicholas Magliocca, Diana S. Summers, Kevin M. Curtin, Kendra McSweeny, Ashleigh N. Price, “Cocaine Trafficking Dynamics.” Landscape and Urban Planning. Vol. 221, no. 104359. 2022: pp. 1–15, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landurbplan.2022.104359.

[159] Op. cit., Moncada at Note 24.

[160] Op. cit., Rojas Aravena et al. at Note 12.

[161] Op. cit., Lessing, at Note 38.

[162] Op. cit., Buscaglia et al. at Note 22.

[163] Op. cit., Lessing at Note 5.

[164], Op. cit., Garay-Salamanca and Salcedo-Albarán at Note 23.

[165] Op. cit., Rojas Aravena et al., at Note 12.

[166] Op. cit., Lessing, at Note 38.

[167] Op. cit., Rodríguez and Vizcarra, at Note 17.

[168] Op. cit., Chomczyński and Guy, at Note 33.

[169] Assaf Moghadam, Vladimir Rauta, and Michel Wyss, “The Study of Proxy Wars,” in Assaf Moghadam, Vladimir Rauta, and Michel Wyss, Eds., Routledge Handbook of Proxy Wars. London: Routledge, 2023, pp. 1–17.

[170] Mantilla J. Proxy, “Wars in Latin America,” in Assaf Moghadam, Vladimir Rauta, Michel Wyss, Eds., Routledge Handbook of Proxy Wars. London: Routledge, 2023, pp. 400–410.

[171] Ibid.

[172] Op. cit., Ziemer at Note 3.

[173] Op. cit., Sullivan and Bunker at Note 2.

[174] Op. cit., Villegas and Zehbrauskas at Note 1.

[175] Francis N. Okpaleke, “Historicizing the Role of Drones in US Grand Strategy,” in Francis N. Okpaleke, Eds., Drones and US Grand Strategy in the Contemporary World. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023, pp. 61–84.

[176] Op. cit., Bunker and Sullivan at Note 86.

[177] Op. cit., Rodríguez at Note 85.

[178] Odd Jarl Borch and Tormod Heier, “Understanding Hybrid Threats: An Introduction,” in Odd Jarl Borch and Tormod Heier, Eds. Preparing for Hybrid Threats to Security: Collaborative Preparedness and Response. New York: Routledge, 2024, pp. 1–13.

[179] Magda Long, “From Kingpins to Terrorists: Trump II, Cartels as FTOs, and the Weaponization of Covert Action.” Small Wars & Insurgencies. Vol. 37, no. 2. 2026: pp. 1068–1100, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2026.2627487.

[180] Op. cit., Okpaleke at Note 175.

[181] Op. cit., Trejo and Ley at Note 4.

[182] Op. cit., “Gunmen Kill Mexican Mayor” at Note 94.

[183] Op. cit., Jiménez at Note 95.

[184] Op. cit., Buscaglia et al. at Note 22.

[185] Op. cit., Garay-Salamanca and Salcedo-Albarán at Note 23.

[186] Op. cit., Moncada at Note 24.

[187] Op. cit., Chomczyński and Guy at Note 33.

[188] Op. cit., Rojas Aravena et al., Note 12.

[189] Op. cit., “Foreign Terrorist Organization Designations” at Note 6.

[190] Op. cit., Long at Note 179.

[191] Op. cit., “Foreign Terrorist Organization Designations” at Note 6.

[192] Op. cit., Long at Note 179.

[193] Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism.” Global Crime. Vol. 6, no. 1. 2004: pp. 129–45, https://doi.org/10.1080/1744057042000297025.

[194] Op. cit., Lessing at Note 38

[195] Op. cit., Long at Note 179.

[196] Federal Penal Code [CPF], Article 139, Official Federal Gazette [DOF], 13 March 2026 (Mexico). https://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/CPF.pdf

[197] Op. cit., Medina at Note 117.

[198] Op. cit., Moghadam, Rauta, and Wyss at Note 169.

[199] “Global Organized Crime Index 2025.” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 10 November 2025, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/the-global-organized-crime-index-2025/.

[200] Lizbeth Diaz and Laura Gottesdiener. “Mexican Military Kills Cartel Boss ‘El Mencho’ in US-Backed Raid.” US News. 22 February 2026, https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2026-02-22/mexican-drug-lord-el-mencho-killed-in-military-operation-says-government-source.

[201] Phil Stewart and Laura Gottesdiener, “Exclusive: New US Military-Led Group Aided Mexico’s Hunt for El Mencho Cartel Boss.” Reuters. 22 February 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/new-us-military-led-group-aided-mexicos-hunt-el-mencho-cartel-boss-2026-02-22/.

[202] Daniel Mejía, “Plan Colombia: An analysis of Effectiveness and Costs.” Brookings. 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/mejia-colombia-final-2.pdf.

[203] Op. cit., Manzi and Calderoni at Note 154.