A Lesson About Counterinsurgency That Could Change America’s Future.
03.11.2015 at 08:29pm
A Lesson About Counterinsurgency That Could Change America’s Future. By Fabius Maximus.
As we move forward to a new round of interventions let’s take a moment to look backwards. What can we learn from our failed interventions since 9/11, and more generally from the scores of failed counterinsurgency programs waged by foreign armies since WWII (when Mao brought 4GW to maturity)? There is a simple lesson, one that if learned could change our future. But the national defense complex (like Satan, it goes by many names) doesn’t want you to learn it. So you won’t (probably). {2nd of 2 posts today.}…
A bit of background: this was inspired by reading “Weaponizing Anthropology: Social Science in Service of the Militarized State” by David H. Price (Prof of anthropology at St. Martin’s U). He describes one facet of America’s militarization: how the flow of DoD money influences scientists to break their professional ethics (that process is far more advanced in the physical sciences, of course) and how this contributed to our failed wars since 9/11.
The follow-up post gives an excerpt from his analysis of COIN. I recommend the book, and especially the last two chapters, to anyone interested in understanding our post-9/11 wars.
Fabian has some interesting points. However, methinks he vastly oversimplifies counterinsurgency, 4GW, and guerrilla war claiming them to be one and the same and limited to just two types. For starters lets look at one of the Kilcullen quotes he refers to several times (in other blog posts):
I highlighted the word “population” because it seems a major flaw in Kilcullen’s and Fabius argument about foreign involvement in other people’s insurgencies. Problems for the counterinsurgent seem most persistent when populations vary widely throughout the affected conflict area. When we beat Japan and Germany in WWII, there was no subsequent insurgency during our occupation because a) the population was unified culturally and by language, b) the population was not receiving external assistance from any other population, and c) we had massive occupation forces that overwhelmed the few military aged males (MAM) in the population that remained able to rebel.
In contrast, in Afghanistan and Iraq, the nature of population varied greatly in religious beliefs, ethnicity, and language. Lots of unemployed MAMs were still able to fight and obviously killing them via the genocide and past practices of other historical insurgencies was not an option. Also, these varied “populations” received external support in Afghanistan by Pakistan to assist the Pashtun Taliban insurgency. But foreign fighters also were involved as were foreign terrorist groups. Finally, in both Iraq and Afghanistan we failed initially to deploy an adequately large stability “occupation” coalition which emboldened the insurgents.
In Iraq, Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds were the three large population groups who also received external support from other countries and terror groups. Contrary to Fabius’ contention, we had won the counterinsurgency effort by 2008, despite having far too few forces initially to battle both Sunni and Shiite insurgents. However, after the surge, we snatched defeat from the jaws of victory by removing all U.S. forces too early, and ignoring al-Maliki’s screw ups and Iran’s influence. Thus when Assad killed 200,000 Sunnis and sent millions into exile, ISIS was born and came to the aid ostensibly of Sunnis in Iraq, as well. ISIS also was supported by external “populations” of foreign fighters and although al-Maliki got the boot, the Iranian and IRGC/Hezbollah influence that was averse to the Sunni “population” persisted in its control.
Likewise, Vietnam involved a foreign population called North Vietnam supported by communist surrogates China and Russia attempting to force South Vietnam to become communist, as well. See the pattern here? Only when the insurgent receives extensive foreign assistance and has sanctuary does the U.S. ability to counter that insurgency run into difficulty. Why wasn’t there an insurgency in Panama or South Korea, or by East Germans influencing West Germans? Could it be a function of effective border control and smaller borders as well as common local “populations” with a common goal? In the case of South Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, our allied governments continued to have great problems of legitimacy in terms of satisfying all members of the “population.” But the Viet Cong largely had been defeated when we left and the ARVN had solidified to some extent until a major conventional (not guerrilla) attack in 1975. Likewise, as screwy as al-Maliki had left Iraq after our departure, it took a strong external assault by ISIS to defeat the Iraqi Army.
So when Fabius claims insurgencies come in two types, there is something being left out when he attributes failure of the “good guys” in aiding one side of the “population” while forgetting to mention that external “bad guys” are supporting insurgents from sanctuary due to poor border control, a stability and transition force that is too small, and widely varied “populations” within the conflict area that are impossible to rule with any government with inherently conflicting goals and influences. Here is what he says are the two basic types of insurgency/4GW/guerrilla conflicts, local vs. foreign-assisted:
So an observer without anthropological training might speculate that no matter how you assist the desired side in an insurgency involving multiple ethnicities/languages/religions, if a more persistent external influence with sanctuary bordering the conflict is assisting the other side, we aren’t going to win. The same observer might note that it then makes sense to split up the affected area created by ancient colonial influence so that the external parties in the sanctuary of Pakistan can assist the new Pashtun state all they want without necessarily having much success intervening in the other new state comprising the Northern Alliance ethnicities who speak a different language and don’t have the same strict religious views or desire to align with Pakistan.
Likewise, a non-anthropologist displaying common sense might speculate that splitting Iraq into Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd states would allow Iran to influence the new Shiite state, the GCC and Turk states to help the new Sunni state, and the U.S. to help the Kurd state. In both cases, the foreign occupation force would only exist in areas where they are welcome–in Kurdistan and in the newly smaller Tajik/Uzbek/Hazara/moderate Pashtun Afghanistan–without any forces in the new Taliban-influenced Pashtunistan in the southeast along the AfPak border. No doubt Iran and India would help the new smaller Afghanistan because they share more in common.
The other major problem with Fabius argument is the lack of viable alternatives. Basically, I think Fabius advocates a completely hands off approach to other’s insurgencies. So what happens when Pakistan, Iran, GCC rich guys (funding ISIS), and Russia/China in Vietnam decide to intervene without opposition? How does that affect America’s future when ISIS expands gaining Sunni backing to combat an expanding Iran? What happens when Pakistan controls Afghanistan and al Qaeda has sanctuary there where training/planning can occur with only cruise missiles being the weapon of choice? No “drone” war because no airspace. Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein are still alive. Sunnis look to buy nukes from Pakistan to battle Iran, and so on and so on.
The unknowns are unfathomable compared to possibly doing it right in the first place with new smaller countries and a larger upfront surge to stabilize and transition to local ethnically-similar security forces after regime change. The alternative is high oil prices and a continued return to Iraq—Desert Storm, early OIF, surge OIF, abandoned OIF, half-assed bombing OIF—get the idea?
Move Forward,
Thank you for your comment. You are, of course, correct that this is a simplification about counterinsurgency. This was a post of a thousand words; books uncounted have been written on the subject since WWII.
However, I don’t understand your objections. I note the bottom line: foreign armies almost always lose when fighting local insurgencies. I cite studies by RAND and others on the subject, although the fact seems obvious by now.
We can quibble about the borderline cases. Is the British army a foreign force in Northern Ireland? Do colonial armies “win” against insurgents when they transfer power to a local government and free the colony? The answers hardly seem significant vs. the big picture.
Using methods that have repeatedly failed doesn’t seem logical, imo. Even more so when each new intervention since 9/11 begins with promises of easy cheap victory — and ends with a nation in ruins, aflame with resurgent jihadists.
What are the alternatives? That’s a subject for another day. One step at a time.
I kept reading after “Martin van Creveld”, but that’s essentially where the author lost me. We few, we happy few, we commentators at SWJ have had this discussion before, recently, ad nauseum, so if everyone will excuse my flippancy, I’ll simply quote one of the most celebrated rock anthems of all time: “no, no, no, no, no, no, no.”
In truth, what we are discussing here is not counterinsurgency, per se, but, rather:
a. Policy.
b. Writ large.
c. And, as the Thomas Jefferson memorandum (referenced in “Weaponizing Anthropology”) indicates, of earliest design and pedigree.
http://www.monticello.org/site/jefferson/jeffersons-confidential-letter-to-congress
To wit: A policy to undermine and replace the way of life and way of governance of other individuals and groups — and other states and societies — who are not optimally organized, ordered and oriented so as to allow for our greater access to — and our greater utilization and power and control over — their human and other resources.
Our foreign and, indeed, our domestic policies — and the interventions and other activities undertaken in their name (to include such things as “regime change” and “counterinsurgency) — to be understood in this more comprehensive light.
Thus to consider, for example:
a. Not whether “counterinsurgency” — undertaken in the name of such a political objective — has proven to be successful or not. But, rather,
b. Whether the overall effort made to achieve this political objective — over time and by various means — has proven to be successful and why.
This such analysis allowing that one might consider approaches OTHER THAN, for example, regime change and counterinsurgency (which seem to have such a poor track record?).
Bottom line:
a. The focus on one of the many possible “servants” of policy (to wit: regime change and counterinsurgency).
b. Rather than a more appropriate focus on the “master” (our enduring political objective of achieving greater power, influence and control over others; this, via the undermining and replacing of their way of life and way of governance).
c. This much more limited analysis (see “a” immediately above) tends to prevent us from looking toward the many other ways and many other means by which we might achieve our such enduring political objective; this, in a more intelligent and more efficient manner.
(Is this not what continuing “failure” — re: any “method” used and re: any endeavor — often suggests?)
I watch a TV show called “sons of anarchy” which is a good example of 4gw imo, but there is an interesting quote on one of the grave stones of one of the founding members of the motorcycle club, who also was a Vietnam Vet. It says “we fight because we believe”. We are slowly learning or not learning that people fight for a lot of reasons besides so called ” interest”.
With the advent of the new Russian military doctrine “non-linear warfare” the Russian term and our term “hybrid warfare” (really hardcore UW) and the various hybrid warfare doctrines of Iran and China we have long moved past the concept of COIN or anything close to that term.
Right now “non-linear warfare” coupled with “informational conflict” are here to stay and has been and or is currently extremely successful and if the new SOF document on C-UW, UW deterrence, and political warfare is to have any input/influence in the coming discussions around “non-linear warfare” COIN has to be finally buried and a wooden stake driven through it’s doctrine.
If one took the time to listen to the hour long CSIS Lesson Learned video on hybrid warfare from their recent experiences in the Ukraine there is nothing in COIN that remotely applies to what the Russians are currently conducting in their non-linear warfare.
Right now the Army is rushing to practice the long lost art of attacking a position and then defending against a counterattack just this week at the German/US JMTC ie the ancient war fighting skills of conventional forces and at the same time defending against SOF attacks in the rear and in built up areas.
The following are elements being seen in the Russian “hybrid army” in eastern Ukraine—and just where then does COIN fit in—it does not.
Russia’s ‘army’ consists of:
1.Cossacks (something in between police and soldiers)
2.conscripts, regular army (similar as with our armies)
3.Chechen mercenaries (lots of them; Kadyrov has something to do with it)
4.other mercenaries (Serbs, we see a lot of Asians)
5.Berkut (former Ukrainian special police)
6.ethnic Russians living in Ukraine who join
7.5th column (locals who work as foreign agents)
8.Russian ‘tourists’ (nationalists who pretend to be Ukrainians)
9.Real life actors, actresses and figurants (used for their own propaganda or deliberately seeking Western cameras to play their drama and speak their propaganda)
10.Ukrainian soldiers and officers (either deserted from Ukrainian army or still working within the Ukrainian army as traitors/spies).
11.local mafia and criminals given training and arms
12.brainwashed locals (mainly manning checkposts and interviewed by Western media)
13.locals somehow forced to join (mainly of young and very young age, or out of need/money)
14.Russian criminals or ‘inmates’ given ‘amnesty’ in exchange for fighting in Ukraine (we have seen many of them already and there is going to be A LOT more of them; see this blog.)
15.Special forces (seldom filmed; used to tip the balance in Russia’s favor)
16.FSB/GRU agents (they check and control)
17.Russian generals ‘coordinating the ceasefire’ on the UKRAINIAN SIDE OF THE FRONTLINE in the JCCC
18.Embedded journalists for creating propaganda (they also get a military training and are called ‘our boys’)
19.Commanders (command and control is all in Russia’s hand)
And lots and lots of “vacationing and contract Russia troops”.
This does not include the massive internet troll business based in St. Petersburg.
THEN just to complicate everything the Russian Army actually conducts a military operation today in one of their occupied towns against some of their “own”–go figure.
There is a Russian army operation taking place in #Makeevka today.
Reason unknown.
https://youtu.be/7LR6W-uabsA
2nd video of today’s #Russia|n army military operation in #Makiivka
https://youtu.be/AwxMwGCs_TQ
pic.twitter.com/71Hb6l6Vca
#Russia|n army military operation in #Makiivka
Unverified: a Commander was taken by storm by “unknown people”
Vid 3 https://youtu.be/f4nkDB8Ta6A
Fabius Maximus noted:
“As a simple dichotomy for analytical purposes, we can say that 4GW’s come in two types, reflecting the degree of involvement of outside interests (obviously there are many other ways to characterize 4GW).
1. Violence between two or more local groups, who can form from any combination of clans, governments, ethnicities, religions, gangs, and tribes.
2. Violence between two or more sides, where at least one is led by foreigners – both comprising, as above, any imaginable combination of factions.
a. 4GW victories by governments are usually of the first kind, local governments fighting insurgencies.
b. After the late 1940’s, western states fighting 4GW’s in other lands – type two wars – usually lost.”
Might we consider a somewhat similar — but also somewhat different — characterization of Type 1 and Type 2 insurgencies, as indicated below:
Type 1 Insurgencies:
a. If it is one’s own government — one that has some degree of legitimacy — who has decided that it is time to transform the subject state and its societies more along modern western political, economic and/or social lines,
b. Then, in these instances, the population would seem to be more likely to consider such a initiative as legitimate (think China cir. 1979 and/or Russia cir. 1989) and, therefore, would seem less likely to rebel.
c. In those instances where insurgencies are undertaken anyway — by those who might disagree with and/or lose power/wealth/prestige under these new arrangements (think certain samurai in Japan cir. 1870) — then these insurgencies, due to their inherent lack of legitimacy (the domain of the local government in these cases), would seem to be more likely to fail.
Type 2 Insurgencies:
a. If, on the other hand, it is a foreign power — one that DOES NOT have some degree of legitimacy with the local population — who (1) decides that it is time to transform a foreign state and its societies along modern western political, economic and/or social lines and (2) invades the country, occupies it and replaces its leaders so as to effect such a transition (think Afghanistan and Iraq cir. 2003).
b. Then the population, in these circumstances, would seem to be more likely to see such a move as illegitimate and, accordingly, (1) to refuse “transformation” and (2) rebel.
c. Thus, it is in these instances — of foreign invasion, occupation, etc. — and specifically to transform the subject state and its societies more along the generally foreign and profane lines of another’s civilization — that the “mantel of legitimacy” is seen to be resting on the shoulders of the insurgents. Successful insurgencies, significantly, to be understood in this way.
A note about the RAND report cited in this post
This is among the most interesting evidence about the two kinds of insurgencies cited in this post because it’s by RAND — started and to this day still largely a government-funded research center. Organizations seldom act against the interests of their customers — and especially their top customer. So RAND’s conclusion in this report about COIN — that US military interventions in foreign insurgencies are unlikely to work — is remarkable.
It’s somewhat like what attorneys call an “admission against interest“, and so deserves special attention.
Contrast that with another episode in RAND’s history, more typical of such things. Robert Hirsch is one of America’s top energy experts (he ran the fusion program in the 1970s, walking away when he realized it was not going to work in his lifetime). The Washington Post wrote about this interesting story in 18 March 2003:
Oil was then roughly $23/barrel, bouncing back after crashing in the 1998-99 downturn. Hirsch’s draft report said that the world was headed for an energy crisis, and the US had to start preparations immediately to prepare. Let nobody say that the government cannot act quickly! DoE staff contacted RAND and demanded a more comforting report.
RAND fired Hirsch in October and produced a report saying that oil was OK and not likely to spike again.
As oil prices spiked up, DoE realized their mistake and funded a team headed by Hirsch to produce (re-produce) his study. Which he did in February 2005: “Peaking of World Production: Impacts, Mitigation, and Risk Management” (aka “Mitigations”). It’s still the closest thing we have to an energy policy (i.e., it was ignored).
Many of the comments here — especially those raising questions about the wider implications of this theory — are answered in an article of mine up today at Martin van Creveld’s website: “Why we lose so many wars, and how we can win” — Summary:
As the western nations begin a new round of interventions against insurgencies in the Middle East, let’s look at the record of such conflicts since WWII. They teach a simple lesson that if widely recognized could change our future. But the leaders of our national defense institutions do not want to see it, so we probably will not either. Failure to learn is among the most expensive of weaknesses, one which can offset the power of even great nations.
Since World War II, our interventions would seem to fall into two categories:
I. During the Cold War:
a. To attempt to PREVENT the Soviets/the communists from gaining greater power, influence and control throughout the world.
b. This, by attempting to PREVENT them from further advancing their political, economic and social norms and institutions — and by attempting to PREVENT them from further advancing their values, attitudes and beliefs which underpinned same.
c. These such interventions to be understood under the heading of our containment strategy.
II. Post-the Cold War:
a. To CAUSE the U.S./the West’s to gain of greater power, influence and control throughout the world.
b. This, by FACILITATING the advance of our political, economic and social norms and institutions — and by FACILITATING the advance of our values, attitudes and beliefs which underpin same.
c. These such interventions to be understood under the heading of our expansionist strategy.
In this context, to see and understand interventions/conflicts post-World War II.
Thus, THE common characteristic of these such post-World War II interventions and conflicts is that indigenous personnel are being asked/forced, by one great power foreign government or another (or, indeed, by both!) to:
a. Throw off ways of life, ways of governance, and values, attitudes and beliefs which — often for millennia — have sustained them. And, in the place of these, to:
b. Adopt foreign, alien and often profane ways of life, values, etc.
(A definition of “profane” might be helpful here: Relating or devoted to that which is not sacred or biblical — secular rather than religious; treat [of something sacred] with irreverence or disrespect.)
In this context, to consider “failures.”
Herein to suggest that interventions — in one form or another — and whether routinely successful or not — will continue.
This, due to:
a. Our continuing determination to try to prevent the advance of/eliminate other ways of life, values, etc., and
b. Our continuing determination to try to advance, in the place of these, our such attributes.
Perhaps I am not cynical as much as despondent about the reasons for our failures. But what strikes me over and over again is the weakness of our professional dialogue on COIN. The current crop of O-3s to O-5s have spent the entirety and majority (respectively) of their careers fighting insurgents. Yet the fingerprints of those experiences on our force design and doctrine are surprisingly inconspicuous. Now, don’t get me wrong, a lot has been written and many a working group had.
Yet looking around the ground forces I see a lot of hvy/light/air mixing with a healthy dose of networking and that’s about it. That kind of adaptation could have been spurned by any opponent. That’s the thing about it…what are adapting to exactly? Our force mixes allow us more lethality at smaller scales…there is value in that. Our network fixes allow us greater information flow…value in that too. Our tech fixes allow us fewer lethal systems per effect…yup, also potentially good (caveat: depending on cost). But, uh, what exactly are we doing to allow us to effectively gain and maintain control of human populations? Considering that this last part is one of the main reasons for the very existence of land armies, our lack of sophistication on this topic, after 13 yrs of “practice”, is what drives my pessimism.
Perhaps COIN campaigns are won mostly by domestic forces. In fact, I think in order to have a COIN campaign one must be domestic by definition. One cannot have an insurgency without something to “surge” against. Thus, the notion is a bit of tautology. Consider then the idea that when a foreign Army sets up shop in a foreign land as an occupation, it becomes the domestic force. On May 1, 2003, we became the default domestic power in Iraq, as much as we didn’t want to. We avoided that fate in Afghanistan, but wound up being unwilling (and ignorant/naive/useful-idiot) power brokers in a hot mess of a State. We became the ally to Northern Alliance and then wound up doing the lion’s share of the work…some alliance.
In any case, controlling populations by using land armies is as old as civilization. Perhaps COIN can only be reasonably won by native powers, and foreign powers need time to “go native” if they intervene. But rebellion is only one possible future in controlling a population, and it is one future that is most directly dependent on the domestic power’s relationship with the people. And rebellions are hard and they suck; I don’t recall any historic figure relishing a rebellion, though they might have been itching for a grand campaign against a foreign enemy.
NOTE: There is a vast difference between being a native power and domestic power. The former is a cultural relationship, the latter is a political relationship. It’s complex enough to where I would say that we should abandon the idea of domestic. We became a domestic power in Iraq. The CPA was nothing less than that. It was not a foreign power in the sense of far off influence…it was foreign in terms of understanding. Otherwise it was perfectly accessible to local politics. A colonial government in that sense is domestic, though its patron state may be foreign, as the colonials reside and exist in the same time and space as the people it governs and may well be staffed by the people there. But it’s structure and understanding of law and management may be non-native. This is also our greatest weakness in our “help” to other states. What we introduce to their governance is domestic institutions, but they are not native. Their foreign-ness isn’t tied to the identity of the people sitting behind the Minister’s desk, but in the structure that Minister presides over. But I digress…
For those of you who find our analysis too bleak, here’s a more popular one — an example of the emerging and fun theme of “it’s not our fault; we’re still great!”
“Why Has America Stopped Winning Wars?” by Dominic Tierney (Associate Professor of political science at Swarthmore), in the current issue of The Atlantic. It’s an excerpt from his new book:
For a different perspective on why we cannot learn these lessons about fighting insurgencies (aka a form of 4GW) I recommend reading…
“A Manœuvre Renaissance: Overcoming the attritionist tendency“
By Daniel R. Grazier (Captain, USMC) in the Marine Corps Gazette, June 2015.
For those of you without a subscription to the MCG, here’s an ungated copy (posted with permission).
Captain Grazier (USMC) writes another chapter in America’s post-9/11 diary explaining why we lose at modern warfare despite the training, size, and fantastic tech of our forces. It’s another article by a Marine officer explaining our military’s internal struggle to overcome its attritionist tendency (i.e., fighting 21st wars with WWI methods). He explains the complexities of our wars (debunking the “kill until we win” mindlessness that often dominates discussions of our wars).
We should listen when he says that learning faster and better is the key to future success.
For another ground-level perspective on this see problem The Attritionist Letters in the Marine Corps Gazette.
Martin van Creveld requested an improved version of this essay to post at his website. Here it is:
“Why we lose so many wars, and how we can win.”
It covers several of the issues raised in these comments.
Here is Move Forward responding to the 1975 article I provided at another thread:
“The allure of SF and airpower is the deception that it costs less in blood and treasure. Yet, little current or past evidence exists that it alone makes our world a safer and more stable place. We think we are safe because threats are far away and only a few are fighting/advising. Yet Pearl Harbor, Task Force Smith, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and 9/11 illustrate that while we may not be interested in war, war is interested in us.”
With the exception of Pearl Harbor and WWII (not a “limited war”), I think that Move Forward has this pretty much right here. I would, however, state the case somewhat differently as follows:
The key to understanding why a great power, such as the United States, might move to pursue its “limited war” aims, more via the use of its special operations and air forces, is because such a move allows that the great power might, via this approach, retain its public’s support, over the long haul, for these “nice to have” — rather than existential — problems and projects.
Herein to suggest that the reason why great powers may lose small wars is simply because:
a. To the great powers, these are, in fact and as stated, “small” (read “inconsequential”?) wars.
b. Whereas, to the native combatants — fighting within and outside of these states and societies — these are anything but small and inconsequential wars.
This “higher stakes”/”Apples v. Oranges” argument stated another way; in this case, using Move Forward’s good words:
a. While we may be fighting “to make the world a safer and more stable place.” (Apples.)
b. They, on the other hand, may be fighting for their highest beliefs and convictions, for their very existence and/or for the existence of their group and their preferred way of life. (Oranges.)
Re: the Algerian conflict, and as an additional illustration of this “higher stakes” argument, a Algerian rebel, I believe, once summed it up this way:
“France is fighting in Algiers for the price of tomatoes. We, however, are fighting for higher principles.”
Bill,
As I said before, imo you are one of the few creative thinkers writing about these things! Here are my guesses (emphasis on guess) as to the likely outcomes, with links to posts giving details:
(1) “think special operations and air forces), for a longer/indefinite period of time.”
Fighting fire by pouring gasoline on it. The resulting pushback from this is probably almost stronger than the force we apply. Odds of success: near zero. I and others have written a lot about this. Martin van Creveld published this of mine on his website: Killing insurgents drives the Darwinian ratchet & making them more effective.
(2) “CIA “bagmen,” state department dudes/dudetes, members of our business community, investors, development specialists, AID folks”
I agree, this is the way to go. For example, CIA bagman are perhaps the most effective weapon the CIA has ever wielded, used to great effect in post-WWII western Europe and after 9/11: Who overthrew the Taliban: Special Forces’ guns or CIA’s cash?
(3) “working with or without the aid of our special operations and air forces”
Only without. They’re 2 incompatible paths.
(4) “This approach, might we say, is also likely to avoid the label — and stigma — of “colonization?”
No need to guess. China is employing this strategy in Asia and Africa with great success: How China builds its commercial empire.
@ Fabius:
A CIA guy think the CIA is key? Kidding. Schroen seems ok. Why can’t it be multifactorial? And CIA throwing cash sometimes works, sometimes doesn’t. Let’s see, we worked with anti-Taliban forces, paid cash, provided air power, and parts of the Taliban leadership were retracted, almost a kind of strategic depth retraction (?) Operation Evil Airlift is interesting not only for the claims but the very nature of relationships in the region and how they played out.
I don’t disagree but I don’t think one factor can explain everything.
You make great points, our being there creates the worst problems for us but the world is complicated. What I miss in Creveld’s work is an embedding of the 4GW phenomenon within global, regional and local frameworks that contribute to violence and disorder. Unless I’ve missed that part b/c my main exposure is through your site.