America’s Dangerous Love for Special Ops
America’s Dangerous Love for Special Ops by Mark Moyar, New York Times
… The country, and its presidents, have been enamored with special operations forces ever since Franklin Roosevelt created the first unit in 1942. John F. Kennedy expanded the Army Special Forces from 2,000 to 10,500 soldiers and founded the Navy SEALs. Under George W. Bush and Barack Obama, special operations forces grew from 38,000 in 2001 to 70,000 in 2016.
Will President Trump follow suit? He has already used special operations forces in several Middle Eastern countries. And the units seem custom-made for a president intent on both combating terrorism and avoiding large-scale war.
But the history of America’s special operations forces recommends caution. They are primarily tactical tools, not strategic options. Nor, for all the talent and training, can they always beat the odds.
When Jimmy Carter sent special operators to rescue the hostages in Iran, the raid went awry far short of its objective, with eight dead Americans left behind. Bill Clinton deployed Delta Force members to neutralize the Somalian warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid, but aborted the mission after militiamen dragged American corpses through the streets of Mogadishu. Barack Obama’s use of special operations forces to train a Syrian rebel army yielded a pitiable “four or five” fighters.
When special operations forces have succeeded tactically — as they so frequently and impressively have — they rarely have produced strategic success on their own. Presidents Bush and Obama hoped that precision strikes by special operators would decapitate the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the insurgents endured so long as they controlled territory and population…
Mark is talking about what Anthony Cordesman called the use of SOF in his 2015 OpEd: “strategic tokenism.” He provides a brief history of SOF wonders about the utility of SOF in the next war (which I think he posits has a major theater war – but of course SOF will play a supporting role major wars). But he makes this important point. But I would add the caveat that it is hard to achieve strategic effects if you do not have a strategy with balance and coherency among ends, ways, and means.
QUOTE: When special operations forces have succeeded tactically — as they so frequently and impressively have — they rarely have produced strategic success on their own. Presidents Bush and Obama hoped that precision strikes by special operators would decapitate the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the insurgents endured so long as they controlled territory and population. The killing of Osama Bin Laden did not cripple Al Qaeda, and it produced a strategically damaging backlash in Pakistan. With the notable exception of the defeat of the Taliban in 2001, strategic victory has required the integration of special operations forces with both conventional forces and civilian national security agencies.
END QUOTE:
Important conclusion:
QUOTE: One virtue of the military veterans in Mr. Trump’s national security circle is their ability to reject the unrealistic expectations of military novices, a group that has always been well represented among the White House consiglieri. The deployment of Marines to Syria last month is an encouraging sign of a willingness to transfer burdens from special units, overutilized by Obama-era greenhorns, to underutilized conventional units.
Let’s hope it represents a trend. If Mr. Trump pays heed to the generals and the veterans, he is likely to go down in history as one of the few presidents to demonstrate sobriety and prudence in the use of Special Operations forces.
END QUOTE
From our article above:
BEGIN QUOTE
When special operations forces have succeeded tactically — as they so frequently and impressively have — they rarely have produced strategic success on their own. Presidents Bush and Obama hoped that precision strikes by special operators would decapitate the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the insurgents endured so long as they controlled territory and population. The killing of Osama Bin Laden did not cripple Al Qaeda, and it produced a strategically damaging backlash in Pakistan. With the notable exception of the defeat of the Taliban in 2001, strategic victory has required the integration of special operations forces with both conventional forces and civilian national security agencies.
END QUOTE
First, let’s do the logical — and boringly basic and necessary thing — and attempt to articulate what “strategic success”/the strategic objective/the “ends” that the U.S./the West seeks to achieve look like today. This being: to gain greater power, influence and control throughout the world by transforming outlying states and societies more along modern western lines and by incorporating said states and societies more into the U.S./the Western sphere of influence.
Next, let’s look at how — in the Old Cold War of yesterday — the Soviets/the communists back then used, for example, unconventional warfare as a means/method for achieving their, similar, expansionist objectives. (In their case, of course, this being: To gain greater power, influence and control throughout the world by transforming outlying states and societies more along communist lines and by incorporating such states and societies more into the Soviet/communist sphere of influence.)
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1034145?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
On Page 89 of this referenced/linked document, at the second paragraph of the first column, note the following:
BEGIN QUOTE
The offensive employment of unconventional warfare — to extend political and strategic positions — has been almost solely the weapon of the Sino-Soviet bloc in the Cold War. The Communists follow a pattern of active and aggressive promotion of their goals, while the United States and allied countries have used unconventional warfare primarily for the protection and safeguarding of their interests.
END QUOTE
Thus to ask:
Is the problem here the use of the U.S./the West’s special operations forces today in a defensive role? (To wit: as per the quoted paragraph of this article which I have provide above.) If so,
Then might the solution to this problem (the lack of proper application of our special operations forces to strategic objectives) be the use of the U.S./the West’s special operations forces today more in an offensive manner? (Such as more per the Soviet/communist model of old — described in my referenced/linked item above.)
Bottom Line Questions:
When the strategic objective of the U.S./the West was “containing communism,” a defensive role for America’s/the West’s special operations forces could — from a strategic perspective — be better understood. Yes?
Given, however, that our strategic objective today is “expansionist” in nature (herein, certain state and non-state actors standing in our way), to wit: as per “advancing market-democracy;” then, in this decided different/opposite strategic context, might an offense role — for America’s/the West’s special operations forces — make more sense?
Let me move COL Maxwell’s comment below to the top of the page now — this, so that we might consider some of his and Anthony Cordesman’s thoughts.
BEGIN COL MAXWELL COMMENT FROM BOTTOM OF THIS PAGE
Mark is talking about what Anthony Cordesman called the use of SOF in his 2015 OpEd: “strategic tokenism.” He provides a brief history of SOF wonders about the utility of SOF in the next war (which I think he posits has a major theater war – but of course SOF will play a supporting role major wars). But he makes this important point. But I would add the caveat that it is hard to achieve strategic effects if you do not have a strategy with balance and coherency among ends, ways, and means.
QUOTE: When special operations forces have succeeded tactically — as they so frequently and impressively have — they rarely have produced strategic success on their own. Presidents Bush and Obama hoped that precision strikes by special operators would decapitate the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the insurgents endured so long as they controlled territory and population. The killing of Osama Bin Laden did not cripple Al Qaeda, and it produced a strategically damaging backlash in Pakistan. With the notable exception of the defeat of the Taliban in 2001, strategic victory has required the integration of special operations forces with both conventional forces and civilian national security agencies. END QUOTE:
Important conclusion:
QUOTE: One virtue of the military veterans in Mr. Trump’s national security circle is their ability to reject the unrealistic expectations of military novices, a group that has always been well represented among the White House consiglieri. The deployment of Marines to Syria last month is an encouraging sign of a willingness to transfer burdens from special units, overutilized by Obama-era greenhorns, to underutilized conventional units.
Let’s hope it represents a trend. If Mr. Trump pays heed to the generals and the veterans, he is likely to go down in history as one of the few presidents to demonstrate sobriety and prudence in the use of Special Operations forces. END QUOTE
END COL MAXWELL COMMENT FROM THE BOTTOM OF THIS PAGE
Question:
As discussed by Warlock and myself below, and specifically re: achieving “strategic success,” it would seem that NEITHER
a. Precision strikes by special operators “to decapitate insurgencies” (or to decapitate regimes for that matter) in Iraq and Afghanistan, NOR, indeed,
b. The use of our special operations forces with both conventional forces and civilian nation security agencies, herein, “to control territory and populations;”
NEITHER of these approaches, it would seem, is likely to achieve “strategic success” for the U.S./the West; this, given that the U.S./the West’s definition of “strategic success” is understood more in “hearts and minds” — rather than “decapitation of regimes/insurgencies” or “control of territory and populations” — terms, to wit: as winning the population’s acceptance of our unusual and unique way of life, way of governance and values, attitudes and beliefs.
Thus, should we conclude that to achieve “strategic success” — as we understand, require and perceive it in the “hearts and minds” realm noted above — this cannot be achieved by (a) ANY singular or combined use of our military, national security and/or indeed WOG assets focused on (b) “decapitation of regimes or insurgencies” or, indeed, focused on “controlling territory and populations?”
Rather, for the measure of “hearts and minds” strategic success that we require, should we understand that this can only be achieved via (a) a successful pre-invasion or pre-revolt “ideological indoctrination” process; one which is focused on (b) winning the population over to our unusual and unique way of life, way of governance, etc.?
(Attempts at achieving our “ideological indoctrination” requirements — in a post-invasion/post-revolt setting — which became necessary due to the failure of such things as “universal western values” — these such post-invasion/post-revolt “ideological indoctrination” attempts/approaches have resulted in dramatic strategic reversals/strategic disasters/strategic failures?)