Mine Warfare and the Second Chimurenga in Zimbabwe
Introduction
The Second Chimurenga (1964 – 1980) was a protracted armed conflict that happened in Rhodesia. It was between the Rhodesian Front (RF) and two nationalist forces, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). ZANLA was a military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and ZIPRA of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) political parties.
Conceptually, the Second Chimurenga can be characterized as a small war for various reasons. One of the reasons is that the RF, unlike the nationalists, had a regular army capable of providing security across the country. The Second Chimurenga highlighted that wars, including small wars, have a political motive. And the RF used war as an instrument of state security policy.
The RF Foreign Minister, P.K. van der Byl, claimed that the Second Chimurenga was to suppress black terrorists and white-skinned communists. His bold expression and labelling nationalists as terrorists and the white-skinned people who supported the nationalists as communists characterized the existence of a small war. This was a kind of moral force attack, where the minister unmistakably tried to prove the RF’s might, authority, and legitimacy.
Contrastingly, one of the nationalist military wings, ZANLA, claimed that its objective of attacking the RF was to seize power by means of destruction of the racist political-military machine and its replacement by the people in arms to change the existing economic and social order. ZANLA refused to cooperate with the RF without majority rule. Therefore, it started to attack the Rhodesian army, the white minority population, and their infrastructure without any declaration of war.
ZANLA and ZIPRA, although they later combined forces, had some similarities and differences. On the theory of attack, ZANLA, which was trained by the Chinese, used Maoist or guerrilla tactics. ZANLA forces knew their terrain well and could easily conceal their presence and identity. They usually avoided direct contact with the Rhodesian military since they used light weapons. ZANLA had a flexible concentration and dispersion capacity on the battlefield.
ZIPRA forces had similar tactics. They avoided the Rhodesian security forces for various reasons. For example, under Rhodesian law, activities of nationalist forces were acts of terrorism, hence illegal. ZIPRA forces were trained by the Soviets and other Eastern European countries. On attack, ZIPRA was partly capable of engaging in conventional attacks, using the Rhodesian captured weapons. It also used weapons donated by Russia and other Eastern Europeans that were left from World War II.
To provide context of the conflict, Britain, which had annexed Southern Rhodesia in 1922, gave RF self-governance status as its colony. It then directed RF to allow majority rule in Southern Rhodesia. The RF rejected the directive and chose to dissociate from Britain through a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965. Britain considered RF rogue and reported it to the United Nations. The United Nations declared RF an illegal regime and a threat to international peace and security. Hence, the international society was supposed not to recognize it. The United Nations further enacted mandatory economic sanctions on RF.
De jure, Rhodesia functioned as an unrecognized state. This was because, under the prevailing norms, Britain, as a colonial power, had the right to grant independence to Rhodesia. The lack of recognition of Rhodesia by the international community deprives it of the legal personality and legitimacy of statehood. Nevertheless, recognition of the government proved not to be the only precondition for Rhodesia to be seen as a state.
De facto, Rhodesia continued to function. It had a government, fixed territory, and a population. Rhodesia freed itself from colonial Britain and showed a probability of permanency. This challenged the international legal personality and statehood that were fixed to recognition. Rather, recognition became a consequence of the reality of the existence of Rhodesia. The de facto understanding of Rhodesia as a state led to the Second Chimurenga being viewed as a civil war. Nevertheless, some push back on the notion of civil war, saying that a colonial resistance by natives cannot be equated with civil war.
The RF had a lean military and a small defense budget. Since 1965, it has been internationally isolated, unrecognized, under sanctions, and without any military pacts except unofficial collaborations with South Africa and the Portuguese regime in Mozambique. As a result, the military was unable to counter the growing number, hostility, and attacks of nationalist forces.
By the early 1970s, the Rhodesian military developed mine warfare as a robust tactic to counter nationalist forces. This study argues that mine warfare did not help in suppressing the nationalist uprising and keeping the RF in power. Furthermore, it articulates how mine warfare was pursued, including its effectiveness and the actors involved, as part of a small war discourse.
Mine warfare
War demands that opponents’ military units equip themselves with the inventions of art and science. Inventions like landmines increase the chances of compelling and rendering the opponent powerless. A landmine is a munition designed to be placed under, on, or near the ground or the surface. It is exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle. Landmines are generally categorized into Anti-personnel (AP) and Anti-Tank or Anti-Vehicular (AT) mines.
ATs are bigger in size and filled with more explosives than APs. Their purpose is to immobilize heavy and armored vehicles, including injuring and killing the occupants. APs are small, usually between 60 – 140mm in diameter, and are typically victim-operated. However, some can be remotely commanded or triggered due to the passage of time. In an attack, landmines rely on the effect of the contained explosive to injure or kill victims.
For example, blast APs generate lots of toxic gases and energy that act as demolition power. After detonation, the gases would rise and spread in the air with very high velocity, temperature, and concentration, choking, injuring, and killing people. Other types of landmines, like fragmentation APs, use their explosive content to drive metal fragments into the victims. They are usually triggered through trip wires. Fragmentation APs can kill and injure several victims at once.
Landmines can be tactically employed in huge quantities and patterns across an area to create a minefield. The invention, modernization, and tactical use of landmines are explicit signs that the advancements in civilizations have nothing practical to alter the impulse to destroy the enemy, which is central to the idea of war. Instead, the lethality and indiscriminatory nature of landmines prove that war has no logical limit to the application of force and violence.
The totality of violence generated by landmines as instruments of war gives a perspective that wars do not genuinely follow legal and moral standards. Any legal and moral observance arguably may likely result in the worst mistakes or logical absurdities that the opponent can capitalize on. This could be the logic why military units sidestep international law, norms and morals to act with unlimited decisive violence.
Minefields in Rhodesia
Minefields in Rhodesia were established by the Rhodesian military during the Second Chimurenga. ZANLA and ZIPRA used landmines, especially ATs, on a small scale and did not construct minefields. The Rhodesian military resorted to mine warfare for a number of reasons. It had had a workforce shortage. Despite having superior weapons, the growing number of nationalist forces was threatening Rhodesian military effectiveness. And the Rhodesian military resorted to landmines to multiply its workforce and level of violence.
Landmines were used to guard the borders of Rhodesia, particularly at the northern and eastern sides, to impede the communication channels of nationalist forces. ZANLA and ZIPRA used to infiltrate the borders, together with war supplies, from their bases in Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania. Furthermore, the Rhodesian military used landmines because they were generally cheap to procure and manufacture. Partly, the military relied on South Africa to bankroll their procurement.
The construction of minefields was under the Rhodesian Engineering Corps (RhE). The prototype was imported from the Israeli Defense Forces – the blue line minefield, which was at the border of Israel and Lebanon. In a personal interview with an 81-year-old former sergeant of the RhE in April 2024, who led the initial minelaying in Rhodesia, the minefields increasingly differed with time and place. One RhE unit could not breach another unit’s minefield.
According to the former sergeant interviewee, the minefields in Rhodesia were constructed in six different operations: Hurricane (1972), Thrasher (1976), Repulse (1976), Tangent (1977), Grapple (1977), and Splinter (1978). The first five operations were along the northern and eastern borders, and only Operation Splinter was inland and to the south. The planning, monitoring, and advising of minefields was under the Mine Warfare Committee, also known as the Geisha Committee.
Minefields provided obstacles that molded particular terrains in Rhodesia. They guaranteed the control and retention of certain areas from nationalist forces. Minefields were also used to concentrate and track nationalist forces to designated areas, where the Rhodesian military would capture or shoot them. This entails that minefields were used as free firing zones and no-go areas that impede nationalists from crossing the border. The establishment of minefields depopulated borderlands by moving people into protected camps.
During the Second Chimurenga, the Rhodesian military had a close relationship with the South African Defense Forces, to the extent of collaborating in the South African Defense industry. The South African defense industry included private actors operating under the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. One of the companies, Denel Limited, is credited with designing and manufacturing two types of APs – the R2M1 and the R2M2. These landmines were widely used during the Second Chimurenga.
Later, the Rhodesian military successfully produced two main APs: the RAP1, which was nicknamed the carrot, and the RAP2, nicknamed Adams Grenade. It also developed claymores and ploughshares. RAP1 and RAP2 were considered dangerous to manufacture, handle, and deploy. And after a series of accidents and fatalities, their production was stopped in 1977. The Rhodesian army then relied on South Africa to supply landmines until the end of the war.
There are signs that minefields in Rhodesia were established following the Geneva Conventions and Protocols on the engagement in armed conflicts. One such sign was on the minefields being a “cordon sanitaire.” A cordon sanitaire is a military barrier system that includes fencing and signage to restrict access. Generally, if the Convention on the engagement in armed conflict is not followed, the military commanders of any war are charged with war crimes.
Nevertheless, there are also signs and events that show that mine warfare in Rhodesia failed to follow international standards. For example, according to the former sergeant of RhE interviewee, the Rhodesian army and the Geisha Committee used to protest against the erection of fences and the putting up of signs. They attributed it to the advertisement of minefields, which was against their purpose and nature to work in concealment. The Deka minefield was one of the proofs of the protests, with no perimeter fence and signs.
Not putting perimeter fences and warning signs at the Deka minefield proved that during a war, there is no respect for treaties, laws, and other positive prevailing norms. The main objective was to compel and destroy the nationalists at any cost. It is arguably an unwritten rule in warfare that, at every opportunity, opponents have to be conquered. If met with a shrewd opponent, an omission to such a totality understanding can never be rectified.
Similar to other wars, the Second Chimurenga was a theatre of contingencies. When some plans or approaches failed to inspire the goal of the war to be met, they were quickly substituted with others. For example, according to the 81-year-old former sergeant, all minefields were supposed to follow the international border. However, there were exceptions when a rugged terrain would make it impossible. Thus, a new route would be proposed.
It was the duty of the Rhodesian military high command to assess the situation before approving the new route of the minefields. Afterwards, the proposal would then be forwarded to the parliament through the Engineer Directorate to the Army Commander of the Combined Operations (COMOPS). The inputs from the parliament were necessary because the military proposal required political input in case the minefield route may encroach on private land and property, as well as cultural sites like graveyards and national parks. According to the former sergeant interviewee, many proposals did not pass through parliament due to the advertence pressure brought by war.
Mine warfare in Rhodesia showed that it required support from diverse actors. It also highlighted the need for constant planning, the understanding of geography, and its resultant impacts on war. For example, the clearance and fencing of land before minefields were done by the North Eastern Border Game Fence (NEBGF), commonly called the Fly Men. The NEBGF was a civilian unit specialized in tsetse fly control.
Geographically, along the northeastern border of Rhodesia, in areas like Mukumbura, tsetse fly is an epidemic due to the presence of valleys, high temperatures, a large number of game animals and livestock. Tsetse feeds on blood. Therefore, the NEBGF put fences along the borders to limit the migration of humans and animals. This was a mechanism to depopulate the area and suffocate the reproduction of tsetse flies as they would find no blood to feed on.
The erection of fences by the NEBGF became strategic and a prerequisite for establishing minefields. According to the former RhE sergeant, they formed a symbiotic association with NEBGF because they wanted to be provided with food, especially bush meat, which only the unit has the legal right to kill. In return, the NEBGF used to get security cover from the Protection Unit, which was a division of the Rhodesian army that specialized in counter-terrorism.
According to the 81-year-old former sergeant, they started laying the Portuguese M969, then the South African R2M1 and R2M2. The Rhodesian-made RAP1 and RAP2 followed, and later the Italian VS50. Landmines were employed as they were procured. Other mines that were later used were MAPS and ploughshares. The interviewee claimed that sappers, people who lay mines, used to have a daily target of laying 3,000 mines per square kilometer per day.
A cordon sanitaire had three rows (A, B, and C). The rows were equidistant and ran parallel, covering a width of 25 meters. As a result of wear and tear and breaches by the nationalist forces, the Rhodesian military was forced to add extra minefield belts, inland of the cordon sanitaire. Henceforth, a ploughshare minefield was established using directional fragmentation ploughshares and was protected by the sub-surface APs like MAPS.
Directional fragmentation ploughshares are a variant of AP fragmentation designed to direct the main explosive force outwards on detonation. They are generally used in front of defensive positions, and are command-detonated in the presence of human waves to cause frontal assaults. The ploughshare minefield had three rows, a width of 400 meters, an average of 100 ploughshares, and 300 sub-surface APs per square kilometer frontage.
In some areas, like Gomo, close to Mukumbura, the Rhodesian military put a third belt called the reinforced ploughshare minefield. It comprised directional fragmentation ploughshares mixed with sub-surface mines like the R2M2. The minefield had four rows with a width of 400 meters. Nevertheless, the former sergeant interviewee had a different view. He recalled reinforced minefields having three rows and the same density of mines with ploughshare minefields, except in a few cases.
The Rhodesian military faced challenges in using mine warfare as a military tactic. For example, the 81-year-old interviewee claimed that some sub-surface landmines were left exposed due to uncleared land, rugged terrain, fatigue, inexperience and a workforce shortage. In 1974, along the Musengezi-Mukumbura minefield, the former sergeant claimed that a whole square kilometer could not be armed and concealed due to errors from the new sappers. It was discovered after a month.
One of the minefield belts, the Musengezi, Mukumbura, Nyamapanda to Rwenya, had electronic and alarm systems. Their installation was done by the Rhodesian Corps of the Signals (Rh Sigs). The first electronic system was the YEAL. However, it was deemed too sensitive to be triggered by wind and animals. It was replaced by the DTR 78, which only covered 50 of the 359 kilometers of the minefield. The electronic system relied on the workforce for rapid response, which the Rhodesian army lacked. This caused it to be abandoned in 1975.
Mine warfare frustrated and brought violence to the Rhodesian army and opponents alike. The Rhodesian military admitted that it was exacting a toll on its vehicles and operations. In 1974, 57 civilians were killed; 34 were natives, and the remainder were white. By 1980, there were 2,405 incidents recorded, some involving vehicles triggering nationalists emplaced landmines, and all caused 632 deaths and 4,410 injuries.
Landmines caused problems than their warfare promise. According to the former sergeant, the Rhodesian military was ensnared in its minefield several times and suffered fratricide. This limited mobility and operational tempo against a highly mobile nationalist force. Furthermore, minefields required constant maintenance from breaches by nationalists or other environmental disturbances.
The former sergeant interviewee said that maintaining a minefield was a dreadful and perilous task that could not be compared to initial minelaying. A record of over 30 deaths of sappers during the minefield maintenance phase was recorded. For the injured, 97 sappers had amputations, and 96 lost either eyes, ears, fingers, or hands.
Due to increased fatalities, the former sergeant halted minefield maintenance. One of the Rhodesian Air Special Services officers argued that mine warfare was a waste of time and resources as a military strategy. This view is supportable because mine warfare failed to compel nationalists to abandon their rebellions, and it could not help the RF to stay in power.
It took an assortment of isolated mine warfare, guerrilla tactics, and diplomacy for the nationalists to achieve their goal of majority rule. Mine warfare failed to be decisive for both conflicting parties in Rhodesia. After the Second Chimurenga, people continue to face danger from the impacts of landmine remnants in Zimbabwe.
Conclusion
Mine warfare was used as an operational tactic during the Second Chimurenga. It was intended to multiply the workforce and level of violence against the backdrop of a lean Rhodesian military. Minefields were set to surveil and impede nationalist movements across the borders. The Rhodesian military turned to landmines because they were cheap to manufacture, and South Africa partly bankrolled their procurement.
Nationalist forces sparingly used landmines, particularly the ATs, but did not construct minefields. They also did not manufacture landmines; they relied on military aid packages from external sponsors like Russia. Furthermore, nationalists used to breach the Rhodesian minefields, capture and repurpose the landmines. Mine warfare highly impacted the Rhodesian military, by damaging vehicles, slowing operational tempo, ensnaring the military units in their minefields and at times, committing fratricide.
As a tactic, mine warfare could not be decisive. The RF failed to compel the nationalist to abandon their rebellions. Consequently, the RF could not manage to stay in power. For nationalists, mine warfare was buttressed by guerrilla tactics, international solidarity, and diplomacy to meet the objective of majority rule. Nevertheless, the Second Chimurenga gives suggestions on political developments and counterinsurgency doctrine.
Political developments must be evaluated to determine what can be pursued militarily. On political developments that require military intervention, military units must think through the last step before taking on the first one. They then need to apply the right type of force and the sequencing of the workforce to avoid defeat. Mine warfare and a limited workforce could not provide the right type of force for the Rhodesian military. In case of limited knowledge about opponents and terrain, military units need to scale down expectations as insurgents are capable of coming up with surprises.
