Iraqi Stability and the “ISIS War”

Interesting paper and I always read Anthony Cordesman’s studies/editorials for their ample facts. For instance on page 8:

* The impact of the current war has also combined with the growing problems caused by the impact of far lower oil revenues. Revenues were 11% lower in 2014 than the government had originally projected, in spite of a growing total volume of oil exports. Official Iraqi estimates in April 2015 projected a budget deficit of at least $22 billion in 2015 for a budget of $105 billion.
* Iraq’s oil wealth is also limited at best. Even in 2014, the U.S. Energy Information Agency estimated that Iraqi annual per capita oil income was only $2,682 vs. $25,362 for Kuwait, $36,012 for Qatar, $7,900 for Saudi Arabia, and $9,435 for the UAE.
* At the same time, these figures are a warning as to how limited Iraq’s overall economic wealth really is. Estimates of Iraq’s GDP per capita are uncertain at best, but the CIA puts it at $14,400. This compares with figures of $143,400 for Qatar, $71,000 for Kuwait, $64, 500 for the UAE, and $52,500 for Saudi Arabia. Iran – at $17,100 – is the only Gulf oil exporting state whose per capita income comes close to Iraq, and Iran, too, after years of crippling international sanctions, is anything but a wealthy country.
* Shortfalls in oil revenues are critical in an economy that makes a minimal effort to collect tax revenues, and that the CIA rates as receiving 90% of its government income and 80% of its export revenues from the petroleum sector

PM Abadi’s proposed and approved reforms address financial, economic, services and corruption areas (Iraq is 170 out of 175 in Corruption Perceptions Index) but do not address sectarian security forces, the Shiite/Sunni/Kurd divide, or solve anything unless implemented. The per capita oil revenue is more a reflection of Iraq’s far larger population than other GCC states used for comparison.

Page 13-14:

At the same time, it is important to understand that Iraq cannot solve its sectarian problems by focusing on Anbar and Ninewa or the areas ISIS now controls, and that Iraq’s current demographics mean that there is no clear approach to “federalism” or separating Iraq into Sunni and Shi’ite portions that would not involve a massive and impractical exercise in population relocation. The challenge the Iraqi government faces is not simply to recover or “liberate” the West, it is to find a way of ending the growing segregation and division of the country.

Taken together, it is unlikely that the present population of both provinces is now more than 4 million, or roughly 11% of the 37 million people the CIA estimates are now in Iraq’s total population, and there are significant populated areas in both provinces that are not under ISIS control. (Other population estimates are generally lower, but seem less credible given estimates of Iraq’s birth rates.)

At the same time, the fact that Anbar and Ninewa are largely Sunni, does not mean they can be the basis for a Sunni federalist entity. Unfortunately, there are no reliable estimates of the total sectarian and ethnic population groups in Iraq. However, the CIA “guesstimate” puts the percentage of Sunnis at 32% to 37% or 11.8 to 13.7 million, many in Baghdad.

Given the fact that there are Shi’ite and other sects in Anbar and Ninewa, this means that at least 8 million Sunnis are not in Anbar and Ninewa, are not under ISIS control, and would not be included in any form of “federalism” that focused on the two Western provinces, ignores the critical problem of dividing up Iraq’s petroleum wealth (which now pays for 90% of government revenue and makes up 80% of foreign exchange earnings), ignores the geography of Iraq’s water and infrastructure, and ignored the cost and inevitable violence in relocating large elements of the population.

The “cost and inevitable violence in relocating large elements of the population” is overstated given existing and past refugee movements out of Baghdad and other contested areas due to Shiite and ISIL control. If a Sunni state exists, they will come. The same is likely for a Kurd state with probably movements there from Turkey and elsewhere. Kirkuk province is a good example where 50% of the population is Kurd but many of them have moved there from elsewhere with the demise of prior decades of Baathification policies.

The current plight of Sunni refugees in Syria also would be reversed if a Sunni state existed in areas of past Sunni domination. Cordesman points out that 36.7% of Iraq’s population is 0-14 years old. That is ample reason to segregate potential trouble now before these youth reach fighting age—or starve or get barrel-bombed to death in Syria. With nearly 20% of Iraq’ population of fighting age, heavily unemployed, and with a projected population of 50 million by 2040, we may not have decades to solve Iraq’s Sunni-Shiite-Kurd and ISIL unrest. Note Cordesman’s points about population growth on page 8:

* Iraq faces critical challenges because of sheer population growth. There are no reliable numbers, but the U.S. Census Bureau seems roughly correct in estimating that Iraq’s population grew from only 5.16 million in 1950 to 13.23 million in 1980 when the Iran-Iraq War began, and to 18.14 million in 1990 when Saddam invaded Kuwait, and was 29.67 million in 2010 as the U.S. phased out its presence. Even assuming a declining birthrate, this population pressure is estimated to continue for at least several decades in the future and reach 50.46 million in 2040.

* It has created an extremely young population and massive numbers of young men and women desperate for careers, jobs, marriage, a home, and a family. The CIA estimates that an extraordinary 36.7% of Iraq’s population is 0-14 years of age, and 19.6% is 15-24 years of age, and Iraq is nearly 70% urbanized. Its economy, politics, and social tensions will be under acute population pressure for at least another two decades.

Cordesman points out that 69.5% of Iraq is urbanized (25.7 out of 37 million Iraqis). Yet, he minimizes the problem of provinces under ISIL control (Anbar and Ninewa) claiming they have only 2.3 million in urbanized population or 9% of Iraq’s urban total. That may be questionable because many of Anbar and Ninewa critical points of contention have well over (Mosul: 1.7 million) to nearly one million (Fallujah, Ramadi each near 700k) in metropolitan population and currently are controlled by ISIL which adds up to more than 2.3 million. If as he points out Iraq suffers from water issues, many of these cities are along rivers letting ISIL effectively control water by holding those upstream cities.

He goes on to list major Iraq cities implying great difficulty in separating Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds in those urban areas. True, Baghdad is the largest city with 6.6 million and it has large Shiite and Sunni populations which also leads to the most prevalence of car and other bombings. However, as previously mentioned Mosul as the second largest city has 1.7 million primarily Sunni residents. Erbil, the third largest city is almost all Kurd, with 1.2-1.5 million. Basra is 95% Shiite with just over a million and 2.4 million within that largely Shiite province. Sulaymaniyah in the northeast near the Iran border has one to two million (depending on source) that are primarily Kurd. All other cities are under a million and Najaf at 890,000, while both a Shiite and Sunni holy site with pilgrimages of both, would not preclude Sunni visitors if under Shiite governance.

It therefore sounds like Baghdad would be the major challenge in terms of both major Shiite and Sunni populations. Yet parts of Baghdad were previously blocked off from other areas to keep the peace under past U.S. control. There is no reason that Baghdad could not follow the former Berlin model with areas of the city under Shiite or Sunni control with visitation allowed in both through checkpoints.

As for oil revenue, any negotiation over boundaries might consider giving Sunnis oil revenue or oil sites since the Kurds in the north and Shiites in Basra have most of the oil wealth. With Mosul under ISIL control, one might assume its nearby Baiji refinery capabilities would be one method of accomplishing that distribution if it could be retaken as part of a new moderate Sunni state.

PM Abadi rejected General Odierno’s retirement interview comment that Iraq might end up divided and that indicates a tough road ahead in any negotiated division of Iraq. It also indicates that such a formerly du jour concept is rapidly gaining the prospect of some permanence in some manner to be determined if not by negotiation, then by ISIL and Kurd force. Both Michele Flournoy and Dexter Filkins on Fareed Zakaria this morning seemed to imply such divisions may be necessary.

Cordesman also mentions that Iraq worries the U.S. is favoring the Kurds and the Turks must similarly be concerned. Yet if we established airbases and a somewhat permanent presence in Kurd areas in shared bases and conducted combined operations, Turkey and the Iraq Army/Militias would be hesitant to bomb/attack such bases. They could include airpower to protect those bases/operations and reduce our reliance on places like Incirlik.

Should Saudi Arabia, GCC countries, Turkey, and Iran participate in negotiations to redraw Iraq borders? Should the Saudi and GCC countries provide ground forces to seize Anbar and Ninawa to form a Sunni state? The Sunni areas of Syria are another problem unaddressed by this paper. It isn’t certain whether Sunni areas of both Iraq and Syria should be one state or two. Increasingly due to ISIL control of those areas, there is a de facto likelihood of an eventual single Sunni state crossing prior Iraq/Syria borders. Most of Syria’s oil is in Sunni and Kurd areas to its northeast so that could become a further means of giving Sunnis oil revenue assuring free flow of water in return.