No, Recent Drone Sightings are Not Examples of Hybrid Warfare

Introduction

There has been a lot of talk in the headlines the past weeks about drone sightings across Europe, and how these are apparently examples of “hybrid warfare.” Normally, common sense would dictate that in order to call something a “war,” there has to be an actual war going on. Or, for something to be an “attack,” something has to actually be attacked. Clearly, clarification is needed. In reality, these events are yet another case of hybrid warfare being confused with gray zone activities, with potentially dire consequences. In this short article, the difference between the two will be explained, and why it matters.

What is a “war”?

What is a state of war? That is a difficult question, and one that is still being forcefully debated by scholars, philosophers and policymakers. Still, there is enough in the literature to determine when some situations are clearly not indicative of a state of war. Clausewitz stated that “War is an act of violence intended to compel an enemy to submit to one’s will.”, and that “war is a continuation of politics by other means.” This firstly means that war is an organized act of violence with a clear target. The threat of violence is not enough to constitute war, being only deterrence or coercion through power projection. Secondly, it means that war is the end of primarily peaceful diplomatic action and the resorting to primarily violent diplomatic action. The end goal remains the same, achieving the state’s political objectives. However, the means have changed, entering into a state of deadly combat. And critically, the primacy of the equation of elements of national power has changed, as the focus shifts from nonviolent to violent action.

Obviously, not all action in war involves violence, but for any conflict to be called a war, it must be primarily a violent affair. If these drones are all Russian, then they are part of a reconnaissance, surveillance and intimidation strategy, not any kind of coordinated kinetic strike against European military and/or civilian targets. Without that essential aspect, it is not only wrong to throw around words like “war,” but extremely dangerous. Make no mistake, this may very well be the latest in a long line of reckless and aggressive actions perpetrated by Russia against Europe. However, if one wishes to avoid worsening the current tensions, one must be careful about the language deployed in international relations.

The West has, unfortunately, increasingly normalized terms such as “trade war,” “economic warfare,” “cyber warfare,” “information warfare,” “war on terror,” “war on drugs,” etc. which are all not only confusing, but inevitably militaristic, even jingoistic. If one militarizes every aspect of society, how can one expect to avoid treating everything as a military affair, whether foreign or domestic?

What is hybrid warfare?

The original meaning of hybrid warfare is as a military strategy employed within a defined geopolitical area of operations, for the main purpose of most effectively causing attrition to the enemy through maximum tactical flexibility. The level of war is clearly fixed at the strategic level, because the overall objective of using a hybrid warfare strategy is to achieve victory in a set war. The key is in the name: hybrid warfare, just as one uses terms such as “limited war,” “total war,” “war of maneuver,” “war of attrition,” etc. These are all strategic methods for achieving victory as defined by a particular grand strategic endeavor. Hybrid warfare, then, means the fluid combination and/or transitioning between of operation or tactical natures depending on the situation a unit finds itself in. Often, this is done to the point that the tactical condition is so blurred that it is no longer recognizable as either “conventional” or “irregular.” This makes for extremely complex situations, where there is little distinction between a soldier, an insurgent, a terrorist, a civilian or even a criminal. They can be any one of them at any time, or all of them at once.

However, that does not mean that one must jump up a level of analysis and declare any kind of tool for “conflict” as “hybrid,” let alone an aspect of “hybrid warfare.” Not only does this eradicate the line between grand strategy and strategy, making doctrine and policy inevitably incoherent, but it also begs for miscalculation relating to rival powers’ intentions and the utilization of national power. Sooner or later, everything will look like an existential threat, and at best, resources will become overstretched and “mission creep” will be a constant. At worst, it could result in the deploying of military assets in a grossly unproportionate manner, or even a quick escalation towards total/nuclear war, which would spell disaster for all humanity. The West risks repeating the grand strategic failures of when the US took George Kennan’s sound advice about “containment” too far during the Cold War, resulting in the unnecessary Vietnam War and several other serious missteps — many of which brought the world to the brink of Armageddon. Of course, the expansionism and aggressiveness of the Soviet Union had a great deal to do with that, just as the US faces similar inclinations from Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. Still, restraint must dominate the mindset of policymakers, so as to ensure faulty first steps by these rogue actors are not worsened by faulty second steps by the free world.

The better term would be gray zone activities, not hybrid warfare, though often in the literature the former is erroneously viewed as the latest incarnation of the latter. This should be rejected, because it confuses the necessary demarcation between states of war and peace that are inherent in classic hybrid warfare theory. But of course, acts of organized violence happen all the time and in many complex ways, and more importantly, tools or methods of wide operational capability can be used for seemingly nonviolent acts — yet still acts of aggression to some degree. This is where one must recognize the inherent complexity of geopolitics, especially today in such a legalistic, decentralized, information-centric world. The gray zone is the area of grand strategic activity which straddles the line between states of war and peace. It is  not friendly, representing “conflict,” but it has not crossed that line into war, and that is important. In many ways, if Russia is indeed behind these drone incursions, this should not be surprising, as they are merely a new tool for a long-standing international rivalry. But that does not mean that they are part of a “war,” or a “prelude to war.”

What is Russia doing?

There are no serious indications in Russian military literature, let alone its doctrine, that suggests that drone incursions signal the ignition of an “unrestricted war” on Europe and/or the West as a whole. Anyone familiar with the facts should be skeptical of the years of claims that Russia is committed to a “hybrid war” on its enemies. The closest this comes to truth is that Russia believes they themselves are the target of “hybrid warfare” from the West. Of course, this is nonsense, and goes to show the paranoia inherent in Russian geopolitical thinking. Still, they do not subscribe to hybrid warfare in either of the forms so far discussed. Russia believes in a delineation between states of war and peace, but what exactly certain methods can be employed in peacetime, or the gray zone, differ from that of the West. Make no mistake, Russia acts aggressively short of war, but it is also important not to let our own values confuse the intended signaling. Russia believes in stages of escalation, going from active measures (also known as strategic deterrence and/or political war) to limited war to total war and finally nuclear war. What is key, however, is that in each of these states of conflict, nonmilitary methods play an extremely important role.

What to do with this information? The West has to balance the objective label of a gray zone conflict with the peculiar Russian label of active measures. However, that is a question for a different day. In any case, it is not hybrid warfare, and it is not a war, or even an attack.

Now, one can certainly use the term “hybrid threats,” because their activities are in some way hybrid, and they are indeed threats to be taken seriously. Hybrid tactics also make sense, because they are tactics used for a grand strategic/strategic non-military endeavor. It may seem strange to stress semantics, but in the world of geopolitics, words are often just as important as actions. There is a reason that the US used the word “quarantine” during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

So what?

Drone warfare today indeed a represents a tactical revolution, but hardly a strategic one. Drones used for strategic purposes suffer from the same limitations as all forms of strategic bombing: targeting the heart of enemy morale and/or economics through air power sounds good on paper, but is almost guaranteed to fall short of such grand aims in reality. They can, however, have great operational ramifications, and serve as an able force multiplier for less industrious actors. But war-winning? No. What does this have to do with the drone sightings? If such technology is not as revolutionary as often touted, then one is dealing with the technological equivalent of a human spy caught in the act. Such events are also seen as concerning, but are less likely to evoke talk of hybrid wars and the like.

The truth is that the free world is losing the fundamental vocabulary that underpins the distinction between its culture and those of authoritarians. Yes, it is critical to understand how lax rival states are with the line between war and peace, but it must not lead to a reflection of such a dangerous mindset. Such a course risks disaster, not only in terms of geopolitical relations, but also in maintaining our values. Complexity is not the same as hybridity, and the gray zone is not a state of war. Nor is it clearly a state of peace however, so one must react accordingly: proportionate response, not panic and alarmism.