Third Generation Gangs Subject Bibliography No 1: Tren de Aragua (TdA)
Overview
Tren de Aragua, TdA, began as a group of criminals in Tocorón prison in Aragua, Venezuela. The earliest reports of TdA are from 2014 and follow a pattern of mega-gangs turned criminals of ‘Tren de Oriente,’ ‘Tren del North,’ and ‘Tren de Guayana’. The gang has quickly expanded to be known as one of the Western hemisphere’s most notorious criminal organizations, primarily due to a 2011 Venezuelan policy that turned over control of some prisons to crime bosses known as ‘pranes,’ an acronym for “Preso Rematado Asesino Nato” meaning “natural-born double killer prisoner.” While its hierarchy and command and control (C2) structure have not been fully identified, there are most likely three heads of TdA: Héctor Rusthenford Guerrero Flores (alias “Niño Guerrero”), Larry Amaury Acuña (alias “Larry Changa”), and Yohan José Romero (alias “Johan Petrica”).
The gang has taken advantage of a fragile and low political capacity Venezuelan state since the early 2010s. It has also exploited extortion, kidnapping, money laundering, and illegal mining in the neighboring countries of Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Bolivia. In 2018, the gang clashed with the Colombian National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) and Gaitanistas (Autodefenses Gaintanistas de Colombia – AGC), fighting for border control. TdA soon took advantage of the mass migration of Venezuelans and began to smuggle migrants and extort vulnerable women and families seeking to leave a dire economy. TdA continues to operate cells around South America and seek out alliances with other criminal organizations to project its power internationally. The group’s notoriety has been heightened in the last 2 years, particularly in the United States, where officials in Aurora, Colorado, reportedly charging seven individuals affiliated with TdA with kidnapping, assault, robbery, and burglary. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has arrested more than 100 people affiliated with TdA since October 2022. In July 2024, the US Department of the Treasury sanctioned Tren de Aragua as a Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO). The new Trump administration, as of 20 January 2025, seeks a Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) designation for them per Executive Order (EO).
Subject Bibliography
Howard Campbell and Charles Larratt-Smith, “The Venezuelan Exodus: A New Migrant Diaspora in the United States.” Small Wars Journal. 18 December 2023, pp. 1–14, https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/venezuelan-exodus-new-migrant-diaspora-united-states:
Abstract: This article examines the unprecedented Venezuelan migration to the United States, fueled by economic collapse, political instability, and widespread poverty. It highlights the perilous journeys undertaken by migrants, including exploitation by criminal organizations like Tren de Aragua and systemic mistreatment across transit countries.
“Documental ‘Narcofiles: el Tren de Aragua’: así funciona violenta banda venezolana en América Latina.” CNN en Español. 18 July 2024, 47:39 minutes, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MGQHCkESNtk:
Abstract: This documentary in Spanish includes interviews with law enforcement agents, journalists, and former gang members to offer a unique insight into the inner workings of Tren de Aragua. It details the group’s exploitation of migrants and efforts to control border crossings while using the prison network to influence local and regional economies across South America.
Mercedes De Freitas, “Organised Crime and Corruption in Venezuela: A Problem of State.” Caracas: Transparency Venezuela, 2020, pp. 1–135, https://transparenciave.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Organised-Crime-in-Venezuela-Collusion-between-Crime-and-Government.pdf:
Abstract: This report examines the nexus between organized crime (TdA et al.) and the Venezuelan state, detailing nine major criminal networks enabled by systemic corruption and institutional complicity. It also details the origins of “pranes” and how gang members in Venezuela have taken over control of prisons and converted them into a headquarters for organizing crime and generating profit.
Sara García and Daniel Mejía, “Fentanyl Markets, Distribution, and Consumption in South America.” Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2024, pp. 1–33, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/FP-20241203-fentanyl-south-america-garcia-mejia.pdf:
Abstract: This report examines the limited yet growing presence of illicit fentanyl in South America, including in Colombia, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina, while highlighting TdA’s role in smuggling in ketamine into Chile. It highlights emerging risks, such as local networks lacing other drugs with fentanyl, and emphasizes the need for stronger forensic monitoring, healthcare interventions, and law enforcement strategies to prevent a North American-style opioid crisis.
Viviana García Pinzón and Jorge Mantilla, “Contested Borders: Organized Crime, Governance, and Bordering Practices in Colombia-Venezuela Borderlands.” Trends in Organized Crime. Vol. 24, 2020, pp. 265–281, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-020-09399-3:
Abstract: This paper analyzes how organized crime influences border management and governance along the Colombia-Venezuela border. It highlights the role of non-state armed actors, such as TdA, in controlling illegal migration routes, regulating the flow of goods, and exploiting vulnerable migrant populations.
Joseph Humire, “Derailing the Tren de Aragua.” Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 5 December 2024, pp. 1–20, https://www.heritage.org/border-security/report/derailing-the-tren-de-aragua:
Abstract: This report explores the rapid expansion of the Tren de Aragua into the United States and its growing presence in 20 states. It highlights the gang’s violent crimes, such as sex trafficking, targeted killings, and extortion, while underscoring its origins in Venezuela’s corrupt prison system and alleged ties to the Maduro regime.
“Venezuela, Tren de Aragua.” Insight Crime, 12 July 2024, pp. 1–7, https://insightcrime.org/venezuela-organized-crime-news/tren-de-aragua/:
Abstract: This article examines Tren de Aragua and how it expanded from a prison-based gang to a transnational entity operating in Colombia, Peru, and Chile. It details the gang’s criminal activities, regional impact, and relationships with authorities, including corruption allegations.
Adam Isacson, “Migrants in Colombia: Between Government Absence and Criminal Control.” Research Report. Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), June 2024, pp. 1–45, https://www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/COLOMBIA-REPORT-JUNE-2024-FINAL.pdf:
Abstract: This report examines the control of migration routes in Colombia by organized crime, including the Gulf Clan and Venezuelan criminal groups like the Tren de Aragua. It describes how criminal groups aim to control ‘trochas’, the irregular crossing points between borders, and overland routes like the Darién Gap by taxing migrants and charging for guides that take them north.
Charles Larratt-Smith and John Polga-Hecimovich, “How Much of a Threat Is Tren de Aragua in the U.S.?” Americas Quarterly, pp.1–19, 9 December 2024, https://americasquarterly.org/article/how-much-of-a-threat-is-tren-de-aragua-in-the-u-s/:
Abstract: This article evaluates the threat posed by Tren de Aragua in the US, contrasting political alarmism with evidence while cautioning against overstating its impact.
Lorena Andrea Erazo Patiño, Carlos Alfonso Laverde Rodríguez, and Emerson David Devia Acevedo, “Medios digitales y percepción de la violencia: un análisis de la expansión del Tren de Aragua.” Revista Científica General José María Córdova. (46), Vol. 22, No. 24, 2024, pp. 457–482, http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?pid=S1900-65862024000200457&script=sci_arttext:
Abstract: Article in Spanish; This article studies the criminal organization known as Tren de Aragua and its rapid expansion in Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Chile in recent years. Based on data science and the tool Meltwater, the social listening in digital media about this phenomenon between 2021 and 2023 is analyzed.
Ronna Rísquez, El Tren de Aragua: La banda que revolucionó el crimen organizado en América Latina. Caracas. Editorial Dahbar, 2023, pp. 1–266, https://www.amazon.com/-/es/El-Tren-Aragua-revolucionó-organizado/dp/9804250918 [ISBN-13: 978-9804250910]:
Abstract: This is the premier Spanish language work on Tren de Aragua. The author writes about years of investigations and multiple interviews, illustrating how the organization was born and became one of Latin America’s most notorious criminal gangs. This work details her first-person account of the infamous Tocorón prison, conversations with women in the inner circle of TdA’s leaders, and the intricate web of regional alliances with criminal groups throughout South America.
Ronna Rísquez, Tren de Aragua: The Gang Changing Organized Crime in the Americas. Virtual: World of Crime, 2025 (Forthcoming):
Abstract: This is the updated English version of Ronna Rísquez’s 2023 Spanish language work. The book includes the most up to date information on TdA’s current organization, leadership, and areas of operation. It includes sections on the Dystopia of Tocorón and the Venezuelan seizure of the prison in September 2023, how the gang’s illicit economy functions, and the role of women.
Diego Ramírez Sánchez, “El Crimen Organizado en Chile: El desafío que se avecina.” Small Wars Journal, 20 April 2023, pp. 1–8, https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/el-crimen-organizado-en-chile-el-desafio-que-se-avecina:
Abstract: Article in Spanish; En cuanto al contexto chileno, no es una novedad que el país vive hace varios años una “crisis migratoria” que ha multiplicado la cantidad de inmigrantes viviendo en el país, incluyendo un importante número de aquellos en condición irregular. Ocultos dentro de ese flujo irregular han hecho ingreso al país, al menos, integrantes de “El tren de Aragua”, y está por ver si es que otra banda de 3ª generación de origen venezolano se ha instalado en el país.
Diego Ramírez Sánchez, “Organized Crime in Chile: The Challenge Ahead.” Small Wars Journal, 4 May 2023, pp. 1–9, https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/organized-crime-chile-challenge-ahead:
Abstract: In the Chilean context, it is not news that the country has been experiencing for several years a “migratory crisis” that has multiplied the number of immigrants living in the country, including a significant number of those in irregular conditions. Hidden within this irregular flow, at least members of “El tren de Aragua” have entered the country and it remains to be seen whether another third generation gang of Venezuelan origin has settled there.
Diego Sánchez Ramírez and John P. Sullivan, “Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 56: The Tren de Aragua in Chile: The Ronald Ojeda Kidnapping and Murder Case.” Small Wars Journal, 29 March 2024, pp. 1–12, https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/third-generation-gangs-strategic-note-no-56-tren-de-aragua-chile-ronald-ojeda-kidnapping:
Abstract: This analysis notes TdA’s infiltration into Chile as the country’s first third generation gang. It highlights the group’s kidnapping and murder of former Venezuelan Lieutenant Ronald Ojeda and presents theories of government collusion, questions the relationship between the Maduro regime and the criminal group.
Laura Strickler, Julia Ainsle, Didi Martinez, and Tom Winter, “‘Ghost criminals’: How Venezuelan gang members are slipping into the U.S.” NBC News, 12 June 2024, pp. 1–8,https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/tren-de-aragua-venezuelan-gang-members-slip-into-us-rcna156290:
Abstract: This article highlights the challenges US law enforcement faces in tracking suspected members of the Tren de Aragua gang entering the country amidst surging migration flows. Specifically, a lack of cooperation by countries to provide details regarding criminal backgrounds of migrants makes them commonly referred to as ‘ghost criminals.’ Gang-related tattoos can indicate current or previous affiliation with a group like Tren de Aragua.
John P. Sullivan and Diego Ramírez Sánchez, “Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 55: Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) Expanding its Reach to Chile.” Small Wars Journal. 25 March 2024, pp. 1–10, https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/third-generation-gangs-strategic-note-no-55-primeiro-comando-da-capital-pcc-expanding-its:
Abstract: This research note provides an introduction to the evolving transnational organized crime situation in Chile. The expanding reach of the PCC and its allies (the Tren de Aragua and MS-13) are an emerging public safety and national security risk in Chile. All three of these gangs have transnational, third generation gang attributes. Together, these three groups can potentially overwhelm local crime control and policing efforts.
Iris Terán, “De la cárcel al barrio: el control territorial del Tren de Aragua, Venezuela.” Espacio Abierto Cuaderno Venezolano Sociología, (No. 113), Vol. 32, no. 2, 2023, pp. 201–21, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8075454:
Abstract: This detailed Spanish language study examines Tren de Aragua’s evolution from a prison-based gang to a dominant territorial force in Venezuela through interviews with key informants and public officials. It also highlights the groups role as a non-state actor filling a governing void in the ‘peace zones’ created by the Venezuelan state.
“Tren de Aragua – Expansion and US Presence.” Texas Department of Public Safety Slides. 16 September 2024, pp. 1-5, https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/09.16.2024_TdA_Slides-Combined_.pdf:
Abstract: The slide deck contains information on TdA expansion and US presence, illegal immigration from Venezuela statistics, Texas Anti-Gang (TAG) Centers locations, TdA Tattoos and Other Identifiers, and TdA State Wide Activity in Texas locations.
Jonathan F. Thompson, “Testimony on Tren de Aragua and Border Security Threats.” Washington, DC: Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology United States House of Representatives, 10 December 2024, pp. 1–25, https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/2024-12-10-EMT-HRG-Testimony.pdf:
Abstract: This testimony highlights the growing threat of the Tren de Aragua gang in the US, emphasizing its involvement in violent crime, human trafficking, and drug smuggling. It mentions the ‘green lighting’ of law enforcement officers in Denver and New York by the organization.
US Department of the Treasury, “Sanctioning Tren de Aragua: A Significant Transnational Criminal Organization.” Press Release. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), 11 July 2024, pp. 1–2, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2459:
Abstract: This announcement details the US Treasury’s designation of Tren de Aragua as a Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO) under Executive Order 13581. It notes the group’s illicit activities such as human smuggling, money laundering, and drug trafficking and the threat it poses to the Western Hemisphere.
Venezuela Investigative Unit, “Venezuela Prisons: ‘Pranes’ and ‘Revolutionary Criminality.’” InSight Crime, pp. 1–18, September 2017, https://insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Venezuela-Prisons-Pranes-Revolutionary-Criminality.pdf:
Abstract: This report details the birth of the new prison system in Venezuela in 2011 and the subsequent rise of ‘pranes,’ or gang leaders inside these prisons. It illustrates how pranes gain and maintain their power over the inmates while running criminal operations and government-like services for the local populations.
Venezuela Investigative Unit, “Tren de Aragua: From Prison Gang to Transnational Criminal Enterprise.” InSight Crime, October 2023, pp. 1–28, https://insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Tren-de-Aragua-From-Prison-Gang-to-Transnational-Criminal-Enterprise-InSight-Crime-Oct-2023-1.pdf [Spanish version: https://insightcrime.org/es/investigaciones/tren-de-aragua-megabanda-carcelaria-empresa-criminal-transnacional/]:
Abstract: This comprehensive report tracks the rise of Tren de Aragua from a prison gang to a sprawling criminal empire with a presence in multiple countries. It provides detailed insights into the group’s internal organization, including its hierarchical structure under Héctor “Niño” Guerrero, its role in controlling key smuggling routes across Latin America, and prospects for growth as a drug trafficking organization.
