The Hidden Network That Fueled Terror in Northern Syria
Introduction
For years, before the fall of the Assad regime and the emergence of Syria’s new government under Ahmed Al-Sharaa, trucks steadily rolled into northern Syria from Turkey into territory controlled by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The Sunni Islamist group, formed from the ex-al-Qaeda branch Al-Nusra Front, was widely designated as a terror organization at the time. These trucks carried the fuel that powered the wartime economy in Idlib and its surrounding northern region.
HTS’s exploitation of the Bab al-Hawa border crossing was no secret, but what is less known was the network of Turkish nationals behind this illicit trade that helped change the region forever. This article argues, based on the evidence at hand, that the cross-border trade that funded Al-Sharaa’s men was more than just opportunistic, but rather part of a larger maneuver led by private actors whose activities aligned with Turkey’s broader geopolitical strategy during the Syrian civil war.
HTS and the Wartime Fuel Economy
In the summer of 2017, HTS took control of Idlib and essentially created a quasi-state economic system that relied on fuel imports and border taxation. They established a three-headed fuel monopoly system with energy companies Watad Petroleum, Kaf, and Shahba, all which regulated fuel imports and pricing.
Fuel, in this context, was not merely a commodity. It functioned as a strategic asset that enabled governance, strengthened internal control, and supported military operations. As seen in other conflict zones, control over energy supply chains can be decisive in allowing non-state actors to transition from insurgent groups into proto-state entities.
Cross-Border Supply Networks and Turkish Intermediaries
In 2021, the independent Turkish publication Duvar came out with a report covering mobster-turned-whistleblower Sedat Peker, who made noteworthy allegations pertaining to cross-border fuel trade between Turkey and HTS in Syria. In his tell-all videos, Peker goes into details naming a company called MT Group as the key facilitator from the Turkish side. He alleged that MT Group, headed by Murat Sancak, was the only dealer in Turkey selling oil to the entire Syrian region controlled by HTS and other terror factions. According to Peker, cross-border trade had to go through Sancak and MT Group, and only then would it be possible to contact an HTS official named Abu Abdurrahman, also known as Abu Sheyma. The report states that Ukrainian oil from the Port of Mersin was transported to Watad’s trucks at Bab-al Hawa, and then in order to cross the border, a ‘tax’ of $400 per truck was paid to HTS.
These operations, as described by Peker, are affirmed by other sources as well. According to the Syria Files, Watad was “importing petroleum derivatives from Ukraine, through intermediary Turkish companies, including a company called ‘mt.’” The Files go on in detail to describe HTS’s firm grip over fuel distribution and pricing in the region. Another independent Syrian media outlet, Enab Baladi, also supported the same claims, identifying the key Turkish supplier as “MT.”
Networks, Business Interests, and State Proximity
In Peker’s testimony, Murat Sancak’s name was mentioned in tandem with an individual named Ramazan Öztürk, chairman of Nakkaş Holding, a diversified energy group active in infrastructure, trading, fuel and fuel storage. Nakkaş is the parent company of both Transpet Petrolcülük and Global Terminal Services, two entities that effectively owned and operated the Dörtyol oil terminal in Hatay, Turkey, a key hub that has been linked to sanctions evasion. While Transpet Petrolcülük wasn’t specifically mentioned in Peker’s video, Turkish media has stated that Sancak and Öztürk were formerly partners in the company and that Transpet’s name has been frequently mentioned together with Syrian oil. Interestingly, the connection between Sancak and Öztürk goes back even further. Both families had a joint partnership in the Turkish defense firm BMC, known for manufacturing tanks and other armored military vehicles.
In the Duvar report, Peker lays out a specific hierarchy of how cross-border business is done with HTS in northern Syria. He explains that the first step is applying through Metin Kıratlı, the Head of the Directorate of Administrative Affairs of the President of Turkey. Once approved by Kıratlı, next in order is “Murat Sancak-Ramazan Öztürk, that is, the MT Group of Companies.” Once given the green light from Sancak and Öztürk, the bottom of the pyramid would then be Abu Sheyma, the official in charge of commercial affairs for HTS. Notably, Öztürk’s name is directly associated with MT Group here.
Looking for a common denominator that has been corroborated across sources, we can conclude that there was an entity by the name of “MT” that was involved in the transportation of fuel into HTS-controlled Syria. However, the mention of Öztürk provides a node that connects us to a deeper layer – the Turkish government.
Human Rights Violations and War Crimes Allegations
Ramazan is the son of Talip Öztürk, a long-time associate of Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. According to a site called Nordic Monitor, relaying the information from Peker’s YouTube allegations, “the Öztürk family has been involved in an illicit trade between Turkey and Syria that has included the smuggling of oil purchased from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the past, moving stolen historical artifacts and reselling olive oil and wheat bought cheaply from Syrian farmers under threat.”
These serious allegations connect us to a broader issue involving Turkish influence in northern Syria at the time. The United Nations released a number of reports documenting human rights violations on behalf of Turkey in the area occupied by its military. UN investigators issued a warning to the Turkish government, describing the levying of taxes in territories under its occupation as ‘pillage,’ which could amount to a war crime. The Nordic Monitor article alleges that the Öztürk family was working closely with the Suleiman Shah Brigade, a faction backed by the Turkish military, to facilitate illicit trade into Syria. Suleiman Sham, and its leader Muhammad al-Jasim, were reportedly accused of extortion of locals and even more heinous crimes.
Turkey’s Gray-Zone Strategy in Northern Syria
This complex network of Turkish businessmen and anti-Assad Syrian factions is part of larger strategy for Ankara. As the now-extinct Syrian Arab Republic approached its eventual collapse, Turkey made sure to position itself optimally for the power vacuum that would come with HTS’s victory and consolidation of power in 2024. This is where the geopolitical aspect enters the story.
By spreading its influence in northern Syria, private sector actors from the Turkish side were able to secure key energy deals and reconstruct contracts favorably. And of course, this is where Murat Sancak, Ramazan Öztürk and MT Group play their role. This then begs the more central question: are these privately-owned entities really operating independently or are they de facto intermediaries working on Ankara’s behalf?
Based on Peker’s allegations of the structural hierarchy, it was the top echelons of the Turkish government that ran the decision-making. What’s for certain is that the lack of transparency in the midst of the cross-border trade with HTS benefited the NATO-member nation by keeping it out of the spotlight. Peker did his best to shine a light back on it.
Aside from embedding Turkish firms in local energy markets, Turkey’s proactive advances in Idlib and northern Syria served as a buffer against potential Kurdish autonomy along its southern border. Moreover, it positions Ankara well against any potential rising militant factions in the region, which are not rare in Syria’s volatile environment, even post-war. Then there’s the political shaping in Al-Sharaa new Syrian government, which is no less crucial. By exerting Turkish influence in Syria through various channels, especially the energy sector, Ankara is able to leverage the existing framework of deals and contracts to ensure that Syria’s future involves dependency on its more powerful northern neighbor.
Conclusion
The story of Idlib and northern Syria reveals a unique situation where terrorism, statecraft, geopolitical hegemony, war crimes, energy trade, and the Turkish mafia all cross paths. On the Syrian side, it exposes the source of what financed HTS’s quasi-state control as it maintained a symbiotic relationship with the Turks. From the Turkish perspective, it uncovers how Ankara will not hesitate to use highly unconventional methods to extend its security and economic posture in a region stricken by uncertainty. Overall, it serves as a broader example of how some governments are not afraid to go through private channels to achieve geopolitical aspirations, and how the worlds of energy trade and governance are more intertwined than what is seen on the surface.
